Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court No. PA059929 of Los Angeles County, Shari Silver Judge.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KLEIN, P. J.
Jerome A. Stone (Stone) appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of guilty to possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and his admissions that he previously had been convicted of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and had served a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Stone to five years in prison. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts have been taken from the transcript of the preliminary hearing.
At approximately 10:20 a.m. on August 31, 2007, Los Angeles Police Officer Trevor Silvera (Silvera) and his partner, Officer Jose Herrera (Herrera), responded to a call directing them to Vallarta Tires on Foothill Boulevard in Sylmar. There, the officers saw a group of people standing in front of the store. As the officers arrived, Stone began to walk “briskly” away from the crowd. As he did so, he looked back in the direction of the officers.
The officers “drove around,” stopped Stone and asked him if he was on parole or probation. Stone replied that he was on parole. Herrera then performed a “parole compliance” search of Stone and found in Stone’s front left pocket a bindle containing a rock-like substance resembling cocaine.
Counsel stipulated that, if the People were to call as a witness Los Angeles Police Department analyst Stephanie Thomas, she would testify that on September 4, 2007, she analyzed .13 grams of off white rock-like solids recovered from Stone and found that they contained cocaine base.
2. Procedural history.
On September 20, 2007, an information was filed charging Stone with one count of possession of cocaine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). It was further alleged that Stone had suffered three prior convictions for which he served prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), and had suffered two prior convictions for serious or violent felonies within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b) to (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) to (d), the Three Strikes law.
At proceedings held on October 1, 2007, the prosecutor offered to allow Stone to enter into a plea bargain. The prosecutor explained the terms of the bargain as follows: “The offer is count 1 and the strike prior and one prison prior for the midterm doubled plus one which is five years state prison. Although this is a Three-Strikes case and the defendant has a record going all the way back to 1971, and since his strike prior he’s been to prison several times [sic]. So I think it unlikely that anyone would strike his strike priors. And I think it’s an exceedingly generous offer.” The trial court then addressed Stone and stated, “The district attorney today is being more generous than normal and she’s willing to strike a strike, have you plead to two years midterm, not high term but two years midterm, times two which is four and then admit only one state prison prior, for a total of five years state prison, of which you would have to serve a minimum 80 percent of that time. [¶] Do you understand that?” Stone replied, “Yes.”
Stone consulted with his counsel and decided to accept the prosecutor’s offer. After waiving his right to a jury or court trial, his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, his right to present a defense and his privilege against self-incrimination, Stone pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a) and admitted previously having been convicted of robbery in case Nos. GA007928 and LA013036. Counsel for Stone joined in the waivers and admissions and stipulated to a factual basis for the plea based on the police report, the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and the pre-plea probation report. The trial court found a factual basis for the plea and that Stone’s waivers were “knowingly, intelligently, expressly and voluntarily made, and that his plea and his admissions [were] made freely and voluntarily with a full understanding of the consequences thereof.”
The trial court sentenced Stone to the middle term of two years in state prison for his conviction of possession of cocaine, then doubled the term to four years pursuant to the Three Strikes law. For the finding Stone served a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), the trial court imposed a consecutive term of one year in prison. In total, the trial court sentenced Stone to five years in prison.
Stone was given presentence custody credit for 48 days, consisting of 32 days actually served and 16 days of good time/work time. The trial court ordered Stone to pay a $1,000 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)), a stayed $1,000 parole revocation restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.45), a $50 laboratory analysis fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.5, subd. (a)), a $50 penalty assessment (Pen. Code, § 1464), a $35 penalty assessment (Gov. Code, § 76000), a $20 court security fee (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and a $20 DNA penalty assessment (Gov. Code, § 76104.7). The trial court dismissed all remaining charges and allegations, then found that Stone is “a severe drug addict” and recommended that he “be housed in Donovan State Prison or any other state prison that has a structured drug counseling program.”
On November 7, 2007, Stone filed a timely notice of appeal and obtained a certificate of probable cause.
This court appointed counsel to represent Stone on appeal on January 29, 2008.
CONTENTIONS
After examination of the record, Stone’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief which raised no issues and requested this court to conduct an independent review of the record.
By notice dated February 15, 2008, the clerk of this court advised Stone to submit within 30 days any contentions, grounds of appeal or arguments he wished this court to consider. In a letter filed February 25, 2008, Stone asserts his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made because, since having been moved from Van Nuys to the downtown jail, he had not received his psychiatric medication. Stone states that “[w]ithout medication [he is] incompetent to deal with reality.”
DISCUSSION
In “Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709] . . . ‘the United States Supreme Court . . . explained that a defendant seeking to plead guilty is denied due process under the federal Constitution unless the plea is voluntary and knowing.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Christian (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 688, 693-694, italics omitted.)
A review of the record in the present case indicates Stone’s plea was “knowingly and [voluntarily] entered of his own free will, unhindered by any medical condition and with adequate representation.” (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 918.) During the plea proceedings, Stone indicated numerous times that he understood the consequences of the guilty plea and the rights he was waiving. More importantly, when Stone failed to understand, he did not hesitate to say so. For example, when the prosecutor indicated that each of the rights she was “going to explain to [Stone] and ask [Stone] to give up appl[ied] both to the crime charged as well as the allegations of the prior convictions[,]” Stone stated, “I can’t understand how some priors going to affect me when they never was brought to my knowledge that my past priors going to come back and haunt me.” Stone’s counsel explained to Stone that the Three Strikes law, under which prior convictions for serious or violent felonies could be used to enhance one’s sentence, was the law of the State of California and Stone, like any other citizen, was expected to know that. When the prosecutor then asked Stone if he understood that “each of the rights that [she was] going to explain to [Stone] and ask [Stone] to give up appl[ied] both to the crime charged as well as the allegations of the prior convictions[,]” Stone stated that he understood. Later in the proceedings, when the prosecutor advised Stone that he had “a right to present a defense and use the subpoena power of the court,” Stone stated, “I don’t know what you’re talking about.” However, after Stone’s counsel explained that he had “the right to use the subpoena power of the court to bring in witnesses that could help . . . defend [him] in this case,” but that “[b]y accepting the plea and sentence offer . . ., [he would] not be using the subpoena power, [he would] not be bringing in witnesses, and [he would] not be contesting the charge[,]” Stone indicated that he understood and waived the right. Finally, when the prosecutor informed Stone that he would be required to pay a $1,000 restitution fine, Stone stated, “For what? A thousand dollars for what?” “I don’t understand why I got to pay a thousand dollars when I just had six years and didn’t have to pay but $200. I don’t understand that.” After the trial court explained to Stone that it followed the rule that “it’s $200 times the number of years that you are sent to state prison[,]” Stone indicated that he wished to go forward with the plea knowing that he would be required to pay the $1,000 fine.
We note that “ ‘a defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system’ is . . . ‘relevant to the question [of] whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights.’ [Citation.] That is so because previous experience in the criminal justice system is relevant to a recidivist’s ‘ “knowledge and sophistication regarding his [legal] rights.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365.) Stone has a lengthy criminal history dating back to 1971. Stone’s probation report lists 35 prior convictions for crimes ranging from misdemeanor “shoplifting” to “aggravated assault” and robbery. Stone is no stranger to the criminal justice system.
APPELLATE REVIEW
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied that Stone’s counsel has complied fully with counsel’s responsibilities. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278-284; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: CROSKEY, J., KITCHING, J.