Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC061828
Lambden, J.
Defendant pleaded no contest to one count of knowingly renting a structure to a person for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing drugs (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.5, subd. (a)) and possession of an assault rifle (Pen. Code, § 12280, subd. (b)). Prior to this plea, he had moved to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5; he now appeals the denial of that motion. Defendant makes various challenges to the validity of the search warrant and the search conducted pursuant to it. We are unpersuaded by his contentions and affirm the lower court’s judgment.
All further unspecified code sections refer to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
San Mateo County Deputy Sheriff Brad Buckwalter, assigned to the county narcotic task force, participated in the service of a search warrant at 998 Runnymede Street, East Palo Alto, on May 5, 2006. Defendant owned the property and was in the upstairs of the front house when the police conducted their search. The officers found 16 firearms upstairs in the front house. The search also revealed that the structure behind the front house at the back of the property was being used to make methamphetamine. The officers recovered various drugs and firearms from the back structure.
The facts are from the evidence presented at defendant’s preliminary hearing and the motion to suppress.
The Search Warrant
The search warrant signed by the magistrate on May 5, 2006, found probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The warrant commanded the officers to search 998 Runnymede Street, which was “described as a two-story family dwelling. The residence is an orange/red colored wooden structure. The numbers ‘998’ are affixed to a black mailbox in front of the residence. The numbers can be clearly seen from Runnymede Street. Additionally, there are two detached structures to the rear of the property which are controlled and occupied by the residents of the main property.” The warrant described the premises as “including all rooms, safes, storage areas, containers, surrounding grounds, trash areas, garages, crawl spaces, vehicles and outbuildings assigned to or part of residence located at 998 Runnymede Street . . . .”
Officer Thomas Marchese, the affiant, stated that during the morning of May 5, 2006, officers searched pursuant to a warrant of a residence in Watsonville. During the search of the home, the officers recovered large quantities of pseudoephedrine pills in the room of Jose Guadalupe Martinez and in the room of his brother-in-law, Miguel Angel Cazares. The officers also found numerous receipts for purchases of pseudoephedrine products. Marchese interviewed Martinez; he reported that he had been purchasing pseudoephedrine pills for Cazares. Martinez disclosed that several times per month he would drive Cazares to a house in East Palo Alto where methamphetamine was being produced. Martinez claimed that he remained in the vehicle while Cazares entered the house to deliver the pills. He added that frequently he spotted a Chevrolet Avalanche parked at the residence. His last delivery of pills to this residence, according to Martinez, was approximately two weeks earlier. Additionally, Martinez reported that several weeks earlier a drug deal had gone “sour” at this residence in East Palo Alto resulting in a “shoot out” that was not reported to the police.
When Cazares returned home, the police also questioned him. He stated that he liked to keep large quantities of cold pills around in case he became sick. When told that the officers knew about the house in East Palo Alto, Cazares stated that he had sold some pills to people at that house because some people there were sick.
Martinez did not know the exact address of the house in East Palo Alto but he agreed to point the house out to the officers. According to the affidavit: “Martinez described the residence as being a two-story dwelling with the second story shaped like a wedge, coming to a point. He stated there was a driveway running down the right side and a second detached structure to the rear of the property where the methamphetamine was being ‘cooked.’ ” Subsequently, Martinez drove with an East Palo Alto police officer in an unmarked vehicle and Martinez identified 998 Runnymede Street as the residence where he had gone with Cazares to deliver the pills. Martinez admitted that he had actually gone into the residence and that the person there was named “Taquache.” The affiant, Marchese, confirmed that “Taquache” was the street moniker of Angel Lara Garcia (Angel) and that he resided at 998 Runnymede Street. Marchese also discovered that Angel had an extensive criminal history. Additionally, Marchese learned that Angel had once been kidnapped for ransom; the testimony at the trial revealed that Angel had been kidnapped because he was a major drug trafficker and the kidnappers wanted drugs and money from his family.
The search warrant refers to the codefendant as Angel Lara Garcia, but the remainder of the record refers to him as Angel Garcia Lara. To avoid confusion, we refer to him as Angel or use his full name.
Marchese corroborated Martinez’s statement by confirming with several East Palo Alto police officers that they had received information from reliable informants that an unreported drug related shooting had occurred in the driveway of 998 Runnymede Street several weeks earlier. Additionally, the officer who had accompanied Martinez to the residence at 998 Runnymede described the place as being a two-story dwelling with the second story shaped like a wedge. He stated there was a driveway running down the right side and a second detached structure to the rear of the property and a third, smaller structure, in the rear of the property, which had bars on the windows and approximately a dozen ventilation pipes erected from the roof. He also observed a Chevrolet Avalanche pull up to the property.
In addition, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reported that it had been conducting surveillance on 998 Runnymede Street on May 4, 2006, after receiving information from a proven informant that he or she had been to the residence on multiple occasions and received various quantities of methamphetamine from “Taquache” or Angel Lara Garcia. A special agent of the Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement (BNE) stated that there had been a three-year investigation involving the production, sales, and distribution of methamphetamine and 998 Runnymede Street was named as a target and Angel Lara Garcia was named as a suspect.
The Execution of the Warrant
After the issuance of the search warrant, on May 5, 2006, approximately 35 officers were involved in the execution of the warrant at 998 Runnymede Street. Buckwalter, who was in charge of the tactical deployment of the officers, testified that there were three structures at 998 Runnymede Street. The first structure is a two-story home with a driveway to the right. Down the driveway is a shed and beyond the shed is a single-story cinder block frame building.
Buckwalter and a number of officers entered the front of the two-story house while other officers entered the back single-story cinder block structure. Other officers remained in the center courtyard to provide security and to “hold” the shed.
When no one responded to the officers’ knock and notice at the front house, they forced the front door open and entered. The front part of the house was unoccupied and completely unfurnished. A wall separated this unit from the back of the house and it did not connect to the upstairs. Buckwalter and his team left the front of the house and noticed another door on the first floor on the west wall of the front house. They entered and found it to be furnished but not occupied. They then left and went to the exterior stairwell to a porch on the second floor at the back of the front house. The officers went up the stairs and entered the back door; they found defendant on the front porch or patio that hung over the first floor of the property. The officers found 16 weapons on the second floor of this residence.
Buckwalter testified that he spotted at the center of the floor on the second story more than 30 hand instruments that were typically used in hospitals, including forceps, tongs, and scissors. He also found three television monitors, a recorder, and cables running to different parts of the house. There was access to the attic, which had a window overlooking the front part of the property and two cameras were mounted to look out the window. The attic window had bullet holes. Two cameras were also looking back toward the smaller single-story residence and shed.
When asked what one could see from all of these cameras, Buckwalter responded: “You can see anybody walking or driving from the front of the driveway all the way down to the shed, that’s what the shed would cover. The cameras mounted at the front of the house look out on the street and at the threshold of the driveway. The cameras mounted at the west side of the house cover an area somewhat towards the shed, and the other one a little straighter back towards the rear residence.”
Buckwalter stated that he spoke with Marchese, who had entered the back house with his team. After approaching the back house, Marchese saw “people moving around and about in the living room through the windows leading to the south bedroom.” Some windows had metal bars over them. After the officers gave knock and notice, they observed multiple people from the living room moving westerly out of the living room towards the hallway. Marchese feared that some people were attempting to escape and, consequently, the officers broke down the front metal door.
Once inside the back structure, the officers forced open the door of the bathroom. They spotted Angel by the bathtub; he was on his knees leaning over the bathtub and the water was running. Angel’s hands were wet. They ordered Angel to the ground and he complied. The bathtub contained spilled chemicals and a metal spoon. The officers found pseudoephedrine pills. They located a cardboard box “measuring perhaps 18 [inches] wide by 20 [inches] long, 14 inches high, and completely full of blister packs.” They uncovered currency in a bowl. They located two loaded guns in the living room. They also found a food processor sealer, which was used to seal plastic bags. They also located cocaine and methamphetamine. They uncovered over $4,000 in cash and Angel had over $14,000 on him.
Subsequently, San Mateo Deputy Sheriff Leroy O’Laughlin entered the rear structure. Based on his observations of various chemicals and equipment, he concluded that there was a methamphetamine extraction laboratory in the residence.
On May 6, 2006, San Mateo Deputy Sheriff Daniel Guiney interviewed defendant who waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. Defendant stated that he owned 998 Runnymede and that he resided primarily on the second floor of the front building. He reported that he had rented the back home to Angel for approximately three years. The weapons discovered in the front house had, according to defendant, all been legally purchased and all, except one, had been properly registered.
The Arrests and Charges
Defendant and others were arrested. On August 29, 2006, an information charged defendant with possession of narcotics for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), with a quantity enhancement (id., § 11370.4, subd. (b)(1)), and two arming enhancements (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (c)); possessing marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359); two counts of possessing a controlled substance while armed (id., § 11370.1, subd. (a)); possession of PCP (phencyclidine) for sale (id., § 11383); renting a place for use in the manufacture of narcotics with two arming enhancements (id., § 11366.5, subd. (a)); manufacturing methamphetamine with two arming enhancements (id., § 11379.6, subd. (a)); three counts of possession of an assault weapon (Pen. Code, § 12280, subd. (b)); and possession of an illegal firearm (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)).
Motion to Suppress
On November 22, 2006, defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warrant searches. Defendant argued that the officers had information that illegal activity was occurring in the back house, but the officers never identified any related activity as occurring in the front unit. Further, defendant argued that the search warrant failed to describe the residence, which was a multi-occupancy premises, with sufficient particularity. Defendant submitted pictures showing that the property had two separate electric meters, and that the door on the lower level of the street side of the front building had the letter “A” and the door on the first level of the back side of the front building had the letter “B”. Documentation from the building department established that the back building was built as a separate single family dwelling. A later building permit authorized the conversion of the second story of the front house into an apartment.
The court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on February 16, 2007. At the hearing, Marchese testified that when he first saw the residence, he noticed that the upstairs had two surveillance cameras and multiple bullet holes. His team’s assignment was “to make entry into what we thought to be the lab complex to the rear, just attached structures to the rear of the main home.” He stated that directly in front of the back building was a metal fenced area with a pit bull.
Marchese testified that they gave knock and notice at the back house and the officers then observed movement inside. The officers were able to knock the door open with a metal ram; the officers immediately saw currency scattered around the first room. He then forced entry into the bathroom where they found Angel. Marchese reported that his eyes and throat began to burn when they entered the bathroom.
The hearing continued on February 23, 2007, and Buckwalter testified. He said that he had driven by 998 Runnymede Street on many occasions during the prior six months. He had noticed the surveillance cameras in the window and the bullet holes in the upstairs window. Prior to entering the front house, he had no indication that it was a multiple-unit residence.
Buckwalter stated that his team entered the front door of the two-story residence and discovered that this portion of the house was vacant and unfurnished and provided no access to the remainder of the house. He noticed that the front door had the letter “A” attached to it. He asserted that this letter was not visible from the street. He knew that the upstairs was occupied because he heard another officer, who was looking up at the balcony at the front of the house and pointing his service weapon at someone standing up there, yelling to the person to freeze and put his hands up.
After determining that he did not have access to the remainder of the house from the front of the house, Buckwalter and his team exited and went down the driveway where they observed another door. This door, which was also on the ground level, had the letter “B.” They gave knock and notice but received no response. They forced the door open; Buckwalter saw personal items in this portion of the house, but no one was present.
Buckwalter located an exterior flight of stairs in the back of the house that led to a balcony on the second floor; he also spotted a door that had no external markings. He gave the knock and notice announcement and then forced the door open when no one responded. He saw an unfurnished kitchen and dining room. He also spotted several boxes. As he was proceeding down the hallway, he heard Marchese give the code word for hazardous material on the police radio. As he conducted his sweep, he saw weapons in the second bedroom. He made that observation within 20 seconds of entry. The weapons were potentially assault weapons and one had “a tripod extension on it or a tripod kit on it.”
The trial court announced at the close of the hearing that it did not believe that the officers knew ahead of time that there were multiple residences. The court pointed out that Cazares, who had not cooperated with the police, knew the police were interested in the East Palo Alto home and there was a significant risk that he would tip off Angel. The court took the matter under submission. On February 27, 2007, the court denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
The Plea, Sentence, and Appeal
On September 5, 2007, defendant pleaded nolo contendere to knowingly renting a structure to a person for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing drugs (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.5, subd. (a)) and possession of an assault rifle (Pen. Code, § 12280, subd. (b)), in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. The trial court sentenced defendant to three years of supervised felony probation with a special condition of one year in the county jail.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order denying his motion to suppress.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the lower court should have granted his motion to suppress the items uncovered on the second floor of the front residence. He maintains that probable cause did not support the search warrant’s inclusion of the front house. He also argues that, once the officers entered the front house and learned that the residence had three separate apartments, they could no longer objectively rely on the property description in the search warrant. Finally, he asserts that the affiant was chargeable with the knowledge of the East Palo Alto Building Department that a building permit authorized the conversion of the second story of the front house into an apartment. We consider each of these arguments.
The motion to suppress concerned the 16 firearms and other items seized from the second floor of the front house.
I. Standard of Review
Defendant argues that probable cause did not support the search warrant and that the lower court should have granted his motion to suppress. The basic standard for probable cause to issue a search warrant is “whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . ., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238.) Probable cause is not measurable by formulas; rather, its existence depends on the totality of the circumstances. (Id. at p. 236.)
We overturn the lower court’s determination to issue a search warrant only if the affidavit upon which it is based fails as a matter of law to set forth sufficient competent evidence to support the magistrate’s probable cause finding. (People v. Butler (1966) 64 Cal.2d 842.) Moreover, the affidavit carries with it a presumption of validity. (Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 171 (Franks).) Courts resolve doubtful or marginal cases in favor of the warrant (United States v. Ventresca (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 109), but must review the sufficiency of affidavits conscientiously to ensure that the magistrate had sufficient information and did not merely ratify the bare conclusions of others (Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 239).
“An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] ‘The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.’ [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law, viz., the reasonableness of the challenged police conduct, is also subject to independent review. [Citations.] The reason is plain: ‘it is “the ultimate responsibility of the appellate court to measure the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301.)
II. The Warrant’s Inclusion of the Front House
Defendant argues that the search warrant affidavit did not contain any probable cause to support a search of the front of the house. He claims that the affidavit only established probable cause to search the cinder block building in the rear, and therefore the warrant authorizing the search of all three structures on the property was overbroad. “The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to prevent general searches. By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit. Thus, the scope of a lawful search is ‘defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.’ ” (Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 84, fn. omitted (Garrison).)
Defendant contends that Martinez told the officer that the methamphetamine was being made in the back house. Additionally, an officer who had been observing the property saw two males exit a Chevy Avalanche on the property and take an object from the vehicle to the “structure to the rear.” This information, according to defendant, limited the suspected activity to the back structure and therefore defendant objects to the warrant authorizing a search of the front house.
We note that defendant quotes from the record but provides no citations to the record in this part of his argument section. In fact, there are almost no citations to the record in any of his argument sections. Citations to the record in the factual portion of the record do not relieve the party from citing to the record in the argument portion of the brief because “any reference in the brief must be supported by a citation, regardless of where in the brief that reference appears.” (City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239, fn. 16.) Each brief must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Although we may disregard contentions unsupported by citation to the record (Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979), we will disregard this noncompliance and consider the merit of defendant’s arguments (see Cal. Rules or Court, rule 8.204(e)(2)(C)).
The affidavit made it clear that there were three buildings at 998 Runnymede Street. It stated that there was a front two-story dwelling with the second story shaped like a wedge and a second detached structure to the rear of the property. The affidavit also stated that there “was a third, smaller structure in the rear of the property, which has bars on the windows and approximately a dozen ventilation pipes erected from the roof which vary in size.” As already noted, the warrant authorized a search of all three buildings.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, a complete review of the affidavit establishes that it set forth information to support probable cause that activities related to drug activity were occurring on the entire premises of 998 Runnymede Street, and not limited to the back structure. According to the affidavit, Martinez told Officer Marchese, the affiant, that he would deliver the pills to a house in East Palo Alto and that he remained in the vehicle while Cazares “went inside the house to deliver the pills . . . .” Martinez specified that the methamphetamine was being “cooked” in the rear structure, but he did not suggest that the drug transactions or other activities connected to the distribution of drugs were limited to the back structure.
Indeed, much of the information set forth by the affiant related to information related to the “residence” or to the address of 998 Runnymede Street. Martinez told the affiant that he had delivered the pills to “Taquache,” who was Angel; Angel’s address was 998 Runnymede Street. The DEA told affiant that an informant had told an agent that he or she had “been to the residence on multiple occasions and taken delivery of various quantities of methamphetamine . . . .” Further, an agent for BNE stated there had been a three-year investigation “involving the production, sales and distribution of methamphetamine in which 998 Runnymede Street was named as a target.” Finally, police officers confirmed that an unreported drug related shooting had occurred in the driveway of 998 Runnymede.
As already discussed, the affidavit stated that Martinez reported that the methamphetamine was being made in the back cinder-block structure, but there was evidence that the illegal activities were occurring on the property of 998 Runnymede Street; the affidavit does not limit the illegal activity to the back house. Indeed, the affiant received information that a shoot-out had occurred in the driveway to the right of the main residence, not in or next to the back structure. Accordingly, we conclude that this information was more than sufficient to provide probable cause to search the front house, as well as the rear structure. (See People v. Gallegos (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 612, 625 [“ ‘ “[A] warrant to search ‘premises’ located at a particular address is sufficient to support the search of outbuildings and appurtenances in addition to a main building when the various places searched are part of a single integral unit” ’ ”].)
Defendant cites a number of cases holding that the affidavit must set forth probable cause for each building to be searched and there was not probable cause for each unit of the front house. (See, e.g., Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. 79.) Here, however, the affidavit provided probable cause that criminal activity was being conducted on the entire premises. As the trial court found, the officers knew there was a two-story front residence and back buildings, but there was nothing to alert them to the fact that the front building was subdivided into several units. We agree that the officers were not on notice of the property’s multi-dwelling character and the affidavit provided probable cause that criminal activity was occurring on the entire premises at 998 Runnymede Street, which included the front two-story house.
Defendant also claims that the warrant was overbroad by including the front house and therefore it was objectively unreasonable. He asserts that the officers relied on an overbroad warrant and therefore the issue is whether the officers knew or should have known that a mistake had been made in designating the place to be searched. (See Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 85 [no constitutional violation when warrant permitted a search of apartment on third-floor and officers in executing the warrant discovered there were two apartments].) As already mentioned, the affidavit did state that the premises included three buildings and it did not limit the description of suspicious activities to the back building. Thus, it was reasonable for the officers to rely on the warrant’s description of the property to be searched.
Defendant claims that the overbroad description was only in the warrant, not in the supporting affidavit, and therefore the lower court improperly applied Franks, supra, 438 U.S. 154. The record does not indicate that the lower court improperly used Franks. Rather, defendant had requested an evidentiary hearing to traverse the search warrant under Franks and the trial court found that there was no showing to satisfy the threshold requirements under Franks.
Accordingly, we conclude that the affidavit presented to the magistrate contained probable cause to search the entire property at 998 Runnymede Street, which included the front two-story house, and therefore the warrant was not overbroad.
Since we conclude that probable cause supported the search warrant, we need not address defendant’s argument that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply.
III. Execution of the Warrant
Defendant contends that, once the officers entered the front house and realized that it was comprised of separate apartments that were not connected, the officers could not have objectively relied on the property description in the warrant that the front house was a two-story family dwelling.
Here, the warrant clearly described the premises to be searched: the front two-story house and the two structures in the back. Although a warrant to search a single dwelling unit located at a particular address may validly permit the search of outbuildings and appurtenances thereto, it will not support the search of multiple living units on the same property absent the existence of probable cause to search each unit or a reasonable basis for believing that the entire premises are a single living unit. (People v. Estrada (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 136, 146 [holding that an overly broad warrant is void]; see generally People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 881, fn. 5.)
However, even when the warrant specifies one dwelling rather than multi-units, the search of all the units is permitted when there is probable cause for believing that the premises are a single living unit. (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 85, 87-88.) The constitutionality of the officers’ execution of a search warrant is assessed “in light of the information available to them at the time they acted.” (Ibid.) A search of multi-units when the warrant specifies one dwelling is lawful if based on the officers’ reasonable belief that those quarters were within the scope of the warrant. (Id. at pp. 87-89; compare United States v. Cannon (9th Cir. 2001) 264 F.3d 875, 879-880 [holding that officers are required to stop a search and obtain a separate warrant upon discovering that the place being searched constituted the separate living quarters of a third party as to whom no probable cause was established].)
Defendant relies on Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. 79, when arguing that the search of the upstairs front building was illegal. In Garrison, the police obtained a search warrant for an entire floor of a building that the officers reasonably believed contained only the suspect’s apartment. (Id. at p. 80.) In fact, there was a second apartment on the floor occupied by the defendant. (Ibid.) Believing it to be the suspect’s apartment, the police searched the defendant’s apartment. (Ibid.) After discovering contraband, officers realized they were in the wrong apartment and stopped the search. (Ibid.) The United States Supreme Court held that the search before discovery of the error was proper and that the contraband was admissible. (Id. at pp. 86-89.)
The United States Supreme Court in Garrison stated that when police discover separate living units during a search pursuant to a warrant for a single living unit they are “on notice of the risk that they might be in a unit erroneously included within the terms of the warrant.” (Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 87.) The general rule is, once the officers discover multiple apartments not specified in the warrant, they should discontinue the search and either obtain a more specific warrant or limit their search to the defendant’s premises. (Id. at pp. 86-89.) The Garrison court concluded that in the particular situation before it the search of the defendant’s apartment was lawful because the officers’ failure to realize the warrant was overbroad was “objectively understandable and reasonable.” (Id. at p. 88; see also United States v. Kyles (2nd Cir.1994) 40 F.3d 519, 523-524; United States v. Cannon (9th Cir.2001) 264 F.3d 875, 879.) The officers’ conduct and the limits of the search were based on the information available as the search proceeded. (See Garrison, supra, at p. 87.) The court cautioned in a footnote: “ ‘Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability.’ ” (Id. at p. 87, fn.11.)
Here, the trial court found that the officers believed that the front house was one residence and, once they discovered there were separate units, it was reasonable for them to believe that the warrant authorized their entry into all three units. The court found that the photographs taken from the street “would not put anyone on notice there were subdivided units within any structures.” We conclude that the record supports this ruling. There were few objective indicia that the house had been converted into three separate units and the house appeared, from an exterior vantage point, to be a single family home, with two structures in the back. The house had only one driveway to the right of the front house and there was only one mailbox that had the address of 998 Runnymede Street. The two small downstairs units had an “A” and a “B” on the doors, but the door to the upstairs did not have a letter. Significantly, these letters were not visible from the street.
Prior to entering the front residence, the officers had observed the bullet holes and surveillance cameras on the second floor of that house. Thus, it was reasonable for them to believe that they could gain access to the second floor by entering the first floor and going up stairs. Once the team under Buckwalter’s supervision entered the downstairs front door and became aware that the front unit was vacant and provided no access to the remainder of the house, it was reasonable for them to search for a different door to provide them access to the remainder of the house. The officers entered the second unit on the ground floor, which appeared to have someone living there, but no one was present. At that point, the officers knew someone was upstairs because Buckwalter testified that he heard another officer, who was looking up at the balcony at the front of the house and pointing his service weapon at someone standing up there, yelling to the person to freeze and put his hands up.
Since the warrant authorized the officers’ search of 998 Runnymede, which the officers believed to be the location of various drug activities and the home of Angel, it was not unreasonable for them to believe that the upstairs, which was clearly occupied, was the home of Angel or the place where drug deals were occurring. Based on what they knew at the time, it was reasonable for them to believe that the warrant authorized their entry into the second-floor unit. As Buckwalter entered the upstairs, he saw weapons in the upstairs residence. He made that observation within 20 seconds of entry.
Defendant cites Steagald v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 204, 215, in support of his argument that the police cannot extend a search to a third person’s home even if they have probable cause to believe the suspect is there. In Steagald, the police had an arrest warrant and entered the home of a third person “on their belief” that the suspect might be a guest there. (Id. at p. 213.) That is not the situation before us. The present case involves a search warrant, not a warrant for an arrest. “Search warrants are not directed at persons; they authorize the search of ‘place[s]’ and the seizure of ‘things,’ and as a constitutional matter they need not even name the person from whom the things will be seized.” (Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978) 436 U.S. 547, 555.) “The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.” (Id. at p. 556, fn. omitted.) The officers in the present case did not enter defendant’s home because they believed Angel may be visiting there. They entered the upstairs because they believed that drug activity was occurring there and that Angel resided there. This belief was supported by their observations that a person was upstairs on the deck, the windows upstairs had surveillance cameras, there were bullet holes on the second floor, and the address provided for Angel was 998 Runnymede Street.
Once the officers discovered that there were multiple apartments not specified in the warrant, they attempted to find the main residence and to restrict their search to where they believed the drug activity was occurring. (See Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 86-89.) The officers’ conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Ibid.) The warrant authorized the officers’ entry into the main residence at 998 Runnymede and we agree with the lower court’s determination that the execution of the warrant was reasonable under the unfolding events. Once the officers entered the upstairs, the guns were in plain view and therefore the lower court properly rejected defendant’s motion to suppress.
IV. Charging the Police with Knowledge of Information at the East Palo Alto Building Department
Defendant maintains that the knowledge that a building permit in the records of the East Palo Alto Building Department authorized the conversion of the second story of the front house into an apartment is imputed to the police officers. To support this claim, defendant cites Whiteley v. Warden (1971) 401 U.S. 560, 564-568 and People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, 38-39.
Defendant’s reliance on Whiteley v. Warden and People v. Willis is misplaced. In Whiteley v. Warden, the court was concerned with an arrest based on a deficient warrant and not supported by probable cause. (Whiteley v. Warden, supra, 401 U.S. at pp. 564-568 [arrest that is not supported by probable cause remains an illegal arrest even though the arresting officers were unaware of the deficiencies in the warrant].) As already discussed extensively, the warrant in the present case was not defective and authorized a search of the front house. People v. Willis, supra, 28 Cal.4th 22is also inapplicable as the court in this case was concerned with the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897). In Willis, our Supreme Court determined that the search was illegal when the officer mistakenly believed that the defendant was on parole after being given erroneous information by the defendant’s parole officer. (Willis, supra, at p. 26.) The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because the parole officer in this case was acting as an adjunct of the police department when involved in the police investigation. (Id. at pp. 38-39.) Here, we are not concerned with the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as we have concluded that the search was pursuant to a valid warrant.
Additionally, we note that the holding in People v. Willis applies only when the individual or agency with the pertinent information is “ ‘an adjunct of the law enforcement team.’ ” (People v. Wills, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 35.) Defendant claims that that the East Palo Alto Building Department is part of the same municipal government as the police department and responsible for building code enforcement and is therefore a law enforcement agency. Further, he points out that building inspectors are authorized by statute to obtain search warrants to inspect properties for both building and zoning code violations.
Defendant repeatedly asserts that he is not challenging the search warrant affidavit. Although he may label his argument something else, his claim is essentially that the affiant had constructive knowledge of the public records in the building department and therefore the statements in his affidavit were false. No matter how defendant tries to classify his argument, the challenge is to the affiant’s failure to describe the front residence as having separate units.
When a challenge is made to the validity of the supporting affidavit, the lower court must conduct an evidentiary hearing if the defendant makes a substantial showing that: (1) the affidavit contains statements that are deliberately false or were made in reckless disregard of the truth and (2) the affidavit’s remaining contents, after the false statements are excised, are insufficient to justify a finding of probable cause. (Franks, supra, 438 U.S. 154.) Here, there is nothing in the record to support any argument that the affidavit contained statements that were deliberately false. Nothing in the record suggests that Marchese had personal knowledge that the front house had been subdivided. (See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1299-1301 [search for items already in custody was not illegal where officer was merely negligent in not knowing item had already been seized].) As already discussed, we reject defendant’s argument that the officers had constructive knowledge that the front house consisted of multiple units.
The record also does not contain evidence that Marchese described the property in reckless disregard of the truth. As the trial court found, there was nothing visible from the street to alert the officers to the fact that the front house was subdivided into three units. None of the other agencies watching the home or any other informant provided any information to place the officer on notice that the house was subdivided. Further, the officer did not have the luxury of time to start searching public records to determine whether the house, which appeared to be a single two-story home, was partitioned into separate units. On the morning of May 5, 2006, Martinez disclosed to officers that he sold pills to a person at a house in East Palo Alto. He drove with officers to the home and pointed out the residence at 998 Runnymede Street. Cazares, who also was involved in the search at the Watsonville residence, was not as cooperative as Martinez and could have attempted to alert Angel and others that the police were investigating them. The officers therefore needed to move quickly. That same day, the officers corroborated the information they had, obtained the search warrant regarding the premises at 998 Runnymede Street, and executed the search in the evening. To require officers to start searching public records to determine whether a house, which appeared from all exterior manifestations from the street to be a single-family residence, had been subdivided would be completely unreasonable. Defendant has pointed to nothing in the record that indicates that Marchese acted in reckless disregard and it would be unreasonable to require officers in the field to search through records in the building department to determine whether a home that appears to be a single residence is subdivided into separate units.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Richman, J.
We reject defendant’s argument. The building department’s authority to enforce zoning and building code regulations is not the same as being able to investigate criminal behavior. Further, as the People point out, the building department maintains its property records for civil and administrative purposes and these records are not related to any criminal investigation. The building department was not part of the criminal investigation and was not an adjunct to the law enforcement team.