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People v. Schaeffer

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.
Jul 31, 2012
208 Cal.App.4th 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)

Summary

In Schaeffer, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and being under the influence of a controlled substance.

Summary of this case from People v. Porcadilla

Opinion

No. E053499.

07-31-2012

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SUSAN ANN SCHAEFFER, Defendant and Appellant.


Neil Auwarter , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris , Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette , Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland , Assistant Attorney General, Gil Gonzalez , Anthony Da Silva and Scott C. Taylor , Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

[CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION]

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part II.

OPINION

HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J.

Defendant and appellant Susan Ann Schaeffer was charged by felony complaint with possessing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 1), being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a); count 2), and possessing a hypodermic syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, former § 4140; count 3). The complaint also alleged that defendant was in violation of her probation. Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pled guilty to counts 1 and 2 and admitted that she was in violation of her probation. The trial court placed her on probation for three years, under certain terms and conditions, including that she participate in a drug treatment program. (Pen. Code, § 1210.1.)

All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted.

On appeal, defendant contends (1) the probation condition limiting her to a residence approved by the probation officer violates her constitutional right to travel and freedom of association and (2) the court erred in imposing a drug program fee and reimbursement for probation costs, since it failed to make a finding on her ability to pay. We remand the matter for the trial court to make a finding on defendant's ability to pay. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts of the case are not relevant to the issues on appeal. According to the complaint, on April 23, 2011, defendant possessed methamphetamine (count 1) and was under the influence of a controlled substance (count 2). ANALYSIS

I. The Court Properly Imposed the Residence Approval Probation Condition

The probation conditions imposed by the court included a requirement that defendant "[r]eside at a residence approved by the Probation Officer and not move without his/her prior approval." Defendant contends that this probation condition is unconstitutionally broad, since it infringes upon her right to travel and freedom of association. We conclude that the condition is narrowly tailored to further the state's interest in defendant's rehabilitation. Therefore, the court properly imposed it.

As noted by the People, the minute order reflects that the condition requires defendant to "[i]nform the probation officer of [her] place of residence and reside at a residence approved by the probation officer." However, the sentencing memorandum form reflects that the condition requires defendant to "[r]eside at a residence approved by the Probation Officer and not move without his/her approval." Thus, there is a discrepancy between the clerk's minute order and the sentencing memorandum form. The reporter's transcript reflects that the court asked defendant if she went over all of the probation terms checked off on the sentencing memorandum form, and if she agreed to follow them. Defendant said yes and waived the court's reading of all the conditions. The court then placed defendant on formal probation. The record of oral pronouncement controls over the minute order. ( People v. Farell (2002) , 384, fn. 2 [ , ].)

Although defendant did not object to this condition in the trial court, the parties agree that she has not waived this claim. The claim is cognizable on appeal, as it presents a "pure question[] of law" turning on undisputed facts. ( People v. Welch (1993) , 235 [ , ].) Defendant's challenged probation condition can easily be remedied on appeal by modification of the condition. ( In re Sheena K. (2007) , 888-889 [ , ].)

(1) "Trial courts have broad discretion to set conditions of probation in order to `foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.' [Citations.] ... [¶] However, the trial court's discretion in setting the conditions of probation is not unbounded." (People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624 .) A term of probation is invalid if it "`(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality....'" (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 [124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545].)

(2) "If a probation condition serves to rehabilitate and protect public safety, the condition may `impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is "not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens."' [Citation.]" (People v. O'Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355 .) "[W]here an otherwise valid condition of probation impinges on constitutional rights, such conditions must be carefully tailored, `"reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation...."' [Citations.]" (People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 942 (Bauer).)

Defendant relies upon Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 937, in which the reviewing court struck a residence approval condition, which seemed designed to prevent the defendant from living with his parents because they were overprotective. Nothing in the record suggested that the defendant's homelife contributed to the crimes of which he was convicted (false imprisonment and simple assault), or that his homelife was reasonably related to future criminality. (Id. at p. 944.) The court concluded that the residence approval condition impinged on the right to travel and freedom of association, and was extremely broad since it gave the probation officer the power to forbid the defendant from living with or near his parents. (Ibid.)

The present case is distinguishable. Defendant here pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine and being under the influence of a controlled substance. Where she lives will directly affect her rehabilitation (e.g., without any limitations, defendant could choose to live in a residence where drugs are used or sold). Under these circumstances, the state's interest in defendant's rehabilitation is properly served by the residence approval condition.

(3) Furthermore, the legal landscape has changed since Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d 937. The Supreme Court stated in People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1] (Olguin), that "[a] probation condition should be given `the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 382.) We view the residence approval condition here in light of Olguin and presume a probation officer will not withhold approval for irrational or capricious reasons. (Id. at p. 383.)

(4) Moreover, we observe that "probation is a privilege and not a right, and that adult probationers, in preference to incarceration, validly may consent to limitations upon their constitutional rights — as, for example, when they agree to warrantless search conditions. [Citations.]" (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 384.) "If a defendant believes the conditions of probation are more onerous than the potential sentence, he or she may refuse probation and choose to serve the sentence. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 379.)

(5) We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the condition that defendant, as a term of her probation, reside at a residence approved by the probation officer and not move without the officer's prior approval. II. The Matter Should be Remanded for a Hearing on Defendant's Ability to Pay

See footnote, ante, page 1.

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of conducting a hearing on whether defendant has the financial ability to pay the challenged fines and fees. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

McKinster, J., and Miller, J., concurred.


Summaries of

People v. Schaeffer

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.
Jul 31, 2012
208 Cal.App.4th 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)

In Schaeffer, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and being under the influence of a controlled substance.

Summary of this case from People v. Porcadilla

In People v. Schaeffer (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1, the court interpreted a similar residence provision in light of Olguin and "presume[d] a probation officer will not withhold approval for irrational or capricious reasons.

Summary of this case from People v. Sauls
Case details for

People v. Schaeffer

Case Details

Full title:The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Susan Ann SCHAEFFER, Defendant…

Court:Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Date published: Jul 31, 2012

Citations

208 Cal.App.4th 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29
12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8628
2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10512

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