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People v. Meza

California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division
Jul 23, 2008
No. B199851 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 23, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BA305934, Patricia M. Schnegg, Judge.

Leslie G. McMurray, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and Dana M. Ali, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


MALLANO, P. J.

Christopher Meza appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422) and a bifurcated court trial in which he was found to have sustained a prior conviction within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivision (a), and 1170.12 (the “Three Strikes” law). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of seven years eight months in state prison. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and requests that this court independently review the transcript of a Pitchess hearing. We affirm.

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).

BACKGROUND

Around 8:00 p.m. on June 28, 2006, Augustine Olmos was driving his white minivan on Third Street in East Los Angeles, taking his wife, Marisol Carrasco, and two children to a nearby park. Olmos saw a green minivan pulling out from the curb and honked his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting it. When Olmos stopped at a nearby red light, the green minivan stopped behind him. Olmos and Carrasco testified that defendant, the passenger, and Jose Andrade, the driver, got out of the green minivan and approached Olmos’s minivan. Defendant tried to open the locked front passenger’s door and said, “‘Hey, open the door, get out motherfucker,’” about three or four times. Andrade tried to open the locked passenger’s side sliding door, then hit it with his fist, saying, “‘Get out motherfucker’” and “‘Kick your ass.’” Olmos and Carrasco were fearful as this was occurring.

Andrade, who was convicted of making a criminal threat and throwing a substance at a vehicle, is not a party to this appeal.

Olmos and Carrasco further testified that while this incident was taking place, they could see a deputy sheriff writing a ticket for a car that had been pulled over 30 to 50 feet away. The deputy had his back to Olmos. When the light turned green, Olmos drove toward the deputy. At that point, defendant and Andrade ran back to their minivan, following which Olmos heard the sound of something hitting the back of his minivan. Later that day, Olmos observed that the glass on the back of his minivan had cracked.

Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Donald Subler testified that he had conducted a traffic stop near the intersection in question when he heard the continuous honking of a car horn. He walked toward the intersection and from a distance of 10 to 15 feet saw a green minivan stopped behind a white minivan. He next saw defendant and Andrade get out of the green minivan and approach the white minivan. Defendant attempted to open the front passenger door and yelled, “We’re going to kill you; get out.” Andrade attempted to open the sliding door on the passenger’s side and yelled, “Get out of [the] fucking van. I’m going to kill you. Get out.” Andrade next walked toward the back of the white minivan and threw a beer bottle which struck the rear window. Defendant and Andrade were then detained.

The person whom Subler had stopped testified for the defense that he did not hear any honking. He did hear a “boom,” which got Subler’s attention.

DISCUSSION

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because Deputy Subler’s testimony was unreliable and incredible in that it was “grossly at odds with that of the victim’s [sic],” and further because the victims did not hear words uttered by defendant that would constitute a criminal threat. The contention is without merit.

Penal Code section 422 provides in pertinent part: “Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety, shall be punished . . . .”

As to Subler’s testimony, “[r]esolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction. [Citation.]” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) Although defendant points to minor inconsistencies between the testimony of Olmos and Subler, defendant has not identified any testimony that is either inherently improbable or describes something that is physically impossible such that the testimony should be discounted.

As to the existence of a threat, defendant is correct that it was only Subler, not Olmos or Carrasco, who heard defendant explicitly threaten to “kill” the people inside the minivan. But no such magic words are needed. “[T]he statutory definition of the crime proscribed by [Penal Code] section 422 is not subject to a simple checklist approach to determining the sufficiency of the evidence. Rather, it is necessary first to determine the facts and then balance the facts against each other to determine whether, viewed in their totality, the circumstances are sufficient to meet the requirement that the communication ‘convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.’” (In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 862.)

The totality of the circumstances here included defendant and Andrade getting out of their own vehicle and approaching Olmos’s minivan, with Olmos’s wife and children inside, while it was stopped at a red light. Defendant then attempted to forcibly enter the minivan and made a profane demand for the door to be opened and for Olmos to get out. Andrade also attempted to forcibly enter the van and made a similar demand, punctuating it by hitting the window with his fist and threatening to “[k]ick your ass.” This evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that defendant had made a threat to inflict great bodily injury which reasonably caused Olmos and his family to be in sustained fear, as required by Penal Code section 422. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576; see also People v. Martinez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1220.)

2. Pitchess

Before the start of trial, defendant asked the trial court to review the personnel records of the arresting officers under Pitchess and its progeny. The court conducted the requested review and concluded that nothing needed to be disclosed.

Defendant asks us to independently review the sealed transcript of the in camera hearing. We have done so and conclude that the trial court’s ruling was proper. (See Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535; People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1232.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: ROTHSCHILD, J., NEIDORF, J.

Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.


Summaries of

People v. Meza

California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division
Jul 23, 2008
No. B199851 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 23, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Meza

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER MEZA, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division

Date published: Jul 23, 2008

Citations

No. B199851 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 23, 2008)