Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County Super. Ct. No. BF117695A. Stephen P. Gildner and Jerold L. Turner, Judges.
Judge Gildner denied defendant’s motion to suppress; Judge Turner sentenced defendant.
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Harris, J. and Wiseman, J.
Gideon Margolis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Wanda Hill Rouzan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT*
This is an appeal from judgment after defendant Raymundo Gomez Romero pled guilty to one count of transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior drug conviction allegation (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)). Defendant was sentenced to a term of five years in prison. This appeal challenges the trial court’s denial of defendant’s suppression motion. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m).) We will affirm the judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
Defendant was driving his 2004 GMC pickup truck at 11:00 p.m. on October 6, 2006. Kern County Deputy Sheriff Michael Boyd was behind defendant and noticed defendant’s truck did not have a license plate. Boyd stopped defendant, explained the reason for the detention, and asked whether defendant had a driver’s license and whether he was on parole or probation. Defendant produced an Oklahoma driver’s license and acknowledged he was on parole.
While another deputy checked the temporary registration posted on the windshield of the truck (which was valid), Boyd had defendant step out of the truck. Boyd searched him because he was a parolee. Boyd found “a couple of dark colored pills” in defendant’s pocket. Boyd then searched the truck and found methamphetamine hidden in a box behind the seat.
After denial of his suppression motion, defendant entered into a plea agreement resulting in the five-year sentence noted above. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Discussion
Defendant contends that because there was a “temporary paper license plate” on the back of the truck and a properly displayed temporary registration on the windshield, defendant “was not in violation of any laws, and there were no objective facts that could reasonably lead Deputy Boyd to believe that appellant was violating any laws.”
We first note that California law, unlike that of some other states, does not provide for issuance of a “temporary paper license plate.” (Compare U.S. v. Wilson (4th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 720, 721-722 [temporary plate, with visible expiration date, mounted on rear of vehicle].) The paper or plastic insert in a frame holder, affixed to many new and used cars, is nothing more than an advertisement for the selling dealer. Informally, it may be meant to suggest that the car has been purchased recently and that registration information is posted on the windshield, but that informal community usage has no legal significance.
Second, the constitutional standard justifying a traffic stop does not require facts establishing that a suspect is violating the law. The correct standard is this: “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231, italics added.)
In the present case, Boyd observed facts that established a violation of Vehicle Code section 5200, subdivision (a) (requiring display of license plates issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)) unless, upon further investigation, some exception to that requirement was established. One such exception is provided in Vehicle Code section 4456, subdivision (c), which states that a vehicle may be operated with a properly posted temporary registration until license plates are delivered from DMV or for six months after the sale of the vehicle, whichever occurs first. The fact that there may be an innocent explanation for what otherwise appears to be a violation of the law does not render the detention invalid. (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894.) In this case, Boyd had to detain defendant to determine whether there was such an innocent explanation.
While essentially acknowledging the foregoing, defendant seizes upon the following exchange at the suppression hearing to argue that Boyd knew at the time of the detention that defendant had not committed an offense:
“[Defense counsel]: And it’s your testimony that you can’t remember whether [defendant’s truck] had Toyota on it, Bill Wright Toyota, the paper plate.
“[Deputy Boyd]: I don’t recall it had any paper plates. I just know it didn’t have a license plate.
“Q: Now, in terms of -- you understand paper plates are legal up to a certain point when somebody purchases a car.
“A: I understand that’s a possibility, yes.
“Q: Okay. And they also have -- to go along with that, they also have something in the window to demonstrate that as well. [¶] Would that be fair?
“A: Yes.”
From this exchange, defendant concludes: “From the deputy’s viewpoint, the absence of a rear license plate alone was not a violation of the law where, as in this case, a temporary plate was a legitimate substitute. Accordingly, it is clear that Deputy Boyd did not reasonably believe appellant violated the law.”
The subjective beliefs of the detaining officer are irrelevant: the question is whether facts known to the officer objectively satisfy the constitutional standard. (See People v. Uribe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436-1437.) Further, defendant has misstated the relevant testimony: Boyd simply acknowledged that “paper plates” and a properly posted temporary registration, together, permit operation of the vehicle until license plates are delivered or six months has passed (that is, “up to a certain point,” as phrased by defense counsel). Boyd did not testify that “paper plates,” if he had noticed them, would have led him to conclude there was no Vehicle Code violation.
We conclude the trial court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.