Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 07F00098
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
Defendant Cletis Lamont Murdock was convicted of possession of cocaine base. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350.) The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred in denying defendant’s Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence seized after he was detained. We conclude that there was no error and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the combined preliminary hearing and hearing on the motion to suppress evidence.
In January 2007, at approximately 9:30 p.m., police officers Jeffrey Rath and Brian Bell saw defendant jaywalk across Center Parkway towards a convenience store, in violation of Sacramento City Code section 10.20.020, which prohibits pedestrians from crossing a street within 300 feet of a crosswalk. Officer Rath got out of his patrol car and approached defendant, who was in front of the convenience store, to contact him about the infraction.
This court granted defendant’s request for judicial notice of Sacramento City Code section 10.20.020. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.)
Defendant behaved suspiciously during the contact -- backing away from the officer as if he were going to run away, and acting as if he did not want to be contacted by police. For his safety, Officer Rath began frisking defendant for weapons and asked him for identification. During the frisk, the officer felt what he believed to be a cell phone. He asked defendant if he could retrieve it to verify it was a phone and defendant gave him permission to do so. When Officer Rath removed the phone from defendant’s pocket, $207 in cash also came out. Officer Rath continued the frisk and felt what he believed to be another cell phone. Officer Rath asked if he could retrieve it to verify it was a phone and defendant said “no.”
At that point, defendant told Officer Rath his name and said he had identification. Defendant stepped away from the officer and reached toward his back pocket, but then told the officer he was unable to locate his identification in his wallet.
Based on the infraction, defendant’s suspicious behavior, and the high crime location, Officer Rath placed defendant in handcuffs and detained him in the police car until he could be identified. While the officers were trying to identify defendant through their system, they heard defendant moving around in an abnormal manner. Officer Rath got out of the car to check on defendant and saw defendant drop a clear plastic baggie containing what appeared to be rock cocaine onto the seat.
The officers then arrested defendant for possession of a controlled substance. In the subsequent search incident to arrest, the officers located a second baggie containing a larger quantity of what appeared to be rock cocaine, secreted in the top of defendant’s underwear.
Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the narcotics, packaging, cash, and his subsequent statements to the officers. (CT 15) The court found that the detention and patdown search were constitutional and denied defendant’s motion.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure. [Citation.]” (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922.)
II.
Initial Stop
Defendant contends his motion to suppress should have been granted because the initial stop was not justified. He was unlawfully detained because the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that he had jaywalked at the time of the stop. We disagree.
Defendant does not dispute that he crossed the street within 300 feet of a crosswalk, which is jaywalking in violation of Sacramento City Code section 10.20.020. Instead, he argues that the officers did not know he had done so at the time of the stop. He bases his argument on Officer Rath’s testimony that he went back and measured the distance from the crosswalk with his Global Positioning System (GPS) the day before the suppression hearing. From this, defendant deduces that the officer had no reason to believe he had crossed within 300 feet until the day before the hearing. Defendant’s reasoning is flawed and contrary to the evidence presented at the hearing.
Officer Rath testified at the hearing that he observed defendant cross the street within 300 feet of the crosswalk. As the trial court noted, “300 feet is the length of a football field without end zones, of course, and so it’s not such a hard thing to imagine. [Officer Rath] said it was within the 300 feet. That’s a violation. He had the right to contact him.” The fact that the officer went back and measured the precise distance the day before the hearing does not, in any way, establish the officer did not know defendant crossed within 300 feet of the crosswalk until that time. Indeed, no one elicited from the officer the actual distance he measured or whether it was even close to the outer limit of 300 feet. Thus, the evidence established that the stop was justified.
III.
Prolonged Detention
Defendant next contends that the detention went beyond the scope necessary for the offense. He argues that, even though he was unable to produce satisfactory identification, the officers were required to cite and release him, without detaining him to verify his identity. Thus, he concludes, the cocaine discovered during the detention must be suppressed. He is wrong.
Penal Code section 853.5, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part: “Except as otherwise provided by law, in any case in which a person is arrested for an offense declared to be an infraction, the person may be released according to the procedures set forth by this chapter for the release of persons arrested for an offense declared to be a misdemeanor. In all cases, except as specified in Sections 40302, 40303, 40305, and 40305.5 of the Vehicle Code, in which a person is arrested for an infraction, a peace officer shall only require the arrestee to present his or her driver’s license or other satisfactory evidence of his or her identity for examination and to sign a written promise to appear contained in a notice to appear. If the arrestee does not have a driver’s license or other satisfactory evidence of identity in his or her possession, the officer may require the arrestee to place a right thumbprint, or a left thumbprint or fingerprint if the person has a missing or disfigured right thumb, on the notice to appear. . . . Only if the arrestee refuses to sign a written promise, has no satisfactory identification, or refuses to provide a thumbprint or fingerprint may the arrestee be taken into custody.” (Italics added.)
Under this section dealing with arrest for an infraction, acceptance of a thumbprint in lieu of identification in order to be released is permissive, not mandatory. If the offender does not provide satisfactory evidence of identification, the officer may take the arrestee into custody. Thus, the mere detention of defendant while the officers verified his identity was not unreasonable, since the officers were permitted under the statute to take him into custody.
Moreover, even if the officers had violated the arrest procedures set forth in Penal Code section 853.5 by improperly taking defendant into custody, evidence discovered as a result of such a violation would not be subject to suppression. “[T]here is nothing inherently unconstitutional about effecting a custodial arrest for a fine-only offense. [Citation.]” (People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 607.) “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” (Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 532 U.S. 318, 354 [149 L.Ed.2d 549, 577].) “[S]o long as the officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed a criminal offense, a custodial arrest--even one effected in violation of state arrest procedures--does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” (People v. McKay, supra, at p. 618.)
Thus, we conclude that the officers’ action of placing defendant in the car did not violate either the Fourth Amendment or Penal Code section 853.5.
IV.
Patdown Search
Defendant also argues the evidence should be suppressed because it was derived from an unreasonable physical search by Officer Rath. Defendant contends that the officer patted down and frisked him without specific and articulable facts to warrant a suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. (See Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906].)
We need not explain why the officer’s frisk was reasonable because defendant’s argument misses the point. The contraband was not obtained as a result of a patdown or frisk. The contraband was obtained when defendant tried to dispose of it in the officer’s car while the officers were trying to identify him. And, despite defendant’s suggestion to the contrary, there was no evidence that defendant was placed in the officer’s car as a result of the patdown.
Defendant did not seek to suppress evidence of the cell phones at the trial court. In any event, discovery of both the cell phones and the $207 was inevitable. Even assuming, for the purpose of argument, that the frisk was unjustified, the officers would have discovered the cell phones and cash when defendant was lawfully searched incident to his arrest for possessing the contraband. “Evidence need not be suppressed if . . . [it] would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means.” (People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1040; accord, Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 444 [81 L.Ed.2d 377, 387].)
Since we have already concluded that the initial stop was reasonable, as was the officers’ detention of defendant for purposes of identifying him, the evidence gained from the detention was not subject to suppression.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., NICHOLSON, J.