Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC61863
Rivera, J.
Craig Allen Ogans appeals from a judgment upon his plea of no contest to possession of counterfeiting paper (Pen. Code, § 480). He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 because he was unlawfully arrested. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
On October 12, 2005, the superior court issued a bench warrant seeking the arrest of defendant’s son, Craig Allen Ogans, Jr., then 18 years old. The warrant, however, incorrectly listed defendant’s son’s birthday as May 6, 1959, which is defendant’s birthday. Following defendant’s arrest on the warrant, the court ordered defendant released from custody, finding that he was arrested by mistake inasmuch as the original citation described his son with a date of birth of November 21, 1986. The court directed that the birthdate of defendant’s son be placed on the face sheet of the arrest warrant.
On May 10, 2006, a new bench warrant for defendant’s son was issued. It, however, again erroneously listed defendant’s birthdate. At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, the parties stipulated that Officer Stahler arrested defendant on the new bench warrant on July 10, 2006. Upon defendant’s arrest, Stahler secured defendant’s consent to search his hotel room. After the search, another officer informed Stahler that defendant was on parole.
The evidence at the preliminary hearing showed that in searching defendant’s hotel room, the police found a false driver’s license, a stolen credit card, counterfeit $20 bills, paper used to make counterfeit bills, and materials used in the production of counterfeit documents.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress evidence, finding that the police were justified in relying on the arrest warrant that was valid on its face.
II. Discussion
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because he was searched incident to an invalid arrest warrant. He argues that under the collective knowledge doctrine, the mistake in the arrest warrant should be imputed to the collective law enforcement department.
“The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Where the facts are basically undisputed, as they are here, we independently review the court’s decision. (People v. Ferguson (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 367, 371 (Ferguson); People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641, 1650 (Downing).)
This case falls squarely within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1 (Evans) and United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 (Leon). Leon and Evans addressed police reliance on erroneous information contained in records maintained by court employees. In both cases, the courts declined to apply the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence seized pursuant to defective warrants because to do so would not serve the exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring police misconduct. (Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 3-4, 14-16 [police relied on computer information indicating outstanding misdemeanor warrant for the defendant’s arrest when warrant had, in fact, been recalled]; Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 900, 919-920 [police relied on search warrant that was later found to be defective].)
In Downing, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pages 1654-1657, the court followed Leon and Evans and held that a police officer was justified in relying on “facially valid computer information produced by the superior court” that erroneously showed the defendant was subject to a probation search. The court reasoned that “[i]n this fast-paced, computerized society, it is absurd to require a police officer to exhaust all avenues of investigation and corroboration when he has no objective reason to question facially valid computer data produced by other than the collective law enforcement department in front of him.” (Downing, at p. 1657; see also People v. Palmer (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 663 [good faith reliance on invalid arrest warrant].)
Here, as well, the police acted reasonably and on good faith in relying on the existence of the bench warrant in arresting defendant. The defect in the warrant could not be imputed to the police as the mistake in birthdates was attributable to court employees and not law enforcement. The purpose of the exclusionary rule would, thus, not be served by applying it here.
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, People v. Ramirez (1983) 34 Cal.3d 541, and Ferguson, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 367 is misplaced. In those cases, the police relied on information which the courts determined was imputable to the law enforcement agency or provided by parole or probation officers who were acting as adjuncts to law enforcement. For example, in Ramirez, supra, 34 Cal.3d at page 547, the court held that an arrest based on a warrant that was subsequently found to have been recalled was unlawful and determined that the evidence seized incident to that arrest must be seized. “Because the recall of the warrant was, or should have been, within the ‘collective knowledge’ of the police, we cannot permit the arresting officer to rely with impunity on his fellow officers’ errors of omission, but must impute their accurate knowledge to him.” (Ibid.; see also Willis, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 26, 38-39, 51 [suppression of evidence appropriate where police relied on information provided by parole officer who erroneously told police that the defendant was on active parole]; Ferguson, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 371-372, 377[exclusionary rule applicable where police relied on dispatcher’s erroneous confirmation that the defendant was on probation].)
The Ferguson court distinguished Evans explaining that probation officers’ significant responsibilities to enforce the law and assist law enforcement differentiate them from ordinary court employees like those at issue in Evans and in the present case. “Like parole officers, probation officers will sometimes ‘ “act like police officers and seek to uncover evidence of illegal activity” ’ and ‘ “are undoubtedly aware that any unconstitutionally seized evidence that could lead to an indictment could be suppressed in a criminal trial.” ’ [Citations.] Under these circumstances, failure to apply the exclusionary rule ‘ “would greatly increase the temptation to use the parole officer’s [or, in this case, the probation officer’s] broad authority to circumvent the Fourth Amendment.” ’ [Citations.]” (Ferguson, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 375.)
The considerations present in Ferguson are not applicable here where the police relied on an arrest warrant issued by the superior court that appeared facially valid. The mistake here was made by court employees, not the police. Thus, it would be inappropriate to apply the exclusionary rule as it would not serve the purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct.
III. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P. J. Sepulveda, J.