Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIF123575, Edward D. Webster, Judge. Dismissed.
Harry Zimmerman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Karl T. Terp, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHLI, J.
Defendant Earl J. Robbins was found, by a jury, to be incompetent to stand trial. At the competency hearing, his counsel chose to have defendant wear prison clothing, and defendant was shackled due to concerns he had a potential for violence. A commitment order to Patton State Hospital ordered that defendant be administered antipsychotic medication involuntarily if he refused to take the prescribed medications. Subsequent to the filing of the instant appeal, defendant was found competent to stand trial by officials at Patton State Hospital, he was transferred back to the custody of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department, and trial proceedings have resumed. In this appeal, defendant contends:
1. The trial court abused its discretion and denied him due process by requiring him to wear shackles in front of the jury.
2. Forcing defendant to wear jail clothing during the competency hearing denied him due process and equal protection.
3. The involuntary medication order must be reversed, as defendant’s counsel was absent from an important hearing, and no substantial evidence supported the order.
Since defendant has since been found to be competent to proceed to trial, the remedy he seeks -- reversal of the incompetence finding and proceeding to trial -- can no longer be granted on appeal. Although defendant argues that the issues on appeal are of continuing public interest, we conclude none of the issues presented by defendant are of such a nature that this court must decide them for the benefit of future courts. Further, the commitment order requiring administration of involuntary medication has expired. Hence, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 13, 2008, defendant was charged in an amended information with forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)), forcible sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)), kidnapping to commit rape (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), and sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (a)). It was further alleged that defendant committed the offenses while released on custody prior to judgment in another case and that he had suffered two prior serious or violent felony offenses.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
During pretrial proceedings, defense counsel expressed a concern regarding defendant’s mental competency. The proceedings were suspended, and the trial court appointed forensic psychologists Dr. Michael E. Kania and Dr. Craig C. Rath to evaluate defendant to determine his competency to stand trial pursuant to section 1369 in the instant case, and for Riverside County Superior Court case No. RIF114808, a case in which defendant was awaiting sentencing. Both doctors submitted reports. Dr. Kania proffered the opinion that defendant was not competent to stand trial based on his suffering from a delusional disorder. Dr. Rath also concluded defendant was not competent to stand trial.
Although the competency hearing also involved case No. RIF114808, the instant appeal is only from case No. RIF123575.
Defendant refused to submit on the reports and requested a jury trial on the determination of competency. Prior to the hearing, defendant advised the trial court that he did not want to be dressed in civilian clothing for trial. The trial court also noted that defendant was handcuffed and apparently shackled. Defense counsel expressed concern for his own safety because defendant had told him that members of the Al Qaeda terrorist group were going to hurt counsel and that defendant had a history of violence. The trial court initially ruled that defendant should remain handcuffed due to the possibility of his injuring defense counsel.
After voir dire, defendant brought a motion in opposition to his wearing of jail clothing and being shackled in front of the jury. The trial court concluded that trial counsel could tactically choose for defendant to wear jail clothing. No further determination on shackling was made.
A competency hearing was conducted on April 2, 2007. Dr. Kania testified that he had conducted an evaluation of defendant. Dr. Kania noted that defendant had numerous delusional thoughts, including that he had ties with Al Qaeda, he claimed to have dated Saddam Hussein’s daughter, and he claimed to have been married to one of the wealthiest women in the world. Although Dr. Kania concluded that defendant understood the nature of the proceedings against him, his delusional behavior rendered him unable to assist in his trial.
Dr. Rath also testified that he met with defendant and completed an evaluation. Defendant was delusional, also telling Dr. Rath he was connected with Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. Dr. Rath concluded that defendant was not competent to stand trial.
Defendant testified on his own behalf that he understood the case against him and attempted to back up statements he made to the psychologists, which he claimed were not delusions. He claimed that since he was “Moslem,” he had met members of Al Qaeda. The defense investigator also testified regarding defendant’s delusions.
According to defendant, a Moslem “is not the same thing” as a Muslim.
The People presented their own expert, who opined that although defendant was suffering from delusions, he was competent to stand trial.
Prior to the case going to the jury, defendant again complained about wearing jail clothes and being shackled. The trial court reiterated that counsel had made a tactical decision to have him appear in jail clothing and that the jury would have to be “stupid” not to realize defendant was in custody. The trial court also stated that defendant had a history of violence and was unstable, warranting the use of shackles.
Defendant was found incompetent to stand trial by the jury and trial court. The sentencing in case No. RIF114808 was stayed. On May 2, 2007, defendant was sentenced to a maximum term of confinement at Patton State Hospital for life in the instant case, to be returned to the court should a certificate of restoration of competency be received from the hospital.
Thereafter, the trial court was advised that defendant had not been transferred to Patton State Hospital. The court was informed that Patton State Hospital would not accept defendant because no order regarding the giving of involuntary medication had been made by the court. A recommendation was received from the San Bernardino County Department of Behavioral Health that an involuntary medication order be signed. On August 3, 2007, the trial court signed the order for defendant’s commitment to Patton State Hospital, which included an order for the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication if defendant refused to take the medication in order to render defendant competent to stand trial.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the competency determination and commitment order.
II
THE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL ARE MOOT
The parties acknowledge that since the time that the instant appeal was filed, defendant has been certified competent to stand trial. On July 31, 2008, we deemed the certification of mental competence submitted in the trial court a part of the record on appeal and took judicial notice of the minute order dated March 5, 2008, in case No. RIF123575. Pursuant to these records, defendant has regained competency, and trial proceedings have resumed. The People assert that the claims raised on appeal are now moot.
A question becomes moot when, during the pendency of an appeal, events transpire that prevent us from granting any effective relief. (See, e.g., Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 566.)
The relief requested in defendant’s opening brief was that the finding he was incompetent to stand trial and be given involuntary medication while at Patton State Hospital be reversed. Such relief has now been afforded to defendant. He has been found competent to proceed to trial. According to the minute order from March 5, 2008, defendant is in the custody of the Riverside County Sheriff. Hence, the commitment order issued to Patton State Hospital to involuntarily medicate defendant is no longer in effect.
Defendant contends in his reply brief that this court should nonetheless review his claims on appeal because they are capable of evading review and are of continuing public interest. He asks this court to address the issues to provide guidance to future courts.
Defendant relies upon People v. Harris (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 984 to support his claim that despite his regaining his competency, the issues raised on appeal warrant a determination by this court. In Harris, the defendant appealed the determination that he was incompetent to stand trial. (Id. at p. 989-990.) However, during the pendency of the appeal, the defendant was certified competent to stand trial. The court addressed whether the claims defendant brought on appeal from the incompetency determination were rendered moot. (Id. at p. 990.) The appellate court concluded that three of the defendant’s contentions were of “sufficient public importance” to address on the merits. (Ibid.)
These issues included defense counsel’s ability to waive jury trial and defendant’s presence on behalf of defendant (People v. Harris, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 990-995) and whether two psychiatrists must be appointed under section 1369, subdivision (a) (id. at pp. 995-996). However, it did not reverse the expired commitment order despite the fact errors may have occurred. (Id. at p. 996.)
In the instant case, defendant fails to explicate what novel and fundamental issues must be decided to guide other courts. Initially, as for his trial counsel’s decision to have defendant wear jail clothing during the competency proceeding, defendant admits that pursuant to People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 972, counsel is entitled to make procedural and strategic decisions for a client who he or she suspects is incompetent. Hence, there is no issue of “sufficient public importance” to be decided as to counsel’s decision to have defendant wear jail clothing; it is merely a fact-specific determination whether this was a proper strategic decision made by counsel.
Similarly, the trial court’s decision to have defendant shackled during the proceeding simply is a question of whether such determination was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Defendant does not provide with specificity what issue must be decided to inform other courts. Again, this is a question that is fact specific, and there is abundant case law on the subject of shackling that need not be repeated here.
Finally, as to the order requiring involuntary medication, such order has expired. The involuntary medication order was included in the commitment order to Patton State Hospital. Defendant has since been transferred to the custody of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department; hence, the order and any conditions of that commitment are no longer valid. Once again, defendant does not state what novel issue, or what issue that is possible of evading review, is raised by the claim. It is simply a determination of whether the trial court followed well-established guidelines in determining whether defendant should be involuntarily medicated, and whether such determination was supported by the evidence.
We note that the People never submitted a response to defendant’s argument regarding involuntary medication. However, even if no respondent’s brief had been filed, we could decide the issue based upon the record and the opening brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220.) However, since we find the claim moot, we need not address the merits of the claim.
III
DISPOSITION
Since during the pendency of this appeal defendant has been certified competent to stand trial and the commitment order requiring involuntary medication has expired, the instant appeal is dismissed as moot.
We concur: RAMIREZ, P.J., MILLER, J.