Opinion
E050406
10-25-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRIAN MOFFITT, Defendant and Appellant.
Mark Yanis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch, Barry Carlton, and Peter Quon, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super.Ct.No. FVI03738)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Miriam Ivy Morton, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Mark Yanis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch, Barry Carlton, and Peter Quon, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 1996, defendant and appellant Brian Moffitt was charged with three felonies and five prior serious or violent felony convictions. He was subsequently deemed incompetent to stand trial, the proceedings were suspended, and defendant was sent to Patton State Hospital (Patton) for treatment. For the past 15 years, defendant's competency fluctuated, and he had been between county jail and Patton with proceedings being resumed and suspended repeatedly. Defendant was recommitted to Patton in January 2010. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in recommitting him under Penal Code section 1370, because he had already been held beyond the maximum allowable time in violation of section 1370, subdivision (c) and his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. We agree and will remand the matter for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was arrested on November 3, 1995. In an information filed August 19, 1996, defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)); resisting an executive officer, to wit, a probation officer (§ 69); and possession of a deadly weapon, to wit, a billy club (§ 12020, subd. (a)). The information further alleged that defendant had suffered five prior serious or violent felony strike convictions (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subd. (a)).
According to the district attorney's trial briefs, court minute orders indicate that on November 20, 1995, after defendant was arraigned, the proceedings were suspended under section 1368. On March 22, 1996, defendant was deemed competent to stand trial, and criminal proceedings were resumed. "For the next few years, various motions were considered and continuances granted. At all times in which criminal proceedings were reinstated, the Defendant waived his right to a speedy trial."
The Attorney General appears to disavow the dates of the procedural history used by the district attorney in the People's briefs. However, "[t]he admission of fact in a pleading is a 'judicial admission.'" (Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271.) "'"A judicial admission in a pleading . . . is not merely evidence of a fact; it is a conclusive concession of the truth of a matter which has the effect of removing it from the issues. . . ."' [Citation.]" (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 218.)
On February 24, 1999, the proceedings were suspended again under section 1368. On April 7, 2000, defendant was deemed competent to stand trial, and the proceedings were once again resumed.
On June 15, 2001, the proceedings were again suspended under section 1368. On November 9, 2001, defendant was again deemed competent to stand trial, and the proceedings were resumed.
On April 28, 2003, the proceedings were again suspended under section 1368, and psychiatrists were appointed.
On August 1, 2003, the trial court determined defendant to be incompetent to stand trial, and he was committed to Patton. However, on October 1, 2003, the matter came back to the court, because defendant had not yet been transported to Patton. On October 3, 2003, the court again committed defendant to Patton.
On February 19, 2004, a status conference was held because defendant still had not been transferred to Patton due to there being a waiting list.
On March 4, 2004, the trial court again found defendant incompetent to stand trial and referred him to the county Mental Health Director for a placement recommendation.
On March 26, 2004, the trial court again committed defendant to Patton. However, on June 22, 2004, Patton certified that defendant's mental competency was restored. Defense counsel disagreed with this assessment, and a restoration-of-competency hearing was held on October 7 and 28, 2005. On October 28, 2005, the court found defendant to be incompetent to stand trial and again committed him to Patton.
On May 5, 2006, Patton certified that defendant was competent. Defense counsel and the People stipulated that defendant was competent, and criminal proceedings resumed. Defendant thereafter pled not guilty by reason of insanity, and the trial court ordered psychological reports pursuant to section 1026.
On December 7, 2006, defense counsel again declared a doubt as to defendant's mental competency to stand trial, and the proceedings were once again suspended under section 1368. A doctor subsequently concluded that defendant was mentally incompetent. On January 16, 2007, the trial court found defendant to be incompetent to stand trial and remanded him to Patton.
Some time later, Patton certified defendant as mentally competent, and a hearing was held on January 18, 2008. Defense counsel did not stipulate to the competency finding, and the matter was continued several times with the trial court continuing to find the proceedings suspended.
On January 6, 2009, the parties stipulated that defendant was competent, and the proceedings were reinstated. However, after questioning Dr. Nitin Kulkarni from the Department of Mental Health, the trial court ordered defendant to "be returned to the treating facility for whatever treatment is necessary to maintain the defendant's competence pending his trial" under section 1372, subdivision (e). Defendant was therefore ordered transported back to Patton.
On February 20, 2009, defense counsel again declared a doubt as to defendant's mental competency, and the proceedings were again suspended pursuant to section 1368.
A hearing to determine defendant's competency was held on December 4, 2009. At that time, the prosecutor informed the trial court that he had spoken with Dr. Kulkarni and that Dr. Kulkarni noted that "defendant very well may be incompetent based on a recent evaluation he did on him." The prosecutor therefore submitted on the two existing reports from Dr. Wilkinson and Dr. Munoz. The court found defendant mentally incompetent to stand trial and referred him to the Department of Behavioral Health for placement.
On December 14, 2009, defendant filed a propria persona petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that he has been unlawfully detained without good cause.
On January 15, 2010, the trial court ordered defendant committed to Patton. The court also noted defendant's actual custody credits to be 5,183 and maximum sentence to be 75 years to life.
In a letter dated February 26, 2010, Christina Garcia, a correctional case records supervisor employed by the Department of Mental Health, informed the trial court that "[a]fter the application of the Court[']s 5183 days custody credit, [defendant's] 3-year term limit pursuant to PC 1370(c)(1) has expired. [¶] Therefore based on the Court's discretion and interpretation of the PC 1370(c)(1) statu[t]e, we respectfully request that the Court consider the following options with regard to [defendant's] custody status: [¶] 1) The Court may issue a commitment order to STAY [defendant's] actual pre-commitment custody credits until sentencing, and award actual custody credit for time served in Patton State Hospital, only, of 456 days (three previous admissions were 4-13-04 to 07-02-04, 01-20-06 to 05-05-06 and 04-19-07 to 01-15-08). Please reference Appellate decision (In re Polk, CA 1st No., A084596, May 4, 1999). [¶] 2) If appropriate, the Court also has the option to seek a conservatorship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code [section] 5358 or [section] 5008(h)(1)(B). [¶] Therefore, we have deferred admission at this time." (Boldface and underscoring omitted.)
On March 9, 2010, defendant filed a letter to the Appeals Division of the San Bernardino County Superior Court, stating among other things that he had been unlawfully held for 14 years. The Appeals Division treated that letter as a notice of appeal.
On March 26, 2010, this court deemed defendant's letter to be a notice of appeal from the orders entered on January 15, 2010.
On April 8, 2010, the trial court amended defendant's actual custody credits to be 456 days "towards commitment time in Patton State Hospital." (Capitalization omitted.)
II
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in recommitting him to Patton because under section 1370, subdivision (c) he had been held beyond the maximum allowable time. Defendant further argues that his recommitment is in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
The People respond that the trial court properly ordered defendant recommitted to Patton to restore his competency to stand trial, because nearly two years of commitment time still remained under section 1370, subdivision (c).
A defendant who, as a result of a mental disorder, is adjudged not competent to stand trial on a felony charge may be committed to a state hospital for three years or the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most serious offense charged in the information, whichever is shorter. (Pen. Code, §§ 1367, subd. (b), 1370, subds. (a), (c); People v. Karriker (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 763, 780.) If, at the end of the maximum period of commitment, the medical staff determines there is no substantial likelihood the defendant will regain mental competence in the foreseeable future, the defendant must be returned to the court for further proceedings. (Pen. Code, § 1370, subds. (b), (c); Karriker, at p. 781.) If it then appears to the court that the defendant is "gravely disabled," the court shall order the conservatorship investigator to initiate a "Murphy conservatorship." (Karriker, at pp. 775-777, 781; see also Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (c)(2); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B).) The court may impose a Murphy conservatorship if it finds the defendant, as a result of a mental disorder, "'represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.'" (Karriker, at p. 776; see also Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 28 Cal.3d 161, 176-177.) Alternatively, the court can dismiss the charges and order the defendant released without prejudice to the initiation of alternative commitment proceedings under Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS). (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (e); In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 806.)
In full, section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) reads: "At the end of three years from the date of commitment or a period of commitment equal to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most serious offense charged in the information, indictment, or misdemeanor complaint, whichever is shorter, a defendant who has not recovered mental competence shall be returned to the committing court. The court shall notify the community program director or a designee of the return and of any resulting court orders." Subdivision (a)(3)(B) of section 1370 specifies that a commitment order must include a "computation or statement setting forth the maximum term of commitment in accordance with subdivision (c)."
As noted above, section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) limits commitment to the lesser of either three years or "the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most serious offense charged in the information, indictment or misdemeanor complaint . . . ." If a single accusatory pleading has been filed against a criminal defendant, the statute plainly mandates that he be returned to the court for redetermination of competency after (1) three years from the date of commitment, or (2) the maximum term of imprisonment for the most serious offense charged in that pleading. (People v. Waterman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 565, 568; see also In re Conservatorship of Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 169.)
Resolution of defendant's contention raises a question of statutory interpretation, the fundamental goal of which is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. Specifically, the question here is when does "commitment" begin for the purposes of the three-year limitation? Defendant argues that "commitment" includes the time period defendant had been held pursuant to section 1368 while incompetent, and it is not limited to a judicially ordered commitment. The People, on the other hand, assert that "commitment" within the meaning of section 1370 "can only be that time in which the defendant is actually receiving treatment at the state hospital." (Italics added.)
We must construe the commitment limitation provisions of section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) in a manner which will effectuate the legislative intent. (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007; Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 897.) In determining such intent, "we look first to the words themselves." (Woodhead, at p. 1007; see also People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895.) "It is a paramount canon of statutory construction that statutes should be given effect according to the usual and ordinary import of the words used in the statute." (Guedalia v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1156, 1160.) "When the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, however, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citations.]" (Woodhead, at p. 1008.)
The statute does not specifically provide when "commitment" for purposes of the three-year limitation commences. Hence, we must endeavor to ascertain the legislative intent by examining the objectives to be served by the statute. (People v. Shirokow (1980) 26 Cal.3d 301, 306-307.)
Section 1370 is part of a "comprehensive scheme for dealing with criminal defendants whose mental competency is suspect." (People v. Bye (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 569, 571.) The statutory scheme provides that, upon a finding of a defendant's incompetence to stand trial, criminal proceedings shall be suspended and the defendant committed for treatment designed to restore his competence. (§§ 1367-1370; People v. Waterman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 568.) A defendant found mentally incompetent to stand trial is not subject to criminal sanctions. (People v. Mayes (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 908, 914.) The primary purpose of the pretrial confinement of incompetent defendants is neither punishment nor rehabilitation, but the restoration of that specific mental state without which the criminal process cannot proceed. (Waterman, at p. 569.)
Nevertheless, commitment of a mentally incompetent defendant must comport with due process principles. (Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715, 730 [92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435]; In re Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801.) Commitments of indefinite duration are invalid: "no person charged with a criminal offense and committed to a state hospital solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial may be so confined more than a reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial likelihood that he will recover that capacity in the foreseeable future." (Davis, at p. 801.) "Pretrial confinement of incompetent defendants beyond the maximum period for a charged offense violates basic notions of fairness and due process . . . ." (In re Banks (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 864, 869 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)
The confinement limitation provisions of section 1370 were enacted to bring California's laws for confinement of incompetent criminal defendants within constitutional bounds. (Conservatorship of Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 169; see also In re Mary T. (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 38, 42; In re Polk (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1235.) "Before 1974, a criminal defendant found mentally incompetent to stand trial in California was committed to a state hospital until he regained competence and thus faced the possibility of an indefinite commitment without regard to the crime with which he was charged or his prognosis for recovery of competence." (Polk, at p. 1235.)
Section 1370 evinces a legislative intent to prevent undue confinement of incompetent defendants who cannot be returned to competence and to promote speedy restoration to mental competence of those who can. (People v. Mixon (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1481.) Restoration of mental competence is not, however, the sole interest furthered by section 1370. The statutory scheme also recognizes the compelling state interests in public safety and the humane treatment of the mentally disturbed. (Conservatorship of Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 171.) By weighing whenever possible the compelling interest in avoiding undue confinement against the equally exigent need to protect society from dangerous persons who are mentally ill, the Legislature has made valid statutory distinctions respecting the length and conditions of confinement based upon the degree of perceived danger presented by a defendant. (Id. at pp. 172-173.)
If, upon being returned to the court after confinement in a treatment facility for the maximum period provided in section 1370, the defendant is found competent, criminal proceedings are resumed; if not, the court must either release the defendant or order that "gravely disabled" conservatorship proceedings be instituted against him under the LPS Act. (§ 1370, subd. (c)(2); Conservatorship of Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 169-170; In re Mary T., supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 42.)
Under section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(B), a court is to suspend the criminal proceedings until the defendant becomes mentally competent and, in the meantime, is to commit the defendant to a state hospital or other facility for treatment for restoration to mental competence. The statutory framework of section 1370, although previously mentioned, bears repeating here: "Within 90 days of the commitment, the director of the treatment facility must make a written report to the court concerning the defendant's progress. [Citation.] If the defendant has not regained his mental competence, but there is a substantial likelihood he will do so in the foreseeable future, he is to remain at the facility. Thereafter, at six-month intervals or until the defendant becomes mentally competent, the director of the treatment facility must continue to make written reports to the court concerning the defendant's progress. If a report indicates there is no substantial likelihood that the defendant will regain mental competence in the foreseeable future, he must be returned from the treatment facility. [Citation.] If the defendant remains in a treatment facility for 18 months, the court must order him returned for a second hearing on his mental competence. [Citation.] At the end of three years from the date of commitment or a period of commitment equal to the maximum term of imprisonment for the most serious charge, whichever is shorter, the defendant must be returned from the treatment facility. [Citation.] When the defendant is returned following a report that there is no substantial likelihood of recovery of mental competence or following the maximum term of commitment, the court is to order conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act. [Citation.]" (In re Polk, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1237.)
Based on the legislative intent and the statutory framework, we believe "commitment" for purposes of the three-year time limitation under section 1370 commences when a defendant begins to receive treatment at a state hospital or other "secure treatment facility." As explained in Polk, "[t]he three-year limit was added to section 1370 in 1974 when the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1529, authored by Assemblyman Frank Murphy. [Citation.] The purpose of the legislation was to bring the procedure for the commitment of mentally incompetent defendants in accord with the decision of the California Supreme Court in In re Davis[, supra] 8 Cal.3d 798 [106 Cal.Rptr. 178, 505 P.2d 1018]." (In re Polk, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235.) Accordingly, "[t]he intent of the Legislature in enacting Assembly Bill 1529 was to bring California statutes into compliance with the dictates of the California Supreme Court in In re Davis regarding the amount of time a defendant could be committed solely for incompetency to stand trial. The statute requires six-month reports and a second hearing on competence if a defendant remains under a section 1367 commitment for eighteen months. It then dictates three years as the outside limit for commitments under section 1367." (Id. at p. 1238.) In light of the legislative intent and the statutory framework, we conclude that the most reasonable interpretation of "commitment" for purposes of the time limitation is that commitment commences when a defendant begins to receive treatment in a state hospital or other treatment facility.
"For the purpose of this section, 'secure treatment facility' shall not include, except for state mental hospitals, state developmental centers, and correctional treatment facilities, any facility licensed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1250) of, Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1500) of, or Chapter 3.2 (commencing with Section 1569) of, Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code, or any community board and care facility." (§ 1370, subd. (g), italics added.)
The People's interpretation of "commitment" is contrary to the legislative intent and the statutory framework of section 1370. The People contend that "a commitment period can only be that time in which the defendant is actually receiving treatment at the state hospital." However, what if a defendant is receiving treatment in another secure facility following his formal commitment? Indeed, "'secure treatment facility'" includes "correctional treatment facilities . . . ." (§ 1370, subd. (g).) Moreover, the county jail is a designated treatment facility pursuant to section 1369.1: "(a) As used in this chapter, for the sole purpose of administering antipsychotic medication pursuant to a court order, 'treatment facility' includes a county jail. Upon the concurrence of the county board of supervisors, the county mental health director, and the county sheriff, the jail may be designated to provide medically approved medication to defendants found to be mentally incompetent and unable to provide informed consent due to a mental disorder, pursuant to this chapter. . . . The provisions of Sections 1370 and 1370.01 shall apply to antipsychotic medications provided in a county jail, provided, however, that the maximum period of time a defendant may be treated in a treatment facility pursuant to this section shall not exceed six months." (§ 1369.1, as amended by Stats. 2009, ch. 35, § 12, italics added.)
As explained in In re Mille (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 635, 647, "section 1369.1 deems the county jail a treatment facility 'for the sole purpose of administering antipsychotic medication pursuant to a court order . . . .' [Citation.] Section 1369.1 was enacted to enable a county jail to treat a mentally incompetent defendant with antipsychotic medication on an interim basis, while the defendant is awaiting transfer to a state mental hospital or other treatment facility or after the defendant returns to jail from the treatment facility."
We do not, however, believe that treatment in a county jail is a substitute to being treated at a state hospital or other treatment facility. A defendant must timely be transferred to the court-ordered treatment facility or state mental hospital for treatment within a reasonable period of time. (In re Mille, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 647-650.)
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The People's interpretation of "commitment" is unreasonable in light of the legislative intent in enacting section 1370. Indeed, the People's interpretation of "commitment" for the purposes of section 1370 envisions a scenario, much like here, where a defendant would be committed indefinitely without a conviction while awaiting "delivery" to a state hospital.
Here, there is no question that defendant had been held much longer than the three-year time limit while he was receiving treatment in a state hospital or other treatment facility. Although the record is unclear as to when defendant began to receive treatment from 1995 until 2003, it is undisputed that defendant was first committed to Patton on August 1, 2003. It is reasonable to presume that while defendant awaited admittance to Patton, from October 1, 2003, until April 13, 2004, defendant began to receive treatment to restore his competency. The record shows that on March 26, 2004, the trial court, after again finding defendant incompetent to stand trial, referred defendant to the county Mental Health Director. Even if we assume defendant was not receiving treatment while awaiting placement in Patton during the years 1995 until April 2004, it is difficult under the circumstances of this case to find the three-year time limit had not expired or that defendant was not receiving some sort of treatment in a secure facility. Defendant was committed to Patton on August 1, 2003; March 26, 2004; October 28, 2005; January 16, 2007; and January 15, 2010. The record shows that during this time, at least once, the court ordered defendant to remain under treatment while his trial was pending.
Moreover, the provisions of section 1370, subdivisions (a) and (b) were not followed here. The statutory scheme requires the mentally incompetent defendant to be delivered by the sheriff to the state hospital for treatment "that will promote the defendant's speedy restoration to mental competence . . . ." (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i).) Further, "[w]ithin 90 days of a commitment . . . , the medical director of the state hospital or other treatment facility to which the defendant is confined shall make a written report to the court . . . concerning the defendant's progress toward recovery of mental competence." (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1).)
The trial court initially ordered defendant committed to Patton on August 1, 2003. However, after several court hearings, defendant was not delivered to Patton until April 14, 2004, according to the February 26, 2010, letter from Christina Garcia, about 255 days after the trial court first ordered defendant committed. The subsequent delays in transporting defendant to Patton were about 73 days following the placement order on October 28, 2005, and approximately 92 days following the placement order on January 16, 2007. When a defendant arrives at Patton with such delays, "there is no meaningful opportunity for the defendant to make progress toward recovery of mental competence, let alone for the medical director of the hospital to make a written report to the court concerning such progress by the defendant." (In re Mille, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 645.) "'[E]ven if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal.'" (Ibid.) "If a mentally incompetent defendant is kept in county jail, rather than undergoing treatment in a state mental hospital, the justification for continued commitment is absent." (Ibid.)
The People's argument also ignores the constitutional principles enunciated in Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. 715, 730 and In re Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d 798, 801. The record here is clear that defendant's recommitment in January 2010, after being held for the past 15 years either in a county facility or a state hospital awaiting restoration of competency, is contrary to those constitutional principles. In Jackson, the United States Supreme Court held, "[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal. In light of differing state facilities and procedures and a lack of evidence in this record, we do not think it appropriate for us to attempt to prescribe arbitrary time limits. We note, however, that petitioner Jackson has now been confined for three and one-half years on a record that sufficiently establishes the lack of a substantial probability that he will ever be able to participate fully in a trial." (Jackson, at pp. 738-739, italics added, fn. omitted.)
In the year following Jackson, our Supreme Court in Davis addressed "the constitutionality of the procedures [citation] for the commitment to, and release from, state hospital of defendants in criminal cases who have been found to lack sufficient mental competence to stand trial." (In re Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801, fn. omitted.) Davis concluded: "Although . . . petitioners' initial commitments were proper, we acknowledge that some provision must be made to assure that petitioners do not face an indefinite commitment without regard to the likelihood that they will eventually regain their competence, for such an indefinite commitment has been held to offend constitutional principles of equal protection and due process. [Citation.] Accordingly, we adopt the rule of the Jackson case that no person charged with a criminal offense and committed to a state hospital solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial may be so confined more than a reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial likelihood that he will recover that capacity in the foreseeable future. Unless such a showing of probable recovery is made within this period, defendant must either be released or recommitted under alternative commitment procedures." (Ibid.)
In sum, "commitment" commences for the purposes of the three-year time limitation found in section 1370 when a defendant begins treatment at a state hospital or other secure facility as prescribed by statute. Additionally, constitutional principles prohibit a defendant from being held "more than the reasonable" period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. (Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 738; accord In re Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801.)
III
DISPOSITION
The order committing defendant to Patton State Hospital is reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion pursuant to Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (c)(1), (2) et seq. and Welfare and Institutions Code section 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(B).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI
J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
Acting P.J.
CODRINGTON
J.