Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Lake County Super. Ct. No. CR913442
Judge of the Superior Court of Contra Costa County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Vernon Royal, Jr. (defendant), pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and was placed on probation pursuant to Penal Code section 12101.1. The court also imposed $180 for a laboratory analysis fee and $520 for a drug program fee, including penalty assessments. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11372.5, subd. (a); 11372.7.) After a contested hearing on a probation violation, the court revoked probation and sentenced defendant to three years in state prison. Without objection the court also increased the aggregate amount of the laboratory analysis fee and penalty assessments to $232.50, and the drug program fee and penalty assessments to $697.50.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, in which he contends: 1) The court imposed more than the statutory maximum and failed to specify how it calculated the penalty assessments on fees imposed pursuant to Health and Safety Code sections 11372.5, subdivision (a) and 11372.7, subdivision (a); and (2) He is entitled to additional custody credits.
We shall vacate the penalty assessments and remand to the trial court to recalculate the amounts, and to consider defendant’s claim that he is entitled to additional custody credits. In all other respects, we shall affirm the judgment.
Analysis
I.
Penalty Assessments
The probation report recommended that defendant be required to pay a $50 laboratory analysis fee pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.5, plus a penalty assessment of $182.50, and a drug program fee of $150 pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.7, plus a penalty assessment of $547.50. The abstract of judgment simply lists the aggregate amounts of $232.50 and $697.50. The record provides no further information regarding how the court calculated the penalty assessments and the statutory bases for them.
Defendant does not dispute that the court correctly imposed the mandatory $50 lab fee and the drug program fee of $150, but contends that the related penalty assessments imposed exceed the statutory maximum and must be reduced. He further asserts that the failure of the court to specify the statutory bases for the various penalty assessments or their amounts is also error and makes it difficult definitively to determine the correct amounts without a remand to the trial court. (See People v. Eddards (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 712, 717; People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200-1201.)
Defendant provides the following detailed calculation of the maximum amount he estimates for which he could be liable:
Laboratory Analysis Fee, Health andSafety Code § 11372.5
$50
$50
Penal Code § 1464
$10 for every $10
$50
Government Code § 76000
$7 for every $10
$35
Penal Code § 1465.7
20% of amount assessed under Penal Code § 1464
$10
Government Code § 76104.6
$1 for every $10
$5
Government Code § 76104.7
$1 for every $10
$5
Government Code § 70372
$5 for every $10
$25
TOTAL
$180
Drug Program Fee, Health and SafetyCode § 11372.7
$150
$150
Penal Code § 1464
$10 for every $10
$150
Government Code § 76000
$7 for every $10
$105
Penal Code § 1465.7
20% of amount assessed under Penal Code § 1464
$30
Government Code § 76104.6
$1 for every $10
$15
Government Code § 76104.7
$1 for every $10
$15
Government Code § 70372
$5 for every $10
$75
TOTAL
$540
Defendant further contends that his calculation may overstate the amount of penalty assessments for which he is liable because his calculation assumes that he is subject to the penalty set forth in Government Code section 70372. Government Code section 70372, subdivision (a)(2) provides that the “amount of the court construction penalty may be reduced by a county as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 70375.” If Lake County participates in a local courthouse construction fund established under Government Code section 76100, or participates in the Transitional State Court Facilities Construction Fund under Government Code section 70401, defendant would also be entitled to a reduction in the Government Code section 70372 penalty assessment. Resolution of the question whether he is liable for a penalty assessment pursuant to Government Code section 70372, and for how much, depends upon a factual determination regarding the county’s participation in one of these funds. Defendant concludes that a remand is also necessary to allow the trial court to make that determination, and to recalculate the amount of penalty assessments. (See, e.g., People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 454, 457-460 [remand required to determine whether county participated in fund that would render defendant eligible for a reduction in penalty assessment].)
For reasons of judicial economy, when it is possible to determine the correct amounts of all applicable penalty assessments, the preferable remedy would be to simply amend the abstract of judgment, rather than remand to the trial court. (See, e.g., People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1029.) Here, however, although the People acknowledge that the penalty assessments “may” be inaccurate, they do not concede that the penalty assessments imposed exceed the statutory maximum, or that defendant’s calculation is correct. The People note that, in addition to the unresolved factual questions regarding Lake County’s participation in one of the aforementioned funds that affect whether defendant is entitled to reduction of the penalty set forth in Government Code section 70372, defendant may also be subject to additional penalty assessments that he does not mention, such as Government Code section 76000.5, subdivision (a)(1).) The People do, however, concede that the failure of the court to specify the individual penalty assessments, and their statutory bases as required by People v. Eddards, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 712 and People v. High, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, “makes it difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the correct amount of the total fines.”
We conclude that a remand is the appropriate remedy. Unfortunately, the proliferation of fines and fees, and the dispersion of these provisions throughout the Penal, Government, and Health and Safety Codes, has made the process of calculating penalty assessment unnecessarily burdensome and complex. As the court in People v. Taylor observed: “Any trial court aggrieved by the complexity of these procedures may petition the Legislature for relief.” (People v. Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 460.) “Although we recognize that a detailed recitation of all the fees, fines and penalties on the record may be tedious, California law does not authorize shortcuts. All fines and fees must be set forth in the abstract of judgment.” (People v. High, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200.) In order to facilitate review of the penalty assessments imposed in a case, as well as to assist in collection efforts, it is important for the trial court to recite the statutory basis for the penalty assessments. (See People v. Taylor, at pp. 456-460; People v. High, at p. 1200.) On this record we simply cannot tell whether the trial court may have properly assessed penalty assessments in this case, or what the correct assessment should be. It would have been more helpful if the trial court had stated the statutory bases for penalty assessments and, where necessary, made the requisite underlying factual findings.
II.
Custody Credits
Defendant also asserts that he is entitled to additional custody credits for the period between January 22, 2008, and February 19, 2008. He contends that after January 22, 2008, he was no longer in custody for a parole violation, but solely on the probation violation. Resolution of his claim for additional credits turns upon the question whether he was actually released from custody on his parole violation on January 22, 2008, or whether the probation report correctly states that he was not released on the parole violation until February 19, 2008. Although the Attorney General does not concede that defendant was actually released on January 22, 2008, he does acknowledge that defendant was arraigned on a bench warrant for the probation violation on January 28, 2008, and may be entitled to some additional credits, although not necessarily for all he claims on appeal.
In light of the need to resolve the underlying factual question, we therefore also direct the trial court on remand to consider defendant’s claim of error in the calculation of presentence custody credits, and to amend the judgment to state the correct amount. (See Pen. Code, § 1237.1.)
Conclusion
The case is remanded to the trial court with directions to specify the component parts of, and the statutory authority for, the penalty assessments levied in connection with the fees imposed under Health and Safety Code sections 11372.5 and 11372.7, and, if necessary, to modify the aggregate amounts of the penalty assessments. The court shall also consider defendant’s request for additional custody credits, and amend the abstract of judgment to state any corrected amount of credits, and deliver the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MARCHIANO, P. J., SWAGER, J.