Summary
In Ochoa, the Court held that the defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree for possessing a loaded firearm was not an armed felony (182 A.D.3d at 410, 121 N.Y.S.3d 268).
Summary of this case from People v. MeridyOpinion
11317 Ind. 1921/15
04-02-2020
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ezequiel OCHOA, Defendant–Appellant.
Christina A. Swarns, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Kami Lizarraga of counsel), for appellant. Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Robert C. McIver of counsel), for respondent.
Christina A. Swarns, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Kami Lizarraga of counsel), for appellant.
Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Robert C. McIver of counsel), for respondent.
Gische, J.P., Gesmer, Oing, Moulton, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Steven L. Barrett, J.), rendered February 6, 2017, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of six years, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of vacating the sentence, and remanding for a further youthful offender determination, and otherwise affirmed.
To the extent that the court concluded that defendant was presumptively ineligible for youthful offender treatment, that determination was incorrect. Defendant's prior conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, for "possess[ing] a loaded firearm" ( Penal Law § 265.03[1][b] ) was not an "armed felony" within the meaning of CPL 720.10(2)(a). As relevant here, CPL 1.20, which CPL 720.10(2)(a) incorporates, defines "armed felony" as "any violent felony offense defined in section 70.02 of the penal law that includes as an element ... possession ... of a deadly weapon, if the weapon is a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury may be discharged" ( CPL 1.20[41][a] ). The statutory definition of "loaded firearm" explicitly does not require that the firearm be "actually" loaded, because it includes within the definition a "firearm which is possessed by one who, at the same time, possesses a quantity of ammunition which may be used to discharge such firearm" ( Penal Law § 265.00[15] ). In contrast, the definition of "deadly weapon" contains no proviso indicating that an actually unloaded weapon is deemed "loaded," and the definition is therefore met, where usable ammunition is readily available. Accordingly, "in order to be a deadly weapon, a gun must actually be loaded, as that term is commonly understood" ( People v. Wilson , 252 A.D.2d 241, 246, 684 N.Y.S.2d 718 [4th Dept. 1998] [internal quotation marks omitted] [citing People v. Shaffer , 66 N.Y.2d 663, 664, 495 N.Y.S.2d 965, 486 N.E.2d 823 [1985] ). Since a "loaded firearm" is therefore not always a "deadly weapon," the crime to which defendant pleaded guilty did not "include[ ] as an element ... possession ... of a deadly weapon" ( CPL 1.20[41][a] ), and the court should not have found that defendant's conviction rendered him presumptively ineligible. Accordingly, defendant was eligible to be considered for youthful offender status without any presumption of ineligibility due to the nature of his crime ( CPL 720.10[1],[2] ; People v. Boria , 124 A.D.3d 467, 1 N.Y.S.3d 82 [1st Dept. 2015], lv denied 25 N.Y.3d 1069, 12 N.Y.S.3d 621, 34 N.E.3d 372 [2015] ). We therefore remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent herewith (see People v. Rudolph , 21 N.Y.3d 497, 974 N.Y.S.2d 885, 997 N.E.2d 457 [2013] ).