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People v. Smith

Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Two.
Nov 25, 2003
No. A100365 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)

Opinion

A100365.

11-25-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES J. SMITH, JR., Defendant and Appellant.


James J. Smith, Jr., appeals from the trial courts denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

On January 17, 2001, at about 11:00 p.m., Fairfield Police Officers Jeffrey Osgood and Steve Ruiz were dispatched to the Solano Lodge in response to a request for officers to stand by while the motel manager evicted occupants who had been conducting loud parties. The officers proceeded to room 29, escorted by the assistant motel manager, and knocked on the door. There was no response. The assistant manager believed that the room was occupied, and Officer Osgood continued to knock. After approximately 60 seconds, appellant opened the door.

Officer Osgood informed appellant that the officers were there to assist with the eviction, and turned over the conversation to the assistant manager. The assistant manager informed appellant that despite previous warnings, noise from the room had continued unabated and that the room must be immediately vacated. Appellant acknowledged this statement by gesturing as if to walk out the door. Officer Osgood saw a large amount of personal property inside the room and told appellant that he needed to take his property with him, unless he wanted it placed in storage.

Appellant agreed, and Officer Osgood asked him for his identification. Appellant walked back into the room and began to look for something between the two full-sized beds. The officers stepped inside the doorway to better observe appellants movements. Appellant was not able to locate any identification, and Officer Osgood asked him for his name, and whether he was on probation or parole. Appellant admitted that he was on parole.

Officer Osgood approached appellant, and saw, in plain view, a pipe containing white residue, which he recognized as a type of pipe commonly used to smoke methamphetamine. Officer Osgood immediately arrested appellant for possession of drug paraphernalia and placed him in handcuffs. Appellant fell asleep in a chair after his arrest, and Officer Osgood confirmed by radio that he was on parole. Officer Osgood searched the room, and found 4.75 grams of methamphetamine in a film canister, a scale with remnants of white residue, baggies, over $2,000 in cash, a loaded 9MM pistol, a quantity of 9MM ammunition, two scanners, a pager, cell phones and a piece of paper with electronic signature numbers. Officer Osgood seized these items.

The following day, Officer Michael Blacklock was dispatched to the Solano Lodge in response to a report that a maintenance worker had found a large quantity of what appeared to be drugs in room 29, where appellant had been arrested the night before. The maintenance worker explained that when he entered the room to remove the property left behind by appellant, he found a cardboard box containing drugs concealed behind one of the shelves in the rooms entertainment center. Officer Blacklock retrieved what was later determined to be 84 grams of methamphetamine. The maintenance worker told Officer Blacklock that he was almost positive that no one had entered the room after appellants arrest on the previous night.

Appellant was charged with two counts: count one for felony possession for sale of a controlled substance, in violation or Heath and Safety Code section 11378; and count two for misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11364. Information also alleged that the count one violation was committed while in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022 subd. (c)), and that appellant had served a prior prison term (id., § 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant pled "not guilty" to both charges.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. The trial court found that the motel management retained a possessory interest in the room that was sufficient to evict any tenant who had been previously warned to cease disruptive behavior and denied the motion. The court concluded that because the officers were asked to aid the motels assistant manager, the officers had permission to enter the room, and that because they saw the pipe in plain view, they were justified in searching the entire room. Appellant also filed a motion to set aside the information pursuant to Penal Code section 995, which was also denied. Appellant changed his plea to "no contest" as to count one, and admitted the firearm use allegation. The court sentenced him to a total term of five years in state prison, less 853 days credit for time already served. Appellant filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The standard for appellate review of a trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301.) " `[Appellate courts] defer to the trial courts factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, [appellate courts] exercise [their] independent judgment. " (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 384.) In reviewing motions to set aside the information under Penal Code section 995, the appellate courts review the issues de novo. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301.)

II. The Search

Appellant contends that the search of his motel room was conducted in violation of his reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Appellant relies heavily on People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 1297 and Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 486-490 to assert that motel guests enjoy the same expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment as do people who lease or own their residences. Appellant concedes that his parole subjected him to a search condition, but argues that there was no justification for a parole search because the officers did not know at the time of the search that he was on parole. Appellant asserts that California laws prohibit parole searches from being validated after the fact. (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 799-800; In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 88-89; People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 751-752.)

To determine whether this warrantless search comports with Fourth Amendment guarantees, we must examine the totality of the circumstances and consider two issues: the entry into the room; and the officers lack of knowledge of the parole search condition at the time of the search. (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 333 (Sanders).) Our inquiry is informed as follows: " `The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of the search is determined by "assessing on one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individuals privacy and, on the other, the degree to which [the search] is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interest." [Citation.] " (Ibid ., citing United States v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 118-119.) Thus, the question of whether appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy to the motel room is inextricably linked to reasonableness of the search. (Sanders , supra, at p. 333.)

First, " `[i]n determining whether a defendant has standing to contest a search, the foundational question is whether the defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place invaded. [Citations.] . . . The pertinent facts to consider include whether the defendant has a property or possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched; whether he has the right to exclude others from that place; whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that the place would remain free from governmental invasion; whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy; and whether he was legitimately on the premises. " (People v. Satz (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 322, 325, citing People v. Thompson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1269-1270.) It is undisputed that the officers came at the request of the motel management to assist with appellants eviction. When asked to vacate the room, appellant agreed and immediately began to leave the premises without protest, thus surrendering possession of the room to the assistant manager. The record is also clear that appellant was neither a properly registered occupant, nor the guest of a registered occupant. These factors weigh heavily against appellants argument that he had any expectation of privacy in the room.

Nevertheless, appellant contends that the officers illegally entered the motel room in three ways: entry was made without consent; exigent circumstances did not validate the entry; and the entry was not justified for the sake of officers safety. Appellant does not challenge the validity of Officer Osgoods request for his identification. We ordinarily consider validity of the entry based on an objective standard of the officer. (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 334.) At the time appellant retreated into the room to search for his identification, the officers knew that he had already vacated the premises and had agreed to remove his personal property before leaving. The door remained open as the motel manager and the officers stood by. Considering these circumstances together, it was entirely reasonable for the officers to conclude that the motel management had regained the possession of the room, and that they had the managers permission to enter the room to assist in the eviction of appellant. Thus, neither consent by appellant nor exigent circumstances were necessary to permit the initial, limited entry by the officers. (See People v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 648, 657-658.)

Moreover, the exclusionary rules are to be interpreted in a manner that will not endanger officers in the performance of their duties. (People v. Wilson (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1061, citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 110; Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325, 333.) The officers here entered the doorway in order to keep appellant in their view as he rummaged between the beds. The officers conduct in stepping inside the door to better observe appellants movements were objectively reasonable for the officers own safety.

Thereafter, Officer Osgoods seizure of the pipe that he observed in plain view justified. Warrantless seizures of objects in plain view do not violate a suspects reasonable expectation of privacy provided that: the object in question was observed from a place where an officer had a right to be; probable cause existed as to the incriminating object; and an officer had lawful right of access to the object. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 832; Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 136-137.) Officer Osgood saw the pipe from a place where he had a right to be, not only because appellant had given up the possession of the room, but also because the officers had the right to safeguard themselves. Once the pipe containing the white residue was seen in plain view, probable cause was present, and it gave officers the legal right to fully enter the room, seize the pipe, and arrest the appellant for possession of drug paraphernalia. Following the arrest, Officer Osgoods seizure of the other contraband was also proper. (See People v. Breault (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 125, 132 [officer may accompany an arrestee who is looking for personal items and seize contraband in plain sight]; also see Washington v. Chrisman (1982) 455 U.S. 1, 7.)

Appellant next contends that the officers could not have conducted a valid parole search because they were not aware of his parole status at the time of the entry. We discuss this argument only insofar as it may impinge upon the scope of the search. Law enforcement officers who have contemporaneous knowledge of a parole search condition can conduct a reasonable parole search without any independent reasonable suspicion. (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 333; People v. Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p.753-754 [for properly conducted parole search, level of intrusion is de minimis because parolee is on notice that that his activities are closely monitored].) Therefore, even if the arrest had not occurred when the pipe was discovered, the further search would have been permitted once the officers knew of appellants parole status. It is undisputed that appellant admitted to Officer Osgood that he was on parole when Officer Osgood stood inside the threshold of the door. The police dispatcher confirmed appellants parole status, contemporaneously with his arrest. Accordingly, the extended search was not only justified for the reasons discussed above, it was also permissible under the aegis of the conditions of appellants parole.

Appellant does not contend that the parole search became constitutionally unreasonable because it was "arbitrary, capricious or harassing". (See People v. Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 752; see also People v. Clower (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1737.)

The fact that officers initially entered the motel room for reasons unrelated to the ultimate search or arrest of appellant, and only later found probable cause to do so, does not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment. (SeeIn re Danny E. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 44, 53 [if probable cause to arrest arises after entry in connection with investigative work, warrantless arrest is proper]; also see Horton v. California, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 135.) Such conduct is consistent with the governments interest to deter commission of recidivist crimes and protect the public at large. (People v. Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 753). To rule otherwise would pragmatically hamper the legitimate investigatory power of the police, and contradict the general purpose of parole and probation search conditions. (SeeIn re Danny E., supra, at p. 53; see also People v. Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 752-753.)

Finally, we conclude that the 84 grams of methamphetamine overlooked in the initial search was also validly seized. When a private citizen turns over an object obtained by private search to the authorities, the authorities can seize the item as evidence without violating the Fourth Amendment, even if the private search was flawed. (United States v. Jacobsen (1984) 466 U.S. 109, 115-116.) Consistent with the holding in People v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d at pp.656-658, three distinct factors distinguish this case from Stoner v. California, cited by appellant. First, the motel management called the police and invited them to return to the room and retrieve the methamphetamine after appellant was evicted. Second, Officer Blacklock was aware of the methamphetamine only because the maintenance worker reported what he found. Finally, it was reasonable for Officer Blacklock to assume that the motel management was the only party able to give consent to entry. (People v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d at pp.656-658 [court upheld marijuana and other paraphernalia seized by police due to express invitation by landlord, in the absence of a tenant who had been evicted].)

It is unnecessary to discuss the federal authorities cited by the appellant regarding parole searches, because we have concluded that the officers initial entry was justified independent of appellants parole status. The confirmation of appellants parole status simply buttresses our conclusion that the entire search was constitutionally permitted.

Among these authorities, appellant cites U.S. v. Crawford (2003 9th Cir.) 323 F.3d 700. This case has been vacated and ordered to be reheard en banc by U.S. v. Crawford 343 F.3d 961.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: Kline, P. J. and Ruvolo, J.


Summaries of

People v. Smith

Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Two.
Nov 25, 2003
No. A100365 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Smith

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES J. SMITH, JR., Defendant…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Two.

Date published: Nov 25, 2003

Citations

No. A100365 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003)