Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 196322
RIVERA, J.
Amy Swan appeals from a judgment of conviction upon a jury verdict finding her guilty of failure to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)) and failure to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in property damage (§ 20002, subd. (a)). She contends that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction of failure to stop at the scene of an injury accident. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
I. FACTS
At approximately 8:45 a.m. on May 14, 2005, Frank Castanheira was driving home and exited from Highway 101 south at the Cesar Chavez Street exit. As he exited onto Cesar Chavez, he saw a gray Volvo that was at a complete stop in his lane up ahead. The Volvo was stopped although there was no signal light or any traffic impeding its movement. After stopping and waiting a couple of seconds and noticing that a large truck was coming off the freeway behind him, Castanheira honked his car horn. The Volvo drove about 10 feet then stopped again, slamming the car’s brakes. Castanheira stopped his car but had to slam the car’s brakes in order to do so. The Volvo then drove forward another 10 feet. Castanheira did not follow because the Volvo had previously stopped so suddenly. The Volvo then drove in reverse at approximately five to ten miles an hour, backing into Castanheira’s Toyota Corolla and damaging the front end of the Toyota. The Volvo drove forward and backed into the Toyota again, pushing the Toyota back about five to eight feet. After the second impact, Castanheira followed the Volvo, drove to the left of it and attempted to signal defendant, the driver, to pull over.
Patrick Uniacke was driving in the left lane of Cesar Chavez Street, and as he proceeded westbound, he saw the Volvo back into the Toyota. When he came to a stop at Bryant Street, the two cars involved in the incident pulled alongside him, with the Volvo in the lane next to him. As the light turned green, the Volvo hit both the Toyota and Uriacke’s truck’s front bumper as it proceeded into the intersection. As they approached a red light at the intersection of Folsom and Cesar Chavez Streets, Castanheira pulled his car in front and perpendicular to defendant’s car. He was angry and agitated and yelled at defendant to get out of the car. When she did not, defendant got out of his car, and standing in front of the Volvo, said, “please get out of your car and wait for the police to sort this whole mess out.” When the light turned green, defendant drove into Castanheira, causing him to fall onto the hood of the Volvo. Castanheira had no time to jump out of the way. Castanheira landed on the hood of the Volvo and held onto the car’s windshield wipers. Defendant kept driving and struck Castanheira’s car, causing him to fly off the hood of the car and onto the pavement.
Castanheira got back into his car and followed defendant. The Volvo came to a stop at Mission Street, and again Castanheira pulled his car in front of the Volvo to stop it from moving. A cement truck and other cars blocked the Volvo to prevent it from driving away. The police arrived within a few minutes. Defendant initially refused to get out of the car. Castanheira was taken by ambulance to the hospital where he received morphine for pain and was treated for his injuries prior to being released at approximately 5:30 p.m. that day. The doctors recommended that he wear a neck brace and a sling for his left arm.
In defense, Faidrian Seymour testified that she was walking on Cesar Chavez near Folsom Street when she heard a noise. She saw a man get out of his car and jump on top of another car. He was ranting and raving.
Swan testified that on the day of the incident, she took the Cesar Chavez exit and as she slowed on the off-ramp, Castanheira began to honk his car’s horn several times. She proceeded to drive forward but Castanheira started to honk his horn again. He then hit the rear of her car. She reacted by putting her car in reverse and hitting his car. She proceeded to drive forward because she did not think it would be safe to get out of her car. She acknowledged that at some point, she hit Uriacke’s truck and Castanheira’s car. At Folsom Street, Castanheira got out of his car and was yelling at her. When he moved to the side of her car, she drove forward. She was not trying to hit him and believed he was no longer in front of her car. Castanheira then turned around and pounced onto the hood of her car. She drove around his car and proceeded to Mission Street. She called 911 and reported that someone hit her car and was stalking her and that he was causing a scene, “trying to make people think that I’m stalking him . . . .”
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for failing to stop at the scene of an injury accident. She argues that there was no evidence that an injury had occurred.
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, we must review “ ‘the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment’ and decide ‘whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 272, quoting People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
Section 20001 requires that the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to another must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and fulfill the requirements of sections 20003 and 20004. Section 20003, subdivision (a) mandates that “[t]he driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall also give his or her name, current residence address . . . the registration number of the vehicle he or she is driving, and the name and current residence address of the owner to the person struck . . . and shall give the information to any traffic or police officer at the scene of the accident. The driver also shall render to any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance . . . .” “In order to be convicted of felony hit-and-run, the driver must have at least constructive knowledge that he was involved in an accident. [Citations.] Also, failure to perform any one of the acts required by section 20001, including the driver giving his name to the victim, constitutes the offense.” (People v. Bautista (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)
Here, the evidence showed that defendant failed to stop after she hit Castanheira, causing him to fall to the pavement. Instead, she proceeded to drive to Mission Street and did not stop until she was prevented from doing so by other vehicles. Thus, she not only failed to give the required statutory information to Castanheira, but she also failed to render any assistance to him when a reasonable person would have assumed that the accident resulted in injury. (People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 180.) The evidence, thus, overwhelmingly supports the jury’s finding that defendant committed felony hit and run.
Defendant nonetheless argues that since Castanheira was able to get up off the pavement and into his car, she could not have known that defendant was injured. The evidence, however, belies this argument.
Several witnesses saw defendant’s Volvo hit Castanheira and his resulting fall to the pavement. The evidence further demonstrated that Castanhiera spent the day in the hospital and that his injuries required a neck brace and a sling for his arm. On this evidence, defendant had constructive knowledge that she was involved in an injury accident. (People v. Bautista, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 6.)
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Carter (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239 is misplaced. There, following a car accident, both drivers got out of their cars, and while the defendant assisted the other driver in separating the two cars, he left the scene without giving the driver his name or license information. (Id. at p. 240.) The evidence further showed that the defendant asked the driver whether anyone was injured and was told, “No, I don’t think so.” Here, by contrast, defendant did not stop her vehicle, did not inquire whether Castanheira was injured and, in fact, fled from the scene of the injury accident. Given the fact that she drove into Castanheira causing him to land on the front hood of her car and then to fall to the pavement, she should have known that “the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person.” (People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 80, footnote omitted.)
Defendant also argues that in view of the witnesses to the accident, Castanheira would not have gone without aid. This argument is irrelevant, inasmuch as felony hit and run is a general intent crime. (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1019.) Whether Castanheira would have received aid in defendant’s absence is irrelevant to the jury’s finding on defendant’s violation of section 20001.
Further, defendant contends that she was not attempting to avoid liability since she called 911. Again, defendant’s intent is irrelevant as felony hit and run is a general intent crime. Moreover, defendant never provided the information required by section 20003 in her 911 call. To the contrary, she told the dispatch operator that “someone hit me with his car . . . .”
Finally, defendant asserts that she did not stop because she was afraid that Castanheira would assault her. Again, the evidence showed that defendant initiated the accident, hitting Castanheira’s car several times, and that Castanheira got out of his car to tell her that she should let the police deal with the incident. While there is some evidence to support defendant’s theory, the jury disbelieved it and we are bound by their factual determination.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: REARDON, Acting P. J., SEPULVEDA, J.