Opinion
E083274
10-04-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NATHANIEL DECARLO SAPP, Defendant and Appellant.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Ct. No. RIF114377 John D. Molloy, Judge. Dismissed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
McKINSTER J.
On December 29, 2005, a jury found defendant and appellant Nathaniel DeCarlo Sapp guilty of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1.) The jury further found true two felony-murder special-circumstance allegations: that defendant committed the murder while engaged in the crimes of robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and carjacking (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(L)). The court sentenced defendant to life without parole. (Sapp I, supra, E040320; Sapp II, supra, E072769; Sapp III, supra, E076694.)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
We take judicial notice of this court's unpublished opinions in People v. Sapp (June 26, 2007, E040320) (Sapp I), from defendant's appeal of the judgment; People v. Sapp (May 26, 2020, E072769) (Sapp II), from his appeal of the initial denial of his former section 1170.95 petition; and People v. Sapp (Sept. 20, 2022, E076694) (Sapp III), defendant's appeal from the denial of his petition after this court reversed and remanded the matter. (Evid. Code, § 459.)
On January 7, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95, which the superior court summarily denied. (Sapp II, supra, E072769; Sapp III, supra, E076694.) Defendant appealed. We reversed and remanded the matter for reconsideration. (Ibid.)
Effective June 30, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended and renumbered section 1170.95 as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
On remand, the superior court reconsidered the matter and, again, denied defendant's petition. Defendant appealed, again contending the court erred in denying his petition. We reversed and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing. (Sapp III, supra, E076694.)
On remand, the court issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing, after which the court, again, denied defendant's petition. The court found "overwhelming evidence that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree as either the actual slayer or as a major participant acting with a reckless disregard." Therefore, the court ruled "beyond a reasonable doubt that the People have proved that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree."
Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, and Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, setting forth a statement of facts, a statement of the case, requesting that we independently review the record for error, and identifying two potentially arguable issues: (1) whether the court followed the proper procedures when it denied defendant's petition after an evidentiary hearing; and (2) whether sufficient evidence supports the court's findings.
In People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), the California Supreme Court held that Wende and Anders procedures do not apply to appeals from the denial of postjudgment proceedings. (Delgadillo, at pp. 224-226.) Appellate counsel contends that since Delgadillo applied to the denial of a section 1172.6 case at the prima facie stage, rather than after an evidentiary hearing as here, we are required to apply Wende and Anders procedures to the instant case. We do not so narrowly construe the holding of Delgadillo. We broadly interpret Delgadillo as applying to all postjudgment proceedings. (Ibid.)
We gave defendant the opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief. We noted that if he did not do so, we could dismiss the appeal; nevertheless, he has not filed one. Under these circumstances, we have no obligation to independently review the record for error. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 224-231.) Rather, we dismiss the appeal. (Id. at pp. 231-232.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J, MENETREZ J.