Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GA067786 Dorothy Shubin, Judge.
Patrick J. Hennessey, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Robert M. Snider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
Irene Padilla pled nolo contendere to a single count of forgery after the trial court denied her suppression motion. On appeal, she contends the court should have granted the motion because the police had no probable cause to arrest her. We conclude the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. During a valid traffic stop, Padilla’s companion gave police a false name. Padilla confirmed this false identity when police questioned her. These facts established probable cause to believe Padilla violated Penal Code section 148 subdivision (a)(1) or aided and abetted her companion in violating that statute or Penal Code section 148.9.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Burbank Police Department officers stopped an Audi driven by Cristina Farias for not displaying a license plate. Appellant Padilla was seated in the passenger seat of the car. The officers searched the car and its contents. They found blank checks inside Farias’s purse. In an organizer notebook, the officers found the names, social security numbers, birthdates, and personal information of other people. The organizer was in the hatchback of the car, along with merchandise from a Target store in Burbank. The backseat held additional merchandise. After her arrest, Padilla told the police that Farias created the checks with a computer, making up account numbers and names. Farias and Padilla then used the checks to buy things. On the day of their arrest, they had purchased goods at the Target in Burbank using fake checks.
Padilla moved to suppress the statements she made to police following her arrest. She argued that her detention was unreasonably prolonged and that police lacked probable cause to arrest her. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which the arresting officer testified. The court denied the motion. Padilla changed her plea from not guilty to nolo contendere. She also admitted a prior strike conviction. At sentencing, the court struck Padilla’s prior strike and sentenced her to 16 months in prison in accordance with Padilla’s plea agreement with the prosecution.
DISCUSSION
Padilla contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress her statements to the police. On appeal, she no longer urges that the duration of the traffic stop was constitutionally unreasonable. Padilla argues only that the police had no probable cause to arrest her. She does not challenge the constitutionality of the search.
1. The arresting officer’s testimony.
At the hearing on the suppression motion, Burbank Police Department Officer Jason Embleton testified that about 9:10 p.m. on November 24, 2006, he and his partner stopped the Audi driven by Farias because it had no license plates. Embleton approached the passenger side of the car and spoke to Padilla. She said she had no identification, but she gave her true name and admitted she was on parole for fraud. Farias said her name was “Christina Padilla”; she provided a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) form bearing that name as identification. Farias said that her purse and identification had been stolen. Embleton and his partner used their radio and computer to confirm the driver’s stated identity. They learned that “Christina Padilla” was not the driver’s true name. They continued to try to determine the driver’s true identity. Padilla “was in the car right next to [Farias]” when Farias presented the LAPD form to the officers. Embleton had appellant Padilla get out of the car “and asked her the identity of the driver.” (Embleton separated the two “for the integrity of the investigation.”) Appellant “confirmed” that Farias was “Christina Padilla,” that her purse and identification had been stolen, and that she had the LAPD report as identification.
Embleton noticed there was a lot of merchandise in the car, some of it in plastic store bags. The officers searched the car and found, among other things, “numerous” mobile phones, gift cards, a credit card, receipts, a rental agreement for a storage unit, Farias’s organizer containing altered copies of LAPD forms and personal identifying information for other people, three blank checks inside Farias’s wallet inside her purse, and a bottle of prescription medicine labeled with the name Irene Sanchez. Padilla initially said the medicine belonged to a friend. Embleton later found -- in a location not indicated in the record -- a pill matching those in the bottle. On further questioning before police arrested her, Padilla said the pills were hers.
Embleton admitted at the evidentiary hearing that, when he arrested Padilla, he had no information that she possessed stolen property or another person’s personal identification, that she had used the personal identifying information of another person for an unlawful purpose, that she knew anything about the LAPD forms or personal identifying information about other people in the organizer, that she knew of the organizer’s existence or exercised any control over it, that she knew anything about the blank checks in Farias’s wallet, that she was there when the merchandise was put in the car, or that she exercised any control over the merchandise in the car. Nor did he know whether the merchandise was stolen. Embleton nonetheless concluded that both women had committed a crime and he arrested them for identify theft. At the hearing, Embleton explained that he concluded Padilla was “knowledgeable about everything in [the organizer].” He based his opinion on his “observations, the stuff that was found in the vehicle, . . . and Padilla’s statements.” Embleton explained, “The driver identified herself with a yellow piece of paper which is an L.A.P.D. form with a name, Christina Padilla. [¶] When I questioned [appellant] Padilla about the name, she also confirmed the name Christina Padilla as the driver. She also confirmed the L.A.P.D. report that Farias supplied as her I.D. She said she lost her I.D.[,] [h]er purse, and that is how she is identifying herself. Also during the interview with Padilla, she admitted that the pills in the pill bottle under the name of Irene Sanchez were hers. Which is a different name than Irene Padilla. . . . [A]nd based on everything I found in the car, I made the opinion that they were both involved in a crime, and I arrested them both for that crime.”
In denying Padilla’s motion to suppress, the trial court stated, “[G]iven all the items he did find, the merchandise, the receipt, the checks, the medication, I think that is more than sufficient to show that there was identity theft, an identity theft crime.” In response to defense counsel’s argument that none of the items recovered was linked to Padilla, the court explained that “[s]he also has the prescription which is admittedly in the name of another. I think given the totality of what is here, there is a suspicion on the basis of the testimony . . . .”
2. Probable cause for Padilla’s arrest.
The prosecution always has the burden of proving the reasonableness of a warrantless arrest. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130; Badillo v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 269, 272.) A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe that person has committed a felony or committed a misdemeanor in the officer’s presence. (People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1138; § 836, subd. (a)(1).) Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person to be arrested is guilty of a crime. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410.)
In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court judges the credibility of the witnesses, resolves any conflicts in the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws factual inferences. We will uphold the trial court’s findings, express or implied, on these matters if substantial evidence supports them. However, we independently review whether the arrest was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182; People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Whether the officer had probable cause to arrest is a question of law subject to independent review. (In re Justin B. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 879, 887.)
Appellant’s arrest hinged on her affirmation of Farias’s false identification, her possession of a prescription issued under a different name, and her presence in Farias’s car. When he arrested Padilla, Embleton admittedly had no information that she knew anything about -- much less participated in -- the suspected use of other people’s identifying information or fake checks. Nor did he have any information that she knowingly had received property obtained by using another person’s identity, fake checks, or other improper means.
If the prescription medication in the pill bottle were a controlled substance, Padilla might have violated Health & Safety Code section 11174 or 11175. But the prosecutor introduced no evidence about the nature of the medication Padilla possessed. Nor did the prosecution offer any evidence that -- for example -- Padilla had used a false name when visiting the prescribing physician, had used another person’s medical benefits coverage or medical benefits that were fraudulently obtained, or had obtained the pills through a forged or counterfeit prescription. In short, although the name discrepancy on the pill bottle may have suggested misconduct by Padilla, without more it did not support a strong suspicion that she had committed a crime.
However, when Padilla “confirmed” Farias’s false identification to police, she arguably violated section 148 subdivision (a)(1). In the alternative, she arguably aided and abetted Farias’s violation of that statute or of section 148.9. Under section 148 subdivision (a)(1), a person who delays or obstructs a peace officer in the performance of his duties is guilty of a misdemeanor. A person who falsely identifies herself to a police officer also violates section 148.9 and is guilty of a misdemeanor. Misleading or attempting to mislead a police officer by giving a false name may violate section 148 subdivision (a)(1) as well as section 148.9. (People v. Christopher (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 418.) Shortly after the officers stopped Farias and Padilla, they learned that Farias had given them a false name. In attempting to learn Farias’s true identity, Embleton questioned Padilla. Padilla continued to repeat Farias’s story – a story the officers then knew to be false. Padilla delayed and obstructed the officers’ investigation by continuing to lie to them, and she assisted Farias in her attempt to avoid the discovery of her true name. The officers therefore had facts that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that Padilla was guilty of violating section 148 subdivision (a)(1) herself or, in the alternative, of violating sections 148 subdivision (a)(1) and 148.9 as an aider and abettor.
Padilla committed this crime in the officers’ presence. Although this was not the crime for which Embleton arrested Padilla, it nonetheless provides probable cause to support her arrest. “[I]t is reasonable that the court passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the policeman made his decision should find the arrest legal if the evidence that brought about that decision gave probable cause to arrest for a crime whose identity has been aired in the court hearing by either the prosecution or the court sua sponte, even if the policeman was mistaken as to the nature of the crime whose commission was shown by the evidence upon which he acted.” (People v. Clark (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 549, 560 (Clark) [arrest of defendant for burglary supported by probable cause to arrest defendant for disorderly conduct in the form of peeking into a door or window of inhabited dwelling].) As in Clark (id. at p. 557), Padilla’s violation of sections 148 subdivision (a)(1) and 148.9 was closely related to the identity theft for which she was arrested: Farias apparently was engaged in a scheme in which she misrepresented her identity through the use of police forms and fake checks. Farias used just such a form and false name when police questioned her, and appellant furthered the scheme by confirming the false information. Although no one characterized Padilla’s conduct as delaying the officers’ investigation or aiding and abetting Farias’s provision of false identification to a peace officer, the facts supporting that violation were “aired in the court hearing.” It does not matter that the trial court may have erred in concluding that the prosecution had established probable cause to believe Padilla had committed identity theft. We review the ruling, not its rationale. (Bailon v. Appellate Division (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1339; Clark, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at p. 560.) The existence of probable cause to believe Padilla had violated sections 148 subdivision (a)(1) and 148.9 supports her arrest. Therefore, the arrest was valid, and statements she made while in custody were not subject to suppression.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: COOPER, P. J., FLIER, J.