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People v. Sardina

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Jan 25, 2012
B233143 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2012)

Opinion

B233143

01-25-2012

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICHARD SARDINA, Defendant and Appellant.

Murray A. Rosenberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA089630)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Steven D. Blades, Judge. Affirmed.

Murray A. Rosenberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted appellant Richard Sardina of attempted murder in violation of Penal Code sections 187 and 664 (count 1) and two counts of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (counts 3, 4). The jury found that appellant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) with respect to count 1 and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) in count 4. In a bifurcated court trial, the trial court found appellant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon with two prior convictions in violation of section 12021, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2). The trial court found true the allegations that, with respect to counts 1 through 4, appellant had suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony and that he had suffered a prior prison term. (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); 667, subds. (b)-(i); 667.5, subd. (b).)

All further references to statutes are to the Penal Code unless stated otherwise.

After denying appellant's Romero motion, the trial court sentenced him to the high term of nine years in count 1. In count 2, the trial court imposed a consecutive term of one-third the midterm (eight months). In each of counts 3 and 4, the trial court imposed one-third the midterm of three years (one year) to run consecutively to count 1. The trial court doubled the sentence pursuant to the Three Strikes law to 23 years four months. The trial court added a one-year enhancement corresponding to the deadly weapon allegation in count 1, a one-year enhancement corresponding to the great bodily injury allegation in count 4, and a one-year enhancement for the prior prison sentence allegation. Appellant's total sentence is 26 years four months.

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).

Appellant appeals on the grounds that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction in count 1; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction in count 4; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike his single prior felony conviction.

FACTS

Prosecution Evidence

Three months before January 29, 2010, Yolanda Ruiz and four of her children had moved into the Pomona home of her mother, Emma Ruiz. Also living in the home were Yolanda's father, another child of Yolanda's in Emma's care, and appellant. Appellant was Yolanda's nephew and Emma's grandson. Emma had raised appellant since he was a child. Although Yolanda repeatedly denied it at trial, she had an argument with Emma that day about the care of Yolanda's children. Yolanda was screaming at Emma. Appellant told Armando Ruiz, Yolanda's brother who was visiting at the time, that he was getting tired of Yolanda disrespecting his grandmother.

Yolanda returned to her room after the argument. Appellant entered and said to her that "this is . . . to teach you to respect my grandmother," and he hit her in the eye with a closed fist approximately two times. Armando was in the room also, but he was "just looking." Appellant then pushed Yolanda and she fell to the floor. There was an iron nearby, and appellant wrapped the cord from the iron around Yolanda's neck. Appellant knelt on Yolanda's back and began pulling the cord. Yolanda yelled for her mother. Yolanda thought she lost consciousness "a little." She was not able to put her fingers under the cord to pull it out and she saw "blue and stars." Yolanda stated that appellant stopped strangling Yolanda because her mother was knocking for them to open the door, although Emma testified that she did not knock. When she got up, Yolanda realized she had urinated and defecated in her pants.

Yolanda called her daughter, who called the police. Appellant was gone when the police arrived, but he was arrested at Emma's home on February 11, 2010. Yolanda went to the Pomona Valley Hospital where police took photographs of the injuries to her face and neck. The photographs were shown to the jury.

Yolanda acknowledged that she had sustained a felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance in March 2010. She acknowledged giving false information to a police officer on January 13, 2010.

Malinda Wheeler, a nurse practitioner and forensic nurse, testified as an expert regarding strangulation and its effects on the body. She testified that it was not unusual for radiology results to be normal after a strangulation incident, as Yolanda's results were. She believed the photographs showed injuries consistent with some type of trauma to Yolanda's neck.

Pomona police officers Thomas Delavega and Tomas Ramirez responded to the call at the Ruiz residence. Officer Ramirez acted as an interpreter. Yolanda told the officers she had had an argument with her mother that morning. She went to her room and appellant entered and began to assault her. He hit her in the face and began to strangle her. This lasted from three to five seconds. She said she had defecated on herself. She did not say she passed out, only that she thought she was going to. Officer Delavega observed that Yolanda had a black eye, a swollen right eye, an abrasion to her right forehead, a bloody lip, swollen mouth, and strangulation marks around her neck.

Officer Delavega took Armando's statement at the scene. Armando said that appellant asked him if he could beat up his sister Yolanda, and Armando understood this to be a joke. At trial, Armando denied that appellant said this. Armando told Officer Delavega that he entered Yolanda's bedroom when he heard arguing, and he saw appellant push his sister on her chest. Yolanda was apologizing. He saw appellant punch his sister and grab a white cord and wrap it around his sister's neck and choke her. In a later interview at the police station, Armando said he did not want his statements traced back to him because he was fearful of appellant.

When Sergeant Matthew Stone of the City of Pomona Police Department arrested appellant at his grandmother's home on February 11, 2010, appellant was found sleeping on the living room couch. When appellant got up, Sergeant Stone saw a single-action revolver between a seat cushion and a back cushion. The gun was loaded with six .22-caliber rounds.

At the Pomona city jail, Detective Jonathan Edson placed appellant in a holding cell with one other male inmate, Nazario Vazquez. Shortly thereafter, Detective Edson and the jailer heard screaming coming from the cell. The jailer looked into the cell and saw appellant standing over Vazquez, who was lying on the floor. Vazquez testified that he spoke briefly with appellant before sitting down with his head bent down. He then felt blows, and he covered his face with his hands. He fell on the floor and yelled for help as the blows continued. The officers removed Vazquez from the cell, and he was taken to the hospital. Vazquez told the jailer that appellant stomped on his head.

Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Robert Jaeger was working in the Pomona lockup on February 18, 2010, when he heard a commotion that drew his attention to one of the cells. He ran to the cell and saw a fight in progress. Appellant was straddling another inmate, Jose Molina, who was lying on the floor. Appellant punched Molina in the face. Deputy Jaeger yelled "stop it," and appellant retreated to the rear of the cell and sat down. Deputy Jaeger observed cuts and swelling on Molina's face and left him in the custody of another deputy. Deputy Jaeger handcuffed appellant and escorted him to an elevator. As they rode down, appellant told Jaeger that he meant no disrespect to Deputy Jaeger and that it was not about the deputy. Appellant said it was "total disrespect. He was disrespecting me." Appellant explained that Molina had taken appellant's belongings from the bench and placed them on the floor before sitting down where the belongings had been.

Richard Sato, a paralegal for the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, was trained in the preparation of section 969, subdivision (b) packages to prove prior convictions. He testified regarding an abstract of judgment showing that appellant was convicted of section 245, subdivision (a)(1) in case No. FCH00127 and sentenced to two years in prison in 2007. In case No. KJ18748, there was a true finding that appellant had committed a violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(2).

Adam MacDonald, a crime scene investigator employed by the City of Pomona Police Department, was trained in the taking and comparison of fingerprints. He rolled appellant's fingerprints and compared them with the fingerprint cards from case Nos. KJ18748 and FCH00127. He found the fingerprint cards from these cases matched appellant's prints.

Defense Evidence

On January 29, 2010, Dr. James Kim was the emergency physician on duty at the Pomona Valley Hospital. He examined Yolanda, who was the alleged victim of a physical assault. He observed bruising to the skin around the neck that would be consistent with some form of trauma. He described it as a ligature. Yolanda reported that she had not lost consciousness. He did not document any petechia of the skin or eyes. He did not find any documentation that Yolanda reported having defecated due to the assault. She was determined to be medically stable, and no medications were prescribed.

Appellant did not testify in his own defense.

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Attempted Murder (Count 1)

A. Appellant's Argument

Appellant contends there was not substantial evidence to support a finding that he intended to kill Yolanda. The evidence showed that appellant's misguided intent was to discipline Yolanda for the disrespect she was showing Emma and that he lost control of himself. Appellant was guilty only of assault with a deadly weapon.

B. Relevant Authority

When determining whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, "our role on appeal is a limited one." (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) "[T]he test of whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citations.]" (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 667.) "We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment." (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 640.) Reversal is not warranted "unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].'" (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)

Attempted murder requires proof of the specific intent to kill and a direct but ineffectual act toward commission of the intended murder. (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623; People v. Ramos (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1207-1208.)

"'There is rarely direct evidence of a defendant's intent. Such intent must usually be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the defendant's actions.' [Citation.]" (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741.) Although reasonable minds may differ as to whether a defendant had the intent to kill, "[o]ur role is to determine the legal sufficiency of the found facts and not to second guess the reasoning or wisdom of the [jury]." (People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 946.)

C. Evidence Sufficient

The evidence was clearly sufficient to support the jury's verdict of attempted murder in count 1. The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 600 that the People had to prove that appellant took at least one direct but ineffective step toward killing another person, and that he intended to kill that person. The evidence showed that appellant entered Yolanda's room and told her calmly, rather than angrily, to respect his grandmother. He then hit Yolanda in the face twice with a closed fist, causing her to fall to the floor. He grabbed an electrical cord and began to choke her. Yolanda became dizzy and saw stars. Appellant began pulling the cord "more and more." Yolanda urinated and defecated on herself. Appellant did not stop pulling until his grandmother came in.

The trial court read CALCRIM No. 600 as follows: "The defendant is charged in count 1 with attempted murder. To prove that the defendant is guilty of attempted murder, the People must prove that, one, the defendant took direct but ineffective steps towards killing another person, and two, the defendant intended to kill that person. [¶] A direct step requires more than merely planning or preparing to commit murder or obtaining or arranging for someone needed—for something needed to commit murder. A direct step is one that goes beyond planning or preparation and shows that a person is putting his or her plan into action. A direct step indicates a definite, unambiguous intent to kill. It is a direct movement towards the commission of the crime after preparations are made. It is an immediate step that puts the plan in motion so that the plan would have been completed if some circumstance outside the plan had not interrupted the attempt. [¶] A person who attempts to commit murder is guilty of attempted murder even if after taking a direct step towards killing, he or she abandons further efforts to complete the crime, or his or her attempt fails or is interrupted by someone or something beyond his or her control. On the other hand, if a person freely and voluntarily abandons his or her plans before taking a direct step toward committing the murder, then that person is not guilty of attempted murder."

Wheeler testified that her forensic nursing company had done approximately 400 examinations of victims where strangulation had been identified, and she had personally done approximately 30 such examinations. She stated that in the early stage of strangulation, the victim feels dizziness, as Yolanda felt. During strangulation, petechial hemorrhages appear on the eyes and face, and if pressure is applied more strongly, the person will lose consciousness within a time period of 10 seconds to a minute. Strangulation victims could have loss of bowel and bladder control at the time of the incident. If someone reported seeing blue and stars, it would be consistent with a loss of consciousness, and this is a frequent symptom described by patients as they are blacking out. Wheeler testified that the photographs of Yolanda showed red marks typical of strangulation. Although the quality of the photographs was poor, Yolanda's left eye showed signs of broken blood vessels. The evidence thus showed that appellant took a direct step toward killing Yolanda, and that this indicated he had "a definite, unambiguous intent to kill."

The jury was also instructed that "[a] person who attempts to commit murder is guilty of attempted murder even if after taking a direct step towards killing, he or she abandons further efforts to complete the crime, or his or her attempt fails or is interrupted by someone or something beyond his or her control." (CALCRIM No. 600.) In this case, the evidence showed that appellant stopped choking Yolanda only because Emma either was knocking on the door or she was summoned to the room by Armando. Therefore, appellant did not "freely and voluntarily" abandon his plan, and he certainly did not abandon his plan before taking a direct step toward completing it.

Appellant in effect asks us to reweigh the evidence on this issue, when our role is not to reweigh or reinterpret the evidence, but rather to determine whether sufficient evidence in the record warrants the inference of guilt arrived at by the jury. (People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 785.) We reject appellant's contention.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Assault by Means Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury (Count 4)

A. Appellant's Argument

Appellant contends there was not substantial evidence to support a finding that he was not acting in self-defense when he struck the alleged victim in count 4, Molina. Therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury.

B. Relevant Authority

"'To prove a violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a), the prosecution must establish that a person was assaulted and that the assault was committed by the use of a deadly weapon or instrument or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.'" (People v. Griggs (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 734, 739-740.) It is a general criminal intent crime that requires proof only of an attempt to commit a violent injury on another person. It does not require proof that an injury occurred. (Ibid.)

"Self-defense negates culpability for assaultive crimes, whether or not the assault results in death. [Citations.] In either event self-defense goes directly to guilt or innocence. [Citations.] On matters directly going to guilt or innocence, the burden of persuasion is on the state. [Citations.]" (People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 340-341.)

C. Evidence Sufficient

As the jury was instructed, it had to find that appellant did not act in self-defense or defense of someone else in order to find him guilty of assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury. (CALCRIM No. 875.) Appellant, however, made no request for self-defense instructions, nor did he present any evidence that his attack on Molina was in any way related to self-defense.

The trial court read CALCRIM No. 875 to the jury as follows: "The defendant is charged in counts 3 and 4 with assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code Section 245. To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that, one, the defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person, and the force used was likely to produce great bodily injury. Two, the defendant did that act willfully. Three, when the defendant acted he was aware of acts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone. Four, when the defendant acted, he had the present ability to apply force likely to produce great bodily injury to a person. And, five, the defendant did an act in self-defense or defense of someone else. I'm sorry, the defendant did not act in self-defense or in defense of someone else. [¶] Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gained any advantage. The term application of force and apply force means to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including his or her clothing, is enough. Touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind. Touching can be done indirectly by causing an object to touch the person. [¶] The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when he acted. No one needs to actually have been injured by the defendant's acts, but if someone was injured you may consider that fact along with all the other evidence in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault, and if so, what kind of an assault it was. [¶] Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm."

Deputy Jaeger testified that he heard a commotion in the cell and, upon looking inside the cell, he saw appellant standing over Molina with his right arm cocked to throw a punch. The deputy then saw appellant land a punch on Molina's face as Molina lay on the ground. Molina merely lay there, and he appeared to be trying to defend himself. Molina had a cut from his nose to his eye socket area, a cut on his face, and swelling on his right cheek. As appellant rode in the elevator, without prompting he told Deputy Jaeger that he meant the deputy no disrespect, but that Molina had moved appellant's belongings from a bench onto the floor, which showed total disrespect for appellant. The clear inference is that appellant's aggression toward Molina was caused by a belief that Molina had shown him disrespect, and that appellant had suffered no physical attack from Molina against which he had to defend.

Once again appellant asks this court to reweigh the evidence, which we decline to do. Appellant's argument is without merit. III. Denial of Romero Motion

A. Appellant's Argument

Appellant contends that the trial court never genuinely considered striking appellant's prior felony conviction. The court's comments at sentencing made it clear that it did not consider the numerous factors set out in appellant's Romero motion and argued by his attorney. Appellant maintains that the trial court was predisposed to deny the motion and demonstrated an unlawful antipathy toward appellant, which was an abuse of discretion requiring a reversal of his sentence.

B. Relevant Authority

We review the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162 (Williams); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) "In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, '"[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review."' [Citation.] Second, a '"decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. 'An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.'"' [Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377.)

A court's power to dismiss a prior conviction is to be limited by the concept that the dismissal should be in the "'"furtherance of justice."'" (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) According to Williams, in order to "render Penal Code section 1385(a)'s concept of 'furtherance of justice' somewhat more determinate," justice should be sought within the "interstices" of the particular sentencing scheme, because the scheme itself suggests its spirit. (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 160.) This search must be "informed by generally applicable sentencing principles" relating to matters such as the nature and circumstances of the defendant's current and prior felonies as well as the defendant's "background, character, and prospects," which are intrinsic to the scheme. (Id. at pp. 160, 161.) The court cautioned that the standard for review of an exercise of discretion is "deferential," although not "empty," requiring the reviewing court to determine whether a ruling exceeds the bounds of reason under the law and relevant facts. (Id. at p. 162.)

C. Proceedings Below

In her Romero motion, defense counsel gave the following reasons why it was in the interests of justice to dismiss appellant's strike prior: (1) Appellant's strike stems from a 2001 conviction that occurred when he was 17; (2) Appellant had a troubled upbringing in that his father was killed when he was a young boy, and his mother left appellant at that time also. He was raised by his grandmother in an area surrounded by gangs, whose members became his friends and which led to the commission of the strike prior; (3) Although appellant struggles with self-discipline, he has tried to control his anger. He first attempted to speak to Yolanda, and the weapon he used was not brought with him; (4) Appellant's convictions for assaults on other prisoners evidence his struggle with self-discipline; (5) The trial court could exercise its discretion and still give appellant, who is 26, a substantial sentence resulting in his release at the age of 40; and (6) The manner in which the current crime was committed does not show criminal sophistication or professionalism.

The trial court said it had read the Romero motion, the probation report, and sentencing memoranda. At the hearing on the motion, at the request of defense counsel, the trial court gave appellant's family members an opportunity to advocate at length for leniency on his behalf. The trial court then heard argument from defense counsel. In addition to arguing the facts contained in her motion, she pointed out that appellant had not acted out in court or at the preliminary hearing despite the difficulty of listening to the evidence against him. He had always behaved appropriately towards his attorneys. She urged that appellant can and wished to control his emotions and was striving to do so. Appellant was a help to his grandmother and grandfather and to the children in his family.

After hearing further argument by the prosecutor, the trial court denied the motion, stating that it had considered the factors set forth in California Rules of Court, rules 4.421 and 4.423, and it did not find appellant's case to be an appropriate one for striking the strike. The court found a continuing course of conduct involving violence. The court stated it had taken all factors into consideration.

D. Ruling Correct

We conclude the trial court did not abuse or fail to exercise its discretion in refusing to strike appellant's prior conviction. The record shows that the court made the required assessment of the particulars of appellant's background, character, and prospects—with unfavorable results for appellant. (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) These particulars were presented to the court in the probation report, the Romero motion papers, the argument of counsel, and in the lengthy statements made by appellant's family in his favor. Absent affirmative evidence to the contrary, the court is presumed to have considered all relevant factors. (Evid. Code, § 664; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.409; People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.)

Although appellant makes a passing reference to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, he presents no argument or authority regarding this claim, and we do not discuss this issue. (People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214, fn. 11.)
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When appellant's current convictions are considered along with his prior criminal conduct, which is not minimal, it is clear he does not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. The fact that the prior crimes were committed in 2002 and 2007 does not aid appellant's cause, since he was incarcerated for years before the current crimes were committed. The probation report shows he was committed to the former Department of the Youth Authority after the first crime, and he received a two-year sentence after the 2007 offense, for which he was still on parole when he committed the instant offenses in early 2010. Moreover, his past crimes were violent ones, as are the current crimes. Nothing in the record before us suggests that appellant falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes scheme.

We reject appellant's claim that the trial court showed antipathy toward him. At defense counsel's request, the trial court recommended fire camp for appellant. The trial court heard pleas on appellant's behalf from his family and directly addressed appellant, saying, "Mr. Sardina, I think you have some good qualities in you in listening to your family. It seems you could be a really good guy when you want to. But I think in all honesty you've got an anger issue, and I don't know what it stems from, but goes back to the time you were a juvenile." The court told appellant that it would benefit him to try to deal with his anger issues, although the court understood that prison was a difficult environment in which to accomplish that goal. The trial court also acknowledged that Yolanda was not a sympathetic person, but that her behavior did not excuse appellant's actions.

Clearly, the trial court followed the principles that must guide a court that seeks to comply with section 1385, subdivision (a)—principles that were explained and reaffirmed in Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pages 530-531, and elaborated upon in Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pages 160-161. We cannot say that the court's assessment of appellant's background, character, and prospects was arbitrary or capricious. In People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, the California Supreme Court reiterated that, when deciding whether to strike prior convictions under section 1385, the trial court must consider not only the constitutional rights of the defendant, but also the "'"'interests of society represented by the People . . .""'' (People v. Garcia, at pp. 497-498, citing Romero, at p. 530.) The court justifiably believed appellant was a danger to society and did not abuse its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

___, P. J.

BOREN
We concur:

___, J.

ASHMANN-GERST

______, J.

CHAVEZ


Summaries of

People v. Sardina

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Jan 25, 2012
B233143 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2012)
Case details for

People v. Sardina

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICHARD SARDINA, Defendant and…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

Date published: Jan 25, 2012

Citations

B233143 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2012)