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People v. Tolliver

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division
Mar 19, 2008
No. B194480 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HENRY CLARK TOLLIVER, Defendant and Appellant. B194480 California Court of Appeal, Second District, Fifth Division March 19, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. MA029178, Thomas R. White and Carol C. Koppel, Judges, (retired Judge of the Municipal Ct., assigned by Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, §6 of the Cal. Const.).

Zachary D. Wechsler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Nancy G. James, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

TURNER, P. J.

Defendant, Henry Clark Tolliver, appeals from his convictions for possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359) and sale of marijuana. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a).) Defendant admitted that he was previously convicted of a serious felony. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by prejudicially denying his motion to compel disclosure of peace officer personnel records and there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for selling marijuana. The Attorney General argues the trial court should have imposed: penalty assessments pursuant to section 1464, subdivision (a) and Government Code section 76000, subdivision (a); an additional court security fee; a state surcharge; and a state court construction penalty. We affirm with modifications.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 690; Taylor v. Stainer (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 907, 908-909.) Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Detective Dennis Duarte worked with a task force formed to recognize and suppress street-level narcotics since 2001. In that capacity and prior thereto, Detective Duarte had arrested hundreds of persons in possession of narcotics for both personal use and with the intent to sell. On May 24, 2004, Detective Duarte was in an unmarked police car. At the intersection of 30th Street East and Avenue S, Detective Duarte saw three young men. One of the men was using a pay phone, while the other two sat in a nearby Toyota pickup truck. The man on the telephone ran back to the truck, which immediately drove away. Detective Duarte followed the truck to determine whether the man might be using the phone to order narcotics. The truck drove to another pay phone, at which time a different male jumped out and used the phone. The truck then drove away again. Detective Duarte contacted Detective Steve Anderson, who was also driving around in an unmarked car. Detective Duarte followed the truck to a residential area. The three men remained inside the parked truck.

Detective Duarte saw a white Yukon truck park directly in front of the Toyota. Detective Duarte made note of the license plate on the Yukon. The front passenger in the Toyota got out and walked to the Yukon. The Toyota passenger handed what appeared to be United States currency to defendant, who was the front passenger of the Yukon, through an open window. Defendant then handed an unknown object to the individual. Based upon his experience, Detective Duarte believed a narcotics transaction had taken place. Detective Duarte had seen this type of activity before, which included use of pay phones, parking in residential areas, and remaining in an automobile followed by the arrival of another car. Thereafter, Detective Duarte notified Detective Anderson as well as other team members in the area of what occurred. The deputies began to follow the Yukon because of the suspected narcotics transactions. The Yukon was subsequently stopped for purposes of identifying those individuals inside. Defendant was the right front passenger. Defendant’s driver’s license revealed that he lived directly across the street from where the transaction occurred on Desert Oak Avenue.

On June 1, 2004, Detective Duarte watched defendant’s residence at 2647 Desert Oak Avenue. Defendant and an unknown Black man got into the Yukon. Defendant was again the right front passenger. Detective Duarte followed the Yukon as it was driven away to a residence at 3041 Via Promero. Both defendant and the Black man went inside the home. They later returned to the Desert Oak address. Thereafter, Detective Duarte saw three separate incidents where an individual arrived either by car or on foot and went into defendant’s residence for a short period of time before leaving. This led Detective Duarte to believe that there were signs of “high traffic” typical of narcotics sales. Later the same afternoon, defendant again left as the passenger in the Yukon. Detective Duarte followed the truck. The Yukon was driven to an apartment complex. Defendant walked to an apartment and had a “brief contact” with a woman. Defendant then returned to the driveway. Thereafter, defendant “contacted” a woman in a black car. A “hand-to-hand transaction” took place between defendant and the driver of the car.

On June 7, 2004, Detective Duarte again watched the Desert Oak address. While observing the residence, Detective Duarte saw the Yukon drive to the address. Defendant was again the right front passenger. Two other Black men were also inside. All three men went inside defendant’s residence. Later that day, Detective Duarte followed the Yukon to another residence. While defendant remained inside the truck, another Black man went into the residence briefly. When the Black man returned to the Yukon, it was driven to the Via Promero address previously visited. Defendant was dropped off. Detective Anderson saw defendant walk down the street and into a nearby house. A few minutes later, defendant exited the house and walked down the street. Defendant spoke with the right front passenger of a blue Dodge pickup truck that had parked at the curb. Defendant handed an object to the passenger and retrieved another object from that individual. Detective Anderson had seen thousands of such transactions in the past. Defendant then walked away.

Based on the observations of the task force team members, search warrants were obtained for the 2647 Desert Oak and 3041Via Promero addresses as well as the Yukon. On June 15, 2004, the search warrant was served on defendant’s Desert Oak residence. Although defendant was not present, his four children were inside the home. A search of the residence uncovered a large zip lock baggie containing 81 grams of marijuana as well as an American Express bill addressed to defendant at that address.

While that search was conducted, Detective Anderson continued to watch the Via Promero address where the Yukon was parked. Detective Anderson saw defendant and Robert Butler get into the Yukon. Defendant got into the passenger seat. The Yukon then drove away. Detective Anderson requested that deputies in a marked Sherriff’s car stop the Yukon. The Yukon was stopped a short distance away. The Yukon and its passengers were then returned to the Via Promero address. A search of the Yukon revealed a glove in the front console area which contained seven baggies of marijuana. The net weight of the marijuana contained in the baggies was 9.12 grams. Based upon the fact that the marijuana was packaged in baggies of similar quantity, Detective Anderson believed that it was packaged for sale. It was common, in Detective Anderson’s experience, for marijuana dealers to drive around with smaller amounts of the drugs in case they are either stopped by police or “ripped off” by other drug traffickers or buyers. A small amount of marijuana was found in the Via Promero residence.

Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights and agreed to talk without an attorney being present. Detective Duarte told defendant about the marijuana in a closet at the Desert Oak address. Defendant said it consisted of five to six ounces for his own personal use. Detective Duarte examined the marijuana recovered from defendant’s home and from the Yukon. Both appeared to be of a unique variety grown indoors.

Detective Duarte believed that the marijuana found in defendant’s home was possessed with the intent to sell. The value of the marijuana could be $1,500 to $2,400 depending on how it was broken down and sold. The marijuana appeared to be grown indoors. The marijuana in defendant’s residence was thus of a higher quality and could be sold for more than that grown outdoors.

First, defendant argues the motion to compel an in camera review of Detective Duarte’s peace officer personnel records should have been granted. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b); Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1018-1019; People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1232; Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535-540.) Our Supreme Court has explained that the declaration accompanying the motion must set forth a specific factual scenario of impropriety: “[Evidence Code] section 1043 . . ., subdivision (a) requires a written motion and notice to the governmental agency which has custody of the records sought, and subdivision (b) provides that such motion shall include, inter alia, ‘(2) A description of the type of records or information sought; and [¶] (3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that such governmental agency identified has such records or information from such records.’” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81-83; see also Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1038; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 9; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1148-1149.) In Warrick, the Supreme Court further held that the moving party must show a “plausible scenario of officer misconduct” and “how the information sought could lead to or be evidence potentially admissible” at trial. (Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1026; see Hurd v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1111-1112; People v. Collins (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 137, 151.) An officer’s personnel records are not relevant to any issue without such a showing. (People v. Collins, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 151; California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1020.) We review the trial court’s ruling denying a disclosure request for an abuse of discretion. (Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535; see also Alford v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1039; People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 684.)

In this case, defendant filed a motion prior to trial seeking disclosure of the personnel records of Detective Duarte. In the notice of motion, defendant alleged: “[T]he defendant will move for an order directing each of you to make available the materials herein described to defendant’s attorney for examination, copying, and hearing: [¶] 1. The name, addresses, and telephone numbers of all persons who filed complaints with, or who were interviewed by investigators or other personnel from the Los Angeles County Sherrif’s Department, (hereafter ‘Investigating Department’) against Officer DENNIS DUARTE #23348 relating to acts of dishonesty and fabrication of evidence (hereafter ‘dishonesty’) as well as the dates of the filing of such complaints. [¶] 2. Verbatim copies of all statements, written or oral, made by persons filing complaints or interviewed during investigations of such complaints. [¶] 3. Copies of all investigative reports prepared by members of the Investigating Department of such complaints. [¶] 4. All records or statements, reputations, or opinions, including findings, letters, formal reports, and oral conversations, made by psychiatrists, psychologists, superior officers, and fellow officers of the above-named officer pertaining to acts of excessive force. [¶] 5. All findings, reports, opinions, and transcripts of disciplinary actions or proceedings commenced or taken regarding the above-named officer by the Investigating Department relating to the officer’s acts of dishonesty.”

In his declaration in support of the motion, defense counsel, Roberto F. Dager, stated: “People arrested or detained, and attorneys, friends, or relatives of those people, make complaints to the investigating department concerning its law enforcement officers, alleging that said police officers committed unnecessary acts dishonesty and fabricate evidence and statements at the time of arresting or detaining those people. [¶] The Investigating Department makes and keeps written records of complaints which are made by citizens, and such records are kept in the personnel record files or other files maintained by the department. [¶] . . . [¶] The above-mentioned deputy undertook a course of conduct to ensure that unjustified criminal charges would be filed against the defendant by falsifying his police report, in respect to statements attributed to the defendant. Said deputy asserts that the defendant admitted that the contraband obtained from a home was his. The statement was never made by the defendant.” In response, John M. Bowers, the attorney on behalf of the sheriff’s department, argued Mr. Dager’s declaration was insufficient in that it failed to establish good cause and materiality for the production of the requested documents. In addition, Mr. Bowers argued, “In the absence of a ‘specific factual scenario’ from which the court could justify the defendant’s discovery requests, there is no justification for disclosing confidential materials from the personnel files of Detective DUARTE.”

At the hearing on the motion, Judge Thomas R. White noted: “As both sides well know, the cases are the same cases that most courts rely upon in making the determination. They’re specifically set forth in both parties’ submissions, so I don’t feel I have to cover that territory, other than make general reference to the fact that we need specific facts set forth that would show good cause for the court to go further on materiality. [¶] Regarding the discovery, there has to be a specific factual scenario set forth. City of Santa Cruz, City of San Jose, Memro[]; those are the cases sited and generally are the ones followed required that a specific factual scenario be set forth which establishes a plausible factual foundation for allegations of officer misconduct. [¶] Here there are some general allegations but also the cases require that they not be just conclusory statements or denials by the defendant, that there be a specific statement of reason for the court to be able to find good cause. [¶] I don’t find that that has been established and, therefore, the Pitchess motion is denied, no good cause being found.” (Italics added.)

Defendant argues Judge White “raised the bar establishing ‘good cause’” by requiring specific facts be set forth rather than an explicit factual scenario. However, as set forth above, Judge White referred thereafter to defendant’s failure to establish a “specific factual scenario.” Judge White did not “elevate” defendant’s burden beyond what the law requires.

Moreover, even if Judge White misstated the legal requirement, defendant’s motion and Mr. Dager’s declaration failed to set forth a specific factual scenario that would permit the production of any part of Detective Duarte’s personnel records. Defendant merely denied he said the marijuana at his home was a small amount for his personal use. Defendant’s motion attached only the front page of the arrest report in question, where no such reference was made. As our Supreme Court reiterated in Garcia v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 71: “We discussed what constitutes a good cause showing of materiality in Warrick v. Superior Court[, supra, ] 35 Cal.4th 1101. The supporting affidavit ‘must propose a defense or defenses to the pending charges.’ (Id. at p. 1024.) To show the requested information is material, a defendant is required to ‘establish not only a logical link between the defense proposed and the pending charge, but also to articulate how the discovery being sought would support such a defense or how it would impeach the officer’s version of events.’ (Id. at p. 1021.) . . . [¶] Counsel’s affidavit must also describe a factual scenario that would support a defense claim of officer misconduct. ([People v.] Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1025.) . . . ‘In other cases, the trial court hearing a Pitchess motion will have before it defense counsel’s affidavit, and in addition a police report, witness statements, or other pertinent documents. The court then determines whether defendant’s averments, “[v]iewed in conjunction with the police reports” and any other documents, suffice to “establish a plausible factual foundation” for the alleged officer misconduct and to “articulate a valid theory as to how the information sought might be admissible” at trial.’ (Id. at p. 1025.)” (Garcia v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 71.) Here, Mr. Dager’s declaration did not set forth the defense he intended to pursue. Mr. Dager did anticipate cross-examining and impeaching Detective Duarte with the discovered evidence. Mr. Dager did not provide the complete police report which contained the questioned statements made by defendant. Judge White did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to compel disclosure of peace officers personnel records.

Second, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction in count 2 for selling or furnishing marijuana. Defendant further argues, “[T]he only evidence sufficient to support [his] conviction for possessing marijuana took place on June 15, 2004, three weeks after [he] was first surveilled, when marijuana was found in a home [he]frequented and less than one ounce of marijuana was found in his friend’s GMC Yukon.” In reviewing a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the following standard of review: “[We] consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432, fn. omitted; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 631; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) Our sole function is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 319; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1129; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34; People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303; Taylor v. Stainer, supra, 31 F.3d at pp. 908-909.) The standard of review is the same in cases where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208; People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932.) The California Supreme Court has held, “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’” (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331, quoting People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)

Health and Safety Code section 11360, subdivision (a) provides: “Except as otherwise provided by this section or as authorized by law, every person who transports, imports into this state, sells, furnishes, administers, or gives away, or offers to transport, import into this state, sell, furnish, administer, or give away, or attempts to import into this state or transport any marijuana shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a period of two, three, or four years.” Defendant argues that the detectives’ observations and conclusions following their observations on May 24 and June 1 and 7, 2004, are insufficient to support the inference that he either possessed or sold marijuana. We disagree.

Both Detectives Duarte and Anderson had observed thousands of drug sales and arrested hundreds of persons in possession of narcotics for both personal use and with the intent to sell. Their observations over a period of weeks coupled with the recovery of marijuana from both defendant’s home and the Yukon truck in which he was a passenger provided substantial circumstantial evidence of marijuana sales. On May 24, 2004, Detective Duarte observed suspicious activity by three individuals using a pay phone. After driving quickly away, their truck stopped at another pay phone where one occupant got out and again used the telephone. The man got back in the truck, which quickly drove away. The individuals stopped at a location where a Yukon truck arrived and parked in front of them. Detective Duarte observed defendant in the right front passenger seat of the Yukon. One of the truck occupants approached the Yukon and exchanged what appeared to be currency for another object with defendant. Similarly, on June 1, 2004, Detective Duarte surveilled defendant’s Desert Oak Avenue residence. Defendant and an unknown Black man got into the Yukon. Defendant was again the right front passenger. Detective Duarte followed the Yukon as it was driven away to another residence, where both defendant and a companion went inside. They later returned to the Desert Oak address. Thereafter, Detective Duarte saw three separate incidents where an individual arrived either by car or on foot and walked into defendant’s residence for a short period of time before leaving. Detective Duarte believed this conduct was typical of narcotics trafficking. Later, the same afternoon, defendant again left his residence as the passenger in the Yukon. Detective Duarte followed the truck. The Yukon was driven to an apartment complex, where defendant spoke to a female driver of a black car. A hand-to-hand transaction took place between defendant and the woman.

On June 7, 2004, Detective Duarte again watched defendant’s residence. While watching, Detective Duarte saw the Yukon drive up to defendant’s home. Defendant was again the right front passenger. Two other Black men were also inside. All three men went inside the residence. Later that day, Detective Duarte followed the Yukon to a residence. While defendant remained inside the truck, another Black man went into the residence briefly. When defendant returned to the Yukon, the driver drove away. Defendant was then dropped off. Detective Anderson saw defendant walk down the street and go inside a nearby house. A few minutes later, defendant came out of the house and walked down the street. Defendant handed an object to the passenger of a pickup truck stopped there and retrieved another object from that individual. Defendant then walked away. When defendant’s home was searched pursuant to a search warrant, the substantial quantity of marijuana seized was of a particularly unusual variety. The same variety of home-grown marijuana was found in the Yukon packaged in several small baggies typical of those found for sale. The California Supreme Court has held: “An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 396; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 11.) The jurors in this case could reasonably make “‘A finding of fact [based upon] an inference drawn from evidence . . . .’” (People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 891, quoting People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21 disapproved on another point in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543, fn. 5; People v. Tripp (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 951, 959.) Considering the evidence in its entirety, we conclude that substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction for sale of marijuana.

Third, following our request for further briefing, the Attorney General argues that an additional court security fee, a state surcharge, and a state court construction penalty should have been imposed. The Attorney General argues a section 1465.8, subdivision (a) court security fee should have been imposed as to each count. (See People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753-759; People v. Schoeb (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 861, 865-866.) At sentencing, only one court security fee was imposed. Two such fees should have been imposed. However, in light of the section 654, subdivision (a) stay, the count 1 section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) fee must also be stayed. The trial court also imposed a $50 laboratory fee. However, a $50 penalty assessment pursuant to Penal Code section 1464, subdivision (a) and a $35 Government Code section 76000, subdivision (a) penalty assessment should also have been imposed on the laboratory fee. (People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151, 1153; People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1519.) In addition, a $10 state surcharge pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.7, subdivision (a) should have been imposed on the $50 Health and Safety Code section 11372.5, subdivision (a) laboratory fee. (People v. McCoy (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1257; People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 454, 456-457.) Further, defendant must pay a $15 state court construction penalty pursuant to Government Code section 70372, subdivision (a) on the drug laboratory fee. (People v. McCoy, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1254-1257; People v. Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 458-459.) The judge who imposed the judgment, the Honorable Carol C. Koppel, is to personally insure the abstract of judgment is corrected to fully comport with the modifications we have ordered. (People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 110, fn. 2; People v. Chan (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 408, 425-426.)

Penal Code section 1464, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part, “[T]here shall be levied a state penalty, in an amount equal to ten dollars ($10) for every ten dollars ($10) or fraction thereof, upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for criminal offenses, including all offenses . . . .”

Government Code section 76000, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part, “In each county there shall be levied an additional penalty of seven dollars ($7) for every ten dollars ($10) or fraction thereof which shall be collected together with and in the same manner as the amounts established by Section 1464 of the Penal Code, upon every fine, penalty, of forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for criminal offenses, including all offenses involving a violation of the Vehicle Code . . . .”

Penal Code Section 1465.7, subdivision (a) provides, “A state surcharge of 20 percent shall be levied on the base fine used to calculate the state penalty assessment as specified in subdivision (a) of Section 1464.”

The judgment is modified to impose: a $50 penalty assessment pursuant to Penal Code section 1464, subdivision (a); a $35 penalty assessment pursuant to Government Code section 76000, subdivision (a); a $10 state surcharge pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.7, subdivision (a); and a $15 state court construction penalty pursuant to Government Code section 70372, subdivision (a). In addition, a $20 court security fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), is imposed and stayed as to count 1. Upon issuance of the remittitur, the superior court clerk shall forward an amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

We concur: MOSK, J., KRIEGLER, J.


Summaries of

People v. Tolliver

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division
Mar 19, 2008
No. B194480 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Tolliver

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HENRY CLARK TOLLIVER, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division

Date published: Mar 19, 2008

Citations

No. B194480 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2008)