Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Anita Dymant, Judge, Ct. No. BA282267
Marilee Marshall & Associates, and Jennifer L. Peabody for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MOSK, J.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The District Attorney of Los Angeles County filed an information charging defendant and appellant Tarayne Rolison (defendant) with one count of violating Health and Safety Code section 11351.5, possession for sale of cocaine base. The information alleged that defendant committed the offense for the benefit of and in association with a criminal street gang within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A). It further alleged that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). It also alleged that defendant had been convicted of two prior felonies within the meaning of section 1203, subdivision (e)(4).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
On the People’s motion and pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court amended the information by interlineation to add Count 2 charging defendant with a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351, possession for sale of a controlled substance (powder cocaine). The special allegations of Count 1 under sections 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A), and sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) were made applicable to Count 2. Defendant pleaded guilty to Count 2 and admitted the special allegations. Count 1 was dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
The People withdrew voluntarily an amended information filed the day before defendant’s plea agreement.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of six years in state prison, comprised of the low term of two years, doubled to four years based on the prior strike conviction, plus two additional years pursuant to the gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A). He was awarded 440 days of total custody credit, comprised of 294 days of actual custody credit and 146 days of conduct credit.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal and a request for a certificate of probable cause. The trial court denied defendant’s request for a certificate of probable cause.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following factual information is taken from the transcript of the preliminary hearing. On April 20, 2005, Los Angeles Police Officer David Dilkes was assigned to the gang enforcement detail. At approximately 4:30 p.m., he observed defendant in the area of Harcourt Avenue driving a 1956 Cadillac in excess of the speed limit. Officer Dilkes followed defendant, about two car lengths behind. As defendant initiated a turn, Officer Dilkes observed the front driver’s side window open and defendant’s left hand “toss what appeared to be a plastic baggie” out the window. Officer Dilkes and his partner activated their lights and siren to conduct a traffic stop. After about a half block, they pulled defendant’s vehicle over.
A “responding unit” arrived at the scene and Officer Dilkes directed the two responding Officers to return to the location where defendant had thrown the baggie out the window of his car. They returned from that location with a baggie that was consistent with the one Officer Dilkes had seen defendant throw from the car. Officer Dilkes conceded that there were other people in the vicinity where the baggie was recovered, and that he had not continuously observed the baggie from the time it was thrown from defendant’s car. The baggie contained 29.08 grams of cocaine base.
Officer Dilkes explained his training and experience in “narcotics possessed for sale,” and opined that defendant possessed the cocaine for sale. He based his opinion on the quantity of the cocaine in defendant’s possession, the amount of money defendant had on his person when arrested, and the two cellular telephones in defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest, as well as the lack of any drug paraphernalia on defendant at the time of his arrest or any objective symptoms of narcotics use by defendant.
Defendant had $220 in cash, comprised of two $100 bills and one $20 bill.
Officer Dilkes was familiar with defendant and knew him to be a member of the West Boulevard Crips, the gang which was Officer Dilkes primary assignment. From and after October 2004, Officer Dilkes had many “consensual and nonconsensual” encounters with defendant. Defendant admitted to Dilkes on at least two occasions that he was a member of the West Boulevard Crips, and that his moniker was “Blue.” Dilkes had arrested defendant twice and observed him in the company of other West Boulevard Crips.
The West Boulevard Crips gang territory is bounded by the 10 Freeway on the north, Exposition Boulevard on the south, Crenshaw Boulevard to the east, and La Brea Boulevard to the west. Harcourt Avenue, where defendant was arrested, is within that territory. The gang had approximately 110 members, used hand signs, and wore “colors.” The primary activities of the gang were selling street narcotics and committing armed robberies.
Selling narcotics was the main source of income for the West Boulevard Crips. The gang used the income from the narcotics sales to buy more narcotics for sale and to purchase weapons. Because two of the older West Boulevard Crips were missing and presumed dead, there was a power vacuum in the gang that defendant was trying to fill by becoming the main supplier of narcotics in the area. Officer Dilkes opined that defendant possessed the cocaine for sale to benefit the West Boulevard Crips. His opinion was based on his training and experience, and in particular on his experience with the West Boulevard Crips.
DISCUSSION
On April 4, 2006, defendant filed a notice of appeal. On November 13, 2006, appointed counsel filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We gave notice to defendant that his appointed counsel had not found any arguable issues, and that defendant had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments he wanted this court to consider. On December 18, 2006, defendant filed a supplemental brief asking us to review independently the record, and making general assertions about police harassment, ineffective assistance of counsel, and a lack of “paperwork” from his trial counsel. None of his assertions, however, is supported by citation to the record, and they are conclusory and unsubstantiated. “We have repeatedly stressed ‘that “[if] the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,” the claim [of ineffective assistance of counsel] on appeal must be rejected.’” (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.) “A claim of ineffective assistance in such a case is more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Id. at pp. 266-267.)
Notwithstanding defendant’s failure to support the assertions in his supplemental brief, we have examined the entire record with respect to the judgment entered against him. Based on that independent review, we are satisfied that defendant’s appointed counsel has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J., KRIEGLER, J.