Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. PA049273, Shari K. Silver, Judge.
Michael Jerome Thompson, in pro. per.; and Jonathan P. Milberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PERLUSS, P. J.
Michael Jerome Thompson and two confederates decided to rob Quincy Guidry, a cocaine dealer, to obtain bail money for an incarcerated friend, believing Guidry had facilitated the friend’s arrest. When Guidry resisted, he was shot and killed.
Thompson was charged by information with murder (count 1), conspiracy to commit robbery (count 2), attempted robbery with a special allegation a principal was armed with a firearm (count 5) and possession of a firearm by a felon (count 4). The information further alleged as to counts 1, 2, 4 and 5 that Thompson had suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law and had served two separate prison terms for a felony.
In a negotiated plea Thompson pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon and voluntary manslaughter (amended count 6), admitted one principal-armed-with-a-firearm and one prior prison term enhancement and, as to voluntary manslaughter only, admitted the prior strike enhancement. In accordance with the plea agreement, Thompson was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of 24 years eight months, consisting of the upper term of 11 years for voluntary manslaughter, doubled under the Three Strikes law, plus one year for the firearm enhancement, plus a consecutive term of eight months (one-third the middle term of two years) for possession of a firearm by a felon, plus one year for the prior prison term enhancement. The remaining charges and special allegations were dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
The abstract of judgment incorrectly shows Thompson admitted both prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and fails to show Thompson admitted one principal-armed-with-a-firearm enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)). We order the correction of this clerical error. (See People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471; People v. Hong (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1075-1081 [reporter’s transcript controls].)
Thompson timely filed a notice of appeal, but failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause. We appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.
On May 31, 2007 we directed counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause. On July 27, 2007, after conferring with Thompson, counsel requested we construe the notice of appeal to include non-certificate issues. On August 16, 2007 we granted the request and ordered that the appeal may proceed, limited to grounds that arose after entry of the plea and do not affect the plea’s validity.
After examination of the record, counsel filed an “Opening Brief” in which no issues were raised. On September 13, 2007 we advised Thompson he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. After being granted a 30-day extension, on October 26, 2007 Thompson filed a hand-printed supplemental brief in which he argued imposition of the upper term for voluntary manslaughter violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment in light of Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. __ [127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856]; Thompson asserted the middle term (six years) should have been imposed instead.
Thompson is precluded from challenging his sentence because it was a negotiated component of his plea agreement: “The rule that defendants may challenge an unauthorized sentence on appeal even if they failed to object below is itself subject to an exception: Where the defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, appellate courts will not find error even though the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in reaching that figure, so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction. The rationale behind this policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better the bargain through the appellate process.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.)
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied Thompson’s attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
The abstract of judgment is ordered modified to reflect Thompson’s admission of only one prior prison term enhancement under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), as well as his admission of one principal armed with a firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court shall forward a copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur: WOODS, J. ZELON, J.