Opinion
D060009
02-15-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THELLAS SANDERS III, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. BAF006658)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Paul E. Zellerbach, Judge. Affirmed.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The People charged Thellas Sanders III with possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) (count 1), illegal possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)) (count 2), making criminal threats (§ 422) (count 3), and inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or former spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) (count 4). The People alleged that Sanders committed counts 3 and 4 against Shikira Sanders, his former wife. The People also alleged that Sanders had suffered a prior prison term conviction (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)).
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The amended information referred to the victim of counts 3 and 4 as "Jane Doe." However, at trial, she testified as Shikira Sanders. For purposes of clarity, we refer to her as Shikira throughout this opinion.
In October 2009, a jury found Sanders guilty on counts 3 and 4. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on counts 1 and 2, and the trial court declared a mistrial as to those counts. The court subsequently found the prior conviction allegations true. The court sentenced Sanders to an aggregate term of 11 years in prison—six years in prison on count 4, consisting of the midterm of three years on count 4, doubled because of the strike prior, and an additional five-year consecutive term for the prior serious felony conviction. The court sentenced Sanders to a two-year term on count 3, to be served concurrently with the term imposed on count 4.
On appeal, Sanders claims that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding from evidence documents that Shikira filed in various family court and civil proceedings in which Sanders was a party. Sanders contends that the documents were admissible to establish Shikira's motive to falsely accuse him of committing the charged offenses, and to demonstrate her lack of credibility. Sanders also claims that the trial court violated his right to confront adverse witnesses by restricting his cross-examination of Shikira concerning the documents. Finally, Sanders claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction. We affirm the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The prosecution's evidence
1. Counts 3 and 4
Shikira and Sanders began dating in November 2006. On February 16, 2008, the couple got married in Las Vegas. Shikira and Sanders had an argument on the night after their wedding. Sanders punched Shikira in the stomach, threw her against a wall, and choked her. Shikira and Sanders resolved their dispute and left Las Vegas together the following day.
After the Las Vegas trip, Sanders moved into Shikira's residence in San Bernardino. Sanders physically assaulted Shikira approximately once a month during the time they were living in San Bernardino. Sanders would slap and choke Shikira, causing bruises and marks on her body. Shikira would conceal the injuries with clothing and makeup. In June 2008, Sanders was arrested after he threw a box of hot fried chicken at Shikira and punched her in the face and chest. Shikira filed for divorce in November 2008, but did not complete the process. Instead, Shikira and Sanders purchased a house in Beaumont (Beaumont property or Beaumont house) and moved to Beaumont in March 2009.
One evening in mid-April 2009, Sanders stayed out until 6:00 a.m. When he returned home, Shikira told Sanders that it was unacceptable for him to stay out so late. The couple began to argue. Sanders kicked Shikira, slapped her in the face, and repeatedly punched her. Shikira, who was approximately five months pregnant with Sanders's child at the time, begged him to stop, and curled up in a fetal position to protect the fetus. Sanders said, "I don't give a fuck if you are pregnant," and continued to punch Shikira in her back, sides, thighs, and arms. Shikira told Sanders that she was going to call the police. Sanders threatened to kill her or to have someone else kill her. Sanders then left the house. Sanders returned several hours later, pointed a black handgun at Shikira, and said to her, " 'Don't you know I will kill you? I will kill you and the kids.' "
In May 2009, while Sanders was out of town, Shikira discovered a number of sexually explicit photographs. One of the photographs depicted Sanders engaged in a sexual act with another woman and another man. Shikira called Sanders and told him that she intended to seek a divorce. After this incident, Sanders began to make threatening telephone calls to Shikira. Shikira obtained a restraining order against Sanders, which police served on Sanders on May 17, 2009. In late May 2009, Shikira reported Sanders's abuse and threats to police.
As noted above in part I, ante, the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to these counts.
Shikira stated that on May 20, 2009, she looked through the Beaumont house in an attempt to find Sanders's guns. According to Shikira, she discovered a shotgun and ammunition in the bedroom, where Sanders kept his underwear and t-shirts. Shikira called the police, who retrieved the shotgun and the ammunition. Shikira told the responding officer about some of the abuse that Sanders had inflicted on her, and made additional disclosures of abuse to the officer a few days later when the officer contacted her for further investigation. B. The defense
Counts 1 and 2 were premised entirely on Sanders's alleged possession of a shotgun and shotgun ammunition. Neither count was premised on Sanders's possession of the black handgun that Shikira testified Sanders used to threaten her in connection with counts 3 and 4.
Sanders's mother, Cheryl Thomas, testified that she had heard Shikira threaten to "send [Sanders] back to where [he] came from," if he were to "mess" with Shikira. Thomas also testified that Shikira had admitted that she had "smacked" chicken in Sanders's face during the June 2008 incident that resulted in Sanders being arrested.
Sanders's brother, Sean Aragon, testified that on one occasion in February or March 2009, he saw Shikira slap Sanders in the face three times.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. The trial court did not improperly exclude from evidence documents that Shikira filed in family court and civil proceedings involving Sanders, nor did the court improperly restrict Sanders's cross-examination of Shikira concerning the documents
Sanders contends that the trial court improperly excluded from evidence documents that Shikira filed in family court and civil proceedings involving the couple, and that the court improperly restricted Sanders's cross-examination of Shikira concerning the documents. Sanders notes that the documents showed that Shikira requested that the family court award her sole ownership of the Beaumont house. Sanders contends that the documents demonstrate that Shikira had a motive to falsely accuse Sanders of the charged offenses because "she wanted appellant incarcerated so she could obtain this property through default." Sanders also argues that in one of the documents, Shikira falsely claimed that Sanders had committed fraud in obtaining a loan to purchase the house in his name only, in order to deprive her of her community property interest in the house. Sanders contends that trial court erred in excluding this document, which he maintains was admissible to demonstrate Shikira's lack of credibility, because Shikira knew at the time Sanders applied for the loan that he was applying in his name only, in order to qualify for benefits that were available for first time homebuyers.
1. Factual and procedural background
Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion in limine requesting that it be permitted to introduce in evidence "numerous documents" that Shikira filed in various family court and civil proceedings involving Sanders. Among the documents that the defense sought permission to introduce were documents entitled: Complaint to Quiet Title (filed June 2, 2009); Loan Document Worksheet (attached as exhibit to June 2, 2009 Complaint to Quiet Title); DV-100 Request for Order (filed May 15, 2009); Notice of Lis Pendens (filed June 1, 2009); Uniform Trade Certificate (signed June 2, 2009); Mechanic's Lien (recorded May 15, 2009); Affidavit of Adverse Claim to Land and Title (attached as an exhibit to the May 15, 2009 Mechanic's Lien); Petition for Dissolution of Marriage (filed May 18, 2009); Petitioner's Community and Quasi-Community Property Declaration (filed June 22, 2009); Request to Enter Default (filed June 22, 2009); Declaration for Default of Uncontested Dissolution (filed September 3, 2009); Notice of Entry of Judgment (filed September 3, 2009); Judgment of Dissolution (filed September 3, 2009); and Marital Settlement Agreement/Addendum to Judgment (attached to the September 3, 2009 judgment).
The document is a request for a domestic violence restraining order. This document was admitted in evidence without objection, and defense counsel cross-examined Shikira at length concerning its contents. Thus, we do not understand Sanders to be claiming on appeal that the court erred in excluding this document.
The record on appeal has been augmented to include these documents.
At a hearing on the motion, the prosecutor objected to the admission of the documents, arguing that they were "confusing" and "not relevant." The prosecutor noted that the documents related to "finances . . . of the victim and defendant," and stated, "I can't even make up and understand what they mean, let alone having that explained to a jury."
The trial court asked defense counsel to describe the purported relevance of the documents, beginning with the petition for dissolution of marriage. Defense counsel stated that the document established that Shikira and Sanders had been married for nine months at the time Shikira filed the petition. In response to the court's inquiry regarding whether this fact was in controversy, defense counsel responded, "I don't know that it is, Your Honor. Again, on some of these issues I can certainly cross-examine [Shikira]. And . . . if she has a contrary statement or inconsistent statement, I can impeach her with these documents." The court responded, "Right," and then stated, "[W]e are not going to get into property settlements and things of that nature."
After further discussions between the trial court and defense counsel concerning the relevance of the documents, the court stated, "So if I understand you correctly, your argument or your position is, then, she has fabricated all of this stuff about the physical abuse and the gun because she wants to get the Beaumont property in her own name." Defense counsel responded, "That's correct."
The trial court noted that many of the documents were not necessary to establish this contention, stating, "I am going to allow you to ask [Shikira] in general terms about has she tried to get the property in her own name, maybe what efforts she has gone to accomplish that. But we are not going to go through all of these specific documents. [¶] It's not sufficiently relevant. Again, it's too time-consuming. It's too extraneous and irrelevant."
After further discussions concerning the documents, the court stated, "You can ask her about the purchase of the [Beaumont property] and whose name it was put in, or what she was aware of, or what her understanding was, things of that nature. I am going to allow you to go into that in general terms, even though I think that it's marginally relevant. I will allow you to do that. But we are not going to go through each one of these specific documents and have them submitted to the jury." Defense counsel responded, "I would just ask for the Court's leeway in regards to possible impeachment either—." At this point, the court interjected:
"Again, we will cross that bridge if and when we get to it. If there is a specific document that you think is relevant to impeach her based upon her testimony at trial, then I will evaluate that and make a ruling at that point in time. But right now, I am not going to allow a Uniform Trade Certificate you have marked as Exhibit R. I don't even know what that is."
Defense counsel stated, "I would argue that . . . the fact that she was able to obtain a default because Mr. Sanders has been incarcerated is relevant." The court stated, "You can ask her that. 'Isn't it true you had a default judgment on whatever date?' "
The court summarized its ruling by stating, "I think the defense is claiming that [Shikira] is making all this stuff up to get the Beaumont property in her name. Well, good luck selling that to the jury. But I am going to give you that opportunity, but in limited fashion." After defense counsel stated, "I understand, Your Honor," the court stated, "So we will see where it goes."
The court specifically noted, "I am imagining the marital settlement agreement, without looking at it, has a lot of other information that's totally irrelevant."
During her testimony, the prosecutor asked Shikira, "Do you get anything if the defendant is successfully prosecuted?" Shikira responded, "No." Shikira also testified that she had been awarded the Beaumont house in the parties' marital dissolution proceeding. The prosecutor asked, "So if you didn't testify today or yesterday you would still have the Beaumont house?" Shikira responded in the affirmative.
After Shikira's direct testimony, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel again raised the admissibility of the documents from the family court and civil proceedings. Defense counsel indicated that he intended to ask Shikira whether she had requested that the family court award her 100 percent of the Beaumont property and whether the family court had in fact awarded her 100 percent of the property. The trial court stated that defense counsel would be permitted to ask both questions. However, the court stated that it did not want to litigate the basis upon which the family court reached its decision to award the property to Shikira.
After further discussions with counsel concerning the scope of permitted cross-examination, the court stated, "I think you can fully cross-examine her and ask her about her motivation [in the family court and civil proceedings]. I am allowing you do that." The following colloquy then occurred:
"[Defense counsel]: As far as if I have to impeach her with this documentation, Your Honor, I guess that's my issue.
"The court: Impeach her in what respect with respect to which specific document on which specific issue?
"[Defense counsel]: If I ask her say, for example, '[Shikira], isn't it true that you requested that the Beaumont residence be awarded to you 100 percent?' And if she says no, then —
"The court: All right. That's another matter. I have already said you can ask her that question.
"[Defense counsel]: Then I will ask for a sidebar if we get to an issue.
"The court: Right. But we are not going to get every specific allegation in the family law matter unless it relates to maybe the TRO that she filed, or the declaration that may be inconsistent with what she is testifying to. That's all relevant and pertinent. And you can use those documents to impeach her.
"But as far as some of this other stuff, you know, the financial declaration, and how much money she makes, and what about her San Bernardino property, all of that is not sufficiently relevant to this matter, including her credibility. I think you have ample information to work with to ask her the questions that you need to ask her on cross-examination."
Defense counsel indicated that he intended to ask Shikira "the nature of how she obtained [the Beaumont property] through a default." The court stated that it was incorrect to state that Shikira obtained the property through a default. Rather, according to the trial court, the family court "awarded [the Beaumont property] to [Shikira] pursuant to the marriage settlement agreement." The court reiterated its reluctance to litigate the basis upon which the family court reached its decision to award Shikira the Beaumont property, stating, "[W]e don't know what the judge relied upon in making that ultimate decision. And we are not going to ask this jury to go there either."
The court summarized its ruling by stating:
"Well, like I said, I am . . . going to allow you to ask questions about how the house was purchased and the financial arrangements regarding the initial purchase of that property, what she was aware of or not—or wasn't aware of with respect to how title was prepared with respect to the purchase of that property. But again, I am going to be real hesitant and reluctant to get into any of these family law documents."
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Shikira whether she had requested that a court award her 100 percent of the Beaumont property in the parties' family court proceeding. Shikira responded in the affirmative. Defense counsel also asked Shikira the following questions concerning her knowledge of the manner by which the Beaumont property was purchased:
"[Defense counsel]: Now, the Beaumont property was not purchased in your name; correct?
"[Shikira]: Correct.
"[Defense counsel]: It was purchased in Mr. Sanders's name; correct?
"[Shikira]: Correct.
"[Defense counsel]: Why was that?
"[Shikira]: In order for us to qualify for the first-time homebuyer's program.
"[Defense counsel]: Okay. So when you say 'us,' you mean you were aware that Mr. Sanders was buying this property; correct?
"[Shikira]: Correct.
"[Defense counsel]: And it was while the two of you were married; correct?
"[Shikira]: Correct."
Shikira also acknowledged on cross-examination that she had been involved in the preparation of documents for a loan application on the Beaumont property. Defense counsel asked, "When you reviewed the documents, you were aware that the Beaumont property loan documents were being made in Mr. Sanders's name; correct?" Shikira responded in the affirmative.
Defense counsel also asked, "[A]s a result of this pending action, it doesn't benefit you anymore; correct?" Shikira responded, "Correct." Shikira added, "I don't see how it benefited me at all." Defense counsel then stated, "Okay. You testified earlier that you were awarded the Beaumont property in family court; correct?" Shikira responded in the affirmative.
During closing argument, defense counsel stated, "When it all comes down to it, it's about the money. It's a beautiful house. Is it reasonable that Shikira Sanders would make allegations to try to obtain the house? That's for you to make that determination. But I would assert to you, it certainly is." The prosecutor objected, "Asks for speculation." The trial court overruled the objection. Shortly thereafter, defense counsel argued, "Now, if someone is going to be gaining a house potentially as a result of allegations—." The prosecutor objected, "Misstates evidence." The court overruled the objection.
At a later point during defense counsel's argument, the following colloquy occurred:
"[Defense counsel]: Now, Shikira Sanders made the statement when I was questioning her. Her statement was, 'What have I gained from this?' And I would assert to you what she has gained from this is criminal prosecution of Mr. Sanders, and the home that she is currently living in that she asked for from the Court. [¶] And—.
"[The prosecutor]: Object, Your Honor.
"The court: Sustained.
"[The prosecutor]: Move to strike.
"The court: The last portion shall be stricken. The jury is admonished to disregard it."
2. Governing law and standard of review
a. Relevant evidentiary law
Only relevant evidence is admissible [citations], and all relevant evidence is admissible unless excluded under the federal or California Constitution or by statute. [Citations.] Relevant evidence is defined in Evidence Code section 210 as evidence "having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends " 'logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference' to establish material facts. . . ." [Citations.] The trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence. . . .' " ' [Citation.] [Citation.]" (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1000-1001.) "The 'existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive' on the part of a witness ordinarily is relevant to the truthfulness of the witness's testimony [citation], and ' "[t]he credibility of an adverse witness may be assailed by proof that he cherishes a feeling of hostility towards the party against whom he is called . . . ." ' [Citation.]" (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 634.)
A trial court may exclude relevant evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." (Ibid.) "Under Evidence Code section 352, a trial court has 'broad power to control the presentation of proposed impeachment evidence " ' "to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues." [Citation.]' " [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1089-1090.)
A reviewing court may not reverse a judgment on the ground that the trial court improperly excluded evidence unless the party seeking such reversal sought admission of the evidence in the trial court. (See People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 481 (Panah) ["Since defendant did not seek admission of the . . . evidence, he forfeited any claim that it was improperly excluded"]; Evid. Code, § 354.) Evidence Code section 354 provides:
"A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless the court which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is of the opinion that the error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice and it appears of record that:
"(a) The substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other means;
"(b) The rulings of the court made compliance with subdivision (a) futile; or
"(c) The evidence was sought by questions asked during cross-examination or recross-examination."
We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse of discretion standard of review. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1113, disapproved on another ground by People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.)
b. A defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses
"The confrontation clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const. art. I, § 15.) That right is not absolute, however." (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 892.)
In People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623-624, the Supreme Court explained the scope of the right of confrontation in the context of examining an adverse witness on issues related to the witness's credibility:
"Although the right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters reflecting on their credibility, 'trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination.' [Citation.] In particular, notwithstanding the confrontation clause, a trial court may restrict cross-examination of an adverse witness on the grounds stated in Evidence Code section 352. [Citation.] A trial court's limitation on cross-examination pertaining to the credibility of a witness does not violate the confrontation clause unless a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the witness's credibility had the excluded cross-examination been permitted. [Citations.]"
3. Application
Sanders raises several contentions concerning the trial court's rulings pertaining to the documents from the parties' family court and civil proceedings and his cross-examination of Shikira thereon.
Sanders maintains that the court erred in precluding him from offering in evidence documents that showed that Shikira had requested that the family court award her sole ownership of the Beaumont property. Sanders contends that these documents would have demonstrated that Shikira had a motive to falsely accuse him of committing the charged offenses. We reject this contention because the trial court expressly permitted Sanders to ask Shikira whether she made such a request in the family court proceedings, and Shikira acknowledged on cross-examination that she had in fact made such a request. (See pt. III.A.1., ante.) Thus, the trial court did not commit reversible error in excluding the admission of the documents in question under Evidence Code section 352, since they were plainly cumulative to Shikira's testimony. (See, e.g., People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 194 [trial courts have "discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude unduly cumulative evidence"].)
Defense counsel also was free to argue in closing argument, and did in fact argue, that Shikira had falsely accused Sanders of the charged offenses in order to obtain the Beaumont property in the family court proceedings. Accordingly, we reject Sanders's related contention that he "was not allowed to adequately present his only defense to the jury that [Shikira] was biased against [Sanders] and that she was lying about the domestic violence and [Sanders's] weapons in order to have him incarcerated so that she could attain the Beaumont house as her sole property."
The trial court did sustain the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's argument that Shikira had "gained" from Sanders's prosecution "the home that she is currently living in." However, the trial court acted within its discretion in sustaining this objection, because defense counsel's argument could have been understood to imply, improperly, that the family court's award of the Beaumont house was premised on the Sanders's criminal prosecution.
Sanders also appears to contend that the trial court erred in precluding him from offering evidence that Shikira sought the entry of a default in the family court proceedings. During the initial hearing on Sanders's motion in limine, defense counsel stated, "I would argue that . . . the fact that she was able to obtain a default because Mr. Sanders has been incarcerated is relevant." The court stated, "You can ask her that. 'Isn't it true you had a default judgment on whatever date?' " Defense counsel never asked Shikira any questions concerning her request for a default or the clerk's entry of default. Nor did defense counsel make a specific and narrow request to offer in evidence only the request for entry of default or the default from the family court proceeding. Further, even assuming that the trial court precluded Sanders from offering evidence of Shikira's request for entry of default in the family court proceedings, given the latitude that the court afforded Sanders in cross-examining Shikira concerning the collateral family court matter, and the marginal probative value of her request for entry of a default in that proceeding, we conclude that the trial did not abuse its discretion in precluding Sanders from offering the evidence. (See People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 51 ["The trial court acted well within its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in precluding exploration of this collateral matter"].)
Although the trial court indicated during a subsequent discussion that it would not permit defense counsel to cross-examine Shikira with respect to "how she obtained [the Beaumont property] through a default," the gist of the trial court's comments was that the Beaumont property had been awarded pursuant to the family court's approval of a marital settlement agreement, and that the court would not permit cross-examination concerning the basis upon which the family court made its decision. We do not view the trial court's comments as altering its previous ruling that defense counsel would be permitted to ask Shikira whether she had obtained a default in the family court proceedings.
Sanders also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to admit a document that, he maintains, would have established that Shikira "committed perjury by claiming that [Sanders] had committed fraud in obtaining the loan to purchase the [Beaumont house] they had lived in together to deprive her of her community property rights." In that document, a complaint to quiet title, Shikira stated, "Defendant [Sanders] committed an act of what appears to be real estate fraud listing and misrepresenting himself as an 'unmarried man' and subsequently qualify [sic] for first-time homebuyer's benefits and thereafter defraud [sic] the spouse of her entitlements [sic] to community property . . . ." We are not persuaded.
During the two instances in which the trial court discussed with defense counsel the admissibility of the documents, including the complaint to quiet title, defense counsel proffered no evidence demonstrating the allegedly perjurious nature of the complaint to quiet title. At the time of these discussions, Shikira had not yet testified concerning the manner by which she and Sanders obtained title to the Beaumont property, and defense counsel presented no other evidence to establish that Shikira had committed perjury in the family court proceedings. Thus, the complaint to quiet title became arguably relevant for impeachment purposes only after Shikira testified that she was aware that Sanders had taken title to the Beaumont house solely in his name in order to qualify for a first-time homebuyer's program. Defense counsel never sought to impeach Shikira with her arguably contrary statement in the complaint to quiet title after Shikira testified to this effect on cross-examination. Accordingly, the issue is forfeited on appeal. (See Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 481; Evid. Code, § 354.)
We reject Sanders's contention that any attempt to offer the document in evidence would have been futile. The trial court repeatedly stated that it would permit Sanders to impeach Shikira's testimony with documents from the family court proceedings. (See pt. III.A.1, ante.) For example, during the first hearing discussing the documents, the court stated, "If there is a specific document that you think is relevant to impeach her based upon her testimony at trial, then I will evaluate that and make a ruling at that point in time."
In a related contention, Sanders maintains that the trial court "forbade appellant to inquire of [Shikira] on cross-examination as to whether she had lied in the documents in an effort to obtain the Beaumont property." In support of this assertion, Sanders cites to the entirety of the two discussions among court and counsel concerning the admission of the family court documents summarized above. However, at no time during these discussions did the court preclude Sanders from asking Shikira whether she had made false statements in the complaint to quiet title. Defense counsel never specifically asked Shikira on cross-examination whether she had lied in the family court proceedings, and, as noted above, defense counsel never sought to impeach her testimony by offering in evidence documents from the family court proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not restrict Sanders from cross-examining Shikira in the manner of which he complains on appeal. Accordingly, we further conclude that the trial court did not violate Sanders's constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanders's motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction
Although not expressly stated in his brief, Sanders appears to be referring to the complaint to quiet title.
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Sanders contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction.
1. Factual and procedural background
After the jury reached its verdicts, Sanders filed a motion to dismiss his prior strike conviction. In his motion, Sanders noted that he suffered the strike conviction for the offense of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) in 1993, when he was just 18 years old. Sanders also noted that neither of his two other felony convictions, a 1998 conviction for forgery and a 2002 conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, involved violence. Although Sanders acknowledged that the current offenses involved "violence or the use of force against the victim," he requested that the court consider the fact that he and Shikira had a "tumultuous relationship," and that there was "little corroborating" evidence to substantiate Shikira's testimony concerning his commission of the offenses. Sanders also argued that he was a young man with much to contribute to society. He supported his motion with numerous letters of support from family members and friends.
In their opposition, the People noted that Sanders had been sentenced to prison on three prior occasions, that the current offense involved violence and threats of violence, and that Sanders had violated parole on three separate prior occasions. The People argued that Sanders was "exactly the type of recidivist offender that the Three Strikes law intended to punish."
At sentencing, after hearing argument, the court noted that Sanders's 1993 strike conviction, assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), involved his shooting at a convenience store. The court also observed that Sanders had a lengthy and serious criminal history, commenting that some of his prior convictions involved weapons and/or violence. The court continued, "[T]aking into consideration his criminal history, as well as the facts and circumstances of this case, it seems like very little has changed in his life over the past 16 years. [¶] . . . [¶] So I think he does fall within the scheme or spirit of the three-strikes law." The court denied the motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction.
2. Governing law
The law governing a trial court's consideration of whether to dismiss a prior strike conviction is well established:
"[A trial court] must consider whether, whether, in light of 'the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams).)
Our standard of review of the trial court's decision is also well established:
"A trial court's decision to strike prior felony convictions is subject to review under the 'deferential abuse of discretion standard. Under that standard an appellant who seeks reversal must demonstrate that the trial court's decision was irrational or arbitrary. It is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more of his prior convictions. Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court's ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Romero (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1434.)
"Following Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 148, the overwhelming majority of California appellate courts have reversed the dismissal of, or affirmed the refusal to dismiss, a strike of those defendants with a long and continuous criminal career." (People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 338.)
3. Application
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the nature and circumstances of the present felony offenses did not support dismissing Sanders's prior strike. The court could have reasonably found that Sanders committed repeated acts of physical violence and threats of violence against his former wife. The court also could have found that on one occasion, while Shikira was pregnant, Sanders kicked, slapped and repeatedly punched her, and that on another occasion, Sanders threatened to kill her while holding a gun.
Sanders also has a lengthy and serious criminal history, which, as the trial court observed, has often involved violence and/or weapons. In 1993, Sanders shot a store clerk with a rifle. He was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and sentenced to five years in prison. In 1997, while on parole, Sanders was convicted of misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). In 1998, while still on parole, Sanders was convicted of forgery (§ 484f, subd. (a)) and was again sentenced to prison. In 2002, Sanders was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and was sentenced to prison for a third time. In 2005, Sanders was convicted of misdemeanor forgery (§ 476).
Although Sanders did present evidence of supportive family members and friends, in light of the seriousness of the present offenses and his lengthy and serious criminal record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanders's motion to dismiss his strike prior.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
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NARES, Acting P. J.
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McDONALD, J.