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People v. Salcedo

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento
Apr 2, 2009
No. C058090 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2009)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MIGUEL ANGEL SALCEDO, Defendant and Appellant. C058090 California Court of Appeal, Third District, Sacramento April 2, 2009

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Super. Ct. No. 04F08589

NICHOLSON, J.

Defendant Miguel Angel Salcedo shot and killed Ruben Aguayo during a dispute over a drug transaction. A jury convicted defendant of second degree murder and found true a special allegation that defendant personally used a firearm which caused death. (Pen. Code, §§ 187; 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for 15 years to life for the murder plus 25 years to life on the firearm enhancement.

Defendant appeals, claiming CALCRIM Nos. 570 and 571, used by the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, denied him his constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense by failing to state he could be convicted of voluntary manslaughter even if he acted with malice, in particular, a conscious disregard of life, and if the expressly defined circumstances that define voluntary manslaughter exist (imperfect self-defense, or sudden quarrel or heat of passion) and negate the element of malice. We disagree.

The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 570 and 571 as follows in relevant part:

We recently rejected defendant’s argument in People v. Genovese (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 817 (Genovese). Because the discussion in Genovese applies equally here, we quote from the opinion at length: “Defendant argues the instructions did not inform the jurors they could find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter if they found that he, while acting in imperfect defense . . . (or sudden quarrel or heat of passion), killed either intentionally or unintentionally with conscious disregard for human life.

“Either an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for life is an essential requirement of voluntary manslaughter in this scenario. (People v. Blakeley [(2000) 23 Cal.4th 82,] 88–91; People v. Lasko [(2000)] 23 Cal.4th 101.)

“Defendant argues the trial court should have expressly instructed the jury that intent to kill or conscious disregard for life is an essential element of voluntary manslaughter, in accordance with Blakeley and Lasko, and the failure to do so left the jurors with no way to apply defendant’s proffered defense to the elements of express or implied malice to ascertain whether these elements had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

“Thus, although the jury was not expressly instructed in that manner, the jury was instructed, ‘A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed a person because he acted in imperfect defense of another.’ (Italics added.) Similarly, the jury was instructed, ‘A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.’

“The killing could not ‘otherwise be murder’ unless the jury found defendant intended to kill the victim or acted with conscious disregard for human life, and the jury was so informed in the instruction defining murder (i.e., that to prove murder, the prosecution must prove defendant acted with malice aforethought, and there are two kinds of malice aforethought -- express, which requires intent to kill, and implied, which requires conscious disregard for human life).

“Thus, the instructions did let the jury know that a killing in imperfect self-defense (or heat of passion, etc.), whether intentional or in conscious disregard of life, is voluntary manslaughter.

“. . . Defendant says intent to kill or conscious disregard for life used to be expressly stated as an essential element of voluntary manslaughter in former CALJIC No. 8.40, which defined voluntary manslaughter and said that every person who unlawfully kills another human being without malice aforethought but either with an intent to kill, or with conscious disregard for human life, was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Language similar to former CALJIC No. 8.40 now appears in CALCRIM No. 572, which defines voluntary manslaughter when murder is not charged. (CALCRIM No. 572.) Here, voluntary manslaughter was a lesser offense of murder. Defendant argues that, since no instruction tracking former CALJIC No. 8.40 was given in this case, once the jury determined that express or implied malice was present in defendant’s case, they were given no instructions telling them that even if they found this to be true, they could still find defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter if they believed he acted in heat of passion or in reasonable/unreasonable defense . . . . But defendant’s argument is defeated by the plain language of the instructions as given to the jury, that ‘[a] killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter’ if defendant acted in imperfect defense of another or sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (Genovese, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 831-832, original italics.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J, RAYE, J.

“A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.

“The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion if:

“1. The defendant was provoked;

“2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured (his/her) reasoning or judgment;

“AND

“3. The provocation would have caused an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment.

“Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to act without due deliberation and reflection.” (CALCRIM No. 570.)

“A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed a person because he acted in imperfect self-defense.

“If you conclude the defendant acted in complete self-defense, his action was lawful and you must find him not guilty of any crime. The difference between complete self-defense and imperfect self-defense depends on whether the defendant’s belief in the need to use deadly force was reasonable.

“The defendant acted in imperfect self-defense if:

“1. The defendant actually believed that he was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury;

“AND

“2. The defendant actually believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger;

“BUT

“3. At least one of those beliefs was unreasonable.

“Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be.

“In evaluating the defendant’s beliefs, consider all the circumstances as they were known and appeared to the defendant.” (CALCRIM No. 571.)


Summaries of

People v. Salcedo

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento
Apr 2, 2009
No. C058090 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2009)
Case details for

People v. Salcedo

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MIGUEL ANGEL SALCEDO, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Third District, Sacramento

Date published: Apr 2, 2009

Citations

No. C058090 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2009)