Opinion
8136 Ind. 5911/07
01-17-2019
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Mohamed MUSAID, Defendant–Appellant.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (John Vang of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Ellen Stanfield Friedman of counsel), for respondent.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (John Vang of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Ellen Stanfield Friedman of counsel), for respondent.
Renwick, J.P., Manzanet–Daniels, Gische, Mazzarelli, Kahn, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro, J.), rendered April 12, 2016, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and sentencing him to consecutive terms of 25 years to life and 5 years, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly found defendant fit to proceed to trial following CPL article 730 examinations. The ultimate expert findings, and defendant's statements, showed that he "evinced an understanding of the purpose of a trial, the actors in a trial, their roles, the nature of the charges against him, and the severity of a potential conviction and sentence" ( People v. Phillips, 16 N.Y.3d 510, 518, 924 N.Y.S.2d 4, 948 N.E.2d 428 [2011] ). Despite defendant's claims of innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence of his guilt, the most recent set of expert reports provided "no indication that [he] was unable to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense" ( People v. Snyder, 29 A.D.3d 310, 310, 813 N.Y.S.2d 433 [1st Dept. 2006], lv denied 7 N.Y.3d 818, 822 N.Y.S.2d 493, 855 N.E.2d 809 [2006] ). Although defendant engaged in some conspiratorial thinking, this did not render him unfit in light of his general understanding of the proceedings (see e.g. People v. Jackson, 39 A.D.3d 394, 394, 835 N.Y.S.2d 77 [1st Dept. 2007], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 845, 840 N.Y.S.2d 772, 872 N.E.2d 885 [2007], cert denied 553 U.S. 1011, 128 S.Ct. 2068, 170 L.Ed.2d 805 [2008] ). "The court reasonably credited experts who found that defendant's psychiatric symptoms had been alleviated by compliance with his medication regimen, thus rendering his past history an unreliable indicator of his present competency" ( People v. Breckenridge, 162 A.D.3d 425, 426, 79 N.Y.S.3d 122 [1st Dept. 2018], appeal dismissed 32 N.Y.3d 1072, 88 N.Y.S.3d 412, 113 N.E.3d 468, 2018 N.Y. Slip. Op. 88505 [2018] ). We also find that there was nothing in defendant's behavior during trial that obligated the court to order yet another examination, sua sponte.
Having found defendant competent to stand trial, the court properly permitted him to decline to assert an insanity defense (see People v. Ciborowski, 302 A.D.2d 620, 622, 755 N.Y.S.2d 113 [3d Dept. 2003], lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 579, 764 N.Y.S.2d 389, 796 N.E.2d 481 [2003] ). The court was not required to conduct an inquiry analogous to the procedure for accepting a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel (see People v. Petrovich, 87 N.Y.2d 961, 964, 641 N.Y.S.2d 592, 664 N.E.2d 503 [1996] ). In any event, "[t]he court fully informed defendant of his right to raise the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect and defendant knowingly chose not to assert such a defense" ( Ciborowski, 302 A.D.2d at 622, 755 N.Y.S.2d 113 ).
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.