Opinion
H050147
08-08-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL ANTHONY NIETO, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 19CR008330
DANNER, J.
Defendant Paul Anthony Nieto pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine for sale, misdemeanor possession of controlled substance paraphernalia, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance without a prescription. Prior to the plea, the trial court decided Nieto's motion to suppress evidence found in his car at the time of his arrest. Based on testimony presented at a combined preliminary hearing and hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, the court denied Nieto's motion and held him to answer. Subsequently, the court denied a Penal Code section 995 motion in which Nieto renewed his arguments for suppression of evidence.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, Nieto claims the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. Nieto contends the court improperly considered testimony concerning his criminal history when finding sufficient probable cause. He asserts further that his brief presence at a known drug house did not establish probable cause to search his car.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
In August 2019, the Monterey County District Attorney filed a complaint charging Nieto with felony possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health &Saf. Code, § 11378; count 1), misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia used for unlawfully injecting or smoking a controlled substance (Health &Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a); count 2), and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (promethazine) without a prescription (Bus. &Prof. Code, § 4060; count 3). As to count 1, the district attorney alleged that Nieto had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) for his July 2014 convictions in Monterey County for firearm possession (§ 29800), unlawfully taking or driving another's vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851), and possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health &Saf. Code, § 11378).
In September 2020, Nieto filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 (hereafter suppression motion). Nieto asserted "[t]he pertinent facts are that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion for the search of the vehicle that Mr. Nieto was driving as the search of the car and items contained therein was conducted without a warrant."
In November 2020, the district attorney filed an opposition to Nieto's suppression motion. The district attorney asserted that the police lawfully detained Nieto based on information concerning an outstanding warrant and, further, had probable cause to search Nieto's car based on his visit to an apartment at which drug dealing was suspected and information about his "prior criminal history, including convictions for drug related crimes and illegal drug sales."
In February 2021, the trial court concurrently heard evidence pertaining to the preliminary hearing and the suppression motion. Thereafter, Nieto and the district attorney filed additional briefing on the suppression motion. Later that month, the trial court denied Nieto's suppression motion and held him to answer for the charged offenses.
In March 2021, the district attorney filed an information charging Nieto with the same crimes that were alleged in the complaint.
The information did not include the prior prison term allegation included in the complaint. The law governing prior prison term enhancements changed after the complaint was filed. (See Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1 [Sen. Bill No. 136; eff. Jan. 1, 2020].)
Nieto filed a motion to set aside the information under section 995 (hereafter 995 motion), renewing his argument for the suppression of evidence. The district attorney opposed that motion.
In June 2021, the trial court (through a different bench officer) considered the written and oral arguments of the parties and denied Nieto's 995 motion.
On October 26, 2021, Nieto pleaded no contest to all counts alleged in the information on the condition of placement on formal felony probation.
On June 16, 2022, the trial court found that unusual circumstances exist to justify a grant of formal probation. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Nieto on probation for two years with various terms and conditions, including that he serve 365 days in county jail.
Nieto timely filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his suppression motion (see § 1538.5, subd. (m); People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1096; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2)(A)).
B. Background on the Search and Seizure and Nieto's Suppression Motion
1. Search and Seizure
On the afternoon of April 24, 2019, while working with the Peninsula Regional Violence Narcotics Team (PRVNT), Carmel Police Department Detective Jacob Clifford surveilled an apartment on Carmel Avenue in Marina, California. The police suspected drugs were being sold at the apartment. They had previously obtained a search warrant and were surveilling the apartment in preparation for execution of the warrant.
During an approximately one-hour period of surveillance, Detective Clifford and his fellow task force officers observed three or four vehicles arrive. People exited those vehicles and visited the apartment briefly. Detective Clifford (who testified as an expert on the sale of narcotics) opined that "based on [his] training and experience, a house that's operating drug sales [sic] has visitor traffic that's similar to what [the police here] observed."
During the surveillance, Nieto arrived at the apartment in a blue BMW, entered the apartment, and, like the other visitors, remained inside for less than 10 minutes. Based on "previous knowledge," Seaside Police Department Detective David Dillon recognized Nieto as he was leaving the apartment and saw Nieto drive away. Dillon testified that he could not recall whether he had "had any [prior] personal contacts with" Nieto but, through Dillon's work on PRVNT, he "was aware" of Nieto. Dillon explained further that he had "heard [Nieto's] name before" and had "heard his name around." Dillon's "knowledge of [Nieto] was that he was involved in the drug realm." Dillon believed that he had not previously reviewed Nieto's "RAP sheet" (criminal history information) but "had knowledge that he possibly had a warrant outstanding."
Over defense objections, the trial court admitted Detective Dillon's testimony about having heard Nieto's name previously and knowing that Nieto was involved in the "drug realm" for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining Dillon's "state of mind and subsequent actions."
Upon seeing Nieto drive away, Dillon or another detective who was with Dillon contacted dispatch and requested a warrant check on Nieto. Dillon testified that "it was told to us that they did have a misdemeanor warrant hit for [Nieto]."
The PRVNT detectives asked Marina Police Department Officer Richard Moreno to conduct a traffic stop on Nieto's BMW. They told Moreno that Nieto had a warrant for his arrest. As the detectives were relaying information to Officer Moreno, Moreno saw Nieto pass him on Carmel Avenue. Moreno effected a traffic stop on Nieto's car about half a mile from the apartment. The police stopped only Nieto's car; they did not stop any of the other vehicles that had visited the apartment during the surveillance.
Detective Clifford traveled to the scene of the traffic stop. Clifford testified that he "did not personally know Mr. Nieto or his history." However, on the way to the traffic stop, PRVNT detectives advised Clifford "that Mr. Nieto has a long criminal history of drug charges." Clifford explained further that he "was advised by . . . three different senior detectives that [Nieto] has a long history of drug charges, convictions for drug sales, and the like." On cross-examination, Clifford further testified that three Marina Police Department detectives (two of whom were "very experienced" and "previous PRVNT detectives") had informed him about Nieto's criminal record as they drove to the scene of the traffic stop. In addition, on the way, Clifford received a phone call "from whoever the supervisor was that day, who also gave [Clifford] a profile of the person [he] was about to contact." Clifford testified that he could not recall who the supervisor was and described the information provided as "[c]onvictions for drug sales, not dates or specific cases."
Nieto's defense counsel objected to Detective Clifford's mention of "the criminal history" on relevance grounds. The trial court overruled that objection.
Defense counsel objected to this testimony on hearsay grounds. The trial court overruled the objection "to the extent that it would be offered as non[-]hearsay" related to Detective Clifford's state of mind and subsequent actions.
After stopping Nieto, Marina police officers escorted Nieto out of his car, told him he had an outstanding warrant for his arrest, handcuffed him, and arrested him based on the warrant. Detective Clifford asked Nieto to confirm his name. Officers then searched Nieto's body and found his cell phone and birth certificate, "further confirming his identity." Clifford told Nieto that he (Clifford) "was there because of the arrest warrant, and that [Clifford] would be conducting a search of [Nieto's] vehicle." Further, on crossexamination, Clifford acknowledged having told Nieto that he (Clifford) was going to search Nieto's car to try to find identification. In addition, Clifford recalled having said that Nieto was "being cool and cooperative" with Clifford and the other officers during the stop.
Detective Clifford searched Nieto's car. After searching for about five minutes, Clifford found a digital scale (which had "a dry, white crystally [sic] residue" on it) inside a zippered case in the back seat. Clifford also found two cell phones on the driver's seat, a methamphetamine pipe in a jacket, and another digital scale and "about half an ounce of crystalline methamphetamine" (i.e., 18.28 grams or about 90 doses) in a jacket on the front seat.
After he stopped Nieto's car, Officer Moreno (along with his narcotics-trained dog) traveled to the apartment and, pursuant to the previously obtained search warrant, participated in searches of the apartment and a vehicle parked outside. Moreno did not find any items "of criminal value" inside the apartment or "any items of criminal activity in that car." Further, Detective Dillon testified that the resident of the apartment who was the target of the search was arrested for "more than one" offense, including possession of drug paraphernalia.
Later, Detectives Clifford and Dillon interviewed Nieto (who waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436). Detective Clifford testified that Nieto "boasted about his past drug trafficking, about, you know, that he wasn't really a streetlevel dealer. He . . . described himself as a more . . . mid-level or high-level trafficker of narcotics. Mr. Nieto did admit to selling meth shortly after being released from jail, but said that he wasn't currently selling methamphetamine." Detective Dillon similarly testified that Nieto admitted that the methamphetamine pipe found in the BMW was his. He also admitted that he possessed the methamphetamine found in the jacket but claimed it was not his. Nieto "more or less" said that he "doesn't sling dope or sell small quantities. He, more or less, pushes dope in larger quantities."
The police obtained a warrant to search the three seized cell phones. They found "a number of text messages between Mr. Nieto . . . and multiple unknown other persons about the sale of narcotics."
2. Nieto's Suppression Motion
After taking evidence at the combined preliminary hearing and hearing on the suppression motion, the trial court heard oral argument from counsel about the stop and search of Nieto's car.
Nieto's defense counsel stipulated that Nieto was not challenging the stop itself. The district attorney argued that Detective Clifford had probable cause to search Nieto's car based on the facts and information available to him at the time that he conducted the search. Defense counsel countered, relying on People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353 (Lopez), which overruled In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60, that the police could no longer search a vehicle "strictly for the purposes of recovering identification." Counsel further asserted that Nieto was "merely present at the scene of a location that was suspected for drug activity, but [] there is no specific evidence that it was a place of drug activity." In addition, relying on Remers v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 659 (Remers), counsel argued that "with respect to any testimony of [Nieto's] prior criminal record, it wasn't complete. It wasn't sufficient information concerning it, nor is it relevant."
Lopez was decided on November 25, 2019, seven months after the police searched Nieto's car.
Considering the oral arguments, the trial court permitted counsel for the parties to submit additional briefing on the suppression motion. In her supplemental briefing, the district attorney asserted that "[b]ased on the current case law at the time of the stop, Detective Clifford lawfully searched [] [Nieto]'s car for identification." Additionally, relying on People v. Banks (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d. 1358 (Banks) and People v. Ingram (1995) 16 Cal.App.4th 1745, the district attorney asserted that Detective Clifford had probable cause to search the car because he had "knowledge that the PRVNT detectives had already secured probable cause to search the home for drug related activity, combined with the suspicious behavior that Detective Clifford saw that was consistent with drug activity, as well as the knowledge of [] [Nieto]'s prior contacts and activities provided by other law enforcement officers."
In his supplemental briefing, Nieto argued that the search of his car violated Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332 (Gant), his presence at the apartment was an insufficient basis to search his car, and the information about his alleged criminal history possessed by the officers did not provide probable cause in whole or in part.
In Gant, the United States Supreme Court held that New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454 "does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle." (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 335.)
After hearing further oral argument from counsel, the trial court denied Nieto's suppression motion. The court found that, akin to the circumstances in Banks and Ingram, Nieto "was exhibiting behavior consistent with drug dealing at a residence known for drug trafficking" and "was stopped shortly after leaving the house and within half a mile." The court also found that the information Detective Clifford had received from other detectives about Nieto's history of drug charges and convictions for drug sales was not a "necessary fact or piece of information for [Detective] Clifford to have in the totality of the circumstances. But given the high probable cause that was established through Mr. Nieto's behavior, however, the [c]ourt does note that it was more than mere knowledge of a prior criminal history. [Detective] Clifford obtained information that Mr. Nieto was known for the same type of activity, that is, drug dealing, that was the basis for the [apartment's] search warrant being authorized." The court noted that People v. Buchanan (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 274 (Buchanan) held "that such knowledge can be considered to some degree as corroborative to other facts forming the basis for the probable cause." The court explained further that even without the information regarding Nieto's prior activities, "the [c]ourt, given Detective Clifford's training and experience in drug trafficking together with the observations of Mr. Nieto, does find that there was sufficient probable cause to believe that there was evidence of a crime inside of his vehicle; to wit, drugs."
Regarding whether the search was justified as an attempt to locate Nieto's identification, the trial court said: "I'm not sure that we have to get there because again the [c]ourt does find that there was probable cause to search the vehicle." The court further noted that it did not "believe that the officers were [] necessarily relying on this exception. If they were, then again the Lopez case had not been decided at that particular point in time." In addition, the court found that Gant did not apply to the present circumstances because the search of Nieto's car was not a search conducted incident to his arrest.
In sum, the trial court concluded: "The [c]ourt does find that the search in this case was reasonable under the circumstances and based upon probable cause."
Thereafter, a different bench officer of the trial court denied Nieto's 995 motion that reasserted his arguments for the suppression of evidence.
II. DISCUSSION
Nieto argues that the trial court should have granted his suppression motion because the police did not have probable cause to search his car. Nieto asserts that the trial court found probable cause "only after considering impermissible hearsay evidence." Namely, "the trial court relied on testimony about [Nieto]'s criminal history, from officers who had never arrested [him], had not reviewed his rap sheet, and could not identify who they obtained such information from." Nieto further asserts that his brief presence at a known drug house, without more, is insufficient to establish probable cause. In addition, Nieto contends the trial court properly concluded that the search of his car was not justified as a search incident to his arrest or as an effort to locate his identification.
The Attorney General responds that regardless whether there was justification to search Nieto's car incident to his arrest or for the purpose of locating his identification, the trial court properly denied Nieto's suppression motion because the police had probable cause to search his car based solely on their observations of his visit to the apartment. The Attorney General further asserts that, notwithstanding the existence of probable cause even without considering Nieto's history of selling drugs, the trial court properly admitted evidence about Nieto's criminal history and such evidence further corroborates a belief that Nieto's car contained contraband or evidence of a crime.
Because the Attorney General does not rely on "the Gant or In re Arturo D. exceptions to the warrant requirement," we do not address them and assume arguendo that they do not apply under the circumstances of this case.
A. Standard of Review
As discussed ante, Nieto filed a suppression motion prior to his preliminary hearing. After the trial court (i.e., a magistrate) denied that motion, Nieto reasserted his arguments for suppression of evidence in a 995 motion."' "[I]n proceedings under [Penal Code] section 995 it is the magistrate who is the finder of fact; the superior court . . . sits merely as a reviewing court; it . . . cannot substitute its judgment as to the credibility or weight of the evidence for that of the magistrate. [Citation.] On review by appeal or writ, moreover, the appellate court in effect disregards the ruling of the superior court and directly reviews the determination of the magistrate." '" (People v. Hall (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 946, 951 (Hall).) "Thus, we disregard the lower court's rationale for denying the motion to set aside the information and directly review the court's ruling at the preliminary hearing denying [the defendant]'s motion to suppress." (Ibid.; see also People v. Hawkins (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 194, 203.)
"The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well established." (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)" 'We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.' [Citation.] We determine probable cause considering the totality of the circumstances. [Citation.] We may affirm the ruling if it is correct on any theory, even if the trial court's reasoning was incorrect." (Hall, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 951-952; see also People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 941-942 (Romeo).)
B. Legal Principles
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees individuals the "right . . . to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) A defendant may move to suppress evidence on the ground that a warrantless search or seizure was unreasonable. (§ 1538.5, subds. (a)(1)(A), (f); see also People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 528-529; § 995, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
"The California Constitution similarly protects the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches.' (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) But under the so-called truth-in-evidence provision of the state Constitution,' "issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional standards." '" (People v. McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal.5th 429, 437, fn. 2.)
"Warrantless searches are 'per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' [Citations.] One such exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception, which allows for warrantless searches of automobiles where an officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. [Citations.] Probable cause to search exists 'where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a [person] of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.' [Citation.] An officer who has probable cause to search pursuant to the automobile exception may then conduct a probing search of all 'compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are not in plain view.'" (People v. Moore (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 291, 297 (Moore).) "The prosecution bears the burden of establishing an exception applies." (Hall, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 951; see Romeo, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 939.)
"As the United Stated Supreme Court has noted, 'probable cause is a fluid concept -- turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts -- not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.' [Citation.] Further, '[a]n officer is entitled to rely on his [or her] training and experience in drawing inferences from the facts he [or she] observes, but those inferences must also "be grounded in objective facts and be capable of rational explanation."' [Citations.] When considering the validity of the evidence, it is to be analyzed' "as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement."' [Citations.] 'The principal components of a determination of . . . probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount . . . to probable cause.' [Citation.] As such, we consider the totality of the circumstances, and analyze these facts as would a reasonable police officer, in assessing the officer's probable cause, rather than looking to singular facts in a vacuum." (Moore, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 297-298.)
"[A] person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person." (Ybarra v. Illinois (1979) 444 U.S. 85, 91.) "However, a single contact with a residence where drug activity is ongoing, when coupled with 'other suspicion of the person in question may together amount to probable cause.' [Citation.] In Ybarra, the court identified several factors which might justify a search of a person merely present at a place where a search warrant is being executed. Among those considerations were when officers observed 'gestures indicative of criminal conduct' or 'movements that might suggest an attempt to conceal contraband.'" (Banks, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1363; cf. Ybarra, at p. 91 ["the agents knew nothing in particular about Ybarra"]; id. at p. 93 [and did not recognize him as "a person with a criminal history"].)
"It is well settled that while it may be perfectly reasonable for officers in the field to make arrests on the basis of information furnished to them by other officers, 'when it comes to justifying the total police activity in a court, the People must prove that the source of the information is something other than the imagination of an officer who does not become a witness.' [Citations.] To hold otherwise would permit the manufacture of reasonable grounds for arrest within a police department by one officer transmitting information purportedly known by him to another officer who did not know such information, without establishing under oath how the information had in fact been obtained by the former officer." (Remers, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 666-667.)
Additionally, "[u]nder California law, a suspect's narcotic arrest record always has been considered relevant to the magistrate's determination of probable cause. [Citations.] The defendant's arrest and conviction record is no less relevant under the totality-of-the-circumstances test." (People v. Aho (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 984, 992.) "The officer's knowledge of [the defendant]'s prior activities would not, alone, provide probable cause for his arrest [citations], particularly where the People have not shown the reliability of the sources of the information [citation]. However, that knowledge can be used, in connection with other information, to support a finding of probable cause for arrest." (People v. Martin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 687, 692, fn. 5, citing Remers, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 668.)
C. Analysis
Nieto contends that the trial court "relied on inadmissible hearsay concerning [his] criminal history when deciding if probable cause existed." He asserts that neither Detective Clifford nor Detective Dillon "were able to identify the source of their information" and, thus, the trial court should have sustained defense counsel's objections to their testimony and required the prosecutor to call the source of their information as a witness. Nieto acknowledges that "some cases have allowed the use of hearsay to prove an officer's state of mind when the legality of police conduct is in issue." Nevertheless, he maintains that those cases are distinguishable because "the information about [Nieto's] criminal history came from unidentified officers who did not testify under oath about how they knew such information." In addition, Nieto contends that Buchanan, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d 274 "does not support the trial court's consideration of impermissible hearsay related to [his] criminal history as an ingredient in the probable cause equation. Based on Harvey, Madden, and Remers, the hearsay evidence was inadmissible and should have not been considered."
See, e.g., People v. King (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 1, 5 ["[E]xtrajudicial statements were offered in evidence not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to establish probable cause to effect the search and seizure. The truth of the information given to [the police officer] was not in issue, nor was it offered in evidence to prove any element of the offense against the appellant. The evidence in question was offered solely to establish that the officer had reasonable or probable cause to effect the search and seizure."].
People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516.
People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017.
The trial court here found probable cause without relying on Nieto's criminal history. But this information was relevant and its use appropriate in determining whether Detective Clifford had probable cause to search Nieto's car.
"[A]n officer may generally depend on information received in official channels to develop probable cause either for a search warrant affidavit or a search or arrest without warrant." (People v. Lopez (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 842, 845.) "The Remers-Harvey-Madden rule only requires prosecution proof that information justifying the arrest [or search] was actually given to the police officer who furnished it to the arresting officer, i.e., proof that the source of the information on which the arrest [or search] was based was' "something other than the imagination of an officer"' who did not testify." (People v. Armstrong (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 228, 245-246.)
Here, there was sufficient evidence establishing the veracity of the criminal history information about Nieto that nontestifying officers provided to Detective Clifford. The evidence showed Clifford's awareness that Detective Dillon (a PRVNT member) had recognized Nieto as he was leaving the apartment (which was about to be searched due to suspected drug dealing) and had confirmed through dispatch that Nieto had an outstanding misdemeanor warrant. Detective Dillon corroborated this evidence, testifying that, based on his prior experience, he knew Nieto "was involved in the drug realm" and "possibly had a warrant outstanding" (which was subsequently confirmed by dispatch). In addition, three Marina Police Department detectives with PRVNT told Clifford that Nieto had "a long history of drug charges, convictions for drug sales, and the like." Similarly, an unidentified supervisor called Clifford and provided him "a profile" of Nieto that included general information regarding his convictions for drug sales.
Detective Clifford testified on cross-examination about the phone call from his supervisor. Nieto's defense counsel did not object to that testimony.
These consistent circumstances support a reasonable inference that the criminal history information provided to Detective Clifford by unnamed law enforcement officers was not derived from" 'the imagination of an officer'" and did not involve "the manufacture of reasonable grounds for [the search]." (Remers, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 666.) "When the judiciary can reasonably determine that no evidence has been manufactured, there is no reason for strict compliance with the letter of the 'Harvey-Madden' rule." (In re Richard G. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1260; see also People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 982-983.) On the record before us, we conclude that, under the Remers-Harvey-Madden rule, the trial court properly admitted the evidence of Nieto's criminal history without further proof from the unnamed transmitting officers and could rely on that evidence in denying Nieto's suppression motion.
Having decided that the information concerning Nieto's criminal history can be considered to determine whether Detective Clifford had probable cause to search Nieto's car, we need not address Nieto's claim that his brief presence at the apartment (without considering his criminal history) did not provide sufficient probable cause to search his car. Additionally, irrespective of that claim, we conclude that the totality of the properly admitted evidence demonstrates the existence of probable cause to search Nieto's car.
Detective Clifford's knowledge about Nieto's criminal history, coupled with Nieto's visit to the apartment while it was under surveillance in anticipation of the execution of a search warrant based on suspected drug dealing and Clifford's training and experience regarding drug trafficking, support a finding that a reasonable officer would believe drugs or other evidence of a crime would be found in Nieto's car shortly after he left the apartment. Accordingly, on the present record, we conclude that the search of Nieto's car was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We thus uphold the trial court's denial of Nieto's suppression motion.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Wilson, J.