Opinion
B229092 B235356
01-11-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RANDY THOMAS STANFIELD, Defendant and Appellant. In re RANDY THOMAS STANFIELD, on Habeas Corpus.
Fay Arfa for Petitioner, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA360562)
APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Gail Ruderman Feuer, Judge. Affirmed.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petition denied.
Fay Arfa for Petitioner, Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Idan Ivri, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Randy Thomas Stanfield appeals from his judgment of conviction for robbery with a firearm enhancement (Pen. Code, §§ 211 and 12022.53, subd. (b)), contending he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to seek suppression of evidence on the basis that defendant was unlawfully detained and arrested. Defendant also contends the trial court improperly concluded defendant's consent to search his room was voluntary and improperly denied defendant's motion to suppress his involuntary confession. Defendant also claims his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In a related petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellant reiterates his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment and deny the petition, concluding counsel's assistance was not ineffective, the trial court committed no error, and defendant's punishment is not cruel and unusual.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At 12:20 a.m. on July 26, 2009, Hugo Chavez was working as a parking lot attendant at a lot on North Cahuenga Boulevard in Los Angeles, California. An older, red Chevrolet Camaro entered the lot, and one of its two passengers told Chavez they wanted to park. Chavez directed the car to a vacant parking spot, opened the driver's door, and placed a valet ticket on the windshield. The driver got out of the car, approached Chavez, and brandished a gun, telling Chavez, "Give me all the money." The gun was at the driver's waist, pointed to the ground. Chavez got a good look at the face of the driver, who was about a foot away from him. Chavez was nervous and frightened.
Chavez put all of the money from his pockets on top of the car -- approximately $600 consisting of $5, $10, and $20 bills. The driver grabbed the money and drove away. Chavez walked behind the car and wrote down part of the license plate number. He then called police.
Los Angeles Police Department Officer Mike Gramillo was on patrol at the time of the robbery. He received a radio broadcast describing the Camaro, but was unable to find it, so he drove to the parking lot and spoke to Chavez. Chavez described the driver as wearing a white T-shirt, suspenders, and dark pants. He also described the car, provided a partial license plate number, and described the passengers.
Detective Dave Vinton was assigned to the case and spoke with Chavez several days after the robbery. Chavez described the robber as a tall, thin man, wearing suspenders. He also provided police with a video of the incident.
When Vinton ran a check of the partial license plate provided by Chavez, cross-referenced with information on the make and model of the car, he located a matching vehicle registered to "Randy Knightner" with an address on Kelso Street in Inglewood. Police records showed that a parolee, Ronald Coleman, resided at the same address. Coleman fit the description provided by Chavez. When Vinton showed Chavez a "six-pack" of photographs that included a picture of Coleman, Chavez selected two of the photos as resembling the robber, one of which was Coleman.
Vinton and several other officers went to the Kelso Street apartment to determine if Coleman still resided there. Vinton did not obtain a search or arrest warrant because Coleman was a parolee subject to search and seizure under Penal Code section 3067.
All further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted.
Vinton knocked on the door and it was answered by defendant's mother, Tonia Knightner. Vinton asked whether she knew Coleman, and Tonia answered she had not seen him in more than a year. When asked who else was in the home, Tonia responded that her son (later identified as defendant) and his girlfriend were there. Vinton requested that everyone step outside, and defendant and his girlfriend complied. Vinton and Tonia stayed inside while Vinton explained that he was investigating a robbery. He asked Tonia whether defendant owned a red Camaro. She said "no." She stated that on the night of the robbery, defendant was wearing a purple shirt and suspenders. Vinton then suspected defendant was the robber, because the video of the robbery depicted the robber wearing a purple shirt and suspenders. Vinton requested permission to search the home and Tonia consented.
Vinton then went outside to where defendant was being detained, and asked him where he was on the night of the robbery. He said he was at an IHOP restaurant with his girlfriend. Defendant admitted to registering a red Camaro in his name, but said the car belonged to his neighbor. Vinton did not read defendant any Miranda warnings. When Vinton asked for defendant's consent to search his room, defendant signed a consent to search form. He had been handcuffed by other officers before giving his consent.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
When Vinton searched defendant's room, he found a purple shirt, black slacks, and suspenders in the laundry. When he showed the clothes to Tonia and asked if they were the clothes worn on the night of the robbery, she responded "yes." Vinton confiscated the clothes as evidence.
Vinton spoke to defendant's neighbor, Ronell McTiez, and his mother, Michelle Williams. Ronell confirmed that the red Camaro belonged to him but that defendant had registered it in his name.
Defendant was taken to the police station, and Vinton read him the Miranda warnings. Defendant agreed to discuss the robbery, and admitted he had done it. He claimed to have used a revolver, and taken $290. Defendant's fingerprints were found in the Camaro (which had been impounded sometime between the robbery and defendant's arrest by the Inglewood police when McTiez was caught driving without a license). Coleman's were not. Chavez could not identify defendant in a photo "six-pack."
Defendant's last name on his driver's license and birth certificate was Stanfield, although he had informally used his mother's maiden name, Knightner, all his life.
Defendant's mother testified that at 5:30 a.m. on July 31, 2009, five officers knocked on her door with their guns drawn, and when she opened the door, they rushed into the apartment, forcing her to wake up defendant and his girlfriend. The police escorted Tonia, defendant, and his girlfriend out of the house and handcuffed defendant. Vinton asked Tonia if she knew Coleman, and she told him she had not seen Coleman in eight months. Police asked Tonia if they could search the house, and she said only if they had a warrant. The red Camaro in the complex belonged to their neighbor, Ronell. Defendant did not drive the car, but was occasionally a passenger.
Defendant was found guilty and sentenced to the low term of two years for the robbery, and to a mandatory 10-year firearm enhancement. The trial court denied defendant's motion to strike the enhancement as cruel and unusual punishment. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant makes the following claims on appeal: his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the lawfulness of defendant's detention and arrest; the trial court erred in finding defendant's consent to search his room and confession were voluntary; and defendant's 12-year sentence is cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant also reiterates his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a petition for habeas corpus, which we consider together with his appeal. Because we conclude counsel's assistance was not ineffective, the trial court committed no error, and defendant's punishment is not cruel and unusual, we affirm the judgment. Furthermore, because defendant introduced no evidence (and alleged no facts) outside the appellate record in his habeas petition which would warrant relief, the petition is denied.
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence discovered in the consent search of his bedroom as well as his confession, under section 1538.5 and Evidence Code section 402, reasoning that neither the consent to search nor his confession was voluntary. The facts adduced at the suppression hearing were these.
Vinton testified he was assigned to investigate the July 26, 2009 robbery, and that he came across the name "Randy Knightner" during the course of his investigation. At approximately 7:00 a.m. on July 31, 2009, Vinton went with five other officers to an apartment in Inglewood to find a suspect in the robbery. He did not have a warrant and was seeking information about the robbery. A woman identifying herself as Tonia Knightner answered the door and informed Vinton that defendant and his girlfriend were the only other people home. Vinton told her he was investigating a robbery in Hollywood, and asked her to have defendant and his girlfriend step outside. Defendant and his girlfriend left the apartment to speak with the officers waiting in the driveway and Vinton and Tonia remained in the apartment. Vinton kept his gun holstered at all times.
Tonia gave Vinton permission to search the apartment, although no consent form was signed. Because Vinton believed defendant's separate consent to search his bedroom was necessary, he went downstairs to speak with defendant. The other officers had handcuffed defendant while Vinton had been upstairs with Tonia. Vinton asked defendant where he was on the night of July 25, 2009, and the early hours of July 26, 2009. He considered defendant to be "detained." Defendant responded that he was at an IHOP restaurant.
Vinton asked if he could search defendant's room. Defendant consented to the search and signed a consent to search form. Vinton searched defendant's bedroom and found items he believed were relevant to the robbery. After the search was completed, Vinton noticed that other officers had placed defendant in a patrol car. He was then driven to the Hollywood police station, along with the evidence taken from his bedroom. The time between Vinton's arrival at the apartment and defendant's transport to the station was approximately one hour.
Defendant was not asked any questions about the robbery while being transported to the station. Once he was at the station, Vinton read him the Miranda warnings during a videotaped interview. Vinton questioned defendant about the robbery and said that if defendant showed some remorse, then "we'll see what happens." He did not intend to offer any leniency in exchange for defendant's cooperation.
Tonia Knightner testified to a different set of facts. The police "bang[ed]" on her door at 5:30 a.m., and there were five or six officers with flashlights and guns drawn. When Tonia opened the door, the officers forced their way into her apartment without her permission. The officers asked who was home, and Tonia woke up defendant and his girlfriend. They were then forced out of the apartment, with their hands up, and patted down. Defendant was placed in handcuffs. Tonia was taken back upstairs and questioned for two hours. Vinton asked if she would give her consent to search the apartment, and she told him he could conduct a search if he had a warrant. The officers had their guns drawn while questioning her. Vinton left the apartment, and when he returned, he told Tonia he received consent from defendant to search his room. The signature on the consent form belonged to defendant. Officers allowed her to watch from the hallway as they searched defendant's room. Vinton removed a pair of pants, a purple shirt, and suspenders from defendant's room.
Defense counsel argued that defendant's consent to search his room was involuntary, due to the police officers' coercive tactic of placing defendant in handcuffs. Counsel further argued that defendant's confession was coerced by a promise of leniency by Vinton. The prosecutor submitted on Vinton's testimony as to the consent issue and argued that because defendant never brought up any promise of leniency after making his confession, it was clear he did not interpret Vinton's statements to mean he would be treated differently if he confessed.
The motions were denied by the trial court. The court found that because Tonia was not present when defendant signed the consent form, and she confirmed the signature belonged to defendant, there was no evidence to refute Vinton's credible testimony that the consent was voluntary. The trial court also concluded that defendant was properly advised of his right to remain silent, and that no clear offer of leniency was made by Vinton.
Defendant now contends his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to seek suppression of evidence on the basis that defendant was unlawfully subjected to a "de facto" arrest without probable cause when he consented to the search of his room. Defendant contends "[t]he police had no evidence connecting Stanfield to the July 26, 2009 robbery" at the time he was "arrested." We disagree.
"Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, a criminal defendant has a right to the assistance of counsel. [Citations.] This right 'entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective assistance.' [Citation.]" (People v. Mitchell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 442, 466.) In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. (Id. at pp. 466-467.) In the context of the failure to make a suppression motion, prejudice must be demonstrated by showing that such a motion would be successful. (See People v. Gonzalez (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 432, 437-438.)
Counsel is not required to make futile motions to appear competent. Reversal of a conviction on the basis of inadequate counsel is required only if the record reveals no rational tactical purpose for his or her act or omission. (People v. Terrell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1252-1253.) Here, the record does not reveal the actual reason why defendant's attorney did not challenge the validity of appellant's arrest. However, the record discloses a rational reason why the motion was not made; it would have been futile. Therefore, defendant cannot demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or any resulting prejudice.
Police contacts with individuals fall into three general categories: consensual encounters; detentions of limited duration, scope, and purpose; and arrests (or comparable restraints on a person's liberty). (Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 784.) "A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity."(People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.)
Probable cause for arrest exists only when the facts known to the arresting officer "would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty of a crime." (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410.) When a detention exceeds the boundaries of a permissible investigative stop, the detention becomes a de facto arrest requiring probable cause. (People v. Gorrostieta (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 71, 82-83.)
"A search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within one of the 'specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' [Citations.] It is 'well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.'" (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674.) Evidence obtained as a result of a consent search is still subject to suppression, however, if the consent was given after a detention or arrest that violated the Fourth Amendment. (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 501.)
Defendant contends his detention was converted to a de facto arrest that must be supported by probable cause because he was handcuffed. Defendant appears to concede that a reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention existed. Although defendant acknowledges that police conducting investigations may take "reasonable precautions," such as handcuffing a suspect, if they are "reasonably necessary" (People v. Stier (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 21, 27), he argues that the use of handcuffs during an investigatory detention is justified only if the officer has a "reasonable basis for believing the suspect poses a present physical threat or might flee." (Ibid.) A reasonable basis exists when: "(1) the suspect is uncooperative; (2) the officer has information the suspect is currently armed; (3) the officer has information that the suspect is about to commit a violent crime; (4) the detention closely follows a violent crime by a person matching the suspect's description and/or vehicle; (5) the suspect acts in such a way that raises a reasonable possibility of danger or flight; or (6) the suspects outnumber the officers." (Id. at pp. 27-28.)
Defendant contends that none of these justifications existed. However, defendant ignores that officers were investigating an armed robbery, committed at gunpoint by several participants. The investigation was conducted at the home of a parolee with an extensive criminal history. These facts clearly support the use of handcuffs as a reasonable precautionary measure to ensure officer safety.
Moreover, even if the detention was elevated into a de facto arrest, it was sufficiently supported by probable cause to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The partial license plate and vehicle description provided by Chavez pointed to a car registered to a "Randy Knightner." When police arrived at the address to which the car was registered, they encountered Tonia Knightner, and her son Randy Stanfield. Stanfield and the parolee identified by Chavez had similar physical characteristics, and upon speaking with Tonia, Detective Vinton discovered that defendant was wearing distinctive clothing (a purple shirt, dark slacks, and suspenders) matching the robber's attire seen in a video of the robbery. These facts support a strong suspicion defendant was guilty of the robbery. Therefore, because the detention was not illegal, we find no merit in defendant's claim that his consent to search or later confession should have been suppressed on these grounds. A motion on these grounds would have been futile, and therefore does not provide any basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
2. Trial Court Error
Defendant next contends the trial court erred when it denied defendant's motion to suppress his consent and confession because they were involuntary, reasoning the trial court's ruling is not supported by substantial evidence. "'"An appellate court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] 'The [trial] court's resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.' [Citations.] [¶] The court's resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law, . . . is also subject to independent review."' [Citation.]" (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255.)
"[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given." (Florida v. Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 497.) Relevant factors for evaluating the voluntariness of consent may include whether the consenting person was in custody and given Miranda warnings; whether the officer obtaining the consent had his weapon drawn, informed the person of his right to refuse consent, or used deceptive practices; whether the consent was obtained in the presence of many officers; and whether there was a substantial interruption of the consenting person's liberty. (People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 110, 113-115; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 233-234.)
Detective Vinton's testimony provided substantial evidence that defendant's consent was voluntary. Although there are clearly factors that could vitiate the voluntariness of the consent (the lack of a Miranda advisement, the number of officers, defendant being handcuffed), it is not our job to reweigh the evidence. The court was entitled to credit the evidence supporting the voluntariness of the consent, such as defendant's signature on an advisement that made clear his right to refuse consent, Vinton's testimony that he requested defendant's consent (implying it could be refused), and the absence of any evidence indicating guns were drawn at the time the consent was obtained or that any coercive tactics were employed. Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we can discern no error.
Defendant also contends that his confession at the police station was coerced by a promise of leniency. A confession is involuntary when obtained by an express or implied promise of leniency, and the inducement and confession are causally linked. (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115.) "'However, mere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.'" (Ibid?)Here, Detective Vinton's statement that "you . . . could be a little bit remorseful about what happened and we'll see what happens," in no way offered or implied leniency if defendant confessed to the crime. It was merely a permissible "exhortation[] to tell the truth." (Ibid; see also People v. Cowling (1935) 6 Cal.App.2d 466, 470 [confession not involuntary when officer told defendant "'if you come clean, it will be better for you'"].)
3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Lastly, defendant contends the 10-year mandatory firearm enhancement under section 12022.53 violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as applied to him, reasoning the sentence is disproportionate to his individual culpability. Before sentencing, defense counsel filed a motion to reduce the mandatory sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, arguing the "firearm enhancement . . . will result in a sentence so grossly disproportionate to his actions as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment." In support of the motion, defendant submitted a personal statement and numerous letters from others attesting to his achievements and character. Those letters related the following facts.
Defendant was raised by a single mother. His father, a drug addict, died in 2004. Nevertheless, defendant was a good student and varsity basketball player, graduating high school with a 3.0 grade point average. He attended Hampton University for one year, but financial circumstances and health problems forced him to return closer to home to continue his education. At the time of sentencing, Stanfield had two young daughters. Defendant emphasizes his youth at the time of the offense (20 years old) and his lack of a prior criminal record.
The trial court denied the motion to reduce the mandatory sentence. We recognize this crime appears to have been a deviation from defendant's otherwise positive path in life, yet under the applicable legal standards, we cannot conclude that the sentence "shocks the conscience" or is "grossly disproportionate."
"To determine whether a sentence is cruel or unusual as applied to a particular defendant, a reviewing court must examine the circumstances of the offense, including its motive, the extent of the defendant's involvement in the crime, the manner in which the crime was committed, and the consequences of the defendant's acts. The court must also consider the personal characteristics of the defendant, including age, prior criminality, and mental capabilities." (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1078; see also People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 (Dillon).)The length of a particular sentence crosses the line to become a cruel or unusual punishment when it is "'so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.'" (Dillon, at p. 478.)
Numerous cases have rejected cruel and unusual punishment claims involving serious crimes committed by young defendants without prior criminal records. (People v. Felix (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 994, 1000-1001 [10-year firearm enhancement not cruel and unusual punishment, even if youthful offender had no documented criminal history]; People v. Villegas (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1230-1231 [upholding sentence of 40 years to life for 17-year-old gang member who committed attempted murder with firearm enhancement and had no prior convictions for any serious or violent crimes]; People v. Thongvilay (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 71, 87-89 [upholding sentence of 25 years to life for 17-year-old convicted of felony murder with no prior record of convictions]; People v. Hankey (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 510, 513 [upholding sentence of 25 years to life for non-shooter convicted of murder and robbery despite "his youth, his lack of prior convictions, and the possibility he did not intend to kill"].)
Defendant also argues that he was induced by others to commit the crime, he did not point the gun at Chavez, and he expressed remorse and cooperated with police. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude defendant's sentence "shocks the conscience." Even if the crime was not defendant's idea, he was its primary instrument. He drove to the parking lot, brandished a gun, and demanded money from Chavez with an implicit threat of violence if Chavez did not comply. Successful challenges to sentences on the grounds of cruel and unusual punishment are rare. (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272.) This is not one of the rare cases.
4. Habeas Petition
Because "a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks to collaterally attack a presumptively final criminal judgment, the petitioner bears a heavy burden initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief, and then later to prove them." (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) The petition must "state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought," and "include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or declarations." (Ibid.) "Conclusory allegations made without any explanation of the basis for the allegations do not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary hearing." (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 656.) "An appellate court receiving such a petition evaluates it by asking whether, assuming the petition's factual allegations are true, the petitioner would be entitled to relief." If so, the required prima facie showing has been made. (People v. Duvall, at pp. 474-475.) If no prima facie case is made, we will summarily deny the petition. On the other hand, if the allegations of the petition, taken as true, establish a claim for relief, we will issue an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. (Id. at p. 475.)
We find petitioner has not stated a prima facie claim for relief, and therefore summary denial of the petition is proper. Defendant introduced no evidence and alleged no facts outside the appellate record in his petition which would warrant relief. As we concluded above, the appellate record reveals no ineffective assistance, as the facts amply show that no motion to suppress on the basis of an unlawful arrest could have succeeded. Therefore, the petition is denied.
The only "evidence" was submitted with a reply brief, and consisted of a letter by appellate counsel to trial counsel asking why he did not move to suppress the evidence "on [Fourth] Amendment grounds."
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed, and the petition is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
GRIMES, J. WE CONCUR:
RUBIN, Acting P. J.
FLIER, J.