Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Super. Ct .No. RIF131093 Russell F. Schooling, Judge. (Retired judge of the former L.A. Mun. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Thien Huong Tran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Theodore M. Cropley, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
McKINSTER, Acting P. J.
INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant guilty of buying, receiving, or withholding a vehicle that he knew to be stolen. (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a).) Defendant admitted suffering a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and a prior conviction that resulted in a prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of four years. Defendant contends that the evidence supporting his conviction for buying, receiving, or withholding a vehicle, which he knew to be stolen, does not meet the substantial evidence standard. We affirm the judgment.
The jury was hopelessly deadlocked as to the charge of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and the court dismissed that count.
FACTS
On June 24, 2006, the victim reported his 1995 Honda Accord stolen. The victim had parked his vehicle in “a carpool spot” at approximately 5:00 a.m. when he went to work; when he returned around 4:30 p.m., the vehicle was gone. When the victim left his vehicle, it was in good condition.
On June 26, 2006, Mr. Turner was at his mother’s house, retrieving his tools. Defendant was at the house with Mr. Turner. Mr. Turner’s mother had eviction proceedings pending against Mr. Turner and he was not supposed to be on the property. Riverside County Sheriff deputies stopped by the house because they wanted to ensure that no one was violating the “no trespassing” order that had been posted on the property by the County of Riverside.
Deputy Naccarato testified that Mr. Turner was standing on the side of the house when he and his partner arrived. The stolen 1995 Honda Accord was “more or less, in front of Mr. Turner.” The vehicle was parked on the street, in front of the house, along the curb. The deputies walked onto the property and motioned for Mr. Turner to come to the front of the house. The deputies asked Mr. Turner if anyone else was at the house; Mr. Turner “told them, no.” Mr. Turner testified he told the deputies no one was at the house, but thought they were referring to anyone being “inside” the house. Since defendant was outside the house, he said no one else was there. Deputy Naccarato walked around the house checking the doors and windows to ensure they were locked. When Deputy Naccarato entered the backyard, he discovered defendant in an alcove area, with his back against the wall. Deputy Naccarato escorted defendant to the front of the house.
Deputy Naccarato then inspected the Honda Accord and discovered that the engine was warm and the ignition had been “punched out,” which refers to the metal scissor blade that was pushed into the ignition. The sheriff’s dispatch informed the deputies that the vehicle was reported stolen. Mr. Turner told the deputy he witnessed defendant driving the vehicle. Defendant told Deputy Naccarato that he had entered the stolen “vehicle to gather some change,” but that he had not driven the vehicle. The deputies were unable to recover fingerprints from the vehicle or the scissor blade.
Mr. Turner testified that he did not see anyone driving the stolen vehicle because he was in the backyard. When asked if he told the deputies that he had seen defendant driving the vehicle, Mr. Turner testified that he originally told the deputies he had not witnessed anyone drive the vehicle and only changed his story to accuse defendant of driving the vehicle after the deputies threatened to take Mr. Turner to jail and charge him “with a stolen car.” Deputy Naccarato denied threatening Mr. Turner or telling him that he would be arrested. Deputy Naccarato testified that Mr. Turner’s “overall attitude and demeanor was good” when speaking with the deputies. Mr. Turner stated that prior to testifying at defendant’s trial, defendant’s girlfriend approached Mr. Turner and called him “a rat.”
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the evidence supporting his conviction for buying, receiving, or withholding a vehicle, which he knew to be stolen (§ 496d, subd. (a)), fails to meet the standard for substantial evidence. Specifically, defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding as to the third element of the offense—that he exercised control over the vehicle by buying, receiving, or withholding it. (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a).) Defendant does not contest that substantial evidence supports the first two elements of the offense—that the vehicle was stolen and defendant knew the vehicle to be stolen. (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a).)
“In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court’s role is a limited one.” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738-739.) We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains “‘“substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—”’” from which a jury comprised of reasonable persons could have found the defendant guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 758.) We presume “in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the [jury] could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the decision of the trial court, we do not resolve issues of credibility or evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) “Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient . . . .” (Ibid.)
Evidence Code section 1235 provides that “prior inconsistent statements are admissible to prove their substance as well as to impeach the declarant.” (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 55, fn. 4.) In People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, at page 257, our Supreme Court held: “[T]he sufficiency of an out-of-court identification to support a conviction should be determined under the substantial evidence test . . . that is used to determine the sufficiency of other forms of evidence to support a conviction.” The court explained that a reviewing court should assess the circumstances of the out-of-court statement to determine whether it is sufficiently probative to support the conviction. (Id. at pp. 267, 274-275.)
Mr. Turner testified that he told the deputies he had seen defendant driving the stolen vehicle. Mr. Turner also testified that he lied to the deputies and that he did not see anyone driving the vehicle, but he accused defendant because the deputies threatened to arrest him. Mr. Turner stated defendant’s girlfriend called him “a rat” prior to trial.
Although Mr. Turner recanted his out-of-court statements when testifying at trial, the prosecution offered evidence that Mr. Turner may have falsely recanted in order to not be viewed as “a rat.” From this evidence, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Mr. Turner was telling the truth when he made his out-of-court statements to the deputies regarding seeing defendant drive the stolen vehicle and that he recanted in court due to the reproach by defendant’s girlfriend. Accordingly, we find Mr. Turner’s out-of-court statements to be sufficiently probative.
Now we review whether the evidence supporting defendant’s conviction meets the substantial evidence standard. Mr. Turner’s testimony that he told the police he had seen defendant driving the vehicle is substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that defendant bought, received, or withheld the vehicle. Accordingly, we find substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant bought, received, or withheld a vehicle that he knew to be stolen.
Deputy Naccarato also testified that Mr. Turner told him that he had seen defendant driving the stolen vehicle. Deputy Naccarato’s testimony about Mr. Turner’s statements was hearsay and, arguably, did not correlate with any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, in this opinion, we do not rely on Deputy Naccarato’s testimony concerning Mr. Turner’s statements.
Defendant argues that Mr. Turner’s credibility is too questionable to establish substantial evidence. We cannot resolve issues of credibility. (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) We note, however, “that juries are capable of determining the credibility of out-of-court statements that are inconsistent with a witness’s trial testimony by observing the witness’s in-court demeanor: ‘If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before, they are none the less deciding from what they see and hear of that person and in court. There is no mythical necessity that the case must be decided only in accordance with the truth of the words uttered under oath in court.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 273.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT, J. KING, J.