Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. SA064789, Robert O’Neill, Judge.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Sarah J. Farhat, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KLEIN, P. J.
Jose Pepe Mitchell broke into a vehicle parked in a gated subterranean garage of an apartment building and was convicted by jury of first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) On appeal, Mitchell contends there was insufficient evidence to establish the stall where the car was parked was attached to a residence. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1175), the evidence established that on July 1, 2007, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Mitchell smashed the window of a Dodge Intrepid owned by Datenette Brenklin and removed property from the vehicle. Brenklin testified she parked the Dodge in her apartment complex which is on Slauson Boulevard east of La Brea. Brenklin identified a photograph of her apartment building. Brenklin testified there were two gates, both of which led to “underground parking.” She parked her car inside the gate on the right side and locked the vehicle. People’s Exhibit No. 6 depicts Brenklin’s car in the stall. Once inside the gated area, Brenklin goes to “some stairs next to the parking area” that lead to “a small hallway” that serves several apartment units, including hers.
DISCUSSION
Mitchell contends the People failed to show the parking stall where Brenklin parked her car was located in “an integral part of a dwelling, that is, functionally interconnected with and immediately contiguous to other portions of the house.” (People v. Ingram (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1404, disapproved on another ground in People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 559.) Mitchell claims the prosecutor did not adduce evidence regarding the distance from the parking stall to the apartment building or whether the structures had a common roof, a connecting door, or accessibility from the apartment units. Mitchell asserts there was no showing of the “nature and extent of any attachment of the parking stall . . . to any residential unit.” He concludes the conviction must be reduced to second degree burglary.
By statute, “[e]very burglary of an inhabited dwelling house . . . or the inhabited portion of any other building, is burglary of the first degree.” (§ 460, subd. (a).) “All other kinds of burglary are of the second degree.” (§ 460, subd. (b).) The term “inhabited” is statutorily defined as “currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.” (§ 459.)
“Cases interpreting the term ‘inhabited dwelling house’ in section 460 . . . ha[ve] made it clear that this term should be construed to effectuate the legislative purposes underlying the statute, namely, to protect the peaceful occupation of one’s residence. Thus, the courts [have] recognized that our burglary law stems from the common law policy of providing heightened protection to the residence. [Citations.] The occupied dwelling continued to receive heightened protection under our statutes in order to avoid the increased danger of personal violence attendant upon an entry into a ‘building currently used as sleeping and living quarters.’ [Citation.] As [one court has] explained, ‘a person is more likely to react violently to burglary of his living quarters than to burglary of other places because in the former case persons close to him are more likely to be present, because the property threatened is more likely to belong to him, and because the home is usually regarded as a particularly private sanctuary, even as an extension of the person.’ [Citation.] Courts specifically have recognized that the distinction between first and second degree burglary is founded upon the perceived danger of violence and personal injury that is involved when a residence is invaded. [Citations.]” (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 775-776.)
In determining whether a structure is part of an inhabited dwelling, the essential inquiry is whether the structure is “ ‘functionally interconnected with, and immediately contiguous to other portions of the house. . . .’ ” (People v. Fox (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1046.)
Here, the parking stall was functionally interconnected with the apartment units via a short hallway. The parking stall also met the immediately contiguous requirement because it was within the gated confines of the apartment building and shared a common roof. Thus, the evidence revealed the parking area had an integral relationship with the apartments. Entry into this area by Mitchell involved a greater degree of intrusion on personal privacy and entailed a greater risk of violent confrontation. Consequently, Mitchell properly was convicted of first degree burglary.
This court, on its own motion, has ordered the trial exhibits transmitted from the superior court for our review in connection with Mitchell’s claim on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: KITCHING, J. ALDRICH, J.