Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. PA051969. Harvey Giss, Judge.
Barbara A. Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Ana R. Duarte, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EPSTEIN, P. J.
Arnulfo Sarabia appeals from his convictions of multiple counts of second degree robbery, possession of methamphetamine, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence identifying him as a perpetrator of the robberies, and argues the trial court erred in denying his request for an eyewitness identification expert. Respondent argues the trial court erred in failing to impose the mandatory court security fine for each conviction.
We find substantial evidence supporting appellant’s conviction on the robbery counts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appointment of an eyewitness identification expert for appellant in light of the evidence corroborating the victims’ identification of him as the perpetrator of the robberies and the failure of his attorney to demonstrate the necessity for the appointment of an expert. We modify the judgment to include court security fees of $140 under Penal Code section 1465.8 for each of appellant’s seven convictions.
Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Appellant was implicated in a string of robberies in the San Fernando Valley committed in April and May 2005. We reserve the details of the robberies for our discussion of appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Based on information gathered in their investigation, Los Angeles police officers executed a search warrant at the home where appellant and 15 of his relatives lived. Appellant and Louis Alvarado, who dated appellant’s sister, were in the front yard when officers arrived. They ran through the house and outside. Later, a canine unit located them several doors away, hiding in a shed. Appellant was wearing necklaces stolen in one of the robberies. A loaded .357 gun was recovered from the tank of a toilet, with a wrist band containing ammunition that fit that gun. The toilet was in a bathroom between two bedrooms shared by appellant and his two younger brothers. His sister, Erica Sarabia, testified that all family members used that bathroom. Several cell phones (none registered to appellant) and additional ammunition were recovered from one of the bedrooms adjacent to that bathroom. One of the cell phones was registered to victim Jesse Avila.
Appellant was charged with seven counts of robbery (§ 211) committed between April 28, 2005 and May 12, 2005. He also was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)); possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); and felony child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a)). For each robbery count, it also was alleged that a principal or appellant personally used a firearm in the commission of those offenses. (Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, §§ 12022, subds. (a) & (b), and 12022.53, subd. (b).) The second amended information also alleged that appellant had a serious felony and strike robbery prior (§§ 667, subds. (a) and (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subd. (a)) and that he served a prison term for a prior conviction within the meaning of section 667.5.
There was no count 5 in the second amended information because appellant was not bound over on count 5 of the original information and the court ordered the counts in the second amended information to be renumbered in conformity with the original information.
Appellant stipulated to a generic felony conviction for the purposes of the firearm possession charge. He waived jury on the bifurcated prior conviction allegations. The trial court severed the trial of codefendant Carla Evette Martin (appellant’s girlfriend) on robbery and felony child abuse counts. Codefendant Louis Alvarado’s case was severed; he entered into a plea bargain before appellant’s trial began.
Appellant was acquitted of robbery on counts 1 and 2, each of which occurred on May 10, 2005, and of felony child endangerment, count 8. He was otherwise convicted as charged. Appellant admitted the prior conviction allegations. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 43 years and 8 months in prison. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 104.) . . . We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence. (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 463.) If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 104.) A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1129.)” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 16.)
Appellant’s theory is that the victims’ identifications were unreliable because he resembled his two younger brothers. All three brothers shared bedrooms and a bathroom where a search pursuant to a warrant revealed a loaded gun, ammunition, and stolen cell phones. In addition, appellant points out that not a single eyewitness noticed both of his distinctive features: tattoos all over his body and a distinctive goatee (a strip of hair from his lower lip to below his chin). Appellant characterizes this as the “evil twin” defense, although appellant’s brothers were several years younger. He asserts: “This rendered speculative any finding that prosecution witnesses were identifying appellant, versus a brother who in effect was his ‘evil twin.’”
Appellant acknowledges that when arrested he was wearing necklaces stolen from the Gonzalez brothers, but explains that he and his brothers shared everything. He contends the description of the gun used in the robberies provided by the victims did not match the gun found in the toilet at his home. Appellant invokes the phenomenon of “fancied recognition” described in People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 480 (Boyer). This term appeared in a quotation in Boyer in which the court discussed the generally greater probative value of an out-of-court identification over an in-court identification: “Indeed, ‘an out-of-court identification generally has greater probative value than an in-court identification, even when the identifying witness does not confirm the out-of-court identification: “[T]he [out-of-court] identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness’ mind. [Citations.] . . .” [Citations.]’” (Id. at p. 480, quoting People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 265, italics added.)
Boyer is not helpful to appellant. In that case, a fast food restaurant employee testified at the penalty phase of a capital case to establish defendant’s culpability in an unrelated murder. The employee had identified the defendant as the man who ordered food at the drive-through window of the fast food restaurant where she was employed. She and another employee noticed the man because he had blood on his T-shirt, and positioned himself as though he did not want to be seen. Three years later, she picked defendant’s photograph out of a six-photo array. At trial, the witness acknowledged that more than two years before she identified defendant from the photo array, she had identified other men at live lineups. (Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 426-427.) A receipt from the restaurant that corroborated the witness’s description of defendant’s food order was found in the victim’s car. (Id. at pp. 475-476.)
Although the eyewitness in Boyer did not identify the defendant in the courtroom, nor confirm that she was certain of her photo identification of defendant, she did not disavow her out-of-court identification, and she explained why she was confident about that identification. (Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 480.) Significantly, the Boyer court took into account defense counsel’s full opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the certainty of her identification from the photo array, as well as all aspects of the identification process, including her opportunity to observe the customer and her prior identification of others in the live lineups. The court concluded the jury was able to evaluate the credibility of her identification and that the weight her testimony deserved was for the jury to determine. (Id. at p. 481.)
Here, as in Boyer, defense counsel vigorously cross-examined the witnesses about their identification of appellant as one of the robbers. He questioned them about their opportunity to observe the robbers, their descriptions of the robbers, the gun and the car. He elicited evidence that the victims were extremely stressed because a gun was pointed at them. Defense counsel argued the witnesses had confused appellant with his brothers and had misidentified him as the perpetrator.
Appellant characterizes the evidence as “probabilistic” and asserts that the jury engaged in a “coin toss” in finding him guilty. The evidence was speculative, he argued, because the recovered gun and cell phones, and the telephone number called from one of the stolen phones after the robbery, were not firmly connected with appellant as opposed to the many other persons who lived or temporarily stayed at his residence. He broadly asserts that all the eyewitness testimony was heavily impeached and unreliable. Appellant’s briefing does not challenge the convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm and methamphetamine.
We examine the evidence of each crime, in chronological order.
A. Gollahon Robbery (count 11)
The first robbery victim was Jason Gollahon. On April 28, 2005 at 9:10 p.m., Gollahon was walking through an alley to the back of his house in Granada Hills. As he reached the gate, a car pulled up next to him. He described the car as a late 1990’s silver four-door car, like a Honda or Toyota sedan. One of the occupants said they were from L.A.P.D. and asked him to stop so they could talk with him. Gollahon wondered whether these were actually police officers because the car was unmarked and the driver and passenger, who had shaved heads, were not in uniform. He took a step forward and asked what they wanted.
The driver pulled a gun out, reached across the passenger, and pointed it at Gollahon, demanding his wallet. Gollahon described the gun as a silver revolver, but could not tell the color of the grip. It looked like exhibit 6, the gun recovered by police officers from a toilet used by all the residents at appellant’s home. Gollahon gave the men his wallet.
The Hispanic driver had a shaved head, a mustache, and he was a little heavier set than the passenger. They both looked like they were in their early 20’s. Gollahon did not notice tattoos on the driver, who wore a short-sleeved shirt. He saw the right side of the driver’s body. The passenger looked similar to the driver. Gollahon did not recall him having a mustache, but did recall that he had a shaved head and was thinner than the driver. When asked to identify appellant in the courtroom, Gollahon said: “You know, I honestly can’t 100% say that he’s the one, but he does look similar.” Gollahon explained that appellant looked like the driver. He could not identify anyone from the three photo six-packs he was shown, although he had told the officers who responded after the robbery that he would be able to identify the robbers. Gollahon saw a white license plate on the car, and the first two numbers of the plate, 3T.
Respondent argues this evidence was sufficient because Gollahon’s description of the car used by the robbers matched the description of the car belonging to appellant’s girlfriend. The first two digits of her license plate were “3T”. The gun resembled the gun found in appellant’s home.
We agree with respondent. While Gollahon was not able to identify appellant, he described the car belonging to appellant’s girlfriend which was used in several of the other robberies and identified the first two digits of the license plate. In addition, this robbery matched the pattern of several of the other robberies, as we shall discuss.
B. Gonzalez Brothers Robbery (counts 9 and 10)
The next robbery occurred on May 4, 2005. At 12:30 in the afternoon, Tony Gonzalez was walking along a street in Sylmar with his brother, Adrian Gonzalez. (Adrian, who was in the Army stationed in Georgia at the time of trial, did not testify.) A car pulled up and a man in the car nodded his head. Neither Tony nor Adrian knew the man. Gonzalez made a courtroom identification of appellant as that man. According to Gonzalez, appellant was wearing a black L.A. Dodgers hat, and had tattoos on his right arm. Appellant was in the passenger seat. Gonzalez was not able to see who was driving.
Appellant came out of the car with a gun in his hand. He pointed the gun at the brothers’ heads from an arm’s length away. As soon as he pointed the gun, appellant said that if they did not give him anything, he was going to “blast” them.
Gonzalez gave appellant a silver necklace with a cross, cash, a silver ring and a watch. He saw Adrian give appellant a cell phone, a silver bracelet, a silver chain, and his wallet. Gonzalez was frightened. Appellant ordered the brothers to turn around, and they complied. They heard the car drive off, and then called 911 with a phone which was in the coin pocket of Gonzalez’s pants.
Gonzalez gave the officers a description of the gun, the car, and the gunman—appellant. The gun was silver with a black grip. It looked like photograph A on exhibit 2. Exhibit 6, a gun, looked like the gun appellant used in the robbery. Gonzalez described the car used by the robber as a black two-door Camaro, around a 1986 model and not in good condition. It looked like the car depicted in the photographs on People’s exhibit 3. Gonzalez saw appellant from an arm’s length away. Appellant was wearing a baseball cap and blue jeans, but he could not recall the shirt. Gonzalez said the robber was about his height, 5 feet 9 inches tall. He saw tattoos on the right arm but did not recall tattoos on the face or neck area.
Photographs C and D (two different views) on People’s exhibit 11 depicted the cell phone Adrian gave the robber, which was recovered from appellant’s home. Gonzalez identified photographs A, C, and D on People’s exhibit 15 (jewelry appellant was wearing when arrested). One (15A) shows the necklace Gonzalez was wearing and which he gave to appellant. The cross depicted on exhibit 15C had been on the necklace shown in exhibit 15A. He also identified exhibit 15D as his necklace, which Adrian was wearing at the time of the robbery.
Detective Gutierrez showed Gonzalez both six-packs on exhibits 16A and 16B. He identified photograph 5 (appellant) on exhibit 16A as the robber. He wrote: “Number five looks almost the same, only this one looks a little bit better.” Gonzalez thought photograph 5 showed a man chubbier than the man who robbed him. But he identified appellant at trial as the gunman who robbed him and his brother. He said he was certain about that identification. Gonzalez was told that if the photographs in the six-pack did not look like the robber, he did not have to choose one.
In summary, Tony Gonzalez identified appellant from the photo array and in court. Appellant was arrested wearing jewelry stolen from the Gonzalez brothers, and a cell phone resembling the one taken from Adrian was recovered from appellant’s house. Appellant’s family owned a car fitting Gonzalez’s description of the car used in the robbery. This was substantial evidence to establish that appellant robbed the Gonzalez brothers.
C. Kim Robbery (count 3)
Robert Kim, a security company salesperson, was the victim in count 3. He had just finished an appointment in Sylmar on May 10, 2005. He came out to the sidewalk and two men pulled up and yelled at him. Their car was pulled up at a 45 degree angle to the sidewalk. Kim turned around and saw the man on the passenger’s side of the car was pointing a gun at him. That man was Hispanic, early to mid-twenties, slender build. He was wearing blue jeans and a white or gray shirt. Although the robber was sitting down, Kim estimated his height at 5 feet 9 inches tall. He described the driver as rounder, with a husky, stocky build. The driver wore a white or gray shirt about the same color. Neither man got out of the car.
Kim described the car as a gray, four-door sedan, midsize, Japanese make, perhaps Mitsubishi or Mazda. He thought the model was from the late 1980’s to early 1990’s. Kim identified appellant in court as the driver of the car. The driver had a shaved head but was wearing a hat, and a short-sleeved white or gray shirt. The driver was stocky, 185 to 195 pounds, huskier than the passenger. Kim estimated the age of both men as between 20 and 26. When Alvarado was brought into the courtroom, Kim identified him as the passenger who pointed the gun at him. Alvarado had tattoos on his arms, and acne on his face.
Appellant screamed to Kim to move closer to the vehicle. Throughout the incident, appellant told Alvarado to shoot Kim. Kim described the gun as a stainless steel revolver. Exhibit 6 looked similar to the gun that was pointed at him. It could have been the gun used in the robbery.
When Alvarado demanded his wallet and watch, Kim gave him all his cash, his Tag watch, his pager, and his LG or Samsung cell phone. Alvarado told Kim to turn around and not to look, while appellant constantly repeated “‘Shoot him, shoot him.’” As Kim backed away, the gray car pulled away. Kim drove two to three blocks, saw two police officers, and reported the robbery.
Later, Detective Gutierrez showed him several photo six-packs. Exhibit 8 contains two six-packs (8A and 8B) and a photo identification report (8C). He was shown exhibit 8A on May 24, 2005. He identified photo No. 3 (Alvarado) as the gunman, circling the photo. In the comments section of exhibit 8C, he wrote: “Photo number one was the one on the passenger’s side of the vehicle who pointed the gun at me and took money, watch, cell phone and pager.”
Kim was shown exhibit 9A, a photo six-pack by Detective Gutierrez. He circled photo No. 5 (appellant) as the driver. In the comments section of the report, he wrote: “‘Number one was the driver stating “Shoot him” multiple times.’” He identified appellant in court as the person whose photograph he circled on exhibit 9A.
Kim called his cell phone company the morning after the robbery to report the theft of his phone. He asked for the numbers called from the phone from the time of the theft to 7 o’clock the following morning. He was given phone numbers. When he received his phone bill for that time period, there were several numbers he did not recognize. People’s exhibit 10 is the phone bill. Two numbers at appellant’s home were repeatedly called after the theft. Exhibit 11 consisted of 8 photographs of cell phones recovered from appellant’s home. Kim’s Samsung phone looked similar to exhibit 11F, but he could not identify it for certain because it had been too long since the robbery (two years).
In summary, Kim identified appellant from a photo array and in court. He also identified Alvarado, who dated appellant’s sister, as the other robber. Kim identified the gun found in appellant’s home and his general description of the car fit the description of the car driven by appellant’s girlfriend. Several calls were made after the robbery on Kim’s cell phone to appellant’s house. The manner in which the Kim robbery was committed was very similar to the robberies of the Gonzalez brothers, Gollahon, and, as we next discuss, Jesse Avila. This is substantial evidence to support appellant’s conviction for robbing Kim.
D. Avila Robbery (count 4)
Two days after the Kim robbery, on the evening of May 12, 2005, Jesse Avila was in Sylmar, talking to a friend on his Nextel cell phone. He had pulled his car over to the curb to talk. A gray four-door car drove by, and the front passenger looked at Avila. The car quickly made a U-turn and parked in front of Avila, blocking him. A driver and passenger were in the front seat, and a child was in the passenger side of the back seat. The child was three to four years old, but was not in a child seat. The driver was female, and the passenger was appellant, whom Avila identified in court. Appellant was about 6 feet from Avila.
As soon as the gray car pulled up, appellant got out and pointed a gun at Avila while approaching him. Appellant came within a foot of Avila and demanded his money, saying “‘Just give me your money or I’m gonna shoot you . . . .’” Appellant pointed the gun at Avila’s face.
Avila told appellant that he had been laid off and had no money. He offered his cell phone. Appellant said Avila better give him money or something or else he was going to shoot him. Avila offered him his car, and appellant snatched the keys. Appellant also grabbed Avila’s cell phone. As he went back to the gray car appellant told Avila to look away or he would be shot. Nevertheless, Avila looked at the license plate of the gray car, and saw just three letters on the California license plate, “BTJ.” As appellant and the woman drove away, Avila saw them throw his car keys out of the window.
Avila described the gray car as a four-door midsized sedan like a Corolla or Cressida. He thought it was a mid-1990’s model. He described the gun as shiny, with a wood grain handle, a .357. Exhibit 6 looked like the gun used by appellant.
Within two weeks, Avila was shown six-pack photo arrays. Exhibit 12 (one color six-pack, one in black and white, and an identification report) contains the six-pack the detective showed him. On People’s 12B, Avila circled photograph 1 as the girl involved in the robbery. Avila identified photograph 5 (appellant) on People’s exhibit 13A as appellant, and he circled appellant’s face on exhibit 13B. In the comments space on the identification report, Avila wrote: “I identified number 5 as the guy who robbed me with a gun.” Avila described appellant as wearing a black baseball cap and white T-shirt and white shirt the night of the robbery. He said the robber weighed about 180 to 190 pounds. Avila told the officers at the scene that the robber had tattoos, but that he did not look in detail. He did not notice facial hair, because he was not worrying about the robber’s looks or color of his eyes. He remembered tattoos on appellant’s arms.
Three or four months after the robbery, Detective Gutierrez returned Avila’s cell phone. Photographs G and H (two different views) on exhibit 11 most closely depict that cell phone. He said this was the phone.
In summary, Avila positively identified appellant in court and in the photo arrays as the robber. He noticed appellant’s tattoos, although he did not notice facial hair. His description of the car matched the car belonging to appellant’s girlfriend. He gave a partial plate of “BTJ” which was similar to the plate on the girlfriend’s car: 3TJE995. A cell phone registered to Avila was recovered from appellant’s home during execution of the search warrant. This is sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction.
The Supreme Court has described circumstances which affect the probative value of an out-of-court identification: “[M]any varied circumstances that may attend an out-of-court identification and affect its probative value. These circumstances include, for example: (1) the identifying witness’s prior familiarity with the defendant; (2) the witness’s opportunity to observe the perpetrator during the commission of the crime; (3) whether the witness has a motive to falsely implicate the defendant; and (4) the level of detail given by the witness in the out-of-court identification and any accompanying description of the crime. (See also CALJIC No. 2.92 (5th ed. 1988) [listing factors relevant to reliability of eyewitness identification].) Evidence of these circumstances can bolster the probative value of the out-of-court identification by corroborating both that the witness actually made the out-of-court identification (e.g., testimony by the police officer or other person to whom the statement was made) and that the identification was reliable (e.g., evidence that the witness was present at the scene of the crime and in a position to observe the perpetrator, evidence that the witness had a prior familiarity with the defendant, or evidence that the witness had no self-serving motive to implicate the defendant). Such evidence can show the accuracy and reliability of the out-of-court identification, even though none of it is independent evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, the corroboration required by [People v.] Gould [(1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, overruled on another ground in People v. Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 271-272].” (People v. Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th 252, 267.)
Here, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 315 on eyewitness identification, which directed them to take these and other factors related to the reliability of identification evidence into account. The Supreme Court rejected challenges to CALJIC No. 2.92 on eyewitness identification in People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1141 because that instruction, like CALCRIM No. 315, neutrally listed factors relevant to a determination of reasonable doubt concerning identification. (See also People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 561-562.) In addition, the jury in this case was given CALCRIM No. 226 which instructed it that it alone was to judge the credibility or believability of the witnesses. It also informed the jury: “In evaluating a witness’s testimony, you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of that testimony.” A number of factors were then listed, including the witness’s ability to recall and describe what happened, the witness’s behavior while testifying, whether the witness’s testimony was influenced by bias, the witness’s attitude about testifying or the case, any inconsistent statements, the reasonableness of the testimony, and whether any other evidence disproved the facts about which the witness testified. (See People v. Felix (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 849, 858-859.)
As given, CALCRIM No. 315 stated: “You have heard eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant. As with any other witness, you must decide whether an eyewitness gave truthful and accurate testimony. [¶] In evaluating identification testimony, consider the following questions: [¶] Did the witness know or have contact with the defendant before the event? [¶] How well could the witness see the perpetrator? [¶] What were the circumstances affecting the witness’s ability to observe, such as lighting, weather conditions, obstructions, distance, and duration of observation? [¶] How closely was the witness paying attention? [¶] Was the witness under stress when he or she made the observation? [¶] Did the witness give a description and how does that description compare to the defendant? [¶] How much time passed between the event and the time when the witness identified the defendant? [¶] Was the witness asked to pick the perpetrator out of a group? [¶] Did the witness ever fail to identify the defendant? [¶] Did the witness ever change his or her mind about the identification? [¶] How certain was the witness when he or she made an identification? [¶] Are the witness and the defendant of different races? [¶] Were there any other circumstances affecting the witness's ability to make an accurate identification? [¶] Was the witness able to identify other participants in the crime? [¶] Was the witness able to identify the defendant in a photographic or physical lineup? The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who committed the crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the defendant not guilty.”
These instructions correctly informed the jury of the factors to be considered in weighing eyewitness identification. In addition, defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the witnesses and argued the misidentification defense in closing. Essentially, appellant asks us to reweigh the identification evidence, which we may not do. “[W]hen the circumstances surrounding the identification and its weight are explored at length at trial, where eyewitness identification is believed by the trier of fact, that determination is binding on the reviewing court. (People v. Lundy (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 939, 944.)” (In re Gustavo M. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1485, 1497.)
Appellant cites the considerable stress experienced by the victims of armed robberies as a basis to find the evidence of identification insufficient. But, as we have discussed, the jury was instructed that a witness’s stress is a factor to consider in weighing the reliability of their identification of the defendant. (CALCRIM No. 315.)
“[T]he availability of the identifying witness for cross-examination, the opportunity of the defense to present other evidence questioning the reliability of the out-of-court identification and to request appropriate jury instructions, and the requirement that substantial evidence support the conviction are adequate safeguards against the unjust conviction of a defendant solely on the basis of an unreliable out-of-court identification.” (People v. Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th 252, 274-275, fn. omitted.) “Identification of the defendant by a single eyewitness may be sufficient to prove the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of a crime.” (People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 480.) “[A] testifying witness’s out-of-court identification is probative for that purpose and can, by itself, be sufficient evidence of the defendant’s guilt even if the witness does not confirm it in court.” (Ibid.)
In summary, each robbery followed a pattern, with the robbers approaching pedestrians or a person in a car pulled to the curb. In most, the victim’s escape was barred by the angle at which the robbers parked the car. Each of the two cars used in the robberies matched a vehicle to which appellant had access: his family’s black Camaro, and his girlfriend’s gray midsized sedan. Two witnesses gave a partial license plate matching some of the digits on the plate on the girlfriend’s car. Kim’s stolen cell phone was used to call appellant’s house soon after the robbery. Appellant fled and hid when officers arrived to execute a search warrant at his house. When arrested, appellant was wearing jewelry stolen from the Gonzalez brothers and Avila’s cell phone was found in a room he used. Victims identified appellant as the perpetrator from photo arrays and in court. Applying these principles, we find substantial evidence to support the robbery convictions.
II
Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for the appointment of an eyewitness identification expert, and that this order denied him an opportunity to present a meaningful defense.
The appointment of an eyewitness identification expert is left to the discretion of the trial court. The burden is on the defendant to show that the expert’s services are necessary to his defense. (People v. Gaglione (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1304, disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 452.) A defendant must provide the trial court with sufficient information to allow appointment of the requested expert. In People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 363 (McDonald) (disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 923-924), the California Supreme Court held that the exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony would be an abuse of discretion “when (1) eyewitness identification is a key element of the prosecution’s case and is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving the identification independent reliability and (2) the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record that could have affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be fully known to or understood by the jury.” (People v. Gaglione, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1305, citing McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d 351; see also People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1112 [reaffirming holding in McDonald].)
The McDonald court warned: “‘[T]he decision to admit or exclude expert testimony on psychological factors affecting eyewitness identification remains primarily a matter within the trial court’s discretion; . . . “we do not intend to ‘open the gates’ to a flood of expert evidence on the subject.” [Citation.] We expect that such evidence will not often be needed, and in the usual case the appellate court will continue to defer to the trial court's discretion in this matter. Yet deference is not abdication. When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the prosecution’s case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability . . ., it will ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony.’” (People v. Jones, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1111 -1112, quoting McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 377, fn. omitted.)
Here, as we have discussed, there was substantial corroborating evidence to support the victims’ identification of appellant as one of the robbers. The method of committing the robberies was very similar. They were committed in a three-week period. Appellant was wearing jewelry taken from the Gonzalez brothers when arrested. Telephone calls to appellant’s home were made on Kim’s stolen cell phone shortly after the robbery. Avila’s phone was found in a bedroom used by appellant. Appellant had access to cars matching the two used in the robberies. His sister’s boyfriend, with whom appellant associated, was identified as one of the perpetrators in several of the robberies. His girlfriend was identified in another. This evidence gives independent reliability to the eyewitness identification testimony as required in People v. Jones, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1112.)
Respondent also contends that appellant did not meet his burden of showing the services of an eyewitness identification expert were reasonably necessary. Appellant’s motion for appointment of the expert was supported by the declaration of his trial counsel. He declared: “I believe that, in order to adequately represent the defendant, I will require the services of an eyewitness identification expert in order to test the reliability of eyewitness identifications in which the defendant was identified as the perpetrator. [¶] I am prepared to show defendant’s need for an expert in more detail at an ex parte, in camera, reported proceeding if the Court so requires.” Counsel explained he had spoken to an eyewitness identification expert who was available. He concluded: “I believe that the services of this expert are essential to a vigorous and competent preparation of the defense in this matter; and, without these services, I believe my client will not receive a constitutionally-adequate defense.”
At the pretrial hearing on the motion, the trial court indicated its intent to deny the motion, based on the testimony at the preliminary hearing demonstrating that multiple victims in separate robberies identified appellant, evidence that appellant was found with jewelry taken from victims, and possibly a gun found at appellant’s house was connected with the robberies. Counsel for appellant did not offer to supplement his showing of the need for an expert witness in camera. No additional showing or argument was made by counsel for appellant at the hearing. We agree that this showing was not sufficient to establish the need for the appointment of an expert, particularly in light of the extensive corroborative evidence presented.
Appellant cites People v. Goodwillie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 695. The Goodwillie court held that the trial court’s exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony did not constitute a violation of the defendant’s right to due process. It reasoned: “Specifically, the trial court’s ruling did not prevent Goodwillie from presenting a defense that the eyewitnesses were mistaken in their identification of him. He was able to cross-examine the eyewitnesses and challenge the accuracy of their identifications. Further, the court instructed the jurors as to the factors they could consider when weighing the credibility of eyewitness testimony. Most important, there were at least four witnesses who positively identified Goodwillie as the driver of the silver Chrysler on the day in question. (See [People v.] Sanders [(1995)] 11 Cal.4th [475,] 509 [contrasting ‘strong and unequivocal’ eyewitness testimony in that case, consisting of three eyewitnesses who identified the defendant in lineups and at trial and a fourth who was ‘“pretty certain”’ of her identification of the defendant at a videotape lineup and positive at trial, with equivocal eyewitness identification in McDonald, which included one eyewitness who asserted that the defendant was definitely not the perpetrator].)” (Id. at pp. 725-726.)
Like the defendant in Goodwillie, appellant had ample opportunity to challenge the identifications through cross-examination and vigorously argued the defense of misidentification. We have summarized the independent evidence corroborating the eyewitness identifications here.
In Goodwillie, the court also relied on the defendant’s admissions of culpability which provided strong corroborating evidence giving the eyewitness identifications independent reliability. (People v. Goodwillie, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 726.) Appellant argues that the corroborating evidence in this case is not sufficient because he made no admissions of guilt to the investigating officers. An admission of guilt by the defendant is not the only kind of independent evidence sufficient to corroborate eyewitness testimony. There was ample corroborating evidence here. Gonzalez, Kim, and Avila identified appellant in the photo arrays and in court. While Gollahon was only able to say that appellant looked like the robber, he gave a description of the car used in the robbery that was like the car owned by appellant’s girlfriend, and identified the first two digits of the license plate on her car.
III
Respondent argues the trial court erred in failing to impose the mandatory court security fee under section 1465.8 for each conviction. Instead, the court imposed only a $20 single fee under that statute. Section 1465.8 provides in pertinent part: “(a)(1) To ensure and maintain adequate funding for court security, a fee of twenty dollars ($20) shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense . . . .” This security fee attaches to every conviction for a criminal offense. Here, appellant was convicted of seven offenses, and is subject to seven $20 security fees under section 1465.8. We modify the judgment to include a $20 fee for each of appellant’s seven convictions. (People v. Schoeb (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 861, 866.
DISPOSITION
We direct the trial court to modify the abstract of judgment to impose upon appellant a total of seven $20 fees (for a total of $140) under section 1465.8. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: WILLHITE, J., MANELLA, J.