Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. VA080758, Patrick T. Meyers, Judge.
Landra E. Rosenthal, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Dana M. Ali, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KRIEGLER, J.
Defendant and appellant Jose Ismael Sepulveda-Arias was convicted by jury of first degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 187. The jury found defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b)-(d). The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of 25 years to life for the murder conviction and a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm use.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.
This timely appeal from the judgment raises only one issue. Defendant argues the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of deliberation and premeditation, and as a result, the judgment should either be reversed or, at a minimum, reduced to murder in the second degree. As the record contains the necessary substantial evidence to support a first degree murder conviction, the judgment shall be affirmed.
FACTS
On November 22, 2003, defendant confronted 25-year-old Antolin Zamano (referred to as “Junior” by the witnesses) when he arrived home in Bell Gardens at 7:20 p.m. The confrontation, which lasted 10-20 minutes, was witnessed in varying degrees by Junior’s mother, Natividad Zamano, and a neighbor, Jennifer Herrera. Defendant demanded money from Junior, who told defendant he would have to wait until he received money from his taxes in December.
Junior appeared to be trying to calm defendant, who was loud, aggressive, and pushy. Defendant was wearing a sweater with the hood pulled over his head. Defendant reached toward his pocket, pulled out a gun, and shot without hesitation. Junior was struck with a single gunshot to the forehead as he was reaching for the door to his house. Herrera described defendant as being close enough to Junior so that he was not going to miss when he shot. Defendant backed away, stumbled, and fled the scene.
About eight days before the shooting, Natividad Zamano and Junior were at a video store. As Junior tried to drive out of the driveway, his path was blocked by defendant’s car. Defendant exited his car and spoke angrily with Junior for ten minutes, who was scared by the altercation.
Defendant worked at Hyco Metals in Montebello in 2003. Defendant’s last day of work at Hyco Metals was November 21, 2003, one day before the shooting. An arrest warrant was issued for defendant on January 28, 2004. Defendant was arrested in Arizona on April 30, 2006.
Dr. Pedro Ortiz performed the autopsy on Junior on December 9, 2003, four days after he died in the hospital. Junior suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the head. He never recovered consciousness before death. Dr. Ortiz was unable to determine the distance between the victim and the firearm at the time of the shooting.
Defendant testified that he knew Junior for five months as of November 2003, having met him at work at Hyco Metals. Junior offered to help defendant get a driver’s license, which he could not obtain because he did not have a social security card. Defendant paid Junior $500, but nothing happened and he never got his money back. Defendant filled out credit applications for furniture stores as a favor for Junior. Junior received the furniture, but did not pay, so the stores began calling defendant. The furniture was eventually returned.
Defendant was pulled over while driving his mother’s car in 2003, resulting in the car being impounded. Defendant asked for Junior’s help in retrieving the car, as Junior claimed to have connections. Defendant’s mother paid Junior $700 to retrieve the car from impound, but he did not do so.
Defendant went to Junior’s house on the day of the shooting to talk to Junior. Defendant believed Junior owed him $3,000. He had a revolver he obtained a few days earlier for $20 from a “junkie.” Defendant intended to scare Junior with it.
Defendant, who was upset, asked Junior if he had anything for him, including collateral like his gold watch. Defendant pulled the gun from his sweater pocket and held it to Junior’s face at a distance of five feet to scare him. When Junior moved toward the screen door to the house, defendant shot Junior and walked off. He drove home, where he smoked methamphetamine and drank alcoholic beverages. Defendant went to Oakland for one month. He then went to Mexico for a year and a half before returning to Los Angeles in 2005, where he lived in the same house as before he fled. After one year in Los Angeles, defendant went to Phoenix, where he was arrested.
Defendant was interviewed by detectives, but told them lies that were inconsistent with his trial testimony. He told the detectives he did not know Junior and that he had never been to Bell Gardens. He denied the shooting to the police
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation, essential elements of first degree murder. Defendant asks that review of this issue take into consideration that it was Junior who created the dispute which provoked the ultimate outcome.
A murder by willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing “is murder of the first degree. All other kinds of murders are of the second degree.” (§ 189.) “Review on appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of premeditated and deliberate murder involves consideration of the evidence presented and all logical inferences from that evidence in light of the legal definition of premeditation and deliberation that was previously set forth. Settled principles of appellate review require us to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant premeditated and deliberated beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317-320.) The standard of review is the same in cases such as this where the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932.) ‘Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ (Id. at pp. 932-933, citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124.)
There are three common categories of evidence reflecting on the existence of premeditation and deliberation—planning activity, motive, and the manner of killing. (People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125; People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 25-27.) These “factors, while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive.” (People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125.)
The record contains the necessary substantial evidence of demonstrating the elements of first degree murder. Defendant had an ongoing dispute with Junior over money defendant claimed to be owed, which he resolved with a fatal gunshot. Whether that dispute was the fault of defendant or Junior, the fact is defendant harbored ill will towards Junior and thus had a motive for the killing. Defendant blocked Junior’s car as it exited a parking lot within eight days of the shooting, after which he confronted Junior, who was scared by the incident. Defendant confronted Junior shortly after Junior arrived home on the night of the murder, suggesting defendant had been waiting for Junior’s return. Defendant secreted a firearm in his sweater pocket and with the hood of the sweater over his head as if intending to hide his identity, conduct consistent with advance planning of the murder. The manner of the killing also supports a finding of first degree murder: defendant pulled out the gun and without hesitation killed Junior with a single gunshot wound to the forehead as Junior attempted to open the door to his house.
Moreover, there is little reason to put credence in defendant’s explanation of the circumstances. Defendant fled and was at large for three years after the murder, conduct inconsistent with a mitigated killing and indicative of a consciousness of guilt. Defendant lied repeatedly to the police about knowing Junior, ever being in Bell Gardens, and his involvement in the killing. Again, these circumstances reveal a consciousness of guilt and support the jury’s conclusion that this was a deliberate and premeditated murder.
There is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find defendant guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11; People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 578.) A rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of first degree beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 317-320.) Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J., MOSK, J.