Opinion
11-10-2016
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Craig OWENS, Defendant–Appellant.
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Piotr Banasiak of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of Counsel), for Respondent.
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Piotr Banasiak of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, DeJOSEPH, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him after a jury trial of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[1] ). Contrary to defendant's contention, the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence with respect to the element of intent. The evidence established that the victim had been severely beaten over a period of several hours and that, although those injuries would have eventually resulted in her death, the victim was then strangled to death. Thus, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we conclude that a different verdict would have been unreasonable (see id. at 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, County Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting in evidence two photographs depicting the victim's injuries. That evidence was relevant with respect to defendant's intent and the investigating police officer's determination to treat the victim's death as a homicide, and to corroborate the Medical Examiner's testimony regarding the victim's injuries (see People v. Camacho, 70 A.D.3d 1393, 1394, 894 N.Y.S.2d 680, lv. denied 14 N.Y.3d 886, 903 N.Y.S.2d 774, 929 N.E.2d 1009 ).
We nevertheless conclude that a mode of proceedings error occurred and reversal is required because the record fails to show that defense counsel was advised of the contents of a jury note requesting, inter alia, further instruction on reasonable doubt, murder in the second degree and manslaughter in the first degree (see People v. Mack, 27 N.Y.3d 534, 541–542, 36 N.Y.S.3d 68, 55 N.E.3d 1041, rearg. denied 28 N.Y.3d 944, 38 N.Y.S.3d 513, 60 N.E.3d 407 ; People v. Silva, 24 N.Y.3d 294, 299–300, 998 N.Y.S.2d 154, 22 N.E.3d 1022, rearg. denied 24 N.Y.3d 1216, 4 N.Y.S.3d 598, 28 N.E.3d 33 ; People v. Walston, 23 N.Y.3d 986, 989–990, 991 N.Y.S.2d 24, 14 N.E.3d 377 ). Moreover, because the record does not establish that the court advised defense counsel of the contents of the note, we cannot assume that the court complied with its core responsibilities pursuant to CPL 310.30 and People v. O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 579 N.E.2d 189 (see Silva, 24 N.Y.3d at 300, 998 N.Y.S.2d 154, 22 N.E.3d 1022 ; Walston, 23 N.Y.3d at 990, 991 N.Y.S.2d 24, 14 N.E.3d 377 ; see generally People v. Nealon, 26 N.Y.3d 152, 160–162, 20 N.Y.S.3d 315, 41 N.E.3d 1130 ). We therefore reverse the judgment and grant a new trial. In light of our determination, there is no need to address defendant's remaining contention.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law and a new trial is granted.