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People v. Rojas

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Jul 28, 2008
No. F054501 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County No. 28322, Brian L. McCabe, Judge.

John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.


OPINION

THE COURT

Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Cornell, J., and Kane, J.

In 2003, appellant George Antonio Rojas pled not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) to interference with an executive officer by means of threat or violence (Pen. Code, § 69; count 1) and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a); count 2), and the court found appellant NGI and suspended criminal proceedings. Thereafter, the court ordered appellant committed to Atascadero State Hospital (ASH) for a period not to exceed seven years.

Except as otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.

In June 2007, appellant moved to withdraw his NGI plea. The court denied the motion, and the instant appeal followed.

Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant, in response to this court’s invitation to submit supplemental briefing, has himself submitted a brief in which he argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to withdraw his NGI plea. We will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 25, 2002, a five-count criminal complaint was filed against appellant. On October 28, 2002, the court suspended criminal proceedings and appointed a clinical psychologist to examine appellant for the purpose of evaluating his mental competence (§§ 1368, 1369). On January 30, 2003, the court found appellant mentally incompetent within the meaning of section 1367 and ordered him committed to ASH for a period not to exceed three years.

On May 22, 2003, the medical director of ASH filed a document stating that appellant had the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and cooperate rationally with an attorney in his defense; on June 9, 2003, the court ordered criminal proceedings reinstated; and on August 18, 2003, an information was filed alleging that appellant had committed interference with an executive officer by means of threat or violence (§ 69; count 1), felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1); count 2), resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148; counts 3, 4) and driving without a valid driver’s license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1; count 5), and that he had suffered a “strike.”

We use the term “strike” as a synonym for “prior felony conviction” within the meaning of the “three strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), i.e., a prior felony conviction or juvenile adjudication that subjects a defendant to the increased punishment specified in the three strikes law.

On August 19, 2003, appellant pled NGI to all charges, and the court appointed two clinical psychologists to examine appellant.

On October 1, 2003, the court dismissed counts 3, 4 and 5 and reduced count 2 to a misdemeanor (§ 594, subd. (a)); appellant pled NGI to count 1 and count 2 as amended and admitted the strike allegation; and the court found appellant NGI and suspended criminal proceedings. On October 22, 2003, the court ordered appellant committed to ASH for a period of not less than 180 days and not more than three years. On June 30, 2004, the court issued an amended order, stating that the maximum term of appellant’s commitment to ASH was seven years. That period reflects the three-year midterm for the instant felony, doubled pursuant to the three strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1); 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), plus one year for the instant misdemeanor. (§ 1026.5.) The court also awarded appellant 396 days of custody credits.

In February 2004, appellant was transferred to Napa State Hospital (NSH).

On June 27, 2007, appellant filed an “Application for Court to Allow Defendant/Applicant to Withdraw Insanity Plea Due to Violations of Plea Agreement and Nonadvisement of Plea Consequences” (unnecessary capitalization omitted) (motion to withdraw NGI plea) in which he requested that he be allowed to withdraw his NGI plea on the grounds that at the time he entered his plea, (1) although he knew he would be confined in a mental hospital, he did not know that NSH was, effectively, a prison; and (2) although he understood he would be released if “restored to sanity” and that courts rely on psychiatrists and/or psychologists in making that determination, he was not advised that “there is not any legitimate scientific basis supporting the industries of psychiatry and psychology,” the “opinions of psychiatrists and psychologists” are “subjective and unscientific,” and “there is no cure for mental illness.”

The People filed a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to appellant’s request. On November 15, 2007, following a hearing in which appellant’s counsel submitted the matter based on appellant’s motion to withdraw NGI plea, the court denied appellant’s request.

On November 21, 2007, appellant filed a request for leave to respond to the People’s opposition. On December 11, 2007, the court issued an order stating that it had reviewed appellant’s most recent filing and again denied appellant’s request to withdraw his plea.

On January 2, 2008, appellant filed a notice of appeal from “the decision and order denying [his] motion to withdraw [his] plea ….”

DISCUSSION

A person committed to a state hospital because he or she was insane at the time of the charged offense may be released upon restoration of sanity pursuant to the provisions of section 1026.2. (People v. Sword (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 614, 620.) The first step in the release process is release on outpatient status (ibid.), and at the end of one year in an outpatient program the court “shall have a trial to determine if sanity has been restored, which means the applicant is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder” (§ 1026.2, subd. (e)).

As best we can determine, appellant contends the court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his NGI plea because he did not know at the time he entered his plea that (1) mental illness cannot be cured and therefore it is impossible to prove “restoration of sanity” within the meaning of section 1026.2, subdivision (e), and (2) in order to establish that his sanity has been restored he would have to prove that he is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others. Appellant’s challenge to the denial of his motion to withdraw his NGI plea is without merit.

“By statute, a defendant who seeks to withdraw his guilty plea may do so before judgment has been entered upon a showing of good cause. (Pen. Code, § 1018.) Although section 1018 is limited on its face to the period before judgment, the courts have long permitted defendants to move to set aside the judgment as a means of allowing the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea after judgment.” (People v. Castaneda, (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1617, italics added, fn. omitted.)

“[A] motion to vacate the judgment is recognized as equivalent to a petition for the common law remedy of a writ of error coram nobis. [Citations.] A writ of error coram nobis may be granted when three requirements are met: (1) the petitioner has shown that some fact existed which, without fault of his own, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits, and which if presented would have prevented the rendition of judgment; (2) the petitioner has shown that the newly discovered evidence does not go to the merits of the issues tried; and (3) the petitioner has shown that the facts upon which he relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ. [Citations.] [¶] Thus, a defendant who seeks to set aside the judgment on a petition for a writ of error coram nobis must allege the time and circumstances under which the new facts were discovered in order to demonstrate that he has proceeded with due diligence.” (People v. Castaneda, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1618-1619.)

“The writ [of error coram nobis] lies to correct only errors of fact as distinguished from errors of law.” (People v. Sharp (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 205, 207.) “‘“A mistake of fact” is where a person understands the facts to be other than they are; whereas a “mistake of law” is where a person knows the facts as they really are, but has a mistaken belief as to the legal consequences of those facts.’” (People v. LaMarr (1942) 20 Cal.2d 705, 710.)

“We review a trial court’s denial of a petition for writ of error coram nobis for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Dubon (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 944, 951.) An abuse of discretion is found if the court exercises discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316.)

Because appellant brought his motion for withdrawal of NGI plea more than three years after entry of judgment it was not authorized by section 1018. Moreover, as we explain below, he is not entitled to coram nobis relief.

As indicated above, the purported new facts upon which appellant based his motion are as follows: (1) there is no cure for mental illness, and (2) in order to establish restoration of sanity a defendant must show he is “no longer a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder” (§ 1026.2 subd. (e)).

Appellant has made no showing as to when he discovered these “facts” and therefore he has not established that he has proceeded with due diligence. In addition, appellant’s claim that he misunderstood the standard for establishing restoration of sanity is a mistake of law and therefore not reviewable by means of writ of error coram nobis.

Appellant’s claim that he would not have pled NGI had he known there was no cure for mental illness was implicitly rejected by the court below. In so concluding, the court did not abuse its discretion.

Following independent review of the record, we have concluded that no reasonably arguable legal or factual issues exist.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.


Summaries of

People v. Rojas

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Jul 28, 2008
No. F054501 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Rojas

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GEORGE ANTONIO ROJAS, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

Date published: Jul 28, 2008

Citations

No. F054501 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2008)