Summary
In People v Chapple (38 NY2d 112) we held that the late interposition of those warnings would be "too late" unless there was a demonstration of a "pronounced break" in interrogation adequate to justify a finding that the defendant was no longer under the sway of the prior questioning when the warnings were given (id. at 115).
Summary of this case from People v. GuilfordOpinion
Argued October 21, 1975
Decided December 4, 1975
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department, ROBERT J. FEINBERG, J.
Peter E. Murphy for appellant.
Ara Asadourian, District Attorney (Norman J. Dame of counsel), for respondent.
The question before us is whether defendant's confession was voluntary and admissible, given the circumstances under which it was obtained. The County Court, after a Huntley hearing, determined that it was admissible, and the Appellate Division affirmed, two Justices dissenting. We reverse.
On December 3, 1971, at about 1:15 A.M., the defendant and a friend, Albert Beshon, were walking along the side of Route 22, headed toward Plattsburg. State Police Investigator Gerald Luck, driving by in the opposite direction, saw the pair and swung his car around into oncoming traffic in order to pull up beside them. Both Chapple and Luck agreed that Luck asked Chapple where he was going and then got out of the police car.
Luck himself admitted that he told Chapple he wanted to talk to him and ordered him to get into the police car. He further admitted that he "put" Chapple into the car, pushing him under the steering wheel and over into the passenger seat. According to Luck, he then questioned Chapple about several burglaries in the area, one of which had occurred just that night. Luck stated that he drove Chapple to the site of this burglary, where Chapple freely admitted his guilt and showed Luck where he, Chapple, and Beshon had broken into the building. Luck testified that he then gave Chapple his Miranda warnings and continued to question him. He drove Chapple to the sites of two more burglaries, where Chapple admitted to each of these and also to a fourth a little farther away. Luck stated that he then drove Chapple to police headquarters.
Once there, he questioned Chapple about each burglary, beginning with the latest one and working backward in time. After each round of questioning, Luck stated that he then typed up a confession and had Chapple read it. When this had produced four confessions, one for each burglary, he took Chapple before a local notary public to sign the four confessions. All of this activity consumed about four hours from the time Luck saw Chapple on the road.
Chapple's own testimony confirms the sequence of events in substance. His story differed from Luck's only in the following respects: Chapple testified that Luck hit him while in the police car, bashed his head against a briefcase in the front seat, and threatened to throw Chapple off a nearby bridge if he did not confess to the burglaries. According to Chapple, he originally refused to get into the police car unless Luck had a warrant and unless he was under arrest, and refused to talk to Luck unless he was given a lawyer. Chapple testified that Luck repeated his threats periodically during the typing and signing procedures at the police station. He also testified that he believed these threats and was frightened of Luck during the entire procedure.
The majority below affirmed Chapple's conviction, upon his plea of guilty to one count of burglary, on the authority of People v Tanner ( 30 N.Y.2d 102). In that case we affirmed the conviction of a defendant whose testimony, directed toward the "cat out of the bag" theory (see United States v Bayer, 331 U.S. 532), the lower courts found wholly incredible. The credibility of that defendant was for the lower courts to assess; we did not review their conclusions. Moreover, we refused to adopt any rule which would have the effect of automatically invalidating a confession. (See, also, People v Stephen J.B., 23 N.Y.2d 611, 615; People v Jennings, 33 N.Y.2d 880, affg 40 A.D.2d 357, 363.)
The case before us, however, unlike Tanner, is not premised on the theory that the defendant may have made his second confession on constraint of his first one. Chapple's defense, as noted by the dissenters in the Appellate Division, is premised instead on the theory that the sequence of events, beginning with his impulsive and apparently illegal arrest and ending with the four signed confessions, was, in reality, a single continuous chain of events. Because it focused on the Tanner approach, the majority made no findings of fact with respect to the continuous chain of events in this case. We hold that, as a matter of law, such a theory may support a claim that a confession such as this one is inadmissible because not truly voluntary.
The record discloses no probable cause for the stop and, hence, the arrest would appear to be illegal and any fruits thereof tainted (see Brown v Illinois, 422 U.S. 590; People v Martinez, 37 N.Y.2d 662). The issue was not raised in either tribunal below and may not be considered here because the People were never put to their burden to show that the police conduct was legal (cf. People v Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 367; People v Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389, 391; People v Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 91).
For authority we need look no further than Westover v United States ( 384 U.S. 436), the companion case to Miranda itself. (Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.) In Westover, the defendant was arrested by local police and questioned about a particular crime. After several hours of interrogation, he was turned over to FBI agents in the same police station for questioning about two other crimes. Although the FBI agents administered warnings before beginning their questioning, and, though its agents constituted a separate interrogating team and represented a different sovereignty under our Federal system of governments, the Supreme Court found those warnings insufficient to overcome the effects of prior continuous interrogation. The court explained that a defendant under such continuous and custodial interrogation may well be put in such a state of mind that the warnings which would ordinarily suffice will no longer be enough to protect his rights.
Warnings, to be effective under the combined holdings in Miranda and Westover, must precede the subjection of a defendant to questioning. Later is too late, unless there is such a definite, pronounced break in the interrogation that the defendant may be said to have returned, in effect, to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning. (George, The Fruits of Miranda: Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 39 U Col L Rev 478, 492-493; see United States ex rel. B. v Shelly, 430 F.2d 215, 218; Harney v United States, 407 F.2d 586; Evans v United States, 375 F.2d 355; cf. Darwin v Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346; Clewis v Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710; Matter of Michael G., 40 A.D.2d 520; United States v Knight, 395 F.2d 971, cert den 395 U.S. 930.)
Unlike theories which require examination of a defendant's testimony as to his state of mind and, thus, an assessment of his credibility, the Westover approach may be based on an assessment of external events. We find that the testimony of Officer Luck himself, in the case before us, supplies ample basis for the conclusion that Chapple was subjected to such a continuous interrogation that the Miranda warnings administered at the site of the burglary were insufficient to protect his rights. Given that insufficiency, his later confessions must be suppressed.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division must be reversed, the motion to suppress granted, the plea vacated, and the matter remitted to the County Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES and WACHTLER concur; Judge COOKE taking no part.
Order reversed, etc.