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People v. Tejeda

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Apr 20, 2018
H044442 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2018)

Opinion

H044442

04-20-2018

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MOISES AARON TEJEDA, Defendant and Appellant.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. Nos. C1515944, C1515686)

Defendant Moises Aaron Tejeda pleaded no contest to second degree murder with a firearm enhancement and to shooting at an occupied vehicle in exchange for a total prison term of 43 years to life and the dismissal of other charges against him. He was 22 and 23 years old at the time of his crimes. On appeal, he requests a limited remand for the purpose of making a record of factors relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. The Attorney General concedes that remand is appropriate to allow the trial court to assess whether defendant has been given the opportunity to make the necessary record. Accepting that concession, we shall reverse and remand with directions to the superior court to determine whether defendant was afforded an adequate opportunity to make a record of information that will be relevant to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in a future parole eligibility hearing, and, if not, to allow defendant and the People an adequate opportunity to make such a record.

I. BACKGROUND

By information filed on December 23, 2015, the Santa Clara County District Attorney charged defendant and two co-defendants in case No. C1515944 with attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187); shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246); and participating in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a).) The information alleged that defendant committed the attempted murder and the shooting of an occupied motor vehicle for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4).) In connection with the attempted murder, the information also alleged that a co-defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (c)) and that defendant was a principal in the commission of the attempted murder (§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (e)(1)). It was alleged that the charged crimes were committed on or about April 23, 2015.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. --------

In case No. C1515686, the Santa Clara County District Attorney charged defendant on March 24, 2016 with murder (§ 187); two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187); carrying a concealed weapon with a prior weapons violation (§ 25400, subd. (a)(2)); and carrying a loaded firearm on his person or vehicle with a prior weapons violation (§ 25850, subd. (a)). The information alleged that each charged crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5)) and that defendant personally discharged a firearm in the commission of the the murder and attempted murders (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)). It was alleged that the charged crimes were committed on or about July 13, 2015.

Defendant was born on June 25, 1992. Therefore, he was 22 years old on April 23, 2015, when the crimes charged in case No. C1515944 were alleged to have occurred, and 23 years old on July 13, 2015, when the crimes charged in case No. C1515686 were alleged to have occurred. On August 3, 2016, defendant entered into a plea agreement to resolve both cases. In case No. C1515944, he pleaded no contest to shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246). In case No. C1515686, he pleaded no contest to second degree murder (§ 187) and admitted intentionally discharging a firearm in violation of section 12022.53, subdivision (d).

At a January 27, 2017 sentencing hearing, the trial court denied defendant's request to continue sentencing to allow defense counsel time to evaluate defendant for factors relevant to a future youthful offender parole hearing. In case No. C1515686, the court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life for the second degree murder plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement for a total term of 40 years to life. In case No. C1515944, the court sentenced defendant to the lower term of three years for shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. The court ordered that defendant serve the terms consecutively. The court dismissed the remaining counts and allegations. Defendant timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

Section 3051, which became effective January 1, 2014, was enacted to bring juvenile sentencing into conformity with the limitations imposed by the Eighth Amendment. (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 268, 277 (Franklin).) As originally enacted, it provided that "[a] person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed before the person had attained 18 years of age and for which the sentence is a life term of 25 years to life shall be eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year of incarceration at a youth offender parole hearing, unless previously released or entitled to an earlier parole consideration hearing pursuant to other statutory provisions." (§ 3051, subd. (b)(3).) "Controlling offense" is defined as "the offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment." (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).) Effective January 1, 2016, section 3051 was amended to apply to offenders sentenced to state prison for crimes committed when they were under 23 years of age. (Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1, p. 4175.) That version of section 3051 was in effect at the time of defendant's January 2017 sentencing. Because he committed the "controlling offense"—the firearm enhancement for which he was sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life—at age 23, it had no application to him.

The statute has been amended again and, as of January 1, 2018, it applies to those who committed crimes when they were 25 years of age or younger. (Stats. 2017, ch. 675, § 1, p. 5023.) Our Supreme Court has held that section 3051 applies retrospectively to all eligible youth offenders regardless of the date of conviction. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 278.) Accordingly, the current version of section 3051 makes defendant eligible for a youth offender parole hearing during the 25th year of incarceration. (Id. at p. 277.)

In Franklin, the court remanded "the matter to the trial court for a determination of whether Franklin was afforded sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing." (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) The court stated that "[i]f the trial court determines that Franklin did not have sufficient opportunity, then the court may receive submissions and, if appropriate, testimony pursuant to procedures set forth in section 1204 and rule 4.437 of the California Rules of Court, and subject to the rules of evidence. Franklin may place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender's culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors. The goal of any such proceeding is to provide an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender's characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation to 'give great weight to' youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether the offender is 'fit to rejoin society' despite having committed a serious crime 'while he was a child in the eyes of the law.' " (Ibid.)

Defendant requests remand for a similar determination and opportunity. The Attorney General agrees that remand for that purpose is appropriate, as do we.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to determine whether defendant was afforded an adequate opportunity to make a record of information that will be relevant to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in a future parole eligibility hearing held pursuant to section 3051, and, if not, to allow defendant and the People an adequate opportunity to make such a record.

/s/_________

ELIA, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
GREENWOOD, P. J. /s/_________
MIHARA, J.


Summaries of

People v. Tejeda

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Apr 20, 2018
H044442 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2018)
Case details for

People v. Tejeda

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MOISES AARON TEJEDA, Defendant…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Date published: Apr 20, 2018

Citations

H044442 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2018)