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People v. Robinson

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Jan 23, 2012
H036948 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2012)

Opinion

H036948

01-23-2012

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DOUGLAS LADRAKE ROBINSON, Defendant and Appellant.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1075187)

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), defendant Douglas Ladrake Robinson pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and admitted that he had a prior strike (§§ 667, subds, (b) - (i), 1170.12) and had served five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court denied his Romero motion, and sentenced him to prison for two years eight months. On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress because, notwithstanding the fact that he was on parole, the search of his person was arbitrary and capricious. For the reasons stated below, we find that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
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BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged by information with possession of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) The information further alleged that defendant had one prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b) - (i), 1170.12), and that he had served five prior prison terms (§667.5, subd. (b)).

The Motion to Suppress

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the "evidence and observations and fruits thereof, relating to an illegal search and seizure by officers of the Santa Clara Police Department, on or about 4-23-2010." He contended that "the police acted without benefit of a warrant when they seized and searched his person and effects, and that certain fruits were unlawfully obtained as a result of this warrantless act." The People filed opposition to the motion, contending that the officers "reasonably detained and searched Defendant pursuant to his parole conditions," and that the police action was "lawful." Attached to the opposition was a copy of the notice of conditions of parole that defendant had signed on January 25, 2009. The conditions of defendant's parole included that he participate in GPS/electronic monitoring.

The hearing on the motion was held January 21, 2011. The parties stipulated that there was no search or arrest warrant in the matter, and that defendant was on parole at the time of his search. The People's contention was that the detaining officers knew that defendant was on parole and subject to a search condition when they detained and searched him on the street in order to interview him a second time regarding a pending murder investigation.

The People's Evidence

Santa Clara Police Sergeant Gary Hosman testified for the People that on April 23, 2010, Lieutenant Hogan called him and asked him to meet him in front of the St. Francis Hotel. Hosman knew that a homicide investigation was going on at the hotel. When Hosman arrived at the hotel around 6:00 p.m., Hogan showed him a picture of defendant and asked him to find and arrest him. Hogan said that defendant was on parole, that he was wearing an ankle monitor, and that he was wanted for "a 148 PC." Hosman assembled a team; did a records check on defendant, which came back negative; contacted defendant's parole officer, who was monitoring defendant's ankle monitor; and drove to the area defendant was reported to be, which was on San Antonio Road in San Jose. Around 7:00 p.m., when Hosman saw defendant walking down the street, he and another officer got out of their unmarked car, contacted defendant, identified themselves, and told him that he was under arrest. The officers grabbed defendant's wrists, placed him in a "control hold" against the hood of their car, and handcuffed him. Detective Luis Martin searched defendant "incident to arrest and his parole status" while Hosman reported to Hogan that he had defendant. Martin told Hosman that methamphetamine had been found on defendant. Bags were placed over defendant's hands in order to preserve any evidence for the homicide investigation.

Detective Martin testified for the People that on the night of April 23, 2010, he attended a briefing where Sergeant Hosman said that he needed assistance in locating defendant, who was on parole and wanted for "148 resisting or the gamut of that section, 148." They learned defendant's whereabouts based on a GPS tracking device defendant was wearing, and they drove to East San Antonio Road in San Jose. When Martin arrived at the reported location, Hosman and another officer were already standing next to defendant on the sidewalk, holding his arms. Martin assisted in handcuffing defendant, and conducted a search of him. "[F]or one I knew he was on parole with search terms and two, he was under arrest. So as a matter of procedure, him being arrested and then incident to arrest I was going to search his property knowing that he was going to be brought in for processing. And also he was on parole with search terms so that's what I did." "I wore gloves for safety and then checked his pockets and took his hat off along with that and searched the inside bill of his hat, the seam that folds up, and there I located . . . [¶] . . . a small plastic baggie containing suspected methamphetamine." Defendant was taken back to the Santa Clara Police Department. Later, at the police department, Martin weighed and tested the contents of the baggie and found it presumptively tested positive for methamphetamine and had a gross weight of one-half gram.

The Defense Evidence

Santa Clara Police Sergeant Kurt Clarke testified for the defense that he was working on a homicide investigation at the St. Francis Hotel on the afternoon of April 23, 2010. Other investigators told Clarke that defendant, who lived at the St. Francis Hotel and who was on parole, needed to be transported to the police department for an interview, so Clarke met defendant in the parking lot of the hotel. Defendant told Clarke that he agreed to go to the police department to be interviewed. Defendant was transported to the police department by another officer, and Clarke does not know whether he was searched before arriving. "I don't have specific knowledge of that. The assumption is made he is coming into a secured facility so by the time I get to him he has been searched. I did not search him specifically." Clarke and another officer interviewed defendant regarding the homicide investigation from 1:41 p.m. to 2:15 p.m. The interview was audio taped. During the interview, defendant was asked whether he had entered the murder victim's room, and defendant said he had not. After the interview, defendant was transported back to the hotel.

Sergeant Clarke interviewed defendant a second time for a couple hours beginning around 8:00 p.m. that same day. Between the first interview and the second interview, Clarke learned from other investigators who had interviewed other witnesses that defendant had entered the murder victim's room. Clarke asked that defendant be recontacted. Clarke wanted to speak to defendant a second time because "I have a victim of a homicide and I have a person that told me the first time that [he] came in contact with the victim, however [he] did not enter the room. And that was asked during the first interview and then since the first interview investigators learned he did enter the room, so we believed that Mr. Robinson was a viable suspect in that homicide, so we wanted to talk to him about that." During the second interview, defendant was interviewed about the homicide investigation as well as about his possession of methamphetamine. Some of the questions asked during the second interview were also asked in the first interview, and defendant was confronted with "this new information."

The Court's Ruling

The court ruled as follows. "Okay. So the court is going to focus on the decision that the court must make, which is a defendant can successfully challenge a parole search only if it was conducted in an arbitrary, capricious, or harassing manner. And the parole search is unreasonable if made too often, or at an unreasonable hour, or is unreasonably prolonged, or for other reasons establishing arbitrary or oppressive conduct by the searching officer.

"In this case, even if we set aside the 148 issue, even if we set aside the alleged search incident to arrest, we are still left with the fact that Mr. Robinson was on parole and when a person is on parole one of the liberties they give up for the benefit of being on parole rather than being incarcerated is that you are subject to search and seizure by any peace officer at any time without probable cause.

"And you also have a GPS ankle monitor, which would also contain those provisions for the opportunity of being on the GPS ankle monitor. So when I apply the factors of the cases that control, . . . the officers did not repeatedly hound Mr. Robinson and harass him at his home, at the grocery store, or at his social hangouts. There was no oppressive conduct. And it was not quote, too often, close quotes.

"The contact was not made at an unreasonable time. The contact was not made at an unreasonable place, it was a public street. The officers did not pick Mr. Robinson randomly off a street not knowing who he was or what his parole status was and later tried to justify well, he was on parole and that excuses our conduct.

"There was no animosity or prior bad relationship between the peace officers and Mr. Robinson. The search was not unreasonably prolonged or extensive. It was merely a search of his clothing. They did not search his storage lockers, vacation homes. They also did not ransack a business or strip a car. This was a fairly straightforward parole search of a parolee. So for those reasons and because a part of the justification for parole search conditions is that law enforcement has an interest ensuring that those released on parole are complying with the law and the officers believed that the defendant had information about a homicide is squarely within the rationale of ensuring compliance with the law. The search and seizure were lawful in this case, so I will deny the motion."

The Plea, Romero Motion, and Sentencing

On February 24, 2011, defendant pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and admitted that he had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds, (b) - (i), 1170.12) and had served five prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

On April 14, 2011, defendant filed a Romero motion, requesting that the court strike his strike. The People filed opposition to the motion on April 28, 2011. On April 29, 2011, the court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to prison for two years eight months, double the lower term of 16 months, for the drug offense. The court struck the punishment for the prison priors pursuant to section 1385.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. "This so called parole search is unlawful because the section 148 charge never existed. It is completely fabricated, a phantom, made up apparently by the supervising lieutenant as a device to take [defendant] in custody with the hope that he would then submit to an additional interrogation. The search based on the '148' is not unlawful for want of probable cause or a warrant. It is unlawful because [defendant] at no point resisted, obstructed or delayed any officer in the performance of any duty and absolutely nothing was presented that he had. While a lack [of] probable cause or arrest warrant would not undermine the validity of a legitimate parole search, a search conducted based on an arrest for some manufactured charge does not further any reformative, rehabilitative or legitimate law enforcement purpose and as such cannot serve as the basis for a lawful parole search."

The People contend that defendant's challenge to the parole search lacks merit. "As the trial court ruled, part of the justification for parole search conditions is law enforcement's 'interest ensuring that those released on parole are complying with the law' and the fact that ' the officers believed that the defendant had information about a homicide is squarely within the rationale of ensuring compliance with the law.' By conducting the parole search, police could determine if evidence linked him to the homicide and whether he was complying with the law. Any suggestion no proper law enforcement purpose existed for a parole search is mere cavil."

"As the finder of fact in a proceeding to suppress evidence [citation], the superior court is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable." (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 (Woods).) "The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment." (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) "Under California law, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from police searches and seizures must be reviewed under federal constitutional standards. [Citations.]" (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 794.)

Search conditions are imposed automatically on every parolee in California. (§ 3067, subd. (a); see also People v. Lewis (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 662, 668; People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 763 (conc. and dis. opn. of Kennard, J.) (Reyes).) The United States Supreme Court has held that this statutory provision is constitutional. (Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. 843.) However, " 'a parole search could become constitutionally "unreasonable" if made too often, or at an unreasonable hour, or if unreasonably prolonged or for other reasons establishing arbitrary or oppressive conduct by the searching officer.' [Citations.]" (Reyes, supra, at pp. 753-754; People v. Clower (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1741.) A search is arbitrary and capricious when the motivation for the search is unrelated to rehabilitative, reformative or legitimate law enforcement purposes, or when the search is motivated by personal animosity toward the parolee. (In re Anthony S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1004; Reyes, supra, at p. 754.)

"[The court] recognized in Reyes that whether the parolee has a reasonable expectation of privacy is inextricably linked to whether the search was reasonable. A law enforcement officer who is aware that a suspect is on parole and subject to a search condition may act reasonably in conducting a parole search even in the absence of a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, and such a search does not violate any expectation of privacy of the parolee." (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 333 (Sanders).) " 'The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined "by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Ibid., quoting United States v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 118-119.) "A suspicionless parole search is constitutionally permissible because the parolee lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy and the state has a substantial interest in supervising parolees and reducing recidivism." (People v. Hunter (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1152.) "Where the search is for a proper purpose, . . . even in the absence of particularized suspicion, a search conducted under the auspices of a properly imposed parole search condition does not intrude on any expectation of privacy 'society is "prepared to recognize as legitimate." ' [Citations.]" (Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 754.)

"The validity of a search does not turn on 'the actual motivations of individual officers.' [Citation.] But whether a search is reasonable must be determined based upon the circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted." (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 334.) This objective standard "discourage[s] the sort of disparate results that might result if the validity of such searches were to turn on the searching officer's subjective intent." (Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 680-681.)

Applying an objective standard to the facts of this case, we see no basis for finding the officers' seizure and search of defendant unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The record, viewed objectively, shows that defendant was on parole and was wearing a GPS tracking device, so his expectation of privacy was greatly reduced and he was on notice that his activities were being routinely and closely monitored. (See Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 754; Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 333.) The officers knew about defendant's parole status and his GPS tracking device when they interviewed him at the police department, pursuant to his consent, regarding a homicide that had occurred at his residential hotel. A few hours after that interview ended, the officers learned that defendant may not have been truthful during the interview, and the officers suspected that defendant may have been involved in the homicide. Accordingly, the officers wanted to interview defendant a second time regarding the homicide. Regardless of whether or not the officers' subjective motivation when they then detained defendant was to arrest him for violating section 148, the officers had a legitimate law enforcement purpose in detaining and searching him pursuant to his parole search condition. (Reyes, supra, at p. 754.) The parole search of defendant was conducted on a public street when defendant was contacted and arrested. Therefore, the search of defendant was conducted under the auspices of a properly imposed parole search condition and it did not intrude on any expectation of privacy " 'society is "prepared to recognize as legitimate." ' " (Ibid.)

Although the trial court did not rely on "the 148 issue" in denying defendant's motion to suppress, we note that the record shows that the police were investigating a homicide at the hotel where defendant resided at the time they first interviewed defendant. During that interview, defendant told Sergeant Clarke that he had not entered the murder victim's room. Later, Clarke learned from other investigators who had interviewed other witnesses that defendant had entered the murder victim's room. Clarke then asked that defendant be contacted for requestioning, and the officers who were asked to help in locating and detaining defendant were told that he was on parole and wanted for "148 resisting or the gamut of that section, 148." A person violates section 148 when he or she "willfully . . . delays, or obstructs any . . . peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her . . . employment." (§ 148, subd. (a)(1).) As officers had probable cause to believe that defendant had delayed or obstructed a peace officer in the discharge of his duty, the officers acted reasonably in arresting him and searching him incident to that arrest even though the section 148 charge was not further pursued. (See People v. Lewis (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 662, 669-671.)

The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

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BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

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PREMO, ACTING P.J.

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ELIA, J.


Summaries of

People v. Robinson

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Jan 23, 2012
H036948 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2012)
Case details for

People v. Robinson

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DOUGLAS LADRAKE ROBINSON…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Date published: Jan 23, 2012

Citations

H036948 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2012)