Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIF122145, Patrick F. Magers, Judge.
Michael Ian Garey for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Pamela Ratner Sobeck, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Gaut, J.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated otherwise.
Defendant was charged with 19 counts of sexual offenses against the victim, Jane Doe, a 14-year-old girl. The court dismissed count 19. As invited by the prosecutor, the jury acquitted defendant of count 10 and convicted him of the other 17 counts. The court sentenced defendant to 13 years in prison.
Counts 1 through 3 (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)); counts 4 through 6 (§ 289, subd. (i)); counts 7 through 11 (§ 243.4, subd. (a)); and counts 12 through 19 (§ 288, subd. (c).)
On appeal, defendant contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel in a multitude of ways. Defendant protests the admission of evidence of uncharged prior sexual offenses in 1982 and 1990 and of hearsay evidence. Defendant urges the trial court erred in limiting the defense’s cross-examination of the victim. Defendant accuses the prosecutor of several kinds of error. Finally, defendant asserts insufficient evidence of force supports his convictions on counts 1, 2, and 3. (§ 289, subd. (a)(1).)
We conclude there was no prejudicial error and, in view of the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, we affirm the judgment.
2. Facts
The subject events occurred in July and August 2000 when Jane Doe was 14 years old and defendant was 43 years old.
Defendant was married. He and his wife, Beverlee, were friends with their neighbors, Jane Doe’s parents. The two families often took vacations and socialized together. Defendant operated a Norco business called S & S Livestock, where Jane Doe worked informally, helping to visit dairies and performing office tasks.
In July 2000, defendant began initiating conversations about sexual matters with Jane Doe, particularly about what men like, such as the desirability of sexual experience, oral sex, and masturbation. On a delivery trip to Bakersfield using two trucks, defendant arranged it so he and Jane Doe would drive together instead of with his son and stepson. Defendant talked obsessively about sex and played “footsies” with Jane Doe in a restaurant where they stopped on the way. Defendant also trapped Jane Doe one morning in the laundry room of his house, rubbing, and touching and kissing her.
a. Counts 10 and 15
Another time while they were traveling together in defendant’s truck, defendant leaned over and brushed his hand across Jane Doe’s breasts, commenting, “Well, now you have dirt on me too, so neither one of us can say anything.” He explained if Jane Doe told anyone, Beverlee would leave him, his business would be ruined, and he would lose his children.
b. Count 18
Another day, defendant kissed Jane Doe in the office, making her feel uncomfortable. He then asked her if she would consider having sex with him and he apologized when she reacted badly.
c. Counts 11 and 16
On August 4, the day of a country music concert, defendant encountered Jane Doe in the garage at her house. He kissed her, fondled her breasts under her shirt and bra, and rubbed his genital area against her. He had an erection which he said she had caused. He said he loved her.
d. Count 19
Later, on a horseback ride, Jane Doe confronted defendant about his conduct. He apologized and said it happened because of how much he loved her. Even then, he continued to touch her.
e. Counts 1, 4, 7, 12
On August 9, he cornered her in the office. Although she tried to resist, he kissed and fondled her, put his hands inside her shorts, and digitally penetrated her. After it was over, she cried and yelled at him to leave her alone. She felt horrible and too embarrassed to tell anyone.
f. Counts 2, 5, 8, and 13
On the day Jane Doe’s friend, Brittany, had run away, defendant came to Jane Doe’s house to wait for her parents who were not home. He sat close to Jane Doe on the couch and began fondling her, kissing her, and touching her breasts. Again, he digitally penetrated her. When her parents walked in, he said she was crying about Brittany and he was sweaty because of a flu.
g. Counts 3, 6, 9, and 14
Another day, at defendant’s house, he pinned her on the couch, talked sexually, and digitally penetrated her again.
h. Count 17
Another incident occurred when Jane Doe commented about her back hurting and defendant began rubbing her under her shirt.
i. Other Prosecution Evidence
The molestations finally stopped after defendant’s wife, Beverlee, came to the Doe house, began screaming about defendant, and accused defendant of being a child molester. After that incident, Jane Doe’s parents asked her if defendant had touched her and she denied it.
Later, Jane Doe confided to her boyfriend about defendant touching her breasts and vagina. In December 2000, she also wrote some poems for a school English class expressing her feelings of distress and anger. Her English teacher approached her and asked her about the poems. He testified Jane Doe was upset when he said he would have to report the contents. Finally, on April 25, 2001, Jane Doe wrote a letter to her parents, who immediately contacted the sheriff’s department.
The police arranged for Jane Doe to make a recorded pretext phone call to defendant. During the call they first talked briefly about defendant’s son, Wesley, coming home for the weekend from the Air Force Academy. Toward the end of the phone call, Jane Doe told defendant that she had said something to a friend who had spoken to a teacher. They had the following exchange:
“[Defendant]: Are you serious?
“Doe: Yeah. But, if my teacher says something to me, what should I say?
“[Defendant]: God . . . I’m sorry baby.
“Doe: You’re sorry?
“[Defendant]: I don’t know what to say.
“Doe: What do you mean you don’t know what to say? Um, should I tell ‘em, like, what you did?
“[Defendant]: No.
“Doe: No?
“[Defendant]: No. Tell ‘em, ‘I was mad and I just said that.’
“Doe: That I was mad and I just said that?
“[Defendant]: Yeah. . . . Don’t admit to that.
“Doe: Should I
“[Defendant]: Can we talk about it?
“Doe: So I shouldn’t tell them that you, like . . .
“[Defendant]: No.
“Doe: . . . that you, like, finger-banged me or anything?”
After that statement, defendant hung up.
Afterwards, Jane Doe learned from her father that defendant had been having an affair with her mother. Months later, Jane Doe and her parents filed a civil lawsuit against defendant.
Tina P. testified that she was the sister of defendant’s former wife, Francine, to whom he was married from about 1980 to 1994. In June 1982, when she was 15 years old, Tina visited her sister and defendant in Wisconsin. She was watching television in the morning when defendant began rubbing her back and kissing her. She asked him to stop but he removed her underwear and his shorts and penetrated her with his penis. She did not tell anyone at the time but she ended her visit early. She confided to her sister in 1990 when defendant was arrested for rape in Colorado. She reported it to the police in 1993 when her sister and defendant were involved in a child custody dispute.
j. Defense Evidence
Defendant’s son and stepson testified favorably about defendant, both stating they never observed any untoward behavior by him to Jane Doe and particularly not on the trip to Bakersfield. Defendant’s oldest son, Wesley, testified that he and Jane Doe communicated by email when he was in the Air Force Academy and he heard from mutual friends that she had claimed they had sex. Wesley did not remember telling an investigator in April 2001 that Jane Doe had mentioned defendant once kissed her like a boyfriend.
Two of defendant’s friends testified as to his good character. A third friend and neighbor, Mike Flory, an Orange County deputy district attorney, testified similarly.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He explained that both Jane Doe and her mother sometimes helped out in the office. On the business trip to Bakersfield, he put Jane Doe in the truck with him to stop her from fooling around with the boys driving the other truck. He never touched her inappropriately. He denied touching her breasts and commenting about “having dirt” on her.
Defendant did not see Jane Doe on August 4, the day of the concert. He denied being alone in the office with Jane Doe on August 9. On a trip the two families made later in August, defendant’s wife, Beverlee, became upset when Jane Doe tried to lie down by defendant on a hotel room bed. In September 2000, defendant and Beverlee obtained mutual restraining orders against one another.
Defendant had heard rumors about a relationship between his son, Wesley, and Jane Doe. He claims he asked Jane Doe to stop talking about Wesley that way in July 2000. He did not mention these rumors to the police when he was first interviewed.
When Jane made the pretext call in April 2001, defendant was driving in the car with his youngest son. Defendant wears hearing aids and he thought Jane Doe was talking to him about Wesley. He panicked because he thought Wesley’s career might be damaged by what she was saying. Ultimately the Doe family sued him for $2 million but, at the time of trial in September 2006, there was no civil judgment against defendant.
About Tina’s Wisconsin visit in 1982, defendant denied having any sexual contact with her. He knew both Tina and Francine had said they had been molested by their stepfather.
Defendant and Francine moved to Colorado in 1990. He was arrested after a female coworker in a car pool made an accusation against him. After he passed a lie detector test, no charges were filed and he was released. He admitted he had kissed the coworker. He first heard about Tina’s accusations against him after the 1990 Colorado arrest and during the custody dispute with Francine.
On cross-examination, defendant disagreed with a Colorado police report reciting that defendant had admitted to penile penetration of the victim’s vagina. He then admitted there had been consensual sexual touching between them.
3. Uncharged Sexual Offenses
Defendant maintains the court erred in allowing Tina P. to testify about the alleged 1982 rape and her knowledge about the 1990 Colorado rape arrest.
We determine the court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Tina’s testimony under Evidence Code section 1108. (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124-1125.) Evidence Code section 1108 permits a jury to consider a defendant’s prior sex offense as propensity evidence if it is not unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352 and considering the following factors: “its nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of the defendant’s other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the offense.” (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917; People v. Pierce (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 893, 900.)
Here the trial court properly admitted Tina’s testimony about the 1982 rape. The incident was remote in time but defendant could not claim to have an unblemished record between 1982 and the present incidents. (People v. Harris (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727, 739.) Furthermore, it reflected defendant’s pattern of targeting vulnerable girls for sexual attentions. The jury could then evaluate Tina’s credibility and the degree of certainty of the rape’s commission.
Furthermore, any error was harmless and not prejudicial in view of the overwhelming evidence against defendant. Beginning with her poems and letters and throughout years of proceedings, Jane Doe remained consistent in her detailed and specific accounts of defendant’s conduct against her. In the pretext phone call, defendant implicated himself by his apology and his suggestion to her that she claim she made it all up because she was angry. Even without Tina’s testimony, it is not reasonably probable defendant could have achieved a more favorable result. (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1181.)
Similarly, Tina’s reference to the 1990 rape arrest was properly allowed because it served to explain why Tina finally told Francine, her sister and defendant’s ex-wife, about defendant’s 1982 conduct. Evidence about the 1990 arrest was used for the non-hearsay purpose of showing Tina’s reaction to the information. (People v. Scalzi (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 901, 907.) Furthermore, the court gave the jury a pinpoint instruction regarding the limited nature of the evidence, which was to be used only for evaluating “the meaning and importance of a character witness’s testimony or test the ability of a witness to recollect,” and not as evidence “defendant engaged in any such conduct.”
4. Hearsay Evidence
During cross-examination, Jane Doe testified that defendant’s wife, Beverlee, “accused [defendant] of being a child molester.” The court overruled the defense objection. Jane Doe and her boyfriend both testified without objection that her father told her that defendant had been having an affair with her mother.
Because the child-molester accusation was elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination, it was invited error. (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 237.) The two failures to object about the purported affair means defendant cannot raise the issue on appeal. (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 153; Evid. Code, § 353.)
Furthermore, even if all claims had been preserved, we would conclude there was no prejudicial error because of the strength of the evidence against defendant.
5. Restricting Defense’s Cross-Examination of Jane Doe
Defendant claims he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine Jane Doe about her sexual conduct with a boyfriend. Defendant does not identify where in the record such a request was made and there does not appear to be one except as part of defendant’s new trial motion. Under Evidence Code sections 782 and 1103, even if defendant had made the required written motion, it would not have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to prohibit such evidence. (People v. Ablilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503.) Furthermore, any error would have been harmless because defense counsel could have cross-examined the victim generally about her sexual sophistication and knowledge without asking her specifically about her conduct with her boyfriend.
6. Prosecutor’s Impeachment of Defense Character Witnesses
Defendant contends the prosecutor should not have been allowed to ask the defense character witnesses about defendant’s previous sexual misconduct. Defendant specifically protests about the prosecutor’s treatment of Mike Flory, the Orange County deputy district attorney who testified for defendant. Particularly, defendant complains about the prosecutor’s questions about Flory’s own practice of cross-examination and his views on the use of polygraph evidence, as well as the prosecutor reading to Flory from the Colorado medical report concerning the alleged rape victim and asking him to comment about it. Furthermore, defendant objects to the court instructing the jury to take judicial notice of a published appellate court opinion, People v. Pigage (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1359, finding that “Flory committed outrageous attorney misconduct by demonstrating disrespect for the trial court’s authority, repeated threats to disobey a court order, and a subsequent violation of the trial court’s order. [¶] And I’m taking judicial notice of the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s opinion making that determination.” Finally, defendant criticizes the prosecutor’s use in rebuttal of a Riverside deputy district attorney, John Aki, who testified that Flory had once testified in a criminal trial as a defense character witness about both the defendant and the victim.
The questions about defendant’s previous sexual misconduct were proper because defendant made his reputation an issue by presenting character witnesses: “It is well established that, ‘[w]hen a defense witness, other than the defendant himself, has testified to the reputation of the accused, the prosecution may inquire of the witness whether he has heard of acts or conduct by the defendant inconsistent with the witness’ testimony.’ [Citation.] So long as the People have a good faith belief that the acts or conduct about which they wish to inquire actually took place, they may so inquire.” (People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 578.) The prosecutor had a good faith basis for the questions because the Colorado police report contained credible information about allegations of sexual misconduct by defendant.
We also find no error concerning the examination and testimony of Flory and Aki. Although Flory testified as a character witness for defendant, he also offered expert testimony based on his experience as criminal prosecutor. (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a); People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1207.) Therefore, he was subject to broad cross-examination in the present case regarding his qualifications and opinions. (Evid. Code, § 721, subd. (a).) The court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor to read from the Colorado medical report to challenge Flory’s opinion that the rape allegation was insufficient to support filing a charge or a conviction. The court also properly took judicial notice of Pigage, a published case, under Evidence Code section 451, subdivision (a), as California decisional authority and as a court record. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
Defendant’s reliance on several federal cases is not factually or legally persuasive. His arguments that the brief testimony of Flory and Aki—about 4 percent of the trial testimony—involved problems of proof, unfair surprise, evaluations of moral turpitude, undue time, confusion, or prejudice, outweighing its probative value are not supported by the record. (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 373; People v. Cloyd (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408.) The case of Young v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1204, 1217-1218, involving state bar disciplinary proceedings is not relevant on the issue of the proper cross-examination of a criminal prosecutor testifying as both a defense character witness and an expert witness. We also disagree with defendant’s slightly-developed constitutional arguments that his rights to due process, a jury trial, and confrontation were violated by the prosecutor’s collateral impeachment of Flory. Finally, on this issue, we conclude again any error was harmless in view of the evidence. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
7. Prosecutorial Error
Defendant raises several claims of prosecutorial misconduct or error, involving the prosecutor’s denial of the existence of a $2 million civil lawsuit by the victim; the use of the Colorado police report to refute defendant’s assertion he passed a polygraph test; the argument that the 1990 rape actually occurred; and making false implications about why defendant did not call some witnesses.
Jane Doe testified that her family had filed a lawsuit against defendant and she thought the amount of damages sought was $100,000. Defendant testified the civil lawsuit sought damages of $2 million. In closing argument, the prosecutor asserted there was no evidence of a $2 million lawsuit. The civil statements of damages, which was submitted as part of defendant’s motion for new trial, asked for economic damages of $10,000 and noneconomic damages of $500,000 against Beverlee and economic damages of $10,000, noneconomic damages of $500,000, and punitive damages of $1 million against defendant.
The prosecutor was literally correct. There was no direct evidence about the amount of the civil damages presented at trial. Furthermore, the civil lawsuit claimed damages of $1,510,000 from defendant and $510,000 from his wife. The lawsuit was not for $2 million against defendant only. Therefore, the prosecutor’s argument was within the wide latitude permitted him. (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 463.)
During the cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor referred to the Colorado police report to demonstrate defendant was lying about his insistence that he passed a polygraph test. It is generally true that polygraph evidence is not admissible: “This firm and broad exclusion is justified by the unreliable nature of polygraph results, by the concern that jurors will attach unjustified significance to the fact of or the outcome of such examination and because the introduction of polygraph evidence can negatively affect the jury’s appreciation of its exclusive power to judge credibility.” (People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 390; Evid. Code, § 351.1.) But that rule should not be applied where defendant himself raised the issue by reiterating several times that he had passed a polygraph test. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 476-477.) Under these circumstances, he cannot fairly complain that the prosecutor improperly confronted him with contrary evidence or unjustifiably implied that defendant actually committed the rape. As to the latter, the court also gave the jury a pinpoint instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the rape allegation for the purpose of testing the veracity of character witnesses. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fns. 16 and 17.)
Regarding defendant’s complaint that the prosecutor improperly commented that defendant had not called his son’s girlfriend, who had been scheduled as a defense witness, we agree the prosecutor could reasonably remark that defendant used only his male friends and his sons as character witnesses. (People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 463.)
Overall and taken in context, we conclude the prosecutor’s conduct did not go so far as to infect the trial with fundamental unfairness. (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 522; People v. Van Houten (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 280, 292.) Nor has defendant shown it is reasonably likely the jury misconstrued or misapplied any of the prosecutor’s statements. (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970.)
8. Force
Defendant briefly asserts there was not enough evidence of force to support his convictions on counts 1, 2, and 3 for violating section 289 subdivision (a)(1): “Any person who commits an act of sexual penetration when the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eight years.” Defendant relies on People v. Senior (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 774: “We also do not regard as constituting ‘force’ the evidence that defendant pulled the victim back when she tried to pull away from the oral copulations in August. (Contra, People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 48 —physical manipulation of hand and pushing on back during lewd touching; People v. Bergschneider (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 144, 154—pushing head against victim’s hands during oral copulation; cf. People v. Mendibles (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1277, 1307—pulling head forward during lewd touching.) The ‘force’ factor differentiates the charged sex crime from the ordinary sex crime. Since ordinary oral copulation and digital penetration almost always involve some physical contact other than genital, a modicum of holding and even restraining cannot be regarded as substantially different or excessive ‘force.’ There was no evidence here of any struggle, however brief. (People v. Schulz (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 999, 1004.)”
In reviewing a jury verdict, we apply a deferential standard of review. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 758; People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514.) The jury received an instruction based on Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instruction (2007-2008), CALCRIM No. 1045, to the effect that force means enough physical force to overcome the other person’s will. Here the record shows Jane Doe tried to resist defendant on all three occasions and he physically restrained and compelled her in several ways. The record afforded substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude defendant used force different or greater in degree than that required to perform the molestation. (People v. Quinones (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1158.)
9. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant’s primary argument is he received ineffective assistance of counsel, an issue which was raised in detail in a motion for new trial, during which defendant’s trial counsel, John Pozza, testified. We know appellate counsel are both extremely familiar with the general principles governing ineffective assistance of counsel, which we will cite briefly as necessary. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171 [failure to investigate]; In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408 [failure to object.]) We determine that defendant cannot establish either that his attorney’s performance was deficient or that a more favorable outcome was reasonably likely. (In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 239.)
Defendant first identifies as error the defense counsel eliciting Jane Doe’s testimony about Beverlee’s child-molester accusation and failing to object to the testimony about defendant having an affair with Jane Doe’s mother. The latter testimony could have served a tactical purpose because it could have supplied a motive for Jane Doe to lie about defendant as revenge. (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581.) As to the child-molester accusation, defense counsel twice objected to the statement but, even if it was error for the court to allow it the second time, we have already deemed it not to be prejudicial.
Even though defendant insisted upon the strategy, defendant also blames his defense attorney for calling character witnesses, thus allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of other uncharged sexual offenses from 1982 and 1990, as well as asking about other offenses. (People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 634.) Defendant, however, cannot have it both ways. He cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney acceding to his own demands. Defendant is “‘. . . estopped from later claiming ineffective assistance based on counsel’s acquiescence in his wishes. “The invited-error doctrine operates, in particular, to estop a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s acts or omissions in conformance with the defendant’s own requests.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 120.)
Similarly, defense counsel’s failure to object to defendant’s answers and the prosecutor’s related questions when defendant persistently claimed to have taken and passed a polygraph test in Colorado was not ineffective assistance of counsel but was caused by defendant’s own unwillingness to restrain himself on this topic.
Next defendant criticizes defense counsel for allowing the prosecution to cross-examine defendant about an analysis made of the authenticity of the audiotape of the pretext call and for not objecting to questions about the defense not calling defendant’s son’s girlfriend to testify. But the prosecutor had a right to prove that the tape had not been altered. The absence of a defense objection was not deficient representation. (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587.) The prosecutor also had the right to comment when defense counsel chose not to call defendant’s son’s girlfriend as an exculpatory character witness. (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 948.) Finally, as we have already discussed, the prosecutor could properly cross-examine defendant about other allegations of sexual misconduct and it was not deficient representation not to object to this permissible line of questioning.
Defendant’s last assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel involve the purported failure to present impeachment evidence related to the civil lawsuit against defendant and showing Jane Doe had a poor reputation for truth and veracity and a penchant for fabrication to attract attention.
There was testimony by both defendant and Jane Doe about the civil lawsuit in which damages were being sought. Establishing the exact amount of damages was hardly a decisive issue in the case. There was also some testimony from Flory that challenged Jane Doe’s reputation. Neither of these examples denote prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel.
Nor could defendant’s son’s girlfriend have testified favorably about defendant’s behavior when he was alone with her without contradicting defendant’s insistence that he was never alone with young girls.
We confess we do not fully understand the value of evidence that the family of Tina P. communicated with Jane Doe’s family about defendant’s Colorado arrest.
Ultimately, nothing in defendant’s laundry list of omissions and failures constituted prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel, especially considering the strength of the case against defendant, the credibility of Jane Doe, and defendant’s own inculpatory statements.
10. Disposition
We affirm the judgment.
We concur: Ramirez, P. J., Hollenhorst, J.