Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. C128729
RIVERA, J.
Following a bench trial, David Montgomery challenges his recommitment to the Department of Mental Health (DMH) for an indeterminate term under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) He argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend his commitment and that the indeterminate term violates due process. He also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he suffered from a current mental disorder. For the reasons that follow, we find no error and affirm the recommitment order.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Predicate Offenses and Prior Proceedings
In 1979, defendant broke into the apartment of a 24-year-old woman, who was breastfeeding her one-week old son. Defendant grabbed the woman’s arm and ordered her to put the baby down. As he pulled the woman onto a bed, he began choking her and warned her that he would kill her if she tried to scream. Defendant forcefully removed the woman’s underwear and post-partum sanitary pad. Defendant raped her for three to five minutes. After raping the woman, he demanded money and then left the apartment. At the time of the offense, defendant was on parole and had been released from prison six days earlier. Defendant was convicted of burglary, rape, and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and sentenced to prison for a nine-year term.
Defendant served six years in prison and was paroled on October 12, 1985. On the same day he was released from prison, he broke into an apartment in the same neighborhood as his 1979 offense. The second victim was a 63-year-old woman, who was resting on her couch. Upon entering the apartment, defendant punched the victim in the face, dragged her into the bedroom, where he raped and sodomized her. Following the sexual assaults, defendant punched the victim in the face, as he demanded money. Defendant removed the victim’s watch from her wrist and then left the apartment. Defendant was convicted of forcible rape and sodomy and sentenced to prison for 14 years.
In February 2000, after serving his prison term for the 1985 offense, defendant was committed for a two-year term under section 6600 as an SVP. Due to multiple recommitments, defendant’s commitment was extended to February 2006.
We affirmed a prior recommitment in a nonpublished opinion, People v. Montgomery (Jan. 22, 2004, A101173).
On November 16, 2005, the district attorney filed a petition to recommit defendant as an SVP. The district attorney filed an amended petition on December 1, 2006, alleging that defendant was subject to an indeterminate term due to a change in the law. Thereafter, defendant filed a combined demurrer/motion to dismiss the amended recommitment petition, asserting that the change in law eliminated the trial court’s jurisdiction to extend his commitment. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied the motion to dismiss.
B. Bench Trial
The court trial on the instant recommitment petition began on October 1, 2007. Robert M. Owen, Ph.D., and Harry Goldberg, Ph.D., evaluated defendant to determine whether he continued to meet the criteria for commitment as an SVP. Both doctors concluded that the 1979 and 1985 offenses were sexually violent offenses that were predatory in nature.
Based on his review of defendant’s criminal history, and correctional and state hospital records, Dr. Owen diagnosed defendant with paraphilia not otherwise specified (NOS), schizoaffective disorder, polysubstance dependence disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Goldberg made a similar diagnosis, opining that defendant suffered from paraphilia NOS, undifferentiated schizophrenia, alcohol abuse, and antisocial personality disorder.
Both doctors based their paraphilia diagnoses, in part, on the attendant circumstances of defendant’s predicate offenses. Specifically, both doctors noted that defendant was able to maintain arousal even while violently attacking his victims. Additionally, both offenses were committed less than a week after being released from prison, establishing the strength of defendant’s urges. The doctors also stated that defendant began to act out sexually as a juvenile, noting that he was caught masturbating at school, and pushing his penis against a female student.
Both doctors also concluded that defendant’s behavior while committed at the state hospital was indicative of the continuing nature of his paraphila. Indeed, defendant’s state hospital file was replete with instances of sexually violent behavior directed at female staff. For example, on October 21, 2003, defendant threatened a female staff member, stating, “ ‘I’m going to kill you, fuck you, you white bitch. All hell is going to break loose tonight.... There are two things I don’t trust, women and police.’ ” On September 17, 2004, while staff members were trying to medicate defendant, he told a female staff member, “ ‘I’m going to rape your ass bitch and then I’ll kill you. Yep, you’re going to die. You can bet your ass.’ ” While staring at female staff members on March 13, 2005, defendant stated, “ ‘Yeah, I’ll rape those bitches, yeah, I’ll rape that bitch.’ ” On July 2, 2005, defendant told a female staff member, “ ‘I’m going to rape you, you long, brown-haired bitch.’ ” Then, on July 25, 2005, when a staff member asked defendant to take a shower, he shouted, “ ‘I’m gonna fucking knock you out, bitch.’ ” Defendant continued his threats even after being placed in restraints, yelling, “ ‘I’m gonna stick my.44 in your ass and blow you up....’ ” On May 22, 2007, while responding to internal voices, defendant stated, “ ‘Motherfucker, I’m, going to choke the bitch with these rosary beads.’ ”
Dr. Owen explained that defendant’s behavior while committed demonstrated that he was unable to contain his sexual urges, and that he was still preoccupied with sexually violent themes.
Dr. Owen and Dr. Goldberg both testified that defendant was likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal acts, as a result of his diagnosed mental disorders. Specifically, they opined that defendant’s paraphilia worked together with his schizophrenia to make him an extremely dangerous individual. Both doctors evaluated defendant’s risk of reoffending using the Static-99 analysis of relevant variables. Defendant received a score of seven out of a possible 12.
Theodore Donaldson, Ph.D., testified on behalf of defendant. Based on his review of defendant’s records, Dr. Donaldson did not find sufficient evidence to make a diagnosis of paraphilia or paraphiliac coercive disorder. According to Dr. Donaldson, there was no evidence that defendant preferred nonconsensual to consensual sex. Dr. Donaldson did not believe that defendant’s threatening behavior at the state hospital was indicative of paraphiliac coercive disorder. Rather, he opined that defendant’s threats were “just ranting[s] and raving[s]” that were part of his “general psychosis.” When questioned about defendant’s use of sexually explicit words, Dr. Donaldson explained that this was just part of typical street lingo used to “put somebody down.”
Dr. Donaldson agreed that defendant suffered from schizophrenia; he opined that defendant’s behavior was the result of “hostile, paranoid acting act” and was not symptomatic of paraphilia. Dr. Donaldson further opined that some type of paraphilia must be established in order for an offender to meet the criteria as an SVP.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
Defendant contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend his commitment due to a change in the law. As we shall explain, this contention is without merit.
1. Background
In November 2005, when the recommitment petition was filed, the SVPA provided for two-year commitments that could be extended every two years upon the filing of a petition. (Historical and Statutory Notes, 73D West’s Ann. Welf. & Inst. Code (2009 Supp.) foll. § 6604, p. 153.) On September 20, 2006, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1128 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.), effective immediately, which changed the two-year commitment to an indeterminate commitment, and deleted all references to an extended commitment in sections 6604 and 6604.1. (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 55, No. 8 West’s Cal. Legis. Service, pp. 2126, 2182.) Then, on November 7, 2006, the voters enacted Proposition 83, which is also known as “Jessica’s Law.” (People v. Whaley (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 779, 787 (Whaley); Bourquez v. Superior Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1281 (Bourquez).) This initiative went into effect the following day, and it also amended the SVPA to extend the commitment term from two years to an indeterminate term. (Whaley, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 787.) On December 1, 2006, the district attorney filed an amended petition, which alleged that defendant would be subject to an indeterminate term due to a change in the law, if the petition were found true. On October 24, 2007, the trial court, sitting without a jury, found the petition true.
2. Analysis
Defendant contends that the deletion of any reference to petitions for an extended commitment in the SVPA, as amended by Senate Bill No. 1128 and Proposition 83, repealed these provisions. He argues that in the absence of an express savings clause specifying how the amended law was to apply to persons who had been committed as SVP’s for a two-year term, the court had no jurisdiction to proceed, and he is entitled to immediate release.
Defendant’s argument is based on the common law principle “that when a pending action rests solely on a statutory basis, and when no rights have vested under the statute, ‘a repeal of such a statute without a saving clause will terminate all pending actions based thereon.’ [Citation.]” (Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829.) He argues that a savings clause cannot be implied because the predominant intent underlying the 2006 amendments was to eliminate SVP trials. In light of that purpose, he asserts it is reasonable to conclude the Legislature and the voters intended to release potentially dangerous SVP’s committed under the prior law to save the cost of litigating their status as an SVP at the expiration of the two-year commitment term.
Defendant candidly concedes that his argument has been rejected by every court that has considered it. (See, e.g., People v. Carroll (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 503, 508 510; Bourquez, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1284-1288; People v. Shields (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 559, 563-564.) In each of these cases, the court determined that, despite the absence of an express savings clause, a savings clause could be implied.
As we shall explain, we decline defendant’s invitation to depart from these authorities.
“ ‘ “When questions as to the applicability or interpretation of statutes are presented to this court, numerous cases have recognized that the controlling issue is the intent of the Legislature.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute. [Citations.] But “[i]t is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.” [Citations.] Thus, “[t]he intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.” [Citation.] Finally, we do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute “with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Carroll, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 509-510.)
As the Bourquez court explained, the purpose of the changes enacted by Senate Bill No. 1128 and Proposition 83 was “to strengthen punishment and control of sexual offenders....” (Bourquez, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287.) “By providing for indeterminate terms of commitment, it cannot reasonably be concluded that the voters, by passing Proposition 83, or the Legislature in enacting Senate Bill [No.] 1128, intended to release those previously committed as SVP’s. Indeed, such a conclusion would ‘ascribe to the Legislature [and voters] an intent that the very purpose of the amendment demonstrates could not have existed.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Thus, “ ‘[t]o imply a saving clause in such a situation is simply to give effect to the obvious intent of the Legislature [and voters].’ [Citation.] [¶]... Having ascertained the intent of the Legislature and the voters was to continue and strengthen the provisions for commitment of those found to be SVP’s, we find an implied saving clause to permit proceedings to extend commitments.” (Id. at pp. 1287-1288.) We find this reasoning to be persuasive and adopt it as our own.
Based on the foregoing principles and the indisputable intent of the Legislature and the voters to continue the confinement of SVP’s for an indefinite term, we conclude the trial court was authorized to extend defendant’s commitment period beyond the two-year recommitment period in effect at the time the petition to extend defendant’s commitment was filed.
B. Due Process
Defendant argues that the SVPA, as amended by Senate Bill No. 1128 and Proposition 83, violates due process because it transformed the “ ‘relatively brief’ ” two-year commitments imposed under the former law into what is ostensibly now a life term, without the benefits of periodic review previously afforded to SVP’s.
The California Supreme Court has granted review in a number of cases that address issues regarding the amended SVPA similar to those we address herein. (People v. McKee (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1517, review granted Jul. 9, 2008, S162823 [addressing issues regarding due process, equal protection and the ex post facto laws]; People v. Johnson (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1263, review granted Aug. 13, 2008, S164388 [addressing issues regarding due process, ex post facto, double jeopardy, and equal protection laws]; People v. Riffey (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 474, review granted Aug. 20, 2008, S164711 [addressing issues regarding due process, ex post facto, double jeopardy, and equal protection laws]; People v. Boyle (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1266, review granted Oct. 1, 2008, S166167 [addressing issues regarding ex post facto, double jeopardy, due process, and equal protection laws]; and People v. Garcia (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1120, review granted Oct. 16, 2008, S166682 [addressing issues regarding due process, double jeopardy, ex post facto and equal protection laws, as well as cruel and unusual punishment].)
1. Amended SVPA Procedures
The amended SVPA provides for an annual review and allows the committed person to petition for release. (§ 6605.) Specifically, subdivision (a) of section 6605 provides that a current mental health examination shall be conducted each year to determine whether the committed person currently meets the definition of an SVP. The results are to be filed with the trial court and served on the committed person. (Ibid.) If it is determined that the committed person no longer meets the definition of an SVP, or if the person can be conditionally released, then a petition for such discharge or conditional release is to be filed. (Id., subd. (b).)
If the DMH does not certify that the committed person should be discharged or conditionally released, the person can file a petition pursuant to section 6608 for conditional release or discharge. (§ 6608, subd. (a).) Section 6608, subdivision (i) provides that in any hearing on a petition filed under this section, the petitioner has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, a committed person has the right to seek release by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (People v. Talhelm (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 400, 404-405.)
2. Analysis
Civil commitments do not violate due process merely because they are indefinite. (See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 353 (Hendricks); Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) 504 U.S. 71, 74 (Foucha); Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 361 (Jones); Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 421 (Addington).) Rather, constitutional due process requirements do not prohibit involuntary indefinite commitments, provided that they are subject to adequate opportunities to determine the current status of the committed persons, ensuring that those who no longer qualify for commitment can obtain release. (Foucha, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 77; People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 103-104 [regarding mentally disordered offenders].)
For example, in Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, 353, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute that provided for an indeterminate commitment of an SVP “ ‘until such time as the person’s mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.’ [Citation.]” The Kansas scheme provided for an annual review to determine whether continued commitment was warranted; the committed person also could file a petition seeking to be released. (Ibid.) The Court explained that due to the annual review requirement, the commitment period was “only potentially indefinite.” (Id. at p. 364.)
Similarly, in Jones, supra, 463 U.S. 354, 370, the United States Supreme Court held that due process permitted the confinement of Jones, who was civilly committed after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, to a mental institution until he regained his sanity or was no longer a danger to himself or the general public. The court approved of a congressional legislative scheme whereby the length of the commitment was indefinite subject to periodic review for suitability of release, noting that it was impossible to predict when or if a mentally ill person will recover. (Id. at p. 368.)
Like the Kansas scheme in Hendricks and the congressional scheme in Jones, California’s SVP scheme provides for periodic review for suitability of release. (See Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 353; Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 368; § 6605.) Moreover, as in Hendricks and Jones, appropriate findings of dangerousness and mental illness were made to support defendant’s indefinite recommitment under the amended SVPA. (See Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 357-358; Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 356-358, 368.)
We conclude that defendant’s indeterminate civil commitment under the amended SVPA does not violate his constitutional due process rights. The annual review and the numerous methods by which a committed person may seek discharge or conditional release under California’s scheme assure that an individual remains committed only as long as he or she meets the statutory qualifications as an SVP. These procedural safeguards assure that commitment as an SVP is only potentially indeterminate and that constitutional requirements are satisfied. (See Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 364 365.)
C. Substantial Evidence
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
In order to establish that a defendant is an SVP, the prosecution must prove “(1) [the] defendant was convicted of two separate sexually violent offenses; (2) he had a diagnosable mental disorder that made him a danger to the health or safety of others; (3) his disorder makes it likely he will engage in sexually violent criminal conduct if released; and (4) his sexually violent criminal conduct will be predatory in nature. [Citations.]” (People v. Fulcher (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 41, 52, italics omitted.) Under the SVPA, “a person is ‘likely [to] engage in sexually violent criminal behavior’ if at trial the person is found to present a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk, of committing such crimes if released from custody.” (People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988, italics omitted.)
Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he suffered from a current mental disorder because there was no evidence establishing a current paraphilia diagnosis. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a person’s civil commitment as an SVP pursuant to the SVPA, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 465-466.) “Under this standard, the court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] The focus of the substantial evidence test is on the whole record of evidence presented to the trier of fact, rather than on ‘ “isolated bits of evidence.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 260-261, italics omitted.) We “must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) Furthermore, “[a]lthough we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
2. Forfeiture
The Attorney General argues that defendant has forfeited his right to challenge the evidence as insufficient because of his refusal to be interviewed by the two examining psychologists for the state. We agree.
People v. Sumahit (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 347 (Sumahit), cited by the People, provides compelling authority for finding a forfeiture in the instant case. The defendant in Sumahit complained that the opinions of the state’s experts were based exclusively on past conduct and there was no evidence that he currently suffered from a mental condition impairing his volitional control. (Id. at pp. 351-353.) Rejecting this claim, the court held that “[a] sex offender cannot deny the state access to the workings of his mind and then claim a lack of proof that he has a ‘current’ psychological disorder.” (Id. at p. 353.)
Defendant argues that this language is gratuitous dicta and should be rejected as “bad law” because it “impermissibly requires a committed person to testify against himself, and denies him any semblance of due process and a fair trial.” Neither contention is true.
First, we find it indisputable that the quoted language from Sumahit constitutes a holding. “It is an elementary concept that ratio decidendi is the principle or rule which constitutes the basis of the decision and creates binding precedent, while dictum is a general argument or observation unnecessary to the decision which has no force as precedent. [Citation.]” (United Steelworkers of America v. Board of Education (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 823, 834.) In order to distinguish between the two, the test “is to take account of facts treated by the [appellate court] as material and determine whether the contested opinion is based upon them.” (Ibid.) The Sumahit court treated the defendant’s refusal to be interviewed by either of the state’s experts as material. (Sumahit, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 353.) Beyond that, the opinion was based on forfeiture as it related to an SVP’s inability to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he has a current mental disorder. (Id. at pp. 349, 352-354.) In other words, the forfeiture ruling is pivotal, and is the holding in Sumahit.
Second, nothing in Sumahit can be read as impermissibly requiring a committed person to testify against himself. Rather, the court was concerned with the circumstances in which an SVP refuses to be interviewed by the state’s experts and then challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding of a current mental disorder. As Sumahit explains, “[t]he law has a strong interest in seeing to it that litigants do not manipulate the system, especially where to hold otherwise would permit them to ‘ “trifle with the courts.” ’ [Citations.]” (Sumahit, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 353.)
In sum, because he refused to be interviewed by the state’s experts, who could have formed an opinion as to his present paraphilia, defendant has forfeited the claims that the state did not prove that he has a current diagnosed mental disorder.
3. Evidence of Current Diagnosed Mental Disorder
Even if he had not forfeited his claims, it is abundantly clear that the trial court’s determination that defendant qualified as an SVP was supported by sufficient evidence. That defendant had been convicted of two distinct sexually violent offenses is without question; he does not contend otherwise. Instead he argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he currently suffered from a “properly diagnosed mental disorder, namely paraphilia,... that prevented him from controlling sexually violent behavior....” Essentially, he argues that the recommitment order was not based upon his suffering currently from a mental disorder, but rather upon his commission of decades old sex offenses. Although each of the prosecution’s expert witnesses diagnosed him paraphilia, defendant contends that their testimony should be discounted. However, the credibility of experts and their conclusions are matters to be resolved by the trier of fact, and “[w]e are not free to reweigh or reinterpret the evidence. [Citation.]” (Mercer, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 466-467.)
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the implied findings that he met other SVPA criteria (i.e., conviction of two distinct sexually violent offenses, likelihood of predatory, sexual reoffense if released) for civil recommitment.
In making their respective diagnoses, Drs. Owen and Goldberg looked not only to the fact of the defendant’s prior sexual offenses, but they examined the circumstances of the crimes. Specifically, defendant preyed upon a breastfeeding mother who was one-week post-partum, and a 63-year-old woman. In both crimes, defendant used excessive force by dragging his victims to a location where he could perpetrate the offenses. He choked the young mother and threatened to kill her. He punched the other victim in the face, raped and sodomized her, and punched her again. The record reflects that defendant was able to maintain his arousal during these violent attacks. Additionally, at the time of each offense, defendant had been recently released from custody. The first offense was committed less than a week after his release. Then, after serving six years in prison for this crime, defendant committed a second sexually violent offense on the very day he was released from custody.
Drs. Owen and Goldberg also found indications of current and continuing paraphilia based on defendant’s behavior while in the state hospital. As Dr. Owen explained at trial, “The paraphilia, you know, you don’t need physical acts, you need urges or fantasies. Now, he has expressed these urges in recent years [by] saying that he wanted to rape people. Those statements would reflect an underlying desire to rape.” Dr. Owen noted that only “a minority of schizophrenic men will make sexual remarks or threats, it’s a very small minority.”
Defendant attempts to minimize the seriousness of his behavior at the state hospital, asserting that, given the length of his commitment, his threats are properly viewed as isolated incidents. He also points to his expert’s opinion that the threats were nothing more than street lingo. Again, we cannot reweigh or reinterpret the evidence. (Mercer, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 466-467.)
Finally, even without the diagnosis of paraphilia, there was sufficient evidence that defendant suffered from other mental disorders. Under the SPVA, a “ ‘[d]iagnosed mental disorder’ ” includes “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a menace to the health and safety of others.” (§ 6600, subd. (c); see also Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1144.)
Here, all of the experts, including the defense expert, agreed that defendant suffered from schizophrenia and/or schizoaffective disorder. Additionally, Drs. Owen and Goldberg diagnosed defendant with antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Goldberg explained that defendant’s combination of mental disorders caused special concern, because, “you have an individual who has the paraphilia and has the schizophrenia, which prevents him from understanding how dangerous and destructive his sexual impulses are. [¶] He has no real cognitive control over his thoughts or feelings, which means that he keeps on talking about needing to rape individuals. His antisocial personality means that Mr. Montgomery has no remorse, is impulsive, and is aggressive. [¶] The combination of these three together is a very dangerous combination.”
Despite Dr. Donaldson’s opinion to the contrary, there is no statutory requirement that the “diagnosed mental disorder” be a sexual disorder. (See § 6600, subd. (c); People v. Burris (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1110-1111.) On this record, we conclude there was sufficient evidence that defendant suffered from a current mental disorder that affected his volitional capacity and made him likely to reoffend if released.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: REARDON, Acting P.J., SEPULVEDA, J.