Opinion
B164572.
11-21-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KELVIN PILGRIM, Defendant and Appellant.
Leslie G. McMurray, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Joseph P. Lee and Tita Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Kelvin Pilgrim was convicted of one count of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, with true findings on allegations that he had suffered five one-year priors. He was sentenced to state prison for a term of six years. We reject Pilgrims claim of Pitchess error (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531) and affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
A.
Los Angeles Police Officers Chacon and Ingalls stopped a Toyota minivan driven by Pilgrim (the van had a broken taillight). Officer Chacon saw a "shaved" key in the ignition, and based on his training and experience (that such keys are used to steal cars, particularly Toyota vans) formed the opinion that the vehicle was stolen. When Pilgrim was searched, the officers found pliers (which can be used to start the ignition) and porcelain chips (which can be used to break a car window without much noise). Further investigation disclosed that the van had been stolen from Arturo Rodriguez (who had parked it in front of his house and who had not given Pilgrim or anyone permission to drive or take the van). Pilgrim was charged and convicted as noted above.
B.
Before trial, Pilgrim filed a Pitchess motion supported by a conclusory declaration from his attorney stating that the "defense contends that the car did not [have a] broken taillight. In other words, the police fabricated this fact in order to do a traffic stop. Further, the defense contends that [Pilgrim] did not say that the car was lent to him by someone name[d] Arturo. In fact, [Pilgrim] told the officers who he got the car from, when he received the car, and where he rec[e]ived the car." (Emphasis added.) The trial court denied the motion, and Pilgrim now claims that was error, contending his motion "specified good cause for the discovery sought." We disagree.
To reach the in camera review threshold, a defendant must present a declaration "showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, [and] setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation." (Evid. Code, § 1043, subds. (b)(2), (b)(3).) If good cause is not shown, the trial court does not have to conduct an in camera review. (§ 1043, subd. (c); Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 538 [motion must be made with "adequate specificity to preclude the possibility that defendant is engaging in a fishing expedition"].) Absent an arbitrary and capricious decision, we will not disturb the trial courts ruling on a Pitchess motion. (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 832.)
All section references are to the Evidence Code.
There was no abuse of discretion in this case. Pilgrim did no more than offer his contentions that the arresting officers were lying about the circumstances of the arrest, and his speculation that they "have a pattern of fabricating probable cause, making false arrests and planting evidence on arrestees . . . ." There were no facts to support these contentions, and there was nothing offered to explain a link between the requested documents and Pilgrims defense — which was (as he himself testified) that someone gave him permission to drive the van. This is not the stuff of which a successful Pitchess motion is made, and Pilgrims motion was properly denied.
Pilgrims defense of permissive use defeats his reliance on People v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410, where the officers credibility was critical because the question was whether the defendant had been driving in the dangerous and evasive manner described by the pursuing officer (the defendant claimed he had not been driving in the manner described by the officer). Here, Pilgrim didnt claim that the arresting officers had been present when someone gave him permission to drive the van.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SPENCER, P.J. and MALLANO, J.