Opinion
F061088 Super. Ct. No. VCF232931
02-03-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHERYL LYNN PRICE, Defendant and Appellant.
Paul Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. French and John G. McLean, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Valeriano Saucedo, Judge.
Paul Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. French and John G. McLean, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant/defendant Cheryl Lynn Price was found not competent to stand trial by the Superior Court of Tulare County pursuant to Penal Code section 1368, and criminal proceedings were suspended. She filed the instant appeal and argued the court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. During the pendency of this appeal, defendant was found competent after a lengthy jury trial on the question, and criminal proceedings were reinstated. Given the current status of this case, we will grant the People's motion to dismiss the instant appeal as moot and affirm the judgment.
All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 8, 2010, a felony complaint was filed in Tulare County Superior Court case No. VCF232931, charging defendant with count 1, felony assault with a deadly weapon, a knife (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), with the special allegation that she had one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)); and count 2, misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)).
On April 2, 2010, the court referred defendant for a mental health evaluation pursuant to section 4011.6, to determine whether she should be referred for a 72-hour hold pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150.
On April 14, 2010, the court reviewed the section 4011.6 evaluation. Defendant moved to represent herself pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). The court found defendant was competent to stand trial, granted defendant's Faretta motion, and relieved appointed counsel.
On April 16, 2010, the preliminary hearing was held. Defendant represented herself and she was held to answer.
On April 23, 2010, the information was filed charging defendant with the same offenses as in the complaint. Defendant pleaded not guilty.
On May 28, 2010, defendant requested appointment of counsel and the court reappointed the public defender's office. Suspension of criminal proceedings
On June 22, 2010, defendant's jury trial was scheduled to begin. Defendant moved to discharge her appointed counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). The court heard and denied the Marsden motion. Defendant moved to again represent herself pursuant to Faretta. The court heard and denied the Faretta motion.
The court then declared a doubt as to defendant's competency to stand trial. The court suspended criminal proceedings, vacated the scheduled jury trial, and appointed two experts to evaluate defendant pursuant to sections 1368 and 1369. The court's finding that defendant was not competent
On July 28, 2010, the court reviewed reports submitted by Drs. Middleton and Bindler, the parties submitted the matter on the reports, and the court found defendant was not competent to stand trial. The court ordered defendant to be evaluated for placement and for criminal proceedings to remain suspended.
On August 12, 2010, the court ordered defendant to be committed to Patton State Hospital for treatment. The court further found that defendant lacked the capacity to make decisions regarding psychotropic medication, and ordered defendant to be treated with psychotropic medication as medically appropriate. On August 24, 2010, the court filed the judgment and commitment order.
On September 21, 2010, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the judgment and commitment order in case No. VCF232931, and requested a certificate of probable cause. On September 28, 2010, the court denied defendant's request for a certificate of probable cause.
On September 27, 2010, the court received a letter from Patton State Hospital requesting clarification regarding the court's previous order for involuntary medication.
On September 28, 2010, the court issued an order clarifying that defendant did not consent to medication; the hospital was authorized to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to defendant when and as prescribed by defendant's treating psychiatrist; and defendant would be treated at Patton State Hospital and returned to court upon being restored to competency. A review hearing was set for October 20, 2010.
In the instant appeal now pending before this court, defendant argues there is insufficient evidence to support the superior court's finding that she was not competent to stand trial and the court's order for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication during her commitment. Subsequent competency proceedings
During the pendency of this appeal, both defendant and the People advised this court that defendant had been restored to competency and criminal proceedings were reinstated in case No. VCF232931.
As we will explain, the People have filed a motion to dismiss the instant appeal as moot and defendant filed opposition. The People's motion and responsive pleading are supported by additional minute orders from Tulare County Superior Court case No. VCF232931, the underlying case in this appeal. Defendant has not objected to the inclusion of these minute orders as the basis for the People's motion. Upon this court's own motion, this court will deem the appellate record augmented to include the minute orders from Tulare County Superior Court case No. VCF232931, as attached to the People's pleadings in support of the motion to dismiss. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.155, 8.54(c).)
On March 16, 2011, however, the superior court again suspended criminal proceedings in case No. VCF232931. The court reviewed reports from Drs. Berkson and Middleton, the court found there were conflicting opinions as to defendant's competency, and the court granted the People's request for a jury trial on the issue of competency.
On April 26, 27, 28, and 29, 2011, the court presided over a jury trial on defendant's competency in case No. VCF232931. Drs. Lebby, Bindler, and Middleton testified for defendant; Dr. Berkson and two other witnesses testified for the People. During the jury trial, defendant moved to discharge her appointed counsel pursuant to Marsden and, in the alternative, to represent herself pursuant to Faretta. The court heard and denied both motions.
On April 29, 2011, the jury found defendant competent to stand trial pursuant to section 1367.
On May 3, 2011, defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of competency. The criminal proceedings remained suspended.
On May 12, 2011, the court heard and denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court terminated the civil proceedings and reinstated the criminal proceedings in case No. VCF232931. Motion to Dismiss
On April 12, 2011, the People filed a motion with this court to dismiss the instant appeal. The People argued the appeal was moot since defendant had been found competent after a lengthy jury trial on the matter and criminal proceedings had been reinstated. Defendant filed opposition and acknowledged the jury found her competent, but argued this court should still hear the instant appeal because the question of her competency might be raised again before the superior court.
Defendant asserts that the People have not requested this court to dismiss the instant appeal as moot. To the contrary, the People have specifically requested such an order.
DISCUSSION
The preliminary question before this court is whether the instant appeal should be dismissed as moot. "As a general rule, an appellate court only decides actual controversies. It is not the function of the appellate court to render opinions '"'"upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or ... declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it."'"' [Citation.] '[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380.) Thus, "'[a]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed.' [Citation.]" (In re Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 404; People v. DeLong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 486.)
People v. Lindsey (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 742 (Lindsey) is directly on point on this issue. In that case, the superior court determined after a hearing that a criminal defendant was insane and ordered him committed to a state hospital. The defendant appealed the order. During the pendency of the appeal, the defendant was certified as sane and criminal proceedings resumed. (Id. at p. 743.) Lindsey dismissed defendant's pending appeal of the original commitment as moot because "the superintendent's certification of sanity terminates the commitment, leaving no prejudicial consequences which could be ameliorated by a successful appeal." (Id. at p. 744, italics added.)
Lindsey clearly controls the resolution of the instant case. In this case, as in Lindsey, the superior court found defendant was not competent to stand trial, and defendant filed an appeal from the court's judgment on that issue. In the interim, the court was required to revisit the matter and presided over a lengthy jury trial as to defendant's competency, several expert witnesses testified and were subject to cross-examination, the jury found defendant was competent to stand trial in this case, and the court reinstated criminal proceedings. The jury's subsequent finding of competency has rendered the instant appeal moot.
As noted by the People, defendant argues in this appeal that the superior court's initial finding that she was not competent is not supported by substantial evidence. During the subsequent proceedings, after the jury found she was competent to stand trial, defendant moved for a judgment notwithstanding the finding of competency. Thus, defendant has used the instant appeal to challenge the court's finding that she was not competent, while at the same time, she apparently argued before the jury that she was not competent.
Defendant raises several arguments in support of her opposition to the motion to dismiss. First, defendant asserts this court should not dismiss the instant appeal because of "the continuing stigma of a wrongful commitment." Lindsey rejected the identical argument.
"The certificate of [sanity] . attests that defendant is no longer under . a [mental] disability. The law imposes no disadvantageous collateral consequences upon one whose trial has had to be postponed by reason of such a temporary disability.... If defendant's mental state is considered in future proceedings, the issue will turn upon what that state is found to be as of the relevant time, and not the fact that an order was made under . section 1370 [in May 1971]. If any social opprobrium is thought to attach by reason of the commitment, that is nothing which is likely to be relieved by an appellate decision. The temporary commitment is nothing from which defendant needs to 'clear his name.'" (Lindsey, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at pp. 744-745, italics added.)
Defendant next asserts this court should exercise its discretion to consider her appeal because the question of her competency is "still a live one in the trial court," and appellate review may be thwarted if this appeal is dismissed. This court may exercise its discretion to decide the issues raised in her appeal if they involve important issues of public interest that are capable of repetition yet evade review. (See, e.g., People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 897-898; Conservatorship v. Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 524, fn. 1; In re DavidH. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1634.) We decline to do so in this case, however, because defendant has not identified any issue of public interest that this court should address in order to resolve the ongoing disputed issues between the parties. (See, e.g. In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 329.)
An argument similar to defendant's position in this case was addressed in People v. Harris (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 984 (Harris), where the superior court found the defendant was not competent to stand trial. During the pendency of the defendant's appeal, he was found competent to stand trial and criminal proceedings were reinstated. (Id. at pp. 989-990.) Harris declined to dismiss the defendant's appeal because the defendant raised several issues that were of "sufficient public importance that it is appropriate to address them on the merits despite the fact that [the defendant's] commitment has expired. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 990.) These issues included whether defense counsel, over the defendant's objections, could waive the defendant's right to a jury trial on the question of competency; whether counsel could waive the defendant's presence at the competency hearing itself; and whether the court was required to appoint two experts pursuant to section 1369, subdivision (a), an issue that had not been previously addressed by an appellate court. (Harris, supra, at pp. 990-996.)
While Harris addressed these issues on the merits, it declined to decide whether any of the superior court's errors would have required reversal of the defendant's commitment order. Harris concluded that "[n]o purpose would be served by vacating the expired commitment order" and ultimately affirmed the judgment. (Harris, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 996, fn. 5.)
In contrast to Harris, the issues raised in defendant's appeal do not involve disputed legal standards or questions likely to recur among other parties, but instead exclusively focused on whether the superior court's findings were supported by substantial evidence. While defendant has also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the court's order for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, that particular order has expired given the subsequent proceedings in this case.
Defendant further argues that this court is required to address her appeal based on "the controlling authority" of People v. Solorzano (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1063 (Solorzano). However, Solorzano did not address whether an appeal from a commitment order should be dismissed as moot if the defendant subsequently has been restored to competency. Instead, Solorzano dealt with a defendant's appeal after he had been convicted of multiple felony offenses and sentenced to four consecutive third strike terms. Prior to trial on the substantive charges, the superior court conducted a jury trial on the defendant's competency. The defendant repeatedly tried to make a Marsden motion during the competency trial, but the court "abrupt[ly]" refused to hear the motion, continued to conduct the competency trial, and found him competent. Later, a jury found him sane. (Solorzano, supra, at pp. 1066-1068.) In his appeal after conviction, the defendant argued that the superior court should have heard his Marsden motion during the competency hearing. Solorzano agreed, reversed the judgment of conviction, and ordered a new trial. Solorzano further ordered that if the question of the defendant's competency recurred, and if he again made a Marsden motion during competency proceedings, the superior court was required to promptly hear that motion before terminating the proceedings. (Solorzano, supra, at pp. 1071-1072.)
Solorzano does not support defendant's position in this case. While the defendant in Solorzano had been found competent to stand trial, his appeal was brought after the judgment of conviction and sentence on the underlying substantive offenses, and his convictions were reversed because the superior court's refusal to hear his Marsden motion violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Solorzano never addressed whether the subsequent finding of competency rendered the defendant's appeal as moot, which is not surprising since the defendant's appeal was filed after his conviction and sentence. (Solorzano, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1069-1070.)
Finally, defendant has filed a supplemental letter brief in support of her opposition to the motion to dismiss, and asserts this court must address the issues raised in her appeal because she again was found not competent to stand trial. In support of this argument, defendant has filed a May 27, 2011, minute order that states the superior court has appointed experts to determine defendant's competency. Defendant contends this minute order demonstrates that the issue of her competency is still a ripe issue and the instant appeal should not be dismissed as moot.
However, the May 27, 2011, minute order does not support defendant's argument because it is from a superior court case that is not part of the instant appeal. The minute order is from Tulare County Superior Court case No. VCF248693, where defendant was charged with counts 1 through 6, resisting an executive officer (§ 69), with one prior strike conviction; count 7, assault on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (c)); count 8, criminal contempt (§ 166, subd. (a)(1)); and count 9, misdemeanor criminal contempt (§ 166, subd. (c)(3)), with all of the offenses alleged to have been committed on January 11, 2011. The minute order further states that at the request of defense counsel, the court appointed three experts in case No. VCF248693, to examine defendant pursuant to section 1368. The court set the matter for a hearing on July 8, 2011.
In contrast, the instant appeal is from Tulare County Superior Court case No. VCF232931, where defendant was charged with count 1, felony assault with a deadly weapon, a knife, with one prior strike conviction; and count 2, misdemeanor resisting arrest, with all offenses alleged to have been committed on November 24, 2009. We decline to augment the instant record to include the minute order from Tulare County Superior Court case No. VCF248693, since that minute order is not from the same superior court case that is the subject of the instant appeal.
The proceedings in case No. VCF248693 involve subsequent proceedings in a different case, they are not part of the instant appeal, and the court's orders in that case are not pertinent to whether defendant's appeal from the judgment in case No. VCF232931 should be dismissed as moot.
We further note that on November 17, 2011, defendant filed a notice of appeal from case No. VCF248693, and that appeal is currently pending before this court.
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We conclude subsequent events have rendered the present appeal moot. This case is not one where defendant may suffer future collateral disabilities as a result of the challenged ruling. The appropriate remedy is dismissal. (Lindsey, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 744.)
DISPOSITION
The People's motion for dismissal is granted. The appeal is dismissed as moot and the judgment is affirmed. We take judicial notice of Tulare County Superior Court's rulings as stated by the minute orders filed in support of the People's motion to dismiss and defendant's opposition (fn. 2, ante).
Upon this court's own motion, this court deems the appellate record to include the minute orders from Tulare County Superior Court case No. VCF232931, as attached to the People's pleadings in support of the motion to dismiss. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.155, 8.54(c).)
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Kane, J.
WE CONCUR:
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Levy, Acting P.J.
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Franson, J.