From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

People v. Randale

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Third Division
Sep 29, 2008
No. B195695 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 29, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICKY RANDALE, Defendant and Appellant. B195695 California Court of Appeal, Second District, Third Division September 29, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. MA035116 Lisa M. Chung, Judge.

Meredith J. Watts, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Theresa A. Patterson and Lauren E. Dana, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

KLEIN, P. J.

Defendant and appellant, Ricky Randale, appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction, by court trial, for battery on a non-confined person by a prisoner, with prior prison term and prior serious felony conviction findings (Pen. Code, §§ 4501.5, 667.5, 667, subd. (b)-(i)). Sentenced to state prison for seven years, Randale claims there was trial error.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

The judgment is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Viewed in accordance with the usual rule of appellate review (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206, we find the evidence established the following.

1. Prosecution evidence.

Kevin Ross, a correctional officer at Lancaster State Prison, worked in the Administrative Segregation unit, which is “where the program failures are sent from the general population.” A “[p]rogram failure is an inmate that cannot follow the guidelines set forth in a general population yard.” Defendant Randale was one of the inmates housed in the Administrative Segregation unit. As a participant in the Enhanced Outpatient Program (E.O.P.), Randale had been assigned to receive the “highest level of care for that facility as far as his mental health.” Despite Randale’s E.O.P. classification, Ross never had trouble communicating with him.

On February 4, 2006, shortly after 6:00 a.m., Ross was told to remove Randale from his cell and escort him to the infirmary for a medical evaluation. As Ross was attempting to handcuff Randale for the trip to the infirmary, Randale grabbed the handcuffs. A struggle ensued, during which Ross used pepper spray on Randale. Someone sounded an alarm and other staff members came to Ross’s assistance.

Sergeant Woods ordered Randale to submit to cuffing, and told Officers Ronnie Robbins and Jacob Martinez to take Randale to an outdoor shower area to wash off the pepper spray residue. Robbins and Martinez took Randale to a short corridor with doors at both ends called a sally port. Because the sally port door was narrow, Martinez had to walk behind Randale and Robbins, although he continued to hold onto Randale’s left arm. Robbins, who was forced to turn sidewalks in order to walk through the door next to Randale, was facing Randale’s shoulder. Robbins testified Randale suddenly turned his head sideways, looked at Robbins, raised his right leg and kicked Robbins in the knee. Martinez testified he saw Randale kick Robbins. Randale was wearing soft-soled shower thongs. Robbins’s knee buckled; he stumbled and felt a stinging pain. Randale and Martinez fell to the floor, struggling. Other officers responded and Randale was subdued.

Robbins, who suffered bruising and swelling to his knee, received medical attention. Robbins testified that in the course of his duties he had served Randale meals through the food port in his cell and that, at those times, they had had normal conversations.

2. Defense evidence.

Randale testified that, on the day in question, he had had an earlier confrontation with a corrections officer named Hansen, after which he had been taken to the infirmary. Someone at the infirmary told Randale he would get an X-ray later. When Ross came to his cell that morning, Randale told him about the incident with Hansen. Ross asked to see his foot. Suddenly, for no reason at all, Ross began spraying him with a pepper fogger. When Randale asked what that was for, everyone started laughing.

When Sergeant Woods told Randale to come out of his cell, he resisted because Ross had just pepper sprayed him for no reason. Woods said it would be all right. Randale was handcuffed and taken toward the sally port that led to the outside. There was one officer on his right and one on his left. Randale thought to himself, “Oh, oh. Something is going to go down.” When they got to the sally port, the officers “rushed [him] to the ground.” Randale testified he did not kick Robbins.

Randale also testified Martinez had not been involved in the incident, it had been Ross and two other officers.

CONTENTIONS

1. The conviction must be reversed because Randale was insane at the time of the incident.

2. The trial court erred by failing to determine if Randale was competent to stand trial.

DISCUSSION

1. Randale cannot claim insanity for the first time on appeal.

Randale contends his conviction must be reversed because, due to his insanity at the time of the incident, he was incapable of forming the general intent required to commit a battery. This claim is meritless.

Randale argues: “[U]nder the totality of the circumstances known to the [trial] court, appellant was not able, at the time the alleged kicking took place, to form an intent to willfully do it. This is because his mind was not operating under normal standards, something that is clear from his record and his EOP status. [¶] Therefore, appellant argues that he comes within the M’Naghten rule, in that he was ‘incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his . . . act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.’ Right and wrong were not factors in appellant’s state, only his need for accommodation of his illness and his pressing need for appropriate treatment.”

M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Clark & Fin. 200 [8 Eng.Rep. 718].

But Randale did not plead not guilty by reason of insanity. He pled not guilty. “A defendant who does not plead not guilty by reason of insanity shall be conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time of the commission of the offense charged . . . .” (§ 1016.) “As a matter of state law, a defendant may not raise for the first time on appeal the issue of his sanity at the time of the . . . offense . . . .” (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 169, fn. 25, italics added.)

In an effort to avoid the effect of section 1016, Randale makes much of the fact that, while pronouncing judgment in this court trial, the trial judge made the following remarks about Randale’s mental state: “Being mindful of the fact that the battery element [sic] is an intentional crime, the court has noted the following: [¶] It appears all witnesses – and it is also consistent with the court’s observation of Mr. Randale’s demeanor, he has a lot of quirks, both verbal and physical. I note that throughout the trial, that he made a lot of gestures. At times he was impulsive with speaking out. [¶] I noted various times throughout the trial he was moving his arms up and down. At some points I saw him shushing the clerk and also speaking to Mr. Clark [defense counsel] a lot of times during the testimony. I will say, though, that overall, after admonishments, he was able to comply. [¶] The . . . testimony also indicated that – during this period of time, that he was able to comply when he was told to do so. For instance, when Sergeant Woods intervened, he did agree to put both his hands through the food port to be handcuffed. During the walking, taken [sic] out of the cell, he was compliant. [¶] The court finds that there is sufficient – and this is even noting and being aware that he has an E.O.P. enhanced status under mental health, that it doesn’t rise to the level that he did not know what he was doing when he made the act of looking at Officer Robbins and making the swinging side kick motion.”

Randale argues the trial court “in making its findings, implicitly ruled that appellant was not insane at the time of the ‘kick’ that resulted in the battery charge,” and “[t]herefore, it was unnecessary for appellant’s trial counsel to raise the issue, beyond the extent to which he raised [it] obliquely in argument. The court was well aware that appellant’s mental capacity was at issue, and ruled that he had been mentally capable of committing the crime. In these circumstances, the argument is not forfeited, because the lower court ruled on it.”

We disagree. Defense counsel did not argue to the trial court, even obliquely, that Randale had been insane. Instead, defense counsel argued Randale had merely bumped into Robbins accidentally. And rather than concluding the trial court inexplicably made a sanity finding in a case where no insanity plea had been made and no expert evidence had been presented, it makes far more sense to see the trial court’s remarks as addressed to the mens rea element of battery. (See People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 107 [“As with all general intent crimes, ‘the required mental state entails only an intent to do the act that causes the harm . . . .’ [Citation.] Thus, the crime of battery requires that the defendant actually intend to commit a ‘willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.’ ”].) Hence, we conclude the trial court’s statement that Randale had kicked Robbins intentionally was merely a finding Randale possessed the required general intent to be convicted of battery, and did not constitute an implied finding Randale had been sane. There was, of course, no need for any such finding because Randale was “conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time of the commission of the offense charged . . . .” (§ 1016.)

Defense counsel argued: “[This was] a very minimal touching, which is just as consistent with a barefoot man having his toe stepped on by somebody [i.e., Officer Robbins] walking in combat boots . . ., such that I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that this man had no intention of kicking anybody. [¶] [Randale] has some apparent difficulties. No question. But he is not an idiot. Why in the world in the presence of two men who are paid to control his behavior, both of whom had physical contact with him, he would then elect to kick someone when he is cuffed and going nowhere is ridiculous. [¶] The simple reality is there is an untoward move, and for that they want to keep him in state prison. That’s absurd. . . . [¶] If this had happened on the street, somebody would say, ‘Excuse me,’ ‘I’m sorry,’ as I did the other day when I came through the security gate and very nearly stepped on a small child that came through behind me as I was retrieving my property off the belt. That’s the way we conduct ourselves in society. [¶] This has been made into a major turmoil over nothing. But there is no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that this man intentionally sought to kick, kick at, or have contact with Officer Robbins in any fashion.”

Randale’s first contention fails because he cannot assert an insanity defense for the first time on appeal.

2. Trial court did not err by failing to hold a second competency hearing.

Randale contends the trial court erred by not holding a second competency hearing when it became apparent during trial that there were questions about his sanity. This claim is meritless.

a. Legal principles.

“Trial of an incompetent defendant violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution [citation] and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. Those protections are implemented by statute in California.” (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1281). “Under California law, a person is incompetent to stand trial ‘if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.’ (§ 1367, subd. (a).) A defendant is presumed to be mentally competent to stand trial. (§ 1369, subd. (f).) [¶] . . . [S]ection 1368 provides that if the trial court has any doubt as to the defendant’s competence to stand trial, it must state that doubt in the record and inquire of counsel whether, in his or her opinion, defendant is mentally competent. (§ 1368, subd. (a).) The trial court is authorized to conduct a competency hearing on its own motion and at the request of counsel. (§ 1368, subd. (b).) [¶] . . . ‘[O]nce the accused has come forward with substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial, due process requires that a full competence hearing be held as a matter of right. [Citation.] In that event, the trial judge has no discretion to exercise. [Citation.] As we also have noted, substantial evidence of incompetence is sufficient to require a full competence hearing even if the evidence is in conflict. [Citation.] We have concluded that where the substantial evidence test is satisfied and a full competence hearing is required but the trial court fails to hold one, the judgment must be reversed. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1216-1217, fn. omitted.)

“In this context, substantial evidence means evidence that raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s ability to stand trial. [Citation.] The substantiality of the evidence is determined when the competence issue arises at any point in the proceedings. [Citation.] The court’s decision whether to grant a competency hearing is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citations.] [¶] Substantial evidence of incompetence may arise from separate sources, including the defendant’s own behavior. For example, if a psychiatrist or psychologist ‘who has had sufficient opportunity to examine the accused, states under oath with particularity that in his professional opinion the accused is, because of mental illness, incapable of understanding the purpose or nature of the criminal proceedings being taken against him or is incapable of assisting in his defense or cooperating with counsel, the substantial-evidence test is satisfied.’ ” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507-508.) However, “a defendant must exhibit more than bizarre, paranoid behavior, strange words, or a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the question of whether the defendant can assist his defense counsel.” (Id. at p. 508; see also People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 406 [“the record shows that defendant, despite his ‘bizarre actions’ and ‘bizarre statements,’ understood the proceedings and could assist in his defense”].)

“ ‘ “When a competency hearing has already been held and defendant has been found competent to stand trial . . . a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency hearing unless it ‘is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence’ casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding.” ’ ” (People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 136, italics added.) “We apply a deferential standard of review to a trial court’s ruling concerning whether another competency hearing must be held. [Citation.] We review such a determination for substantial evidence in support of it.” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 220.)

b. Discussion.

According to a notation in the probation report, the pretrial proceedings in this matter were halted at one point to determine Randale’s competence to stand trial. Proceedings resumed when Randale was found competent. Defense counsel did not, during the ensuing trial, ask the trial court to reassess Randale’s competence. Now, however, Randale contends his conviction must be reversed because the trial court failed to declare, sua sponte, a new doubt as to his competence.

Randale argues “his conduct during the trial and his testimony at trial were new evidence of his incompetence to assist in his defense, in that they showed that his judgment was so clouded by his obvious inability to control his behavior that the court should have reopened and reconsidered its finding of competence.” (Italics added.) He asserts his testimony showed “disorientation, and lack of focus on the nature of [the] proceedings. His efforts to counter the testimony he had heard were not intelligible.” To the contrary, Randale’s testimony was on the whole coherent and responsive to the evidence presented against him. Although one portion of his testimony, during which he complains about the bureaucratic handling of his prison classification, is a little hard to follow, this information was not directly relevant to the charges he faced.

Randale also argues his “behavior was unpredictable enough that the court ordered that he be confined with a stealth belt during the court trial, and admonished him not to interrupt.” Randale does not, however, cite any authority or reasoned argument establishing a necessary nexus between shackling and incompetency.

Randale asserts the record shows “[h]is many outbursts during the short trial were apparently uncontrollable.” He cites seven such “outbursts,” claiming they demonstrate he “was plainly . . . a person who suffers from mental illness, exhibiting [a] lack of normal linear thinking capability.” However, four of these alleged outbursts merely consisted of Randale laughing at something a witness said. On one occasion Randale remarked, “Come on.” On another occasion he made a snide remark after being identified by a witness. And while we agree there was one occasion that could be characterized as an outburst, it occurred before the trial started. Contrary to Randale’s argument, the record does not demonstrate he was either out of control or unable to assist defense counsel. In the words of People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1282: “If appellant was in fact incompetent during any part of these proceedings that fact is not apparent on the face of this record.”

“A This gentleman sitting to my right. He’s wearing an olive green shirt. [¶] [Defense counsel]: Indicating for the record, Your Honor, the defendant, Mr. Randale. [¶] The Defendant: It ain’t me. [¶] The Court: Thank you. [¶] The Defendant: My name is not Randale. [¶] The Court: Go ahead. [¶] [The prosecutor]: Thank you, Your Honor.”

The trial court did not err by failing to hold a second competency hearing because it was not presented with either a substantial change of circumstances or new evidence casting a serious doubt on the validity of the earlier competency finding. (See People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 136.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: CROSKEY, J. ALDRICH, J.


Summaries of

People v. Randale

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Third Division
Sep 29, 2008
No. B195695 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 29, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Randale

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICKY RANDALE, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Third Division

Date published: Sep 29, 2008

Citations

No. B195695 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 29, 2008)