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People v. Spencer

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Jul 31, 2008
No. D051183 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JULIE SPENCER, Defendant and Appellant. D051183 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division July 31, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCE257643, William J. McGrath, Judge.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

This case arises from events in which Julie Spencer, a caregiver, severely beat and cut a 98-year-old man for whom she worked. She bound him with a vacuum cord and attempted to set fire to his mobile home and to the victim as well. Spencer then took the victim's phones so that he could not call for help and left him in his mobile home. The victim survived the beating, was able to put out the fire and ultimately received help and medical care. The victim was active and apparently healthy, except for emphysema, at the time of the attack. Thereafter he deteriorated and was ultimately placed in a nursing home where he died about one month after the attack. The principal question presented by this appeal is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Spencer's attack on the victim was a proximate cause of his death. The answer to the question is yes. There is abundant evidence to support the verdict.

A jury convicted Spencer of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)); first degree robbery with the use of a knife (§§ 211 & 12022, subd. (b)(1)); attempted arson (§§ 664 & 451, subd. (a)); elder abuse with great bodily injury (§§ 368, subd. (b)(1) & 12022.7, subd. (c)); caretaker theft from an elder (§ 368, subd. (e)); false imprisonment of a dependent elder (§ 368, subd. (f)); and two counts of forgery (§ 470, subd. (d)).

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

Spencer was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life plus two years for forgery.

Spencer appeals contending there is not sufficient evidence to prove her acts were a legal cause of the victim's death and that the court erred in imposing concurrent sentences for the robbery and attempted arson convictions, which she argues should have been stayed pursuant to section 654. We will reject both contentions and affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Spencer does not challenge the admissibility of any evidence and does not contend the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions for forgery, attempted arson, robbery and the various crimes against an elder person. Her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence deals solely with her claim her acts were not a proximate cause of the victim's death. Accordingly we will set forth an abbreviated statement of facts and address the pertinent facts in the discussion section of this opinion.

In the fall of 2005 Spencer was hired to be the live-in caregiver for 98-year-old Jack Parks, who lived in a mobile home in Santee. Shortly after she was hired, Spencer forged two checks on Parks's account in an amount in excess of $10,000. Parks apparently became aware of the forgeries and was permitting Spencer to repay the amounts from her salary.

On December 10, 2005, Spencer attacked Parks in his mobile home. She punched and kicked him, cut him, bound him with a vacuum cord and attempted to set fire to Parks and his mobile home. Spencer took both of Parks's hearing aids and all of his telephones.

Because of his injuries and the removal of the phones, Parks was unable to summon help. He was able to crawl into bed and the next morning he was able to crawl to his car and drive the short distance to his neighbor in order to get help.

Parks suffered four facial fractures, a broken rib, lacerations on his hand and ear and multiple bruises over his body. He was taken to the hospital where he remained until he stabilized. Parks was then sent to a nursing home. After a short time his condition deteriorated, and he was returned to the hospital. He was returned to the nursing home on January 3, 2006 and died there four days later.

The medical examiner testified that Parks died as a result of the injuries inflicted on him on December 10, 2005, together with his pre-existing condition. The examiner concluded that the injuries inflicted on Parks were significant and life threatening to him given his pre-existing condition. The examiner denied that any injuries that may have been caused by a fall from his wheelchair at the nursing home acted as an intervening cause of death.

DISCUSSION

I

SPENCER'S ACTS WERE A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE VICTIM'S DEATH

Spencer contends there is not sufficient evidence in this record to support a finding that her attack on Parks was a proximate cause of his death. She appears to have contended at trial that the victim's age and poor health were the causes of his death, or that the possible failure of the nursing home to provide adequate care was an independent, intervening cause of death that relieves Spencer from criminal liability for the death.

When we review a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction we apply the familiar substantial evidence standard of review. Under that standard we review the entire record and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court decision. We do not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. We simply inquire whether there was sufficient substantial evidence from which the jury could have found the necessary elements of the offense to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-577.)

In this case, the question is whether Spencer's acts are the proximate or legal cause of the victim's death. The legal principles controlling this area of law have been well settled. In order to be criminally liable for the death of another, the defendant must have done an act, which was the actual and proximate cause of the death. An act is the actual cause if the death would not have occurred but for the defendant's act. (People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866; People v. Brady (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1324.)

"To be considered the proximate cause of the victim's death, the defendant's act must have been a substantial factor contributing to the result, rather than insignificant or merely theoretical." (People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 583-584.)

Case law recognizes that there may be more than one "proximate cause" of the death of a person. However, where the defendant's act is a substantial factor contributing to the death, the existence of another contributing, or concurrent cause of death will not relieve a defendant of responsibility. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 847.)

A defendant may be relieved of liability for an act that is a concurrent cause of death where there is a superseding cause that breaks the chain of causation. In order to absolve the defendant of liability the superseding cause must be independent of the defendant's actions and must not have been reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant's conduct. (People v. Wattier (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 948, 953; People v. Schmies (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 38, 49; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 319.)

Here the question is first whether Spencer's acts were a substantial factor in bringing about the death of Parks. The medical testimony clearly establishes that they were very significant given the victim's pre-existing condition and age. The broken rib would have made breathing more difficult and increased the chances of pneumonia in a person with the lung condition from which Parks suffered. The pathologist testified the injuries were significant and they were in fact a contributing cause of death.

Spencer is thus left with the argument that the fall at the nursing home may have been followed by inadequate medical care, thus it should have been an independent, intervening cause of death. There are several serious problems with Spencer's argument. First, there is no evidence to support it. While there is slight conflict in the record, the nurse who responded to the alarm set off by Parks's fall denied any delay. There was no medical evidence that any act or failure to act by the nursing home was a contributing factor in the cause of death. Second, the pathologist specifically denied that any action of the nursing home was an independent cause of death. Finally, the possibility of inadequate medical care is reasonably foreseeable to a person who viciously assaults and abandons a seriously injured elderly person such as Parks. A foreseeable consequence of injuries inflicted by a defendant on a victim is not an independent, intervening cause that will terminate the defendant's responsibility for his or her actions. (People v. Dilworth 274 Cal.App.2d 27, 33; People v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 312.)

Spencer does not challenge the instructions given to the jury in this case, as indeed she cannot. The jury, fully informed of the law, could easily conclude there was no independent, intervening cause of the death of Jack Parks. The death came as a clear consequence of injuries inflicted on a person, already in a weakened condition. They could reasonably find that nothing happened after Spencer's attack that should relieve her of responsibility for the harm she caused.

II

CONCURRENT SENTENCES FOR ROBBERY AND ATTEMPTED ARSON DID NOT VIOLATE SECTION 654

Spencer contends the concurrent sentences for robbery and attempted arson violate the prohibition of section 654 since those two crimes were all part of a single objective involving the assault of Parks. We disagree.

Section 654 prohibits multiple punishments arising out of several statutory violations produced by the same acts or omissions. Stated another way the statute prohibits multiple punishments where several offenses arise from a single course of conduct with one intent or objective. (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19-20; People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.)

Whether several crimes are based on a single intent or objective is a factual determination to be made by the trial court. We review the trial courts actual or implied finding under the substantial evidence test. (People v. Ferrell (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 828, 834; People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162.)

Spencer contends the robbery and attempted arson were part of the single objective of assaulting Parks without detection. Obviously the trial court rejected that contention. Impliedly the trial court found the robbery was based on a separate objective of taking items of value from Parks, from whom she had already taken a large sum of money by means of forgery. As to the attempted arson, a trial court could reasonably conclude it was a separate, gratuitous violent act against Parks. Parks had already been disabled and tied with a cord. A court could well conclude it was not necessary to try to set fire to him or the mobile home in order for Spencer to get away. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court's implied finding of separate objective, the imposition of concurrent sentences was lawful, and indeed generous. There was no violation of section 654.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J., IRION, J.


Summaries of

People v. Spencer

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Jul 31, 2008
No. D051183 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Spencer

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JULIE SPENCER, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Jul 31, 2008

Citations

No. D051183 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2008)

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