Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 08F15.
NICHOLSON, Acting P. J.
Defendant Stephen Arnold Moore pleaded guilty to hit-and-run causing injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)) and driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)). Defendant also admitted he had two prior “strike” convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, § 1170.12), and he had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). In exchange for his plea, the People dismissed an additional charge of driving on a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)) and additional enhancement allegations, as well as a separate felony case and four misdemeanor cases also pending against defendant. Following an unsuccessful motion to strike one or both of defendant’s strike convictions pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), the trial court sentenced him to two concurrent terms of 27 years to life (25 to life for each of the felony convictions as a Three-Strike offender, plus two consecutive one-year terms for the prior prison term enhancements).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike one or both of his prior strike convictions. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
After consuming four beers and two drinks containing vodka, and without a valid driver’s license, defendant agreed to drive his girlfriend’s son to a friend’s house off of Lake Boulevard in Redding. As they reached the downtown area, defendant accelerated the vehicle to a high rate of speed, ignoring his passenger’s requests to slow down. Defendant ran a red light at the intersection of Pine Street and Shasta Street and smashed into a vehicle that was legally entering the intersection. The driver of the impacted vehicle was David Doty. Doty suffered two broken fingers on his left hand, numerous deep-tissue bruises on the left side of his body, and a bone spur was broken loose from his spinal column near his neck. Doty’s sons, Daniel and Joel, were passengers during the collision. Daniel suffered numerous facial fractures and severe bruising to the left side of his body and face. Joel was not seriously injured.
Following the accident, defendant left the vehicle and ran northbound on Pine Street. Defendant’s passenger, Randall Long, remained at the scene of the accident until police arrived. Long told officers of the Redding Police Department the accident occurred because defendant ran a red light, he had been drinking, and he took off on foot immediately following the accident. While officers were at the scene, defendant’s girlfriend called police dispatch to report the vehicle stolen. She said she last saw defendant chasing after the vehicle on foot as the unidentified car thief drove off. Roughly two hours later, police made contact with defendant, who also said the vehicle was stolen. Defendant denied involvement in the accident even after being informed Long positively identified him as the driver. Defendant was arrested. A blood-alcohol test, administered roughly three and a half hours after the accident, established defendant’s blood-alcohol level was.11 percent.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike one or both of his prior strike convictions. We disagree.
Under section 1385, subdivision (a), a “judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed....” (§ 1385, subd. (a).) In Romero, our Supreme Court held a trial court may utilize section 1385, subdivision (a) to strike or vacate a prior strike conviction for purposes of sentencing under the Three Strikes law, “subject, however, to strict compliance with the provisions of section 1385 and to review for abuse of discretion.” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.) Similarly, a trial court’s “failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374 (Carmony).)
In Carmony, our Supreme Court explained: “In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ‘“[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.”’ [Citations.] Second, a ‘“decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’”’ [Citations.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.)
The court went on to explain that “‘the Three Strikes law does not offer a discretionary sentencing choice, as do other sentencing laws, but establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied in every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike, unless the sentencing court “conclud[es] that an exception to the scheme should be made because, for articulable reasons which can withstand scrutiny for abuse, this defendant should be treated as though he actually fell outside the Three Strikes scheme.”’ [Citation.]” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
The court then cited People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams), for the proper standard for reviewing a decision to strike a prior conviction “in furtherance of justice” pursuant to section 1385: “[T]he court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161; Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
The Three Strikes law “creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378, emphasis added.) This presumption will only be rebutted in an “extraordinary case -- where the relevant factors described in Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 148, manifestly support the striking of a prior conviction and no reasonable minds could differ....” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
In this case, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to strike the prior convictions. Defendant’s protestations notwithstanding, this is far from the “extraordinary case” described in Carmony.
I
Nature and Circumstances of the Present Felony Conviction
Defendant asserts, while “inexcusable and perhaps even reprehensible,” his actions of driving while intoxicated, running a red light, and smashing into another vehicle causing injury to its passengers is relatively low on the list of “opprobrious acts that can cause one to incur criminal liability.” This argument is misconceived. The question is not whether drunk driving causing injury is as opprobrious as premeditated murder, but whether the nature of this offense manifestly supports the striking of defendant’s prior convictions such that no reasonable minds could differ. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Moreover, following the collision, rather than make sure his victims were alive and that an ambulance had been called, defendant fled on foot in an attempt to escape the consequences of his inexcusable and reprehensible actions.
II
Nature and Circumstances of the Prior Strike Convictions
In September of 1989, defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and admitted he personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. While involuntary manslaughter is not ordinarily a strike offense, the use of a dangerous or deadly weapon transforms “any felony” into a “serious felony” for purposes of the Three Strikes law. (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23); § 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) A fight broke out at a party between one of defendant’s friends, Rick Rossler, and two men, Stanley Choate and Darren Pedigo. Defendant came to Rossler’s assistance and attempted to break up the fight. When Choate and Pedigo started to push defendant, he pulled a fixed-blade survival knife from his back pocket and told the men to leave. As defendant drew the knife, he accidentally stabbed his girlfriend, Dynita Thornton, in the arm while she also attempted to break up the fight. Defendant exclaimed: “Look, you made me stab my old lady.” Defendant then stabbed Choate in the chest. According to defendant, he intended to stab him in the leg, but Choate came at him too fast. Defendant retreated to his apartment next door and called the police.
In 1991, defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. While the facts of this conviction are not disclosed in the record, we can surmise from the conviction itself that not long after defendant discovered first-hand that the use of a deadly weapon can result in the death of a human being, he once again used a deadly weapon to assault an individual.
Defendant complains these prior strike convictions were remote in time. However, as explained immediately below, defendant’s criminal conduct did not end with these convictions. Accordingly, we cannot find remoteness of the strike convictions alone renders defendant outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. Defendant also points out he pleaded to at least one of the priors, was accepted into a dependency treatment program, and with respect to the involuntary manslaughter conviction, believed he was acting in self-defense. However, none of these observations required the trial court to exercise its discretion in favor of striking one or both of defendant’s strikes.
III
Background, Character, and Prospects for the Future
Eight years after his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, defendant was again convicted of a felony, this time battery on a police officer causing injury. He was sentenced to three years in prison. Defendant has a fairly extensive misdemeanor record, including convictions for theft, battery against a cohabitant, and driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Defendant has parole violations on seven separate occasions, each time returning to prison to finish his term. For the past 10 years, when not incarcerated, defendant has been employed as a welder/fabricator. It is difficult to fathom how these circumstances could render defendant outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
In sum, the relevant factors described in Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 148, manifestly demonstrate defendant is precisely the sort of career criminal the Legislature had in mind in enacting the Three Strikes law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAYE, J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.