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People v. Moore

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
Nov 29, 2018
No. 341548 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018)

Opinion

No. 341548

11-29-2018

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEBORAH LELA MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.


UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 16-008984-01-FH Before: JANSEN, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and BORRELLO, JJ. PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of encumbering real property without lawful cause, MCL 600.2907a(2). The trial court sentenced defendant to 18 months' nonreporting probation. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm defendant's conviction but remand this matter for further proceedings regarding the imposition of court costs.

I. BACKGROUND

This case has its roots in defendant's involvement in 2003 with a plan to develop property located at 320 Mack Avenue in Detroit. On July 21, 2003, a quit claim deed was recorded with the Wayne County Register of Deeds, in which the city of Detroit granted two properties located at 308 and 320 Mack Avenue to Ahmose Math Center. Ahmose Math Center was a Michigan nonprofit corporation of which defendant was the chairperson. On September 5, 2003, a development agreement between Ahmose Math Center and the city of Detroit was recorded with the Wayne County Register of Deeds. The development agreement required Ahmose Math Center to begin developing the properties within six months of the closing date and to complete construction within 18 months of the closing date unless an extension was granted by the city. The development agreement also provided a mechanism for title to the properties to reinvest in the city of Detroit, and for the city to regain possession, if Ahmose Math Center defaulted on the agreement.

In February 2007, the Wayne County Circuit Court issued a default judgment order declaring the property located at 320 Mack Avenue to be a common-law nuisance, a public nuisance, and blight on the neighborhood. The order further provided that title to the property located at 320 Mack Avenue was transferred to Wayne County in fee simple and free of any encumbrances in order to abate the nuisance. This order was recorded with the Register of Deeds on February 14, 2007.

On July 9, 2007, a quit claim deed was recorded with the Register of Deeds purporting to grant the property located at 320 Mack Avenue from the Ahmose Math Center to defendant and Bilal Hajj.

On August 28, 2007, an order to quiet title to 320 Mack Avenue was recorded with the Register of Deeds. The order stated that the court had determined that Wayne County had legal title and right of possession to 320 Mack Avenue, and it ordered defendant, Hajj, and the Ahmose Math Center to "cease and desist from encumbering 320 Mack [Avenue] in any way."

On November 1, 2012, defendant recorded a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) financing statement regarding 320 Mack Avenue with the Register of Deeds. The financing statement was signed by defendant as "Deborah Lela Moore, El©" and indicated that it was filed on behalf of Ahmose Math Center. The financing statement further indicated that Ahmose Math Center was an organization of the "Moorish Empire."

On October 25, 2013, a quit claim deed was recorded conveying 320 Mack Avenue from the city of Detroit to Realpropco, LLC, and another quit claim deed was recorded conveying the property from Realpropco to DHS Children's Hospital of Michigan.

In the fall of 2014, Children's Hospital of Michigan filed a civil action against defendant in which the hospital asserted claims of trespass and nuisance with respect to 320 Mack Avenue and sought a preliminary injunction forbidding defendant from entering the property. A preliminary injunction was granted. Subsequently, in February 2015, a hearing was held on the motion for a permanent injunction, and defendant participated in the hearing. The court in that action concluded that 320 Mack Avenue belonged to the Children's Hospital of Michigan and issued a permanent injunction ordering defendant not to go within 1,000 feet of the property.

Nonetheless, defendant recorded an amended UCC financing statement in relation to the 320 Mack Avenue property on March 19, 2015. Also in March 2015, Children's Hospital of Michigan entered into negotiations to sell the 320 Mack Avenue property to Rainbow Rascals, LLC, a business that intended to open a childcare facility on the premises. A purchase agreement was executed in May 2015, but the parties were unable to close on the sale because a title search revealed the existence of recorded UCC financing statements involving 320 Mack Avenue. The title company listed these UCC financing statements as encumbrances against the property and refused to issue a title insurance policy.

In June 2015, Children's Hospital of Michigan moved to have its civil trespass and nuisance action reinstated, seeking to have the permanent injunction amended to release the encumbrances on 320 Mack Avenue and to bar defendant from taking any action to further encumber the property. On June 30, 2015, defendant recorded a second amended UCC financing statement against the 320 Mack Avenue property. In July 2015, a hearing was held on the motion by Children's Hospital of Michigan to reinstate the civil action and amend the permanent injunction. Defendant was present at the hearing and presented her arguments. The circuit court issued an order amending the permanent injunction to provide that the property located at 320 Mack Avenue was released from the encumbrances and to prohibit defendant or anyone acting on her behalf from recording further encumbrances against the property.

Following the amendment of the permanent injunction, the 320 Mack Avenue property was sold to Rainbow Rascals, and a warranty deed conveying the property from Children's Hospital of Michigan to Rainbow Rascals was recorded on September 2, 2015. However, defendant also recorded a third amended UCC financing statement against the 320 Mack Avenue property that same day.

Claudia Barden-Jackson, an investigator with the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office Deed Fraud Unit, testified that she was assigned to investigate a complaint regarding the encumbrance of title to the 320 Mack Avenue property. During the course of her investigation, Barden-Jackson examined the original UCC financing statement that was recorded, and she noted that it bore similarities to filings she had seen in her career made by individuals claiming to be Moors or members of a sovereign state and done in an effort to cloud title to property. Barden-Jackson highlighted the elements of the financing statement that were consistent with defendant having an affiliation with the Moors: specifically, she noted the inclusion of "El" and the copyright symbol as part of defendant's name, as well as the reference to the "Moorish Empire" as the type of organization making the filing. According to Barden-Jackson, Moors believe that they should be self-governed and that they are exempt from local, state, and federal laws. She further explained that in her experience with individuals identifying as Moors,

they'll file bogus paperwork for houses and take over houses until the courts have to intervene to have these people removed. They will file false liens against government officials and it's so much so that there's even a term called paper terrorism that law enforcement uses to describe the practice of the massive amount of paperwork that's filed, liens and things of that nature, in an attempt to cloud the issues.

In April 2016, Barden-Jackson spoke with defendant regarding her claim to the property at 320 Mack Avenue, and she asked defendant if she was aware of the August 28, 2007 quiet title order stating that defendant no longer owned the property. According to Barden-Jackson, defendant responded by indicating that she "was aware of [the quiet title action], but . . . she did not recognize the [court's] authority and, therefore, [the city of Detroit] did not own the property."

Defendant was charged with three counts of encumbering real property without lawful cause, MCL 600.2907a(2). Count I pertained to the filing of the original UCC financing statement, while Counts II and III pertained to the filing of two amendments to the UCC financing statement. The jury acquitted defendant of Count I and found her guilty of Counts II and III. As previously noted, defendant was sentenced to 18 months' nonreporting probation. This appeal followed.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

On appeal, defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions of encumbering real property without lawful cause because she believed she was the lawful owner of the 320 Mack Avenue property and therefore did not record the UCC financing statement amendments with the intent to harass or intimidate anyone.

This Court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial de novo. People v Gaines, 306 Mich App 289, 296; 856 NW2d 222 (2014). The evidence is viewed "in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to determine whether the trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. "Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences that arise from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime." People v Blevins, 314 Mich App 339, 357; 886 NW2d 456 (2016). It is the role of the jury as trier of fact "to determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

MCL 600.2907a(2) states that "[a] person who . . . encumber[s] property through the recording of a document without lawful cause with the intent to harass or intimidate any person is guilty of a felony[.]" As we have previously explained, this statute "creates criminal liability for a person who unlawfully encumbers real property" and is "the criminal version of a slander-of-title tort." People v Johnson-El, 299 Mich App 648, 652; 831 NW2d 478 (2013).

Defendant first contends that her actions were the result of her belief that she was the lawful owner of the 320 Mack Avenue property. Regardless of defendant's subjective belief, such a belief was patently unreasonable. Following defendant's attempt to claim title to the property through the July 9, 2007 quit claim deed, a quiet title order was issued in which the court stated that Wayne County had legal title to the 320 Mack Avenue property and specifically ordered defendant to "cease and desist from encumbering 320 Mack [Avenue] in any way." This quiet title order was recorded with the Register of Deeds on August 28, 2007. Accordingly, defendant could no longer claim legal title to the property. Yet, the UCC financing statement amendments signed by defendant were recorded on March 19, 2015, June 30, 2015, and September 2, 2015, well after the issuance of the court's quiet title order. Defendant admitted to Barden-Jackson that she was aware of the quiet title action but did not recognize the court's authority to determine the ownership of the property. Additionally, there was evidence that defendant participated in the hearings that led to the 2015 court orders enjoining her from going within 1,000 feet of the property and from recording further encumbrances against the property. Thus, the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant was aware that she did not have lawful cause to claim an interest in the 320 Mack Avenue property and record the UCC filing statement amendments regarding the property.

Defendant also contends that she did not have the intent to harass or intimidate anyone by recording the UCC financing statement amendments. A defendant's intent may be inferred from the evidence, and "[m]inimal circumstantial evidence suffices to prove a defendant's intent." Johnson-El, 299 Mich App at 653. In this case, the evidence demonstrated that defendant recorded a UCC financing statement approximately five years after it had been determined through the quiet title action that defendant did not hold legal title to the property. In 2014, after Children's Hospital of Michigan had obtained the property, it filed a civil trespass and nuisance action against defendant through which it obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant from entering the property. Defendant participated in this action. Nevertheless, defendant recorded an amended UCC financing statement approximately one month after the permanent injunction was issued. By recording these documents, defendant delayed the ability of Children's Hospital of Michigan to sell the property and caused Children's Hospital of Michigan to reinstate judicial proceedings against defendant in June 2015. During the June 2015 civil proceedings, defendant recorded another amended UCC financing statement. These proceedings resulted in the circuit court enjoining defendant from recording further encumbrances against the property, yet defendant persisted and recorded another amended UCC financing statement on September 2, 2015. The jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant possessed the intent to harass or intimidate based on the evidence that defendant obstinately asserted rights in the property despite court orders and injunctions to the contrary. Defendant's refusal to acknowledge the effect of the circuit court's orders does not negate the existence of this intent. The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions under MCL 600.2907a(2).

III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Defendant next argues that she was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct, asserting that the prosecutor elicited witness testimony and made a remark during closing argument that referred to defendant's apparent affiliation with the Moors and constituted the improper injection of racial and ethnic remarks.

It is improper for a prosecutor to inject "racial or ethnic remarks into any trial because it may arouse the prejudice of jurors against a defendant and, hence, lead to a decision based on prejudice rather than on the guilt or innocence of the accused." People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 266; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). In this case, however, defendant fails to develop her cursory assertions of misconduct into anything resembling a cogent argument. She does not provide any explanation how references to political beliefs held by certain people identified as "Moors" or to her experiences involving certain individuals identifying as Moors who file false paperwork with respect to real property constitute improper racial or ethnic remarks. Instead, defendant has merely asserted that improper racial and ethnic remarks were made. "An appellant's failure to properly address the merits of his assertion of error constitutes abandonment of the issue." People v Harris, 261 Mich App 44, 50; 680 NW2d 17 (2004). "An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority." People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).

Moreover, in light of defendant's failure to preserve her claim of prosecutorial misconduct, our review of the record does not lead us to conclude that defendant has pointed out any error requiring reversal. The comments that defendant apparently challenges were not focused on matters involving race or ethnicity, and they certainly do not give the impression of an attempt to imply defendant's guilt on the basis of race or ethnicity. To the extent race or ethnicity was mentioned in passing, such was innocuous and did not appear to be a deliberate attempt to arouse prejudice. Therefore, we conclude that defendant was not deprived of a fair trial. See Bahoda, 448 Mich at 271-272. Further, any potential for prejudice could have been alleviated by an appropriate curative instruction and we therefore cannot find error requiring reversal. People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 476; 802 NW2d 627 (2010).

Because defendant did not contemporaneously object on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct or request a curative instruction during trial, this issue is unpreserved for appeal. People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 475; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). "An objection based on one ground at trial is insufficient to preserve an appellate attack based on a different ground." People v Stimage, 202 Mich App 28, 30; 507 NW2d 778 (1993).

We note that defendant's appellate argument refers to the alleged improperly elicited testimony in such a vague manner, devoid of any specific quotation or record citation, that we are left to infer what testimony defendant specifically challenges. --------

IV. COURT COSTS

Defendant also argues, and the prosecutor concedes on appeal, that pursuant to People v Konopka (On Remand), 309 Mich App 345, 350-351, 359-360; 869 NW2d 651 (2015), this case should be remanded for a determination of the factual basis for the trial court's assessment of $1,000 in court costs. We agree. Accordingly, we remand for that purpose.

We affirm defendant's conviction but remand for determination of the factual basis for the costs imposed. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello


Summaries of

People v. Moore

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
Nov 29, 2018
No. 341548 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018)
Case details for

People v. Moore

Case Details

Full title:PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEBORAH LELA…

Court:STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

Date published: Nov 29, 2018

Citations

No. 341548 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018)