Opinion
2016–05427 Ind. No. 127/12
01-17-2018
Mark M. Baker, New York, NY, for appellant. William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Kirsten A. Rappleyea of counsel), for respondent.
Mark M. Baker, New York, NY, for appellant.
William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Kirsten A. Rappleyea of counsel), for respondent.
L. PRISCILLA HALL, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, SANDRA L. SGROI, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDERAppeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Craig S. Brown, J.), rendered May 18, 2016, convicting him of falsely reporting an incident in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of falsely reporting an incident in the third degree (see Penal Law § 240.50[2] ) beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Barto, 144 A.D.3d 1641, 1642, 41 N.Y.S.3d 838 ; People v. Krebbeks, 140 A.D.3d 1785, 1786, 32 N.Y.S.3d 411 ; People v. Taylor, 79 A.D.3d 944, 948, 913 N.Y.S.2d 308 ). The defendant contends that the testimony of a prosecution witness was incredible as a matter of law. We conclude that the testimony of this witness, an individual whom the defendant had previously recruited as a confidential informant in the defendant's capacity as a county law enforcement officer, was credible as a matter of law. Nor was this a case "in which all of the evidence of guilt came from a single prosecution witness who gave irreconcilable testimony pointing both to guilt and innocence, leaving the jury without basis, other than impermissible speculation, for its determination of either" ( People v. Thomas, 139 A.D.3d 764, 765, 30 N.Y.S.3d 687 ; see People v. Delamota, 18 N.Y.3d 107, 114, 936 N.Y.S.2d 614, 960 N.E.2d 383 ). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
Moreover, the County Court providently exercised its discretion in permitting the People to present testimony concerning attempted extractions of cell phones to recover deleted text messages, and in allowing testimony relating to the rules and regulations of the drug task force, since such testimony gave context to records that were admitted on consent (see People v. Johnson, 137 A.D.3d 811, 812, 26 N.Y.S.3d 356 ; People v. Wisdom, 120 A.D.3d 724, 725, 991 N.Y.S.2d 141 ), and the probative value was not outweighed by the prejudice to the defendant (see People v. Brewer, 28 N.Y.3d 271, 277, 44 N.Y.S.3d 339, 66 N.E.3d 1057 ; People v. Beer, 146 A.D.3d 895, 896, 47 N.Y.S.3d 38 ). Moreover, the court did not err in admitting into evidence certain portions of the defendant's testimony given at a prior trial on the instant indictment since such testimony constituted judicial admissions (see Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 ; People v. King, 158 A.D.2d 471, 471, 550 N.Y.S.2d 921 ), was relevant, and demonstrated a consciousness of guilt on the defendant's part (see generally People v. Kent, 79 A.D.3d 52, 69, 910 N.Y.S.2d 78, mod 19 N.Y.3d 290, 947 N.Y.S.2d 798, 970 N.E.2d 833 ).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
HALL, J.P., AUSTIN, SGROI and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.