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People v. Norris

California Court of Appeals, Sixth District
Mar 21, 2008
No. H030580 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTHONY NORRIS, Defendant and Appellant. H030580 California Court of Appeal, Sixth District March 21, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 210571

McAdams, J.

Defendant Norris was first committed to Atascadero State Hospital as a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) in 2000. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) Subsequent petitions to extend defendant’s commitment period were filed, and the two most recent ones were consolidated for trial. Following the jury’s verdict finding that defendant is an SVP, the court ordered his commitment extended for two consecutive two-year periods, from October 19, 2004, to October 19, 2008. Defendant appeals from that order. On appeal he contends that the court misinstructed the jury and violated his due process rights. We affirm.

We affirmed prior commitment orders in People v. Norris, H022188, on November 27, 2001, and People v. Norris, H026702, on September 30, 2004.

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Trial consisted of the testimony given by two expert witnesses called by the prosecution, Dr. Lisa Jeko, Ph. D., and Dr. Michelle Reed, Ph. D., both clinical psychologists. Dr. Jeko’s testimony was given at the probable cause hearing and a videotape was played for the jury. Defendant testified in his own behalf and called two witnesses, Calvin Cook, a pastor, and Ralph Bendel Neal, a former employer.

The Prosecution’s Case

Dr. Jeko was recognized by the court as an expert in the diagnosis and risk assessment of sexually violent predators. Dr. Jeko met with defendant on April 6, 2006, for a little over an hour. She reviewed the contents of the probation reports relating to defendant’s 1980 and 1993 offenses.

In 1980, defendant was convicted of raping a 19-year-old casual acquaintance named Kelly. Before raping her, he struck her in the face and brandished a knife, threatening to cut her throat if she did not leave the house they were in and come with him. He also threatened to shove the knife up her vagina, and told her to hold the knife so that her fingerprints would be on it. Drugs and alcohol were involved; at the time of his arrest, defendant had a blood alcohol level of .17. Defendant was sentenced to prison for seven years. When Dr. Jeko originally interviewed defendant in 2004, defendant denied that he had pleaded guilty to this offense and denied that he committed it. He also denied guilt to prior interviewers. He maintained that he had engaged in consensual sex with the girl. However, during two interviews defendant told Dr. Jeko that while he was forcing Kelly to move through some backyards with him, he had the thought that he was probably going to jail and so he might as well rape her.

In the 1993 case, the victim, Kathy G., was walking down the street at 3:00 a.m. and accepted a ride from defendant. Instead of taking her home, defendant took her to his apartment, where he beat her with his fists and raped her at knife point. He threatened to kill her if she told anyone. Crack cocaine was involved in this offense as well. Eventually she was able to flee and called 911. She was taken to a hospital where contusions and abrasions to her face, neck and vagina were noted. After his arrest, defendant told the police that the victim consented to have sex with him in order to get cocaine. At the time, he was on parole for the 1980 offense. He eventually pleaded guilty to rape, kidnapping and use of a knife. He was sentenced to 14 years in prison for these offenses.

In addition, Dr. Jeko reviewed documents relating to offenses for which defendant was arrested but was not ultimately convicted. In 1987, he was arrested for the rape and kidnap of Linda W. and for the use of alcohol and cocaine while he was on parole. He was not prosecuted but he was returned to custody for seven months. Dr. Jeko also mentioned an intent to rape offense involving a Diane in 1987, but the doctor did not discuss the details.

Dr. Jeko diagnosed defendant as suffering from “a paraphilia not otherwise specified” with non-consenting persons. The term “paraphilia” is an umbrella term listed in the DSM IV for a sexual disorder. According to Dr. Jeko, “the essential features of a paraphilia are a recurrent intense sexual arousing, fantasies, sexual urges or … behavior generally involving non-human objects, the suffering or humiliation of oneself or partner or children or other non-consenting person, that’s occurred over a period of at least six months.” In arriving at this diagnosis, Dr. Jeko considered that defendant had a “documented history of sexual assaultive behavior with adult females” involving force, violence or weapons from 1980 to 1993; that his offense involved non-consenting adults; and that his behavior significantly impaired his social functioning by keeping him incarcerated.

Dr. Jeko also diagnosed defendant with alcohol and cocaine dependence, in partial remission, and with an anti-social personality disorder. In his most recent interview with Dr. Jeko, defendant indicated that he did not believe he has a diagnosed mental disorder pertaining to his sexual offending.

Dr. Jeko described the treatment options available to sex offenders at Atascadero State Hospital. The Sex Offender Commitment Program (SOCP) has five phases. Defendant has not availed himself of this treatment program and his stated reason for failing to do so is that he does not suffer from a mental disorder pertaining to his sexual re-offending.

According to Dr. Jeko, Phase 1 is drop-in; the patient does not need to participate or volunteer information; the patient need only sit and listen. During Phase 2, the patient signs a consent form to begin participating. The patient starts a journal and begins to learn about the cognitive thinking errors that lead to sexual offending, as well as about the consequences of behavior and victim empathy. Phase 3 is an in-depth continuation of Phase 2 that involves the use of a polygraph while the patient is questioned about his or her prior offense history, followed by the patient’s creation of a “behavioral chain” of the thinking errors and behaviors that precipitated the sexual offense. Phase 4 prepares the patient for release into the community by focusing on the creation of a release plan and management of the thinking errors that precipitated the prior behavior. Phase 5 is the conditional release into the community while the patient is still in treatment and under surveillance.

In Dr. Jeko’s opinion, defendant suffers from both volitional and emotional impairments that predispose him to commit future sexual offenses. In addition, defendant scored 7 points on the Static 99, an actuarial risk assessment instrument used to assess the level of risk of re-offense posed by defendant. This score placed him in the high-risk category relative to other sex offenders and put him at a 52 percent risk of sexually re-offending in the next 15 years. Using other static variables that are “highly correlated with sexual re-offending,” Dr. Jeko found that the results were consistent with the result of the Static 99 test. Several dynamic factors considered by Dr. Jeko aggravated defendant’s risk. Dr. Jeko did not find that any protective factors, including defendant’s age of 50, lessened defendant’s risk of reoffense.

Dr. Jeko reviewed a relapse prevention and release plan composed by defendant that incorporated the 12-step program from Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.). It did not change her opinion about defendant’s risk of re-offense. In her opinion, defendant continues to present a serious and well-founded risk that he will sexually reoffend and meets all the criteria of a sexually violent predator.

Dr. Reed was also recognized by the court as an expert in the area of mental diagnosis and risk assessment of sexually violent predators. Dr. Reed evaluated defendant in 2004, 2005 and 2006. Dr. Reed interviewed defendant about his childhood and early history. He was raised by his mother and stepfather in a poor and violent area of Chicago; he felt unloved by his stepfather; he began carrying a gun to school at an early age; he had problems in school and difficulty learning to read; he dropped out in the 10th grade. As for his sexual history, he saw people having sex in hallways and public places from a young age; he had his first sexual experience at age 14, in a hallway. He reported having long relationships with women that ended and were quickly followed by new relationships. In 2000 he told another evaluator that he was sometimes a little rough with women but denied raping any.

Dr. Reed also learned that defendant had a history of “fairly significant substance abuse” and that drugs or alcohol were involved in both the 1980 and 1993 offense as well as parole violations. She noted that “if an individual has the propensity to commit a sexual offense, but they control their behavior very carefully on most occasions, it’s important to know what happens when they use substances. And in many cases, substances are involved in these kinds of offenses” because “substance abuse can loosen those controls.”

With respect to defendant’s psychiatric history, Dr. Reed considered it significant that defendant had twice received high scores for psychopathy on tests administered by two other evaluators. According to Dr. Reed, research had shown that psychopathy is a strong predictor of violence, criminal behavior and repeat offending.

Dr. Reed was familiar with defendant’s criminal history. Before the 1980 rape he was arrested for possession of concentrated cannabis, but that was dismissed. Defendant entered prison in 1981 and was released on parole in 1984. In February 1985 he absconded from parole and remained at large until May of 1986. He was then arrested and incarcerated on a parole violation but was released from custody in November 1986. In February 1987, he was arrested for rape and kidnap. The victim reported that she was stopped at a stop light when defendant forced his way into her car saying he had a gun and demanding that she drive him to San Jose. She did not see a gun but felt him poke her with something hard. He forced her to go to a hotel room where he hit her with his fist in the face and neck, grabbed her breast, threatened to throw her out of the window if she didn’t do what he wanted her to do and tried to suffocate her with a pillow when she refused to remove her clothing. Apparently, he let her go when somebody knocked on the door, although the victim said he raped her and then told her to leave. Other witnesses reported hearing noises and struggling. The case was dismissed, however, because the victim made some false statements to the police. But defendant’s parole was revoked for assault and he was returned to prison.

Dr. Reed also summarized the facts of the 1980 and 1993 rapes. When she interviewed defendant in 2004, he did not have much empathy for the victim of the 1980 rape and did not take responsibility for it. Defendant told her that when people at the mental hospital asked him how he felt about the victim, he would say, “I didn’t know the victim. How am I supposed to think of her? I don’t think of her.” Defendant also told her that women who used drugs understood that they were expected to have sex. When she asked defendant if he thought everybody who used drugs also raped women, he answered that the majority of them do; they just hadn’t gotten caught.

In 2004, Dr. Reed concluded that defendant suffered from the diagnosable mental disorders of paraphilia, not otherwise specified, with nonconsenting persons; polysubstance dependence; and anti-social personality. She administered the Static 99 test to assess defendant’s risk of reoffense; as with Dr. Jeko’s administration of the same test, defendant scored 7 points, placing him in the high-risk category.

Dr. Reed also considered additional static factors, such as whether a person has dropped out of sex offender treatment. Persons who start treatment then drop out show a higher risk of committing a sexual offense in the future. At the time of her evaluations, defendant had never been in treatment and so had not dropped out; therefore, this factor did not increase his risk. Other static factors were consistent with a high level of risk.

Dr. Reed understood that defendant had been transferred to Coalinga State Hospital in early 2006 and had begun to attend Phase I meetings of the five-phase SOCP. Phase I was informational, and did not require an individual’s participation. Previously, in 2004 and 2005, defendant had told Dr. Reed that he did not participate in treatment because he did not think he had a sexual problem that needed to be treated.

Dr. Reed opined that defendant would have some reduction of risk because of his age (50). However, use of a weapon such as a knife tended to reduce the protective nature of age. The dynamic, or changeable, factors she looked at were consistent with high risk. In 2004, Dr. Reed concluded that defendant was likely to reoffend in a sexually violent manner and that he met the criteria of a sexually violent predator.

Dr. Reed updated her evaluation in 2005. She again met with defendant. She concluded that defendant continued to suffer from the same diagnosable mental disorders. New negative developments were documented in the hospital notes. In June 2004 defendant “approached an off-ward female staff member to solicit a meeting with a peer he said was interested in her.” This is considered a staff/patient “boundary violation.” Defendant was now in his fourth year of refusing to participate in treatment. Defendant was trying to go to the gym everyday, despite having fallen in the gym two years earlier and hurt his neck. He had not been participating in A.A. or N.A. (Narcotics Anonymous) meetings. In February 2005 he gave another patient a cup full of “pruno,” a patient-brewed alcoholic drink. In March 2005 he was found lying in a fetal position, suffering from abdominal pain and vomiting. Two bottles of pruno, one empty, were found under his bed, and he admitted he had drunk some pruno and taken an opiate-based pain pill (OxyContin) that he had gotten from a patient on the yard.

Dr. Reed talked to defendant about a week after the second pruno incident. Defendant was evasive and did not express any remorse or understanding of the seriousness of the incident. He said everybody else did the same thing and nobody got hurt.

When Dr. Reed asked him about the 1980 rape for the 2005 evaluation, defendant said he never killed anybody. When she reminded him that he had used a knife, he responded: “We were getting high. I didn’t stalk her. They used me to get what they wanted and it happened. Yes, I did, and I’m sorry. I was at the place. We all overreacted because we were high. If they had never approached me – but I take responsibility. Of course, I do. She could have gotten me to stop many times. But I understand I had a knife.” Dr. Reed considered the pruno incident further evidence of defendant’s high risk of re-offense and concluded in 2005 that defendant continued to meet the criteria for a sexually violent predator.

Dr. Reed interviewed defendant again in April 2006 for another updated evaluation. She reviewed additional documents from both Atascadero and Coalinga State Hospitals. Since the last report, defendant had attended a session of anger management and stress awareness group, but had discontinued after one class. As recently as October 2005, defendant had declined sex offender treatment. On August 9, 2005, he tested positive for methamphetamine and alcohol. On February 28, 2006, however, defendant stated to hospital staff that he had not used any drugs or alcohol since he had been hospitalized. Behavior notes in his charts documented an outburst of loud swearing and a “verbal altercation” involving his use of racial epithets. Staff concluded that defendant was the aggressor in this incident.

Dr. Reed asked defendant again about the OxyContin incident in 2005. He told her that it was “just stupidity on his part.” He took the painkiller because wanted to play ball in the gym and had been unable to do so because of back pain. She also asked him about the positive drug test in August 2005. He was “pretty evasive” and he denied using drugs or alcohol.

In Dr. Reed’s opinion, defendant’s mental disorder remains unchanged. However, based on defendant’s increased openness to her in their conversations, Dr. Reed had modified her risk assessment somewhat in that she now considered certain aggravating factors neutral. For example, Dr. Reed believed he had begun to express real remorse for his actions; also she saw his attitude shifting towards more cooperation with supervision. She saw this as a positive step.

As part of her evaluation, she had considered whether defendant could be treated in the community. Although defendant had told her that he was willing to “have some level of supervision and monitoring and ongoing treatment” if released, given his refusal to attend the free treatment offered in the hospital, she was not convinced he was able to “go to the effort that it would require in the community of locating a program, going through the process of getting into such a treatment program, coming up with the resources to participate in it, and go through what’s a very difficult process of looking at yourself at some very painful things.” In her opinion defendant continued to pose a serious and well-founded risk of re-offense. He met the criteria as a sexually violent predator and would not be effectively treated in the community.

The Defense Case

Defendant testified in his own behalf. He admitted that since coming to California in 1976, he has twice been convicted of sexual assaults, as well as of writing bad checks, failing to register, drug possession, falsely identifying himself to a police officer and parole violations. Defendant testified that he committed the 1980 rape after he had been drinking for three days. He admitted thinking at the time, “well, you are going to jail anyway, you know, so you might as well go to jail for something.” So he raped the girl, handed her the knife, and ran away to hide. He admitted he committed both rapes at knife point. He admitted that he lied under oath in 2000 when he testified that he did not rape the victims.

When he was on parole, he met Pastors Carlos, Cooke and Davis and stayed in a Christian group home for three years, eventually becoming its director. However, one of the pastors “did something that really hurt[]” him, and he left the home and returned to using drugs and eventually committed another sexual assault.

Defendant admitted that he beat two women who were drug users. However, now, “if I got into a situation where my woman bought some drugs, I think I would call someone to say, look man, I got a problem….”

Defendant explained that the incident at the hospital in which he yelled at a staff member occurred when he thought a 300-pound man was about to hit him. He later apologized to the staff member. He explained that he took the OxyContin pill because he was in pain. He didn’t ask a doctor for pain medication because the doctors always think the patients are faking. He wasn’t thinking correctly, but he “didn’t harm nobody.” Drinking the pruno was “just … a bad choice.”

Defendant admitted that he “had been using methamphetamine, amphetamine and alcohol while in the Atascadero State Hospital” in 2005, but he explained that someone put methamphetamine and alcohol in his coffee cup without his knowledge. He testified that he “never did no methamphetamine [before]. That was the first time I ever experienced it.” However, he admitted that he told a probation officer in 1993 that he was using methamphetamine once a month, and that when he had testified “a minute ago … [he] wasn’t very accurate.”

Defendant testified that he knows in his heart he has changed because he is asking for help: “I have done enough time to realize that this life I was living wasn’t right. I still make mistakes. I still put myself in predicament that I can be hurt or hurt someone. But I know I have changed in the time I have been locked up.” He now knows that what he did to his victims was wrong. “I looked at the situation as something I never want to do again.” The reason he has not participated in the hospital’s sex offender program is that the program “don’t cure you”; no one has been released from the program since it started in 1996; and “they want us to sign some forms that say we are sex offender(s). … [I]f you don’t sign this form, you can’t get in the program.” However, defendant believes: “I did sex crime [sic], but I’m not a sex offender.” He does not have sexual fantasies or urges about inappropriate partners. Defendant believes he has “enough” that he can go out into the community. He wants to go into a Christian group home. He can get a job with his friend Ralph Neal. He understands that he needs to get into programs such as A.A. or N.A. that he can find on the streets. He has good intentions and does not want to go down the same road again. He has found out with age that if you tell the truth, “everything will be okay.” He doesn’t lie like he used to lie, just to get out of things. Defendant knows he can live in society. “I’m not a bad person, but I made bad choices. That’s all I did. And I didn’t mean it to hurt no one. I didn’t stab them. I just made bad choices.”

Calvin Cook has felony convictions for the sale and possession of cocaine from the late 1970’s, but he has been a pastor of local churches for the last 24 years. He is currently affiliated with the Wings of Eagles sober living environment. He met defendant in the mid 1980’s when defendant came to the Vineyard New Life Training Center, of which he eventually became a very effective director. Pastor Cook knows of defendant’s criminal and drug history and he is willing to offer defendant support if he is released. He could get defendant into the Wings of Eagles’ men’s home, where drug testing is mandatory every other day and a 12-step program is available. He could also help defendant get into anger management, domestic violence, life skills and biblical training.

Ralph Bendel Neal is a janitorial contractor and employed defendant to work for him in his janitorial business in the early 1990’s. If defendant were to be released, Mr. Neal could offer him a job and housing, “as well as a structured environment that would regulate his activities on a daily basis.”

DISCUSSION

Instructional Error

Defendant contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury “regarding its duty to consider evidence of [defendant’s] amenability to voluntary treatment in determining the likelihood of his re-offending.” Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court was required in this case to give the bracketed fourth paragraph of CALCRIM 3454 which states: “It is necessary to keep (him/her) in custody in a secure facility to ensure the health and safety of others.” (See Judicial Council of Cal. Crim. Jury Instns. (2006) CALCRIM No. 3454, ¶ 4.) Such an instruction is warranted where evidence is presented that defendant is amenable to voluntary treatment. (People v. Grassini (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 765, 777; People v. Calderon (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 80, 92-93.) “We conduct independent review of issues pertaining to instructions.” (People v. Cooksey (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1411.)

In this case the jury was instructed with the first three paragraphs of CALCRIM 3454 which provide, in relevant part: “The petition alleges that is a sexually violent predator. [¶] To prove this allegation, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: [¶] 1 (He/She) has been convicted of committing sexually violent offenses against one or more victims; [¶] 2 (He/She) has a diagnosed mental disorder; [AND] [¶] 3 As a result of that diagnosed mental disorder, (he/she) is a danger to the health and safety of others because it is likely that (he/she) will engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.”

Defendant argues that the following evidence supported such an instruction. Dr. Reed testified that defendant reported attending some meetings of Phase 1 of the sexual treatment program as well as anger management groups, and that he had begun to see how anger was a factor in his sexual offenses. Defendant admitted responsibility for the rapes and expressed remorse, whereas previously he had lied to a jury about his involvement because he was unwilling to take responsibility. Defendant testified that the 1980 rape was preceded by a three-day drinking binge, and that drugs and alcohol were involved in 1987. Defendant testified that he had become wiser and more self-reflective with age. Dr. Reed testified that some studies showed a reduction in the risk of recidivism between the ages of 40 to 60, and she agreed defendant’s age of 50 somewhat reduced his risk. Pastor Cook also believed that defendant had become more mature with age and more accepting of responsibility for his actions. Defendant testified he believed he had changed. If released, he would live in a Christian group home and would seek out A.A. and N.A. programs. Pastor Cook would help defendant get into a sober living environment that had a 12-step program and drug testing, and would also help him get anger management, domestic violence, life skills and bible training. Mr. Neal would provide a job and further support. Dr. Reed had seen positive motivational progress, as evidenced by defendant’s development of a 12-step program with another patient, and a shift in defendant’s attitude toward supervision.

In our view, the evidence outlined above did not give rise to a reasonable inference that defendant was amenable to receiving treatment for the mental disorder of paraphilia with nonconsenting women on a voluntary basis. People v. Grassini, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 765, is instructive. In that case, significant evidence was developed at trial to show that the defendant would be amenable to treatment for his pedophilia if he were to be released. Prison records showed that he had participated in all the various types of therapy offered while he was incarcerated. (Id. at p. 770) Called as a prosecution witness, the defendant “acknowledged his need for lifelong therapy because he was a pedophile. Although he previously had reoffended while he was on outpatient therapy, he had learned to take therapy seriously. He realized he needed to completely stay away from children and, if he had thoughts about boys, to actively redirect his thoughts, because these thoughts would not ‘just go[] away.’ He asserted that he was willing to take anti-androgens, known as ‘chemical castration,’ to lower his sexual drive, although he was aware of the significant potential side effects of such treatment.” (Id. at p. 773.)

The record in this case contains nothing remotely similar. On the contrary, the relevant evidence on the question of defendant’s amenability to treatment uniformly demonstrated that he was not amenable to sex offender treatment. Defendant had consistently refused to participate in the sex offender treatment offered at the hospital. Among his stated reasons for refusing to do so was that participation in the program was conditioned on his signing a form acknowledging he was a sex offender, and defendant did not believe he was a sex offender. He was merely someone who had made bad choices. After six years in the hospital, he had finally attended one of the Phase 1 meetings, but Phase 1 is informational only.

At most, the evidence to which defendant points suggests he was willing to treat his substance abuse problems. However, defendant has not been involuntarily committed because he is an alcoholic or a drug addict, but a sex offender, and the relevant treatment contemplated by the instruction required by Grassini is sex offender treatment. With respect to that type of voluntary treatment, defendant has “failed to provide positive evidence in the record as to his amenability.” (People v. Calderon, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 93.) Therefore, we hold that evidence of amenability to voluntary alcohol and/or drug treatment alone does not warrant the Grassini-inspired instruction proffered by defendant on appeal here.

Due Process Violation

In a second argument, defendant recasts his first argument as a due process violation. Defendant asserts that because the jury was not instructed to consider whether it is necessary to keep him in custody in a secure facility to ensure the health and safety of others, he was deprived of his “substantive due process right to the jury’s factual determination of the likelihood of his future dangerousness that included a consideration of the evidence that he is amenable to voluntary treatment.” Furthermore, defendant’s procedural due process rights were violated because the trial court’s instruction improperly described or omitted “a statutory element required to be proven by the prosecution.”

As noted above, the trial court properly instructed the jury to decide whether the prosecution had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that as a result of a diagnosed mental disorder, defendant posed a danger to the health and safety of others because it is likely that he will engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior. This instruction adequately informed the jury of the necessary finding of future dangerousness and satisfied the constitutional concern that there be proof of future dangerousness before a person is subjected to involuntary civil commitment. (Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346; Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138.) We have already determined that no further instruction was required because no evidence was presented to show that defendant was amenable to treatment for paraphilia on a voluntary basis. Nevertheless, the jury was also instructed to consider “all of the evidence introduced in this case” and nothing limited the jury’s consideration of defendant’s proferred evidence on the question of his future dangerousness. No due process violation occurred.

CONCLUSION

The trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury to decide whether it was necessary to keep defendant in a secure facility to ensure the safety of others. Due process was not violated by the court’s instruction as given.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Duffy, J.


Summaries of

People v. Norris

California Court of Appeals, Sixth District
Mar 21, 2008
No. H030580 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Norris

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTHONY NORRIS, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Sixth District

Date published: Mar 21, 2008

Citations

No. H030580 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2008)