Opinion
Argued April 6, 2000.
May 22, 2000.
Appeals by the defendant from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Demakos, J.), rendered June 26, 1997, convicting him of murder in the second degree under Indictment No. 5479/94, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence, (2) an amended judgment of the same court, also rendered June 26, 1997, revoking a sentence of probation previously imposed by the same court, upon a finding that he had violated a condition thereof, and imposing a sentence of imprisonment upon his previous adjudication as a youthful offender for attempted robbery in the third degree under Indictment No. 4832/90, and (3) an amended judgment of the same court, also rendered June 26, 1997, revoking a sentence of probation previously imposed by the same court, upon a finding that he had violated a condition thereof, and imposing a sentence of imprisonment upon his previous conviction of attempted robbery in the second degree under Indictment No. 1197/91.
M. Sue Wycoff, New York, N.Y. (Nancy E. Little of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Alyson J. Gill, and Gavin L. Walcott of counsel), for respondent.
Before: DANIEL W. JOY, J.P., ANITA R. FLORIO, HOWARD MILLER, NANCY E. SMITH, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment and amended judgments are affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt of murder in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Tallarine, 223 A.D.2d 738). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in refusing to charge manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide as lesser-included offenses of depraved indifference murder. There was no reasonable view of the evidence which would support a finding that the defendant committed either of the lesser offenses but not the greater (see, CPL 300.50; People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627; People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61).
The defendant contends that the amended judgments under Indictment Nos. 4832/90 and 1197/91 revoking sentences of probation must be reversed since his conviction under Indictment No. 5479/94 must be reversed. Since we are affirming the latter conviction, the amended judgments must be affirmed as well (see, People v. Hodges, 207 A.D.2d 360).
JOY, J.P., FLORIO, H. MILLER and SMITH, JJ., concur.