Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCD216438 Louis R. Hanoian, Judge.
BENKE, J.
Under the terms of an agreement with the prosecutor, appellant Thomas Francis Riley pled guilty to three counts of second degree commercial burglary. The trial court imposed a stipulated sentence of two years in prison. Riley also accepted civil liability for eight additional charged burglaries, which the prosecutor dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.
In a written statement provided to the probation department by one of the victims, Mona Wong valued her loss at $55,940. Although at a restitution hearing Wong gave somewhat lower purchase prices for some of her lost property, the trial court accepted her previous higher estimates and ordered Riley to pay Wong restitution in the amount of $55,940.
On appeal Riley contends the trial court abused its discretion when it did not at least lower the amount of restitution due Wong to a sum of the average of the varying estimates Wong provided for each item. As discussed below, we are not persuaded by this contention and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 20, 2007, Riley broke into Wong's business, the Hong Kong Nightclub, and stole the safe. Riley pled guilty to the crime. Wong submitted an itemized victim restitution statement to the probation department. Most of the stolen property consisted of jewelry acquired overseas decades earlier and Wong did not have receipts for any of her stolen property. As we have indicated, Wong gave the probation department a written estimate of $55,940 in losses.
Riley contested Wong's claimed losses. At the restitution hearing, Riley called Wong as a witness, where she testified to smaller purchase prices in some of the stolen items. The court found Wong to be an "extremely reliable witness." The trial court further found both her written and oral valuations of her losses credible and reasonably correlated to the descriptions of the stolen items. Importantly, the court stated that the replacement values for Wong's losses could also easily be multiples of her estimates. In its restitution order the court relied principally on the valuations from the restitution statement Wong had given the probation department and ordered Riley to pay Wong $55,940.
DISCUSSION
Riley contends the court abused its discretion when it did not at least average the varying values claimed on some of Wong's items. We disagree.
I
Constitutional and Statutory Framework
Article I, section 28 of the California Constitution provides the basic framework for the criminal restitution statutes. To implement the command of this constitutional provision, the Legislature enacted section 1202.4. Subdivision (f) of that section states "in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, " the trial court must "require that the defendant make restitution to the victim... in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim... or any other showing to the court." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) "The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f); see also § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3) [the restitution order "shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct"].)
Article I, section 28 of the California Constitution states in pertinent part: "It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer. [¶] Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted persons in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss" (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A), (B).)
Although the trial court has broad discretion in making a restitution award, the discretion is not unlimited. (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498.) The trial court may not make an order which is arbitrary, capricious or exceeds the bounds of reason. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234; see also People v. Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1275.) Nonetheless, the court may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution, which is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole and consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation. (In re Brian S. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 523, 527.) Even if the valuation of the restitution ordered by the court is not exact, "[t]here is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be recoverable in a civil action." (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.) Thus, when there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court. (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132; also see People v. Dalvito (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 557, 562.)
II
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Setting the Amount of Economic Damages
Here, although Wong valued her losses differently on different occasions, based on the possibility all her valuations of the jewelry purchased decades earlier might in fact have substantially understated her losses, the trial court adopted her higher valuations. Given the evidence in the record, and the trial court's express finding Wong was a credible witness, there is manifestly " ' "a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court." ' " (In re Johnny M., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132.) Consequently, we affirm.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MCCONNELL, P.J., HALLER, J.