Opinion
2096-04.
Decided September 30, 2005.
Defendant is charged with murder and related crimes. He moved to suppress an in-court identification and statements made to the police. A hearing on defendant's motion was held before me on June 14 and June 21, 2005, at which Detectives Paese and Karpati testified for the People. Although I find both detectives largely credible, I conclude that all of defendant's statements to the police and the prosecutor must be suppressed. I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Detective Karpati, a 20 year veteran of the New York City Police Department, has been a detective since 1994. In October of 2003, Detective Karpati took over the investigation of a shooting that occurred on July 15, 2003. At that time, the only information known to the police was that the shooter was a 5'8" slim male Hispanic wearing a hood, whose nickname was "Ghost." Detective Paese joined the investigation in February of 2004.
On March 18, 2004, Karpati received an anonymous tip indicating that the shooter was a person named "Johnny" who lived at 550 East 147th Street, Apartment 4B. Karpati checked past complaints related to that apartment and found that a complaint had been made by Ms. Maldonado, a resident of the apartment. Karpati went to the apartment and knocked on the door. Defendant opened the door and identified himself as "Johnny Segarra," Ms. Maldonado's boyfriend. Karpati then looked defendant up on the police computers. He discovered that defendant was on parole and was able to get a photograph of defendant to show to witnesses.
On March 21, 2004, Karpati generated two photo arrays from the police computer. He showed the first array to Ms. Ruby Adams, a woman with whom he had spoken on several occasions. Before showing her the array, Karpati asked Ruby to look at the pictures, told her that the perpetrator might or might not be in the array and to tell him if she recognized anyone. Ruby said she thought the shooter was number five and signed her name on the array.
Approximately one half hour later, Karpati went to the home of Sharon Adams, Ruby's daughter. Because Ruby previously disclosed information concerning the case to her daughter, Karpati composed a different photo array to show to Sharon. Karpati told Sharon to look at the pictures and see if she recognized anyone. Sharon said the shooter looked like number two, but refused to sign the array.
On April 20, 2004, Karpati tracked down Michael Yates, a witness with whom he had spoken frequently about the shooting. Yates had told Karpati that he did not know the shooter's name, but had seen him on several occasions with the drug dealers on 185th Street. Karpati showed Yates a photo array including defendant's picture. Yates said the shooter looked like number two but would not commit himself. He wrote on the array that number two looked like the shooter.
After Karpati's session with Yates, he discussed with Detective Paese that Yates had not made a positive identification of defendant. Paese then took Yates into a room and interviewed him. As Paese was writing out Yates' statement and without any prompting by Paese, Yates indicated that he now definitely recognized number two as the shooter. Paese then retrieved the photo array from Karpati and showed it to Yates. Paese pointed to number two and asked "is this the photo array you originally viewed? Is this the person you are talking about in position number two?" Yates confirmed that it was that person. Karpati then gave the photo array to Yates, who crossed out the previous statement that number two looked like the shooter and replaced it with an entry that number two was the shooter.
The photo arrays shown to Ruby Adams, Sharon Adams and Michael Yates were introduced into evidence. All three consisted of pictures of individuals who appeared similar to defendant in age, size, complexion, facial features and hair.
Karpati arranged for defendant to be arrested when he reported to his parole officer on April 22. Upon arriving at the precinct at approximately 2:00 P.M., defendant was handcuffed to a bar in a cell. Karpati told defendant he was there because of a shooting death on July 15, 2003. Over the next several hours, Karpati followed what he described as a "strategy" of feeding defendant details about the case and then letting defendant "stew a little bit" before Karpati returned to the interview cell with more information.
In the course of his conversations with defendant, Karpati told him "look, this is what I have, I have witnesses picking you out, I have people giving you up, I have you." Karpati further advised defendant "I don't need a statement, I have you without a statement, I just want you to tell you to tell me the truth so I can . . . tell the DA your side of the story." Although defendant denied being the shooter, he reached what Karpati characterized as "the breaking point" when Karpati told him that the deceased was holding a knife when Karpati flipped him over. Karpati acknowledged that this was a "ruse," inasmuch as Karpati was never at the crime scene.
After Karpati made this statement as to the knife, there was "a positive response" from defendant. According to the detective, defendant "liked what Karpati said" and told Karpati "yeah, yeah, [the deceased] had a knife." Once defendant admitted being at the scene of the shooting, Karpati told defendant to "hold that thought" and administered Miranda warnings to defendant for the first time.
After acknowledging all his rights and agreeing to speak without an attorney present, defendant made a oral statement, later reduced to writing, in which he admitted to shooting the deceased. Defendant claimed, however, that he acted in self defense. Karpati told defendant that the assistant district attorney was coming. He urged defendant to tell the prosecutor his side of the story so that a decision could be made based on the evidence. While awaiting the assistant district attorney's arrival, defendant was given a soda but did not leave the room.
Approximately an hour after defendant finished giving his statement to Karpati, defendant made a videotaped statement to the assistant district attorney. The interview with the prosecutor took place in the same room as defendant's earlier conversations with Karpati. Defendant was not handcuffed during this interview. Detective Karpati was present throughout the interview and at several points interjected comments to get defendant to clarify or elaborate upon his account of the incident.
At the outset of the interview, the assistant district attorney gave defendant his Miranda rights and defendant agreed to speak without an attorney. During the interview, the prosecutor showed defendant his written statement to Karpati. Defendant acknowledged that the statement was in his handwriting and that the contents of the statement were true.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court denies defendant's motion to suppress any in-court identification by Ruby Stewart, Sharon Stewart or Michael Yates as the product of an improperly suggestive photo array. As noted, all of the photo arrays consisted of persons similar in appearance to defendant's age, size, complexion, facial features and hair. A defendant is not entitled to a photo array composed of identical persons and slight variations as to facial hair do not render a photo array unconstitutionally suggestive. People v. Chipp, 75 NY2d 327, 336 (1990); People v. Callace, 143 AD2d 1027 (2nd Dept. 1998).
The Court does grant defendant's motion to suppress all his statements to the police. The law is clear that when a defendant is in custody, he must be given Miranda warnings before being questioned by the police. The courts have recognized that statements made by the police that are designed to elicit incriminating responses are the "functional equivalent" of interrogation. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 US 291, 301 (1980); People v. Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322 (1984); People v. Bryant, 59 NY2d 786 (1983).
Karpati's statements to defendant over several hours constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation. Karpati acknowledged using a strategy of feeding defendant details about the evidence in the case, letting defendant stew, and then returning to the cell with more information. While all of Karpati's statements to defendant could be considered interrogation under the case law, Karpati's comment to defendant that he wanted to make sure the district attorney knew defendant's side of the story could only have been intended to elicit an incriminating response by defendant, as indeed it did. Based on Karpati's own testimony, is it plain that Karpati improperly failed to give defendant Miranda warnings before interrogating him in a custodial setting. The Court accordingly grants defendant's motion to suppress his pre-Miranda statement made to Karpati.
By not arguing in their memorandum of law for the admissibility of defendant's initial statement to Karpati, the People essentially concede that Karpati engaged in the equivalent of interrogation in violation of defendant's Miranda rights.
The Court also grants defendant's motion to suppress defendant's post-Miranda statements to Karpati, as well as his videotaped statement to the assistant district attorney. The New York Court of Appeals has held as a matter of state constitutional law that where defendant is subject to continuous custodial interrogation, the administration of Miranda warnings after defendant has been interrogated requires suppression of post-Miranda statements "unless there is such a definite, pronounced break in the interrogation that defendant may be said to have returned to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning." People v. Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115 (1975). Since there was no break at all in Karpati's questioning before and after he administered Miranda warnings, defendant's post-Miranda statements to Karpati must be suppressed.
Although New York law is more protective of defendant's rights than federal law [compare Oregon v. Elstad, 470 US 298, 310-311 (1985) (careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings can cure taint of prior, unwarned statement) with People v. Bethea, 67 NY2d 364 (1986) (confirming that rule articulated in Chapple continues to apply as matter of state constitutional law despite Elstad)], it is noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court itself has recognized an exception to Elstad where police deliberately follow the "question first" strategy of giving no Miranda warnings until after interrogation has produced a confession. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). The strategy Karpati admittedly employed thus violates the federal constitution as well.
The law similarly requires suppression of defendant's videotaped statement to the assistant district attorney. In People v. Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130-131 (2005), the Court of Appeals observed: To determine whether there is a "single continuous chain of events" under Chapple, New York courts have considered a number of factors, including the time differential between the Miranda violation and the subsequent admission; whether the same police personnel were present and involved in eliciting each statement; whether there was a change in the location or nature of the interrogation; the circumstances surrounding the Miranda violation, such as the extent of the improper questioning; and whether, prior to the Miranda violation, defendant had indicated a willingness to speak to police. No one factor is determinative and each case must be viewed on its unique facts. The purpose of the inquiry is to assess where there was a sufficiently "definite, pronounced break in the interrogation" to dissipate the taint from the Miranda violation ( Chapple, 38 NY2d at 115). If so, the Mirandized statement is admissible at trial despite the prior, unwarned statement.
When these factors are considered in this case, it is plain that the defendant's statement to the prosecutor must be suppressed. Although Miranda rights were readministered to defendant, only one hour had elapsed since defendant finished making his statement to Kaparti. Defendant never left the interview room in which he made his statements to Karpati. Karpati was present throughout defendant's interview with the assistant district attorney and actively participated in the questioning of defendant. In the course of the prosecutor's interview, defendant was shown his written statement to Karpati and acknowledged its truthfulness. Defendant's statement to the prosecutor mirrored the account he gave to Karpati. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that there was a definite, pronounced break between defendant's statements to Karpati and his statement to the assistant district attorney.
The facts of this case are close to those in People v. Kollar, 305 AD2d 295 (1st Dept. 2003). There, defendant was in the continuous custody of a detective who obtained a statement in violation of defendant's right to remain silent. An hour and a half after defendant's statement to the detective, defendant made a videotaped statement to the district attorney in a different room.
Defendant's statement to the district attorney essentially was the same as his earlier statement. The detective sat next to defendant throughout the interview. The prosecutor held defendant's prior statement in his hands and referred to it during the interview.
The First Department suppressed defendant's videotaped statement to the district attorney, saying:
Defendant was continually in the detective's custody and subjected to the detective's ongoing conversational interrogation for all but what amounted to a short period when the detective completed some paperwork. Although he was moved from the interrogation room to the squad room, that change did not constitute a break in the interrogation as defendant remained constantly under the absolute custody and control of the detective, from the moment he was given his initial Miranda warnings until the completion of the ADA's videotaped interview. If there was a brief "break" in the custodial questioning while the detective attended to paperwork, there was no break in defendant's custodial circumstances. Nor does the fact that the ADA, rather than the detective, conducted the videotaped interview and reread the Miranda warnings establish a sufficient break in the custodial questioning in view of the detective's continued and constant presence at defendant's side during the taping. Any relaxation in the chain of custodial interrogation in these circumstances cannot be said to have been sufficiently pronounced or definite so as to have returned defendant to the status of one no longer under the influence of the earlier questioning.
305 AD2d at 299-300 (citations omitted). See also People v. Robertson, 133 AD2d 355 (2nd Dept. 1987) (suppressing statement made one to two hours after tainted statement, where first interrogator present during videotaped statement to district attorney).
The cases relied upon by the People are distinguishable on their facts. Thus, in People v. Paulman, 5 NY3d 122 (2005), defendant made admissions to the police in his apartment. He voluntarily accompanied state troopers back to their barracks. One of the troopers gave defendant a pad of paper and pen and asked him to jot down the statements he made in the apartment. Defendant spent 15 to 30 minutes memorializing his oral statements, without any further questioning by the police. Over the next half hour, defendant ate pizza and drank soda. He then was taken to a different location and questioned by a different person in a structured question and answer format, after receiving his Miranda rights. Given the change in police personnel involved in the successive interrogations, the fact that the statements were made in different locations and the significant differences in the methods of interrogation, the court held that a reasonable person in defendant's situation "would have perceived a marked change in the tenor of his engagement with the police."
In People v. Davis, 287 AD2d 376 (1st Dept. 2001), defendant's initial statements were made at the scene of the crime 40 minutes before defendant made statements at the precinct. The defendant in People v. Heron, 240 AD2d 156 (1st Dept. 1997) made a statement to the arresting officer while being transported to the precinct. A half hour later, a different officer questioned defendant at the precinct. The arresting officer was not present for that questioning and did not tell anyone about defendant's earlier statement. In People v. Vientos, 164 AD2d 122 (1st Dept. 1990), defendant made admissions at the scene. An hour and a half later, a different officer took a statement from defendant back at the precinct. The arresting officer was not present during this interview. Thus, none of the cases cited by the People are applicable to the facts in this case.
Although not reflected in the First Department's opinion, these facts are gleaned from defendant's appellate brief, at pages 7-8.
Based on Karpati's candid testimony alone, the Court finds that the police violated defendant's Miranda rights. All of defendant's statements are suppressed as fruit of a tree poisoned by Karpati's disregard of defendant's constitutional rights.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.