Opinion
D071835
04-12-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHELSEA SAUNDERS, Defendant and Appellant.
Lindsey M. Ball, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCD261845) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kathleen M. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed. Lindsey M. Ball, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Chelsea Saunders pleaded guilty to assaulting a peace officer with a firearm and making a criminal threat, and admitted to a firearm-use enhancement allegation. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (d), 422, 12022.5, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(11), (23), (31).) As part of her guilty plea, Saunders agreed to a stipulated sentence of 17 years 8 months. Shortly after, Saunders moved to withdraw her guilty plea, claiming she misunderstood the plea agreement because she thought she had agreed to a sentence of 17 months 8 days. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Saunders did not meet her burden to show she misunderstood the plea agreement and denied the motion. On appeal, Saunders contends the trial court abused its discretion. We reject her arguments, and affirm.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Background
In April 2015 Saunders was arrested after she engaged in a physical struggle with a police officer during which she reached for the officer's firearm in the officer's holster, discharging the weapon. In the criminal complaint, the district attorney charged Saunders with attempted murder, assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm, making criminal threats, and resisting arrest. The complaint also alleged that Saunders personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
After Saunders pleaded not guilty, the court held a preliminary hearing. During a prehearing conference, the prosecutor noted the charged section 12022.5 firearm-use enhancement carries a 10-year consecutive sentence, and he had not yet determined whether to add a section 12022.53, subdivision (c) enhancement that required a 20-year consecutive sentence for a defendant's personal and intentional discharge of a firearm. The court said this additional charge would be a "game changer" in plea negotiations. The prosecutor agreed and asked—for purposes of assisting both counsel with plea negotiations—if the court would make a finding after the preliminary hearing "as to whether or not the 12022.53(c) flies or not, if there is sufficient evidence for that." Saunders's retained counsel, George Gedulin, agreed with this proposal.
During the evidentiary portion of the preliminary hearing, San Diego Police Officer Kalena Tutt testified that she responded to a report of a woman disturbing car wash customers. Officer Tutt found Saunders sitting behind a pillar surrounded by alcohol containers. Believing Saunders was drunk, Officer Tutt attempted to detain her. Saunders physically resisted the officer, saying, "Fuck you" and "I'll kill you" multiple times. During the struggle, Saunders reached into Officer Tutt's holster, and discharged the officer's sidearm. After Saunders fired the gun, Officer Tutt subdued Saunders and detained her with the assistance of another officer. Throughout the interaction with the officers, Saunders repeatedly made threats toward the officers' lives and safety.
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the court stated: "[T]his is a very clear case of an attempted murder . . . . [¶] . . . If you look at the acts that were described and the words that she used, the words were extremely indicative of what her specific intent was, and it was to shoot the officer." The court found a witness's statement that he saw Saunders was still reaching for the gun after the shot was fired to be "very significant," stating, "This is not a close case. I'm just being blunt about it." Based on the evidence presented, the court found reasonable cause to hold Saunders to answer to all of the charges, including attempted murder.
The court additionally addressed the potential section 12022.53, subdivision (c) enhancement allegation, stating: "[T]here was a specific request for the Court to make a finding as to whether there was an intentional discharge [within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (c)]. I'm finding that there was an intentional discharge, but I'm not binding over on that at this point . . . . It's not part of what is in the complaint." The court also noted that it would be appropriate for the defense "to pursue the mental health issues further as far as presenting [the issues] to the People for their consideration . . . ."
Information and Pleas
The next month, in October 2015, Saunders was charged by information with numerous offenses: attempted murder; assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm; making criminal threats; attempted taking of a firearm from a police officer; possession of a firearm by a felon; and resisting an officer. On the assault and attempted murder counts, the information alleged firearm-use enhancements under section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The information also alleged serious felonies under section 1192.7.
In November 2015, Saunders pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. The court ordered a psychiatric examination, and Saunders was examined twice. In March 2016, Dr. David Naimark filed his psychiatric evaluation report. Dr. Naimark stated that Saunders has been variously diagnosed with bipolar disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and schizophrenia, and it "it appears that schizoaffective disorder (bipolar type), is the diagnosis that best captures the longitudinal course of the illness." After an extensive analysis of her background and the current crime, Dr. Naimark opined that Saunders was "intoxicated and psychotic at the time of the instant offense, but neither the intoxication or the psychosis affected her ability to know and understand what she was doing, or to be able to distinguish right from wrong."
Guilty Plea
After multiple continuances, in September 2016, Saunders pleaded guilty to assaulting a peace officer and making criminal threats, and admitted the serious felony (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(11), (23) & (31)) and firearm enhancements (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the other charges (including attempted murder), and the parties agreed to a stipulated sentence of 17 years 8 months in state prison.
On the written plea agreement, Saunders initialed the statement that she had "not been induced to enter this plea by any promise or representation . . . , except: [¶] Stip 17 years 8 months State Prison." She also initialed the box stating she understood "that I may receive this maximum punishment as a result of my plea: 17y 8m . . . imprisonment . . . ." She additionally initialed the box stating that she is "sober and my judgment is not impaired. I have not consumed any drug, alcohol or narcotic within the past 24 hours." Her attorney (Gedulin) also signed the form, stating: "I . . . personally read and explained to the defendant the entire contents of this plea form and any addendum thereto. I discussed all charges and possible defenses with the defendant, and the consequences of this plea . . . . I personally observed the defendant fill in and initial each item, or read and initial each item to acknowledge his/her understanding and waivers. I observed the defendant date and sign this form and any addendum. I concur in the defendant's plea and waiver of constitutional rights."
Superior Court Judge Kathleen Lewis presided over the change-of-plea hearing. Before accepting the guilty plea, Judge Lewis advised Saunders of her constitutional rights and extensively questioned Saunders to ascertain her comprehension of the plea agreement. Saunders affirmatively answered that she read and understood the plea forms and thoroughly discussed the contents with her attorney. Judge Lewis twice asked Saunders if she understood she would spend "17 years and eight months" in state prison. (Italics added.) Saunders responded "Yes" each time.
Sentencing Hearing
At her November 2016 sentencing hearing, Saunders asked the court to relieve her retained attorney (Gedulin), and appoint a public defender because she wanted to withdraw her guilty plea. The court granted Saunders's request.
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
Saunders then filed a plea withdrawal motion. The sole basis of the motion was Saunders's assertion that she misunderstood the plea agreement, "believ[ing] that she would be sentenced to seventeen months and eight days in prison rather than seventeen years and eight months in state prison." (Italics added.)
At the February 2017 hearing on the motion, Judge Lewis again presided. At the outset of the hearing, both counsel stipulated that at the change-of-plea hearing, Judge Lewis expressly advised Saunders that "her stipulated agreement was . . . 17 years, 8 months." (Italics added.)
To establish that she nonetheless did not understand the stipulated sentence length, Saunders testified that she did not "hear" this admonition. Saunders said she "didn't hear years any of the times that it was said," claiming she "thought [the sentence was] 17 months and 8 days." Saunders said the first time she heard the term "years" referring to her prison sentence was at her sentencing hearing in November 2016. She also testified she was unaware of the charges to which she had pleaded guilty, thinking "it was like attempted murder and something else." When asked what she would have done had she known the sentence was 17 years 8 months in prison, Saunders testified, "I would have taken it to trial."
On cross-examination, Saunders admitted initialing the guilty plea form next to the statement that she was stipulating to "17 years, 8 months state prison." However, she claimed "the whole time I was told 17, 8. I never heard years. I would have never signed my life away. I'm completely innocent in this case." Saunders testified that her attorney went over the plea agreement with her, but claimed she "just initialed it. I didn't read it . . . I don't know why. I made a big mistake not reading it." Despite being told her sentence would be for 17 years and 8 months, Saunders claimed the only time 17 years actually "registered" in her mind was at the November 2016 sentencing hearing.
In opposing Saunders's motion, the prosecutor called Gedulin, Saunders's retained counsel who represented her at the preliminary hearing and at the change-of-plea hearing. Gedulin testified that before reaching a plea agreement, he discussed the possibility of an attempted murder charge with Saunders. Those discussions also included a potential life sentence with the possibility of parole, and a section 12022.53, subdivision (c) intentional firearm-discharge enhancement potentially exposing Saunders to an additional 20 years. Gedulin testified that he explained the entire plea agreement form to Saunders, including the portion of the form stating that the stipulated sentence was "17 years 8 months State Prison." With respect to the reference on the form that the maximum punishment was "17y 8m," Gedulin testified that he reviewed this statement with Saunders and explained to her that this meant "17 years, 8 months." Gedulin said that if he had any hesitation or reservation about Saunders's ability to understand the plea agreement, he would not have permitted her to sign the agreement.
Counsel's Arguments and Court's Ruling
At the conclusion of the testimony, defense counsel asked the court to grant Saunders's plea-withdrawal motion based on her testimony that she "was not aware of the consequences of her plea. She believed she would be get[ting] 17 months 8 days. Had she understood it was going to be 17 years, 8 months, she would have gone to trial." The prosecutor responded that the plea agreement was accurately explained to Saunders and understood by her, as reflected in her counsel's testimony, her signature and initials on the plea form, and her responses to the court manifesting that she understood her stipulated sentence was 17 years 8 months.
After considering the evidence and arguments, the court denied Saunders's motion, finding she did not meet her burden to show she misunderstood the plea agreement. The court based its decision on three factors: (1) Gedulin's testimony that he went over the form completely with Saunders and did not have any doubt as to her understanding of it, including the 17-year, 8-month sentence; (2) Saunders signed the plea agreement under penalty of perjury; and (3) Judge Lewis's personal experience taking the change of plea from Saunders. On the latter factor Judge Lewis described her own custom and practice when taking a change of plea: "I always ask first . . . did you read and understand all the change of plea forms . . . [¶] . . . [and] [d]id you thoroughly discuss the contents of the plea form with your attorney. If there is ever a negative response on either of those, I halt and . . . we either go over the form or discuss it with their attorney." Judge Lewis also stated that she was "convinced" Gedulin "honestly testified" that he orally advised Saunders of the 17-year, 8-month sentence.
Based on the evidence and her own observations and evaluation of Saunders, Judge Lewis said she was "not convinced that [Saunders's] ability to understand what was going on was impaired, that she hadn't read [the] form, that she hadn't been fully advised." The court denied Saunders's motion, and sentenced her to 17 years 8 months in state prison.
DISCUSSION
Saunders contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her plea withdrawal motion.
The People contend Saunders waived her appellate rights in the plea agreement. For purposes of this appeal, we do not find Saunders forfeited her appellate rights as she obtained a probable cause certificate. (§ 1237.5.)
I. Governing Law
Section 1018 states "the court may, . . . for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn . . . ." The defendant has the burden to show good cause by clear and convincing evidence. (People v. Breslin (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1415-1416.) Good cause exists if the defendant was operating under mistake, ignorance, inadvertence, fraud, duress, or any other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment. (Id. at p. 1416.) A trial court's ruling on a plea withdrawal motion will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 917 (Ravaux); People v. Weaver (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 131, 146.) When assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must adopt the trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. (Ravaux, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 917.)
Relying on a sentence in a footnote in a dissenting opinion, Saunders's counsel suggests we should apply a different and stricter standard in evaluating a denial of a plea withdrawal motion. (See People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 70, fn. 3.) The argument is unpersuasive. The applicable review standards are well settled. In future filings, counsel should familiarize herself with ethical obligations when citing to dissenting opinions.
II. Analysis
The factual record supports the trial court's denial of Saunders's plea withdrawal motion. Before entering the plea, Saunders initialed the guilty plea form confirming the plea was free and voluntary; she was sober and her judgment not impaired by drugs or alcohol; and she understood the information on the form. She placed her initials next to the statement that the stipulated sentence was "17 years 8 months State Prison," and placed her initials next to the statement that the maximum punishment was "17y 8m." She twice answered "Yes" to the court's questions whether she understood that her sentence would be "17 years and eight months." (Italics added.) In his testimony (which the court found credible), Saunders's former attorney confirmed that he specifically discussed the 17-year, 8-month stipulated sentence with Saunders; he explained the meaning of "17y 8m"; Saunders appeared to understand this information; and he would not have permitted Saunders to agree to the plea if he had any doubts regarding her understanding of the plea agreement.
On this record, the court had a reasonable basis to conclude Saunders did not satisfy her burden to establish a basis for a plea withdrawal. Based on the evidence that the 17-year, 8-month maximum sentence was clearly and repeatedly communicated to her and that Saunders manifested no confusion regarding the meaning of these communications, the court could logically reject Saunders's current claims that she misunderstood the length of the maximum sentence. The court acted within its discretion in declining to credit Saunders's testimony that when she heard and read "years," she thought this meant "months."
In challenging the court's factual conclusion, Saunders focuses on evidence that supports her assertion that she did not understand the plea agreement. For example, she argues she does not have a history of committing "serious" crimes, and on a prior resisting-arrest conviction she was placed on probation for only three years. Based on these facts, Saunders argues she "was not prepared to understand" that her current crime carried such a severe sentence. Even assuming Saunders's argument is reasonable given the undisputed evidence that she was expressly informed of the 17-year, 8-month sentence, the trial court had factual grounds to decline to draw this inference from the evidence. This court does not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. (See People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1170.)
For similar reasons we find unhelpful Saunders's reliance on her testimony at the plea-withdrawal hearing that she thought she had pleaded guilty to attempted murder. Saunders argues that the court should have inferred from this statement that she was also confused about the plea agreement's maximum sentence. Although the court could have drawn this inference, it was not required to do so and we are bound by the court's factual conclusions. "Where two conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, it is the reviewing court's duty to adopt the one supporting the challenged order." (People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 104.)
Saunders's reliance on People v. McGarvy (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 557 is misplaced. The McGarvy court held the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside a guilty plea because the record showed the defendant had only a casual and perfunctory conversation with an attorney who was unfamiliar with the case and had not yet been appointed to represent the defendant. (Id. at pp. 560-563.) This case is different because the record shows Saunders was represented by counsel, and had a full and fair opportunity to discuss the plea agreement with her attorney.
Saunders contends the court abused its discretion because the court "did not assess the impact of [her] mental illness upon her ability to understand the terms of the plea agreement . . . ." This issue is not properly before us because her counsel never raised her mental illness as grounds for finding that she misunderstood the plea agreement. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880-881 (Sheena K.).) Moreover, the evidence does not support that a mental disability precluded Saunders from understanding the nature of the plea agreement. The March 2015 psychiatric report reflected that Saunders suffers from serious mental illness and that she was experiencing active psychotic symptoms at the time of the current offense. But the report also noted that Saunders's symptoms can sometimes be controlled by medication and that she was calm and cooperative at the time of the psychiatric examination.
At the plea-withdrawal hearing Judge Lewis (who also presided over the guilty plea) said that her custom and practice is to ensure the defendant has read and understood the plea form and had the opportunity to discuss the plea form with his or her attorney. Judge Lewis said that if there is "ever a negative response on either of those, I halt, and . . . we either go over the form or discuss it with [the defendant's] attorney." Gedulin likewise testified that if he had any doubts about Saunders's ability to understand the plea agreement, he would not have permitted her to sign the agreement.
These statements, together with Saunders's testimony and appropriate responses to the court's inquiries, support that Saunders understood the plea agreement. Judge Lewis had the full opportunity to observe Saunders's demeanor at the change-of-plea hearing and the plea-withdrawal hearing. Absent any contrary showing in the record, we defer to the trial court's assessment that Saunders knowingly and intelligently agreed to the plea agreement, and understood all terms of the agreement. (See People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1129 [mental illness does " 'not necessarily imply incompetence or a reduced ability to understand, and make decisions about, the conduct of the proceedings' "].)
To the extent Saunders relies on facts outside the record to claim she was mentally incompetent when she pleaded guilty to the charges, this claim is appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. --------
Finally, Saunders contends the trial court should have granted her motion because of the unreasonable nature of the plea agreement and the prejudicial impact of enforcing it. She highlights the evidence favoring her version that the gun discharge was accidental. Saunders forfeited this contention by failing to raise it as a ground for withdrawing her plea. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 880.) But even if she had preserved the issue, the record supports that the agreement was reasonable. Had Saunders elected to proceed to trial and the jury rejected her defense, she would have been exposed to a life sentence for the attempted-murder-on-a-peace-officer charge. (See § 664, subd. (e).) Saunders also could have faced the more severe section 12022.53, subdivision (c) firearm enhancement allegation.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HALLER, J. WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.