Opinion
No. 342732
04-16-2019
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENEZ ROCHEEM SINGLETON, Defendant-Appellant.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 16-006138-01-FC Before: LETICA, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and BOONSTRA, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Denez Rocheem Singleton, appeals by leave granted his guilty plea convictions for intentionally discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle causing serious impairment (intentional discharge from a vehicle), MCL 750.234a(1)(c), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Singleton was sentenced to 8 to 20 years' imprisonment for the intentional discharge from a vehicle conviction and two years' imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
People v Singleton, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 21, 2018 (Docket No. 342732).
After a drive-by shooting that occurred on February 13, 2016, Singleton was charged with seven criminal offenses: assault with intent to murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83, intentional discharging of a firearm at a building causing serious impairment, MCL 750.234b(4), intentional discharge from a vehicle, assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH), MCL 750.84, being a felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, and felony-firearm. His jury trial was scheduled to commence on January 17, 2017. Before jury selection began, the prosecution placed a plea offer on the record, under which Singleton would plead guilty to AWIM, with a minimum 9-year sentence, and felony-firearm, with a consecutive two-year sentence. The trial court told Singleton it would impose a 15-year maximum sentence for the AWIM conviction. Thus, if he accepted the plea offer, Singleton would serve "9 to 15 [years] plus 2." The court also warned that Singleton would face a sentence of 23½ to 50 years' imprisonment if he went to trial and lost and that, as a result, he might "never see the light of day." Singleton rejected the January 17, 2017 plea offer, and the proceedings continued with jury selection.
The next day, the prosecution presented a modified plea offer requiring Singleton to plead guilty to AWIM and felony-firearm in exchange for a sentence of 8½ to 15½ years' imprisonment for the AWIM conviction and two years' imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. A pending drug charge in another case would also be dismissed. Singleton accepted the modified plea offer but was unable to establish a factual basis for AWIM when questioned. The trial court suggested that Singleton could plead guilty to AWIGBH and face a similar sentence. Following a bench conference, defense counsel suggested that Singleton could plead guilty to intentional discharge from a vehicle. Before the details of the new plea offer were explained to Singleton, the trial court questioned him and established a factual basis for intentional discharge from a vehicle and felony-firearm. The trial court advised Singleton that the offense he was pleading to was "a little different" than the AWIM charge, in that it carried a slightly higher 20-year maximum sentence. Following a short recess, Singleton signed a written version of the plea agreement and the trial court accepted Singleton's guilty plea to intentional discharge from a vehicle and felony-firearm.
Singleton testified that he shot a firearm from a vehicle into a house. The parties agreed that, as a result of Singleton's actions, the victim suffered serious impairment to a bodily function.
Following sentencing, Singleton moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied his motion. This appeal followed.
Singleton argues that the trial court made unduly coercive comments that rendered his guilty plea involuntary. We agree.
While "[t]here is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once the trial court has accepted it," a defendant "may move to have his or her plea set aside on the basis of an error in the plea proceedings." People v Pointer-Bey, 321 Mich App 609, 615; 909 NW2d 523 (2017) (quotations marks and citation omitted). "[A] motion to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing is governed by MCR 6.310(C)[.]" People v Blanton, 317 Mich App 107, 118; 894 NW2d 613 (2016). The defendant must establish a defect in the plea-taking process to prevail. Id. "We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea." Pointer-Bey, 321 Mich App at 615. "A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
MCR 6.302 governs guilty-plea proceedings. Id. at 616. Under MCR 6.302(A), "[t]he court may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless it is convinced that the plea is understanding, voluntary, and accurate." In taking a plea, the trial court must substantially comply with the requirements of MCR 6.302. People v Plumaj, 284 Mich App 645, 649; 773 NW2d 763 (2009). "[T]he crucial question is whether the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, not whether the trial court has engaged in a letter-perfect 'talismanic chant.' " People v Saffold, 465 Mich 268, 280; 631 NW2d 320 (2001). "A plea that is not voluntary and understanding violates the state and federal Due Process Clauses." Blanton, 317 Mich App at 119 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A trial court's participation in plea negotiations raises the possibility of coercion and can render a guilty plea involuntary. People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189, 213; 330 NW2d 834 (1982). "[A] trial judge shall not initiate or participate in discussions aimed at reaching a plea agreement. He may not engage in the negotiation of the bargain itself. The trial judge's role in the plea-bargaining procedure shall remain that of a detached and neutral judicial official." Id. at 205. Judicial participation in plea negotiations creates a "coercive atmosphere" that "renders the defendant's subsequent guilty plea involuntary." Id. at 213. "The voluntariness of a criminal defendant's guilty plea is questionable where a trial court exerts or even seems to exert the authority of its position to induce the defendant to plead guilty." Blase v Appicelli, 195 Mich App 174, 179; 489 NW2d 129 (1992), citing Killebrew, 416 Mich 189; see also People v Williams, 464 Mich 174, 179; 626 NW2d 899 (2001) ("[U]nder Killebrew, the neutrality of the judge is maintained because the recommendation is entirely the product of an agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant.").
Upon request of the parties, however, the trial court may have limited participation in the plea negotiation process. In People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276, 283; 505 NW2d 208 (1993), the Supreme Court held that, "[a]t the request of a party, and not on the judge's own initiative, a judge may state on the record the length of sentence that, on the basis of the information then available to the judge, appears to be appropriate for the charged offense." (Emphasis omitted.) But "[t]o avoid the potential for coercion, a judge must not state or imply alternative sentencing possibilities on the basis of future procedural choices, such as an exercise of the defendant's right to trial by jury or by the court." Id.
Although the terms of the January 17, 2017 plea offer left the maximum sentence for the AWIM conviction to the discretion of the court, the trial court—without request from either party—told Singleton that he would face a sentence of 9 to 15 years' imprisonment for the AWIM conviction and two years' imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction if he accepted the plea offer. The trial court also told Singleton that, if he lost at trial, he could face a sentence of 23½ to "30 or 40 years or 50 years" in prison and that he may "never see the light of day." Further, if he chose to go to trial and lost, "the sentencing consequences . . . will be very severe much more so than the offer that's on the table right now." The trial court's comments regarding the sentence Singleton would face were made on its own initiative, contrary to Cobbs, 443 Mich at 283.
The trial court's participation in the plea negotiation process during the January 18, 2017 proceedings was also improper under Killebrew, 416 Mich at 205. After the trial court determined that Singleton's admissions were insufficient to establish a factual basis for AWIM, the court suggested an alternative charge that would result in a similar sentence if the prosecution withdrew a habitual offender notice. While the trial court's participation in the plea negotiation process was undoubtedly intended to help Singleton and preserve the plea agreement, Killebrew expressly forbids trial courts from participating in plea negotiations in this manner to avoid the risk of a coercive atmosphere that would render the defendant's subsequent guilty plea involuntary. Id. at 205, 213. Because the trial court's improper participation in the plea negotiation process undermined the voluntary nature of Singleton's plea in this case, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Singleton's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Given our resolution above, it is unnecessary to address Singleton's remaining claims on appeal.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra