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People v. Rith

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division
Apr 21, 2009
No. G040018 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2009)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 07ZF0145, Richard F. Toohey, Judge.

Mark Alan Hart, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Heather F. Crawford, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


OPINION

ARONSON, J.

A jury found defendant Navuen Rith guilty of special circumstance murder to benefit a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, §187, subd. (a); § 190.2, subd. (a)(22); § 186.22, subd. (b)(1);) and active gang participation (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). He contends the court erred by admitting his statements under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) because police officers did not properly advise him of his rights. He also argues the court erred by imposing an administrative fee when directing him to pay restitution to the State Victim Compensation Board. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgment as modified.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless noted.

I

Factual and Procedural Background

On the afternoon of September 11, 2006, defendant stabbed Oscar Gonzalez to death across the street from a Santa Ana high school. Defendant and Gonzales were affiliated with rival criminal street gangs. Police investigators interviewed defendant at the police station on September 15. After initial denials, defendant admitted he and four fellow gang members “jumped” Gonzalez, but claimed he only kicked the victim a few times while he was on the ground. After the officers told him they believed he had stabbed Gonzalez, defendant admitted the stabbing. Defendant explained Gonzalez had been maddogging him at the scene. He confronted him and asked why Gonzalez’s gang had been crossing out his gang’s graffiti. An argument ensued, and defendant’s cohorts assaulted Gonzalez. During the attack, defendant used a kitchen knife to stab Gonzalez twice while the victim was on the ground. He told the officers he considered the stabbing payback because Gonzalez’s gang had “jumped” his brother and had tried to jump him.

Following a trial in October 2007, the jury found defendant guilty. In January 2008, the court sentenced defendant to life in prison without possibility of parole.

II

Discussion

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting Defendant’s Statements Under Miranda

Defendant asserts police officers provided him with a defective Miranda admonishment because they told him that any statement he made “may,” rather than “can and will,” be used against him. We review the issue de novo. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 730.)

In Miranda, the court stated, “The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 469, emphasis added.) The Miranda court also summarized its holding in a manner that reflected the warnings given in this case: “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him....” (Id. at p. 444, emphasis added.)

The United States Supreme Court has “never insisted that Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in that decision. [Fn. omitted.]” (Duckworth v. Eagan (1989) 492 U.S. 195, 202 (Duckworth); California v. Prysock (1981) 453 U.S. 355, 359.) Miranda’s prophylactic warnings need not be presented in any particular formulation or talismanic incantation. The essential inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his right to remain silent. (People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 236-237.) The “may” formulation “‘has been consistently approved by the lower courts.’” (People v. Valdivia (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 657, 664 (Valdivia); 1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) Miranda: Required Warnings, § 6.8, p. 516.)

The warning in this case “touched all of the bases required by Miranda” informing defendant “that he had the right to remain silent,” and “that anything he said could be used against him in court.” (Duckworth, supra, 492 U.S. at p. 203.) The essential point to be conveyed is the real likelihood, not certainty, the prosecution will elect to use a defendant’s statement to convict him or her, so the defendant will understand a waiver is likely to have significant costs. Defendant had no reasonable basis to believe he could speak freely without fear his statements would be introduced against him at trial.

Defendant asserts the advisements were inadequate given the particular circumstances involved in his interrogation. He notes the officers were aware he had been previously arrested for grand theft, had absconded from probation, and a warrant had issued for his arrest. The officer told defendant just before the advisements his name had come up in another investigation, they had some questions for him, they were sure he had some questions for them, and stated “‘we’ll figure this whole thing out, okay?’” Defendant responded, “‘All right.’” The officer replied, “‘That sound all right?’” Defendant said, “‘Yeah.’” The officer then said, “‘Okay. Just answer yes or no to these and we’ll figure this thing out.’”

Defendant argues the officer conveyed the impression the only purpose of the interview was to clear up certain questions and he “would logically understand the exchange as opening the door to the possibility that his statements would not be used against him if he helped police clear things up.” As noted in Valdivia, a particular warning may create confusion and require the trial court to resolve the factual dispute of whether the admonition had misled the defendant. (Valdivia, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at p. 664.) But defendant did not make this claim in the trial court, and we deem the argument forfeited.

In a supplemental brief, defendant cites People v. Bradford (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 843 in arguing the trial court and Attorney General err by focusing on defendant’s familiarity with the criminal justice system and the fact defendant had been read his Miranda rights on a previous occasion. In Bradford, the interrogating officers omitted any reference to the use of defendant’s statements against him. The court rejected the Attorney General’s argument the confession was properly admitted because the defendant’s comments during the interrogation showed he was aware his statements could be used against him, despite the failure of the detectives to provide this warning. The court noted the warnings are an “‘absolute prerequisite’” to the admission in court of the suspect’s statements to police. (Bradford, at p. 851, original italics; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 468-469 [“Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; [fn. omitted] a warning is a clearcut fact”].) But Bradford is inapposite here because we have concluded the warning in this case touched all of the bases required by Miranda. Accordingly, we conclude the investigators provided adequate Miranda warnings and therefore the trial court did not err in admitting defendant’s statements.

We understand defendant’s argument to be based solely on the claim he received defective warnings. Consequently, we need not address the Attorney General’s arguments concerning the voluntariness of defendant’s confession apart from the allegedly defective admonishment.

B. The 10 Percent Administrative Fee Was Authorized by Statute

Defendant contends we must modify the judgment to strike the 10 percent administrative fee added to the order that defendant reimburse the State Victim Compensation Board $7,031.91 for funeral expenses advanced to the victim’s family. He asserts the fee is not authorized when payment is made to the restitution fund rather than collected and given to a victim. Although the court’s minute order erroneously references section 1203.1, subdivision (l), the order was authorized.

Section 1202.4, subdivision (f), provides in pertinent part that: “[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.” Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(2), further specifies that “[r]estitution ordered pursuant to this subdivision shall be ordered to be deposited to the Restitution Fund to the extent that the victim... has received assistance from the Victim Compensation Program pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 13950) of Part 4 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code.” Government Code section 13963, subdivision (a), provides the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board “shall be subrogated to the rights of the recipient to the extent of any compensation granted by the board.”

Section 2085.5, subdivision (b), provides: “In any case in which a prisoner owes a restitution order imposed pursuant to... subdivision (f) of Section 1202.4, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall deduct a minimum of 20 percent or the balance owing on the order amount, whichever is less, up to a maximum of 50 percent from the wages and trust account deposits of a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law. The secretary shall transfer that amount to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board for direct payment to the victim, or payment shall be made to the Restitution Fund to the extent that the victim has received assistance pursuant to that program.”

Section 2085.5, subdivision (c), specifically directs the secretary to “deduct and retain from the wages and trust account deposits of a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law, an administrative fee that totals 10 percent of any amount transferred to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board pursuant to subdivision... (b).”

Thus, where a victim’s claims of economic loss resulting from the defendant’s conduct have been paid by the Victim Compensation Program (Gov. Code, § 13950 et seq.), the court must make the mandated order of victim restitution payable to the Restitution Fund (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(2)). When the defendant is imprisoned, the order of victim restitution, including an order of restitution payable to the Restitution Fund, is to be paid from his prison wages and trust account. (§ 2085.5, subd. (b).) An administrative fee for the collection of such funds is authorized by section 2085.5, subdivision (c).

People v. Eddards (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 712, is not controlling here. The defendant in Eddards was placed on probation for three years on the condition, among others, that he make restitution to the state Restitution Fund in the amount of $1,055.62 plus a 10 percent administrative fee pursuant to section 1203.1, subdivision (b). (Eddards, at pp. 714-715.) The court concluded the 10 percent administrative fee was not statutorily authorized when payment is made to the fund rather than the victim. (Id. at pp. 715-717.) Here, the victim restitution was ordered pursuant to section 1202.4. The administrative fee for such an order is statutorily authorized by section 2085.5, subdivision (c).

III

Disposition

The restitution order is modified (§ 1260) to reflect imposition of an administrative fee pursuant to section 1202.4 and section 2085.5. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J., O’LEARY, J.


Summaries of

People v. Rith

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division
Apr 21, 2009
No. G040018 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2009)
Case details for

People v. Rith

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NAVUEN RITH, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division

Date published: Apr 21, 2009

Citations

No. G040018 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2009)