Opinion
B230991
01-18-2012
In re R.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.C., Defendant and Appellant.
Zoe Rawson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel Jr. and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YJ34580)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephanie M. Davis, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Zoe Rawson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel Jr. and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
On June 30, 2010, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, alleging that the minor/appellant possessed marijuana on school grounds in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (e). The matter was adjudicated on January 6, 2011, and February 1, 2011. The petition was sustained and the minor/appellant was declared a ward of the court and placed on home probation, subject to compliance with terms and conditions, one of which included the condition that the minor/appellant maintain satisfactory grades in school.
The minor/appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal the minor/appellant contends the matter must be reversed for the trial court's violation of the corpus delicti requirement, failure of proof of a usable quantity of marijuana, lack of substantial evidence of actual or constructive evidence of possession and abuse of discretion in requiring minor/appellant to get passing grades in all of his classes.
For the reasons hereafter stated, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SYNOPSIS
Prosecution's case.
On March 26, 2010, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Sharon Tripp, an officer of the Inglewood Unified School District, noticed minor/appellant and a friend walking on school grounds during class session without a pass. When the students approached, Officer Tripp smelled marijuana. Both students were then taken to the principal's office. Officer Tripp then returned to the area where she had first seen the students but did not find any marijuana in the area.
When Officer Tripp returned to the principal's office, Bernarda Gutierrez, a campus supervisor, told Officer Tripp that she found a small bag of marijuana on the floor of the principal's office containing a little bit of the substance. Gutierrez happened to see the baggie in plain view next to minor/appellant's left foot. Gutierrez told the students that no search would be conducted because the baggie was found by her on the floor. Minor/appellant's initial response was to deny that the baggie belonged to him.
Prior to leaving the principal's office the minor/appellant volunteered his statement that he took responsibility for the marijuana and that it did not belong to his friend or companion. The minor/appellant was then arrested by Officer Tripp and the minor/appellant was read his Miranda rights. Officer Tripp asked the minor/appellant where he acquired the marijuana and when he smoked it. The minor/appellant stated he had bought it and smoked it prior to arriving at school.
The parties stipulated that the contents of the baggie which was recovered in the principal's office contained .48 grams of marijuana according to the lab receipt following testing by Senior Criminalist, Edmond Tong.
Defense case.
Minor/appellant and his companion were walking outside of class. Officer Tripp approached and sent them to the principal's office. While they were seated in the principal's office marijuana was found on the floor. Minor/appellant was searched by campus staff but did not have marijuana on him. Minor/appellant felt pressured by the campus supervisor's statements to him and was worried whether his companion would get in more trouble than he would so he spontaneously admitted to taking responsibility after first denying the marijuana belonged to him.
DISCUSSION
Corpus delicti issue.
The statute supporting the charge against the minor/appellant is Health and Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (e), which provides in relevant part as follows: "(e) Except as authorized by law, every person under the age of 18 who possesses not more than 28.5 grams of marijuana, other than concentrated cannabis, upon the grounds of, or within, any school providing instruction in kindergarten or any of grades 1 through 12 during hours the school is open for classes or school-related programs is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be subject to the following dispositions: [¶] (1) A fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250), upon a finding that a first offense has been committed. [¶] (2) A fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or commitment to a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp, or secure juvenile home for a period of not more than 10 days, or both, upon a finding that a second or subsequent offense has been committed."
Minor/appellant relies on the corpus delicti principle that before a criminal prosecution can be undertaken it must first be established that a crime has been committed and that mere out of court statements made by the accused will not suffice. In this instance, minor/appellant first makes reference to his statements made to Officer Tripp on the first campus encounter because no marijuana was actually found on him. Minor/appellant then makes reference to the second encounter in the principal's office indicating that the baggie found near him was not actually in his possession. Minor/appellant postulates that his extrajudicial admissions and confessions under these circumstances cannot serve to establish the necessary corpus delicti or be used by the prosecution to fulfill its burden of proof requirement before proceeding on the charge.
Relying on People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1179-1180, minor/appellant is correct in contending that every criminal prosecution must be supported by prima facie proof of the corpus delicti independent from out of court statements made by the accused. Minor/appellant is also correct in relying on Rayyis v. Superior Court (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 138 for the proposition that the prosecution cannot satisfy its burden of proof by relying exclusively upon extrajudicial statements, confessions, or admissions of the defendant and that independent proof of the crime is required and the burden of proof can only be satisfied by some showing of the existence of an injury, loss, or harm that has been caused by a criminal agency.
This court discerns that minor/appellant's core contention is that the prosecution failed in its burden of proof to show that each element of the charge was established, and in this instance the element of proof of a usable quantity of marijuana was wanting.
Citing In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364, minor/appellant further contends that his due process rights would be violated in this instance because the prosecution has failed to prove every fact necessary beyond a reasonable doubt.
We are not convinced by the minor/appellant's core contention. Initially, we note as contended by the respondent/People, the statute in question does not contain a requirement that a demonstrable usable quantity of marijuana be shown. The respondent/People are correct in so contending. An examination of Health and Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (e) makes no mention of usable quantity. The respondent/People opine that minor/appellant is relying on our high court's decision in People v. Leal (1966) 64 Cal.2d 504, 512, which established the "usable quantity rule." But as the respondent/People point out, this rule has been confined narrowly to its facts by subsequent cases by holding that the Leal opinion applies only when the substance possessed simply cannot be used, such as when it is in a blackened residue or a useless trace, citing People v. Rubacalba (1993) 6 Cal.4th 62, 66 and People v. Karmelich (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 452, 456 as authority.
Contrary to the contention of minor/appellant, we find that Health and Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (e) only provides a benchmark that the weight of marijuana in issue shall be no more than 28.5 grams.
The minor/appellant places considerable reliance on the holding in People v. Villalobos (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 561 in which the trial court was reversed for failure of the People to carry its burden of proof that the 50 milligrams of marijuana scraped from the defendant's pocket was a usable quantity. Because of this deficiency in proof the case was remanded for a new trial. However, in the words of the respondent/People in distinguishing the minor/appellant's reliance on the holding in Villalobos, "the amount recovered in the instant case was the equivalent of 480 milligrams of marijuana, nearly 10 times the amount at issue in Villalobos." (Italics in original.)
Actual or constructive possession issue.
Minor/appellant's next issue pertains to the element of possession set forth in section 11357, subdivision (e) where the legislature has enacted the requirement of possession of the unlawful substance, namely, not more than 28.5 grams of marijuana.
Minor/appellant postulates that the possession element of the crime had not been proven by the People because no marijuana was actually found on his person. We find this contention to be disingenuous for the reason that circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom established that minor/appellant possessed the unlawful substance. As the respondent/People point out, the minor/appellant and his friend smelled like marijuana smoke when first encountered outside of class on school grounds. This, coupled with the small baggie of marijuana found near the minor/appellant's left foot in the principal's office a few minutes later provides sufficient prima facie proof, which when coupled with defendant's admission, constitutes substantial evidence that the minor/appellant did indeed have actual possession of the illegal substance.
Abuse of discretion issue pertaining to passing grades requirement.
During the dispositional hearing, defense counsel requested leniency under Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, seeking probation instead of adjudging minor/appellant a minor ward of the court. Defense counsel stated that minor/appellant "feels that his grades have improved since that last report card." The juvenile court continued the hearing so that minor/appellant could bring in proof of the most recent report card. At the subsequent hearing, the court received a progress report that did not show any passing grades. The court then adjudged minor/appellant a ward of the court, placed him home on probation, and ordered various terms and conditions of probation, including part of Condition No. 9 that he "get passing grades in all of [his] classes." The court then asked if minor/appellant understood and had any questions. Minor/appellant only asked if he could attend night school, which the court allowed. Minor/appellant did not object to the terms and conditions of probation.
Initially, we note that minor/appellant failed to object to the probation condition imposed below, and thus, has forfeited his claim on appeal. (See In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 814 ["to preserve for appeal the issue of reasonableness of a condition of probation, a juvenile offender must object to it in the juvenile court"].) Although an appellate court may invalidate a legally defective probation condition, even without a timely objection, ordinarily objections to inapplicable or unreasonable conditions must be timely made in the trial court. (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 974, 888-889; People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237.) We find no legal defect in probation condition No. 9 requiring minor/appellant "to get passing grades in all [his] classes." Minor/appellant does not challenge the constitutionality of the condition. Instead, minor/appellant contends that the condition is unfairly applied to him. This condition is part of a standard list of conditions for juveniles who have committed an offense such as that committed by minor/appellant. Because minor/appellant failed to raise objections in the trial court, having full opportunity to do so on the "fairness" grounds urged in this court, we find appellant forfeited his right to challenge this probation condition.
Assuming minor/appellant did not forfeit his claim, the probation condition is nevertheless proper. A juvenile court is vested with broad discretion to select appropriate probation conditions. (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 81-82, overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128; In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 6; In re Josue S. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 168, 173.) A juvenile court's exercise of its discretion with regard to fashioning a probation condition should not be disturbed except in cases of "manifest abuse." (In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) Further, a court may impose probation conditions which infringe on constitutional rights, so long as the condition is narrowly tailored to meet specific needs related to the case. (In re Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 81-82.) "[A] condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality. [Citation.]" (In re Josh W., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 6.) Thus, juvenile courts may impose any reasonable condition that is "fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b); Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j); see also In re Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 81; In re Abdirahman S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 963, 968.)
Here, the challenged probation condition which requires minor/appellant to get passing grades in all of his classes is reasonably related to his successful completion of the probationary period without further criminality as well as his future success in society. (See In re Angel J. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1101-1102 [the imposition of a condition of probation requiring satisfactory grades is not unconstitutionally vague and is appropriate for purposes of rehabilitation]; In re Robert M. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 812, 816 [school attendance is a condition of probation reasonably related to rehabilitation and prevention of future criminality].)
We find minor/appellant's reliance on this court's decision in Juan G., cited supra, to be misplaced, because the probation condition there differs from the one in the instant case. This court held that a requirement to maintain a "B" average, in the absence of any evidence in the record that the probationer could achieve that result, was an abuse of discretion. (In re Juan G., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 6-8.) In contrast, the record here showed that minor/appellant received failing grades in a majority of his classes. Minor/appellant also expressed his belief that not all his grades had been F's and that he could improve or at least attend night school to catch up. Since the grade requirement here is distinguishable from that in Juan G. and there is evidence of an ability to improve grades and obtain credits, this court finds the condition valid. Thus, the probation condition will not be disturbed on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WOODS, Acting P. J.
We concur:
ZELON, J.
JACKSON, J.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 383 U.S. 903.